


INDIAN INSTITUTE OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
INDRAPRASTHA ESTATE, RING ROAD,
NEW DELHI-110002.

NATIONAL SEMINAR ON COLLECTIVE VIOLENCE
(FEBRUARY 12 - 14, 1986)

PARTICIPANTS

1. A.M. Shah
Department of Sociology
Delhi University
DELHI-7
2. Adre Batellie
Deptt. of Sociology
Delhi University
DELHI-7.
3. Ajay K. Mehra
Visiting Fellow
Centre for Policy Research
Dharma Marg
NEW DELHI-110021
4. Sahis Nandi
Centre for the Study of
Developing Societies
29, Rajpur Road
DELHI-110006.
5. A.R. Desai
Jaykutir
Taikalwadi Road
Bahim
BOMBAY-16.
6. Amar Kumar Singh
Professor & Head
Deptt. of Psychology
Ranchi University
RANCHI.
7. A.P. Mukharjee
Special Inspector General of Police
Writers Building
CALCUTTA.
8. A.R. Sayyad
Professor & Head
Deptt. of Sociology
Jamia Milia Islamia
Jamia Nagar
NEW DELHI.
9. Arun P. Bali
Dy. Director
ICSSR
35-Ferozshah Road
NEW DELHI.
10. A.B. Bosa
Director
National Instt. of Public
Cooperation and Child Development
Siri Institutional Area
Hauz Khas
NEW DELHI.
11. Arun Purie
Editor
India Today
Living Media India Pvt.Ltd.,
F-40, Connaught Place
NEW DELHI.



12. A.J. Bahadur
Inspector General of Police
Bihar
DARBHANGA (Bihar)
13. Mrs. Aruna Broota
Department of Psychology
I.P. College for Women
DELHI.
14. Ashwini Ray
Chairman
Centre for Political Studies
JNU
NEW DELHI.
15. Anod Kanth
Deputy Commissioner of Police
(Crime)
Delhi Police,
NEW DELHI.
16. A.K. Sen
Prof., Deptt. of Psychology
Delhi University,
DELHI-110007.
17. Mrs. Anima Sen
Prof., Deptt. of Psychology
Delhi University
DELHI-110007.
18. B.S. Baviskar
Deptt. of Sociology
Delhi University
DELHI-110007.
19. B.B. Pande
Faculty of Law
Delhi University
DELHI-110007.
20. B.M. Sinha
Editor
Weekend Review
The Hindustan House
Curzon Road
NEW DELHI-110001.
21. B.M. Varma
Deptt. of Social Work
Delhi University
DELHI-110007.
22. Bipan Chandra
Professor
Centre for Historical Studies
JNU
NEW DELHI-110067.
23. B.K. Nagla
Deptt. of Sociology
M.D. University
ROHTAK (Haryana)
24. C.P. Bhambri
Dean
Faculty of Social Sciences
JNU,
NEW DELHI-67.
25. C. Lakshman
Member of Parliament
16, Windsor Place
NEW DELHI.
26. C.D. Tripathi
Add. Secretary
UPSC,
Dholpur House
Shahjahan Road
NEW DELHI.
27. D.P. Jatar
Datd. Professor & Head,
Deptt. of Criminology & Forensic Sci
University of Sagar,
University Campus.
SAGAR-470003.
28. D.C. Pandey
Indian Law Institute
Bhagwandas Road
NEW DELHI.
29. D.R. Singh
Head
Deptt. of Criminology and Correc-
tional Admn.
Tata Institute of Social Sciences
Deonar
BOMBAY-88

30. D.P. Sen Mazumdar
Director
Defence Instt. of Psychological Research
West Block VIII
R.K. Puram
NEW DELHI-110022.
31. Devakar
Head, Training Division
National Institute of Zonal Defence
West Block-1
R.K. Puram
NEW DELHI-110022.
32. D.C. Nath
5/B Calcutta
9/1 Garia Hat Road
CALCUTTA-700029.
33. D.H. Pai Panadikar
Secretary General, FICCI,
FICCI House,
NEW DELHI.
34. Helmut L Soil
Regional Adviser on Mental
World Health Organizational Defence
I.P. Estate
NEW DELHI-2.
35. Hira Singh
Director
National Institute of Social
Defence, West Block-I,
R.K. Puram
NEW DELHI-110022.
36. H.R. Chaturvedi
Sr. Fellow
Council for Social Development
29, Rajpur Road
DELHI-6.
37. H.N. Singh
Centre for the Study of Social
Systems
JNU
NEW DELHI-67.
38. I.S. Chauhan
Professor & Head
Deptt. of Sociology
Bhopal University
BHOPAL.
39. I.A. Khan
27 Mourich Road
ALIGARH.
40. Imam Mochry
WHO SEARO
World Health House
I.P. Estate
NEW DELHI.
41. Indar Malhotra
Editor Resident
The Times of India
Bahadur Shah Zafar Marg
NEW DELHI-110002.
42. J.S. Gandhi
Centre for the Study of
Social Systems
JNU
NEW DELHI-67.
43. J.N. Chaturvedi
Chairman
UP Public Service Commission
Gandhi Marg
ALLAHABAD (U.P.)
44. J.S. Yadav
Indian Instt. of Mass
Communication
NDSE Part-II
NEW DELHI-49.
45. J.F. Ribeiro
Special Secretary
Ministry of Home Affairs
North Block
NEW DELHI.
46. K.L. Sharma
Chairman
Centre for the Study of
Social Systems
JNU
NEW DELHI-110067.

47. K. Arkash
Dy.Jt. Assistant Director
Internal Security Academy
Mount Abu (Raj.)
48. K.F. Rustamji
I.P. (Retd.)
B-3, 62 Safdarjung Enclave
NEW DELHI-29.
49. K.M. Lal
Secretary
Deptt. of Cooperation
Govt. of West Bengal
CALCUTTA.
50. K.S. Chhabra
Professor & Head
Deptt. of Law
Guru Nanak Dev. University
51. K.D. Gangrade
Dean
Faculty of Arts
Delhi University
DELHI-7.
52. K.M. Mathur
Commandant & Addl. Dy. Inspector
General of Police
GC-2, C.R.P.F.
JMER (Raj.)
53. K.K. Panda
C 2c/237B, Janak Puri
NEW DELHI-110058.
54. K.S. Dhillon
Director General of Police
Home Guards
JABALPUR (MP)
55. Kishan Mahajan
C/o The Hindustan Times
Kasturba Gandhi Marg
NEW DELHI.
56. Kamal Chinnoy
Lecturer
Desh Bandhu Gupta College
Kalkaji
NEW DELHI.
57. Mohit Bhattacharya
Deptt. of Political Science
Calcutta University
CALCUTTA.
58. M.C. Shakhar
Indian Instt. of Mass Communication
NDSE Part-II
NEW DELHI-49.
59. Ms. Madhu
Manushi
C-1/202, Lajpat Nagar-I
NEW DELHI-24.
60. M.C. Verma
Secretary
Education & Planning
Delhi Admn.
61. M.Z. Khan
Professor
Deptt. of Social Welfare
Jamia Millia Islamia
Jamia Nagar
NEW DELHI.
62. M.R. Dua
Professor
Indian Instt. of Mass Communication
NDSE Part-II
NEW DELHI-49.
63. M.D. Dikshit
Retd. DG, RPF
C II/43 Bapa Nagar
Zakir Hussain Marg,
NEW DELHI.
64. Nirmal Singh
Centre for the Study of Social
Systems, JNU,
DELHI-67.

65. Nandu Ram
Cntr for the study of Social Systems Former Member
JNU
NEW DELHI-67.
66. N.R. Madhava Menon
Faculty of Law
Delhi University
DELHI-7.
67. Ms. Nandita Haksar
Murirka Enclave
NEW DELHI-67.
68. N.K. Gouraha
Head
Deptt. of Sociology and
Social Work
University of Sagar
SAGAR.
69. Naeerja Chowdhury
C/o Satasman
Connaught Circus
NEW DELHI-1
70. N.C. Saksena
Jt. Secretary
Waste Land Development Board
Lok Nayak Bhawan
Lodhi Estate
NEW DELHI-110003.
71. Pratap Chandra
Deptt. of Philosophy
University of Sagar
SAGAR-470003.
72. Partha N. Mukerji
Professor of Sociology
Indian Statistical Institute
Delhi Centre
7, SJS Sansanwal Marg
NEW DELHI-16.
73. P.J. Alexander
The Travancore Cement Ltd.
Mattakour
KOTTAYAM-636013.
74. P.M. Bakshi
Law Commission of India
K-5, NDSE Part II
NEW DELHI-49.
75. P.D. Malaviya
Dy. Director
SVENPA
HYDERABAD
76. P.N. Pimplay
Chairman
Deptt. of Psychology
Punjab University
CHANDIGARH.
77. Prabha Rani
Manushi
C-1/202, Lajpat Nagar-I
NEW DELHI.
78. Pradip Bose
Journalist
B-19, Nizamuddin East
New Delhi-110013.
79. P.C. Joshi
Instt. of Economic Growth
University Enclave
DELHI-7.
80. P.D. Kheda
Deptt. of Sociology
Hindu College
Delhi University
DELHI-7.
81. Prem Shankar Jha
Editor
The Times of India
Bahadur Shah Zafar Marg
NEW DELHI-2.
82. P.N. Luthra
President
International Union Family
Organization
D-98, Defence Colony
NEW DELHI-110024.

83. Prayag Mahta
Shanti Prasad Jain
Advanced Management
Research Centre
Delhi University
DELHI-7.
84. P.L. Bhandarkar
Prof. & Head
Deptt. of Sociology
Nagpur University
NAGPUR.
85. Promilla Kapur
K-37A, Green Park
NEW DELHI.
86. P.S. Bhatia
National Institute of Social Defence
West Block I, Wing 7,
R.K. Puram,
NDW DELHI-22.
87. P.R. Rajgopal,
Retd. DG CRPF,
B2/208, Safdarjung Enclave
NDW DELHI-110029.
88. R.S. Sivastava
Reader in Sociology
C-10, Central School Scheme
JODHPUR.
89. Ram Ahuja
Professor
Department of Sociology
University of Rajasthan
JAIPUR-302004.
90. R.V. Kelkar
Faculty of Law
Delhi University
DELHI-7.
91. Rajeshwar Prasad
Professor
Instt. of Social Sciences
Paliwal Park
92. Rajendra Singh
Deptt. of Social Work
Delhi University
DELHI-7.
93. Ram Sagar Singh
Centre for the Study of Social
System, JNU,
NEW DELHI.
94. Rashududdin Khan
Professor
Centre for Political Studies
JNU
NEW DELHI-67.
95. R.C. Sarikwar
Head
P.G. Deptt. of Sociology
KA/83 Kavi Nagar
GHAZIABAD-201002.
96. Ramesh Thapar
Editor, Seminar,
Malhotra Building,
Janpath
NEW DELHI.
97. R.K. Mishra
Editor
Patriot
Bahadur Shah Zafar Marg
NEW DELHI.
98. S.D. Badgaiyan
Deptt. of Sociology
Delhi University
DELHI-7.
99. S.S. Srivastava
Professor
Deptt. of Criminology
Kashi Vidyapith
VARANASI
100. S. Venugopal Rao
Nishchalla
A-2-542, Road No.7
Wanjara Hills
HYDERABAD.

101. S.K. Chandoke
Professor
School of Planning and
Architecture, I.P. Estate
NEW DELHI.
102. S.P. Agrawal
Director
ICSSR
35, Ferozshah Road
NEW DELHI.
103. Surendra Nath
Member
UPSC
68, Lodhi Estate
NEW DELHI-110003.
104. S.N. Mishra
Professor
Institute of Economic Growth
NEW DELHI.
105. S.N. Jha
Professor
Centre for Political Studies
JNU,
NEW DELHI.
106. Shyamal Kumar Roy
Head
Deptt. of Political Science
and Social
University of Burdwan
Burdwan Rajbati
BURDWAN(W.B.)
107. S.N. Kundu
Commander CISF
DURGAPUR.
108. Shankar Sarolia
STS(RPA Compound)
Nehru Nagar
JAIPUR-302016.
109. S. Mansuti
Lecturer,
Deptt. of Criminology
Karnatak University
DHARWAD-580003.
110. Syed Sahabuddin, M.P.
187, North Avenue,
NEW DELHI-110001.
111. Shibaranjan Chatterjee
Dowpoint
51 D, Garcha Road
CALCUTTA-19.
112. S.M. Duba
Professor & Head
Deptt. of Sociology
Bibrugarh University
DIBRUGARH(Assam)
113. T.K. Goman
JNU
NEW DELHI-67.
114. T. Nath
S-55, Panchsheel Park
NEW DELHI.
115. T.N. Madan
Instt. of Economic Growth
University Enclave
DELHI-7.
116. T. Avanthachari
IG Police, RPF
South Eastern Railway
CALCUTTA-700043.
117. U.P. Singh
Head
Deptt. of Psychology
Bhagalpur University
BHAGALPUR(Bihar)
118. Uday Chand Jain
Reader
Deptt. of Psychology
University of Bhopal
BHOPAL.
119. Upendra Baxi
Director (Research)
Indian Law Institute
Bhagwandas Road
NEW DELHI.

120. Amitabha Kundu
Director
ICSSR
New Delhi
121. B.M. Sehgal
Director, SPE
Office of the Lokayukta
Bhopal (M.P.)
122. Inder Kumar Gujaral
Maharani Bagh
New Delhi
123. Dr. J.K.P. Sinha
Secretary
Bihar Regional Branch of IIPA
Patna
124. S.K. Sharma
Professor
Deptt. of Public Administration
Punjab University
Chandigarh
125. V.B. Trivedi
Research Officer
Bureau of Polic Research and
Development
CGO Complex, Lodi Road,
New Delhi
126. V.D. Chopra
C/o Patriot
Bahadurshah Zafar Marg
New Delhi
127. V.V. Devasia
375, PK Sarire Road
Khalarasi Line, Mohan Nagar
Nagpur
128. U.B. Bhoite
Reader
Department of Sociology
University of Poona
Pune
129. Yogendra Singh
Centre for Study of Social Systems
JNU
New Delhi
130. Dr. P.R. Dubhashi
131. Prof. Kuldeep Mathur
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148. Dr. (Mrs.) Shanta Kohli Chandra
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VIOLENCE, DISSENT AND DEVELOPMENT

UPENDRA BAXI

A Paper presented to the Seminar on
Law and Social Change, under the
auspices of the Indo-U.S. Sub-Commission
held at
Tufts University, Boston
(June 12 - 15, 1983)

I. TWO MANKINDS, TWO UNIVERSES

Violence and repression prominently characterize the process of 'development' and 'regression' in the United States and India. Ideologies of constitutionalism and legal liberalism are constantly periclitated by individual and collective violence, even as they are subtly invoked, in both societies, to legitimate repression. And neither sociologists nor lawpersons in India or the United States have perceived the centrality of violence and repression in relation to social 'development' and 'regression'. Undoubtedly, in the United States, the 'sixties and seventies' have been considerable social scientific concern with violence (Graham & Gurr, 1969; Gurr, 1970; Short Jr. & Wolfgang, 1972). At least one lawperson has sought to examine the "dialectics of legal repression" (Balbus, 1977). In contrast, in India, such concern has yet to emerge. In both societies, overall, the full implications of violence and repression in analyzing the role of law have yet to be grasped.

It is not my intention in this paper to attempt a study of even a most superficial similarity between forms of violence and repression in the two societies. Perhaps, this could be attempted in view of many commonalities of political and legal culture between the United States and India. But I believe the differences in the material conditions of social existences of impoverished masses of India provide an insuperable barrier to even facile comparisons. India, like many other 'developing' countries of the South, belongs virtually to a different humankind, in comparison with the United States and other countries of the North. Just one or two indicators should suffice.

The average lifetime of males and females in India, and in South, is about forty-two years, in contrast to in America, and other countries of the North which is seventy-one. Thus about "half the world's population... have average lifetimes about twenty-nine years shorter than another quarter of world's population". And "it is not too much to say...that the wealthiest in the wealthy countries have two lives for each single life of the poor in the poorest countries" (Honderich, 1976). No wonder that the foremost jurisprudential question in the United States today is the right to die, in India it is the right to live.

And, Second, even the average lifetime of forty-two years in South, including India, is characterized by disease and malnutrition from cradle to the grave. Not merely is the biological floor of survival reduced (Banerjee : 1982) but "the most morally revolting aspect of the injustices caused by malnutrition is that it can prevent host of people from realizing even their genetic potential" (George, 1976: 32-33). Constitutional conceptions of justice, liberty, equality may form stock-in-trade of American and Indian jurisprudence. But the underlying realities they must address to in both societies are markedly different. And so, too, clearly are the visages of violence and repression.

Violence by and repression of impoverished masses in an 'economy of scarcity' (Wainer, : 1962) represents, perhaps, a phenomenon different in kind, rather than degree, than violence and repression in economies of abundance and superabundance. And if collective violence "belongs to political life, and changes in its form tell us that something important is happening to the political system itself" (Tilly, 1969: 41), violence and repression in India (and the South generally) tell us different stories altogether than in America (and the North). Perhaps, a universal theory of violence - its scope, intensity and duration - and repression is possible a la Gurr (1970). But there isn't a single universe. There are at least two. In what follows, I attempt to delineate the other universe.

II COLLECTIVE POLITICAL VIOLENCE

In this paper, we eschew the broad dictionary denotation of violence as behaviour designed to inflict injury to persons or damage to things. Rather, we look at collective violence; and that, too, at collective political violence (CPV). The broadest definition of CPV will subsume revolutions and internal strifes having the magnitude of internal or civil wars. Political violence will be defined as "all collective attacks within a political community against the political regime...or its activities" (Gurr, 1970: 3-4). A more explicit definition, of interest to lawpersons, is offered by Honderich:

Political violence is a considerable or destroying use of force against persons or things, a use of force prohibited by law and directed to a change in the policies, personnel or system of government, and hence to changes in society (Honderich, 1976: 154, *italics omitted*).

Political violence, thus conceived, is the very antithesis of law. For, a central idea on which modern state law rests is the legitimate monopoly of legal violence by the state. Not merely the state asserts a monopoly of force through the determinations of the legal system; it also claims that only legal force is legitimate force. Political violence is, thus, notionally illegitimate at the very moment of its birth. Any idea on sanctioning the legitimacy of political violence threatens the very basis of institutionalized coercion or violence of the state apparatus.

Repression denotes suppression of political violence through the lawful exercise of state violence. Repression can be described as a considerable or destroying use of force sanctioned by the law and directed to prevent a change in the policies, personnel or system of government and hence to changes in society. It is in situations of repressive political violence that the great dictum of Ihering - "the law is politics of force" - assumes critical significance.

This way of defining 'repression' enables us to distinguish violent repression by the state from repression arising from dominant ideological institutions of the state, so acutely described by Ralph Miliband (1973:161-236). Political violence is often as effectively discredited or delegitimated by ideological institutions as also often pressed in service after a successful repressive campaign. The courts and the media, especially, the ideological institutions create conditions of "coercion of persuasion" in the wake of, or accompanying, "coercion of force".

The current rediscovery of political violence by American social scientists has been accompanied by various typologies of violence. We concern ourselves with a few typologies which might be relevant to our task. A distinction is often made among three forms of political violence: 'primitive', 'reactionary' and 'modern'. Primitive violence is usually "communal" violence which is "small scale" and involves participation by communal groups and more frequently involves "mutual attacks of hostile religious groups". This kind of collective violence is labelled 'primitive' primarily because of its "implicit and unpolitical objectives". The other form is labelled "reactionary collective violence" because participants typically react to "some change that they regarded as depriving them of rights they had once enjoyed": in this sense, violence is "backward - looking". On the other hand, modern collective violence involves not just considerable

"organizational complexity" but a forward-looking character. Here "participants commonly regard themselves as striking for rights due to them, but not yet enjoyed" (Tilly, 1969).

Professor Tilly appreciates his own analysis better towards the end of his essay when he points out that the essential distinction is not so much among types of violence as between types of political groupings involved and, in fact, the nature of the "organizational basis of political life". Primitive and reactionary violence characterizes "traditional, localized, inherited, slow-changing" group or community. In contrast, in the "pure modern case, deliberately created formal organizations...help shape the aspirations and grievances of their members, define their enemies, determine the occasions on which they will assemble and occasions on which they will confront their antagonists and thus occasions on which violence can occur" (Tilly, 1969: 36).

To put it another way, the distinction between "primitive" and "modern" political violence ultimately turns on the nature of political economy. In a society (like India) characterized by multiple modes of production, political violence will range from 'primitive' to 'modern': advanced industrial capitalist societies might witness variations of the modern type of political violence. Ultimately, judgments on forms and significance of political violence will depend on class positions of those who take part in it as well as of those who are exposed to the reality and the potential of political violence.

It is in this context that another distinction among types of political violence becomes important. One has to distinguish, frankly, between violence of the oppressed from the violence of the oppressors, or the violence of the dominant groups from that of the dominated groups. Often, the violence of dominating groups assumes the form of legal repression for they are in a position to activate legal processes more effectively than the dominated groups. Often, it has extra-legal character (as when high caste Hindus use mass violence to subdue or terrorize untouchables). In a sense, violence of the dominant groups is also political violence; but clearly a concept of political violence which equates the violence of the oppressors with the violence of the oppressed becomes too blunt a sociological tool with limited explanatory power. In Tilly's analysis, dominant group violence can be 'reactionary' or 'modern'; but this does not help us to grasp the crucial distinction between politics for change and politics for domination. In other words, violence for equality and violence for

domination are both forms of political violence. But corresponding forms of legal and extra-legal responses vary. Any typology of political violence which ignores the nature of change espoused by violent actors misses, I submit, the essence of political violence and, therefore, of repression. The definitions of political violence accepted by Gurr and Honderich, quoted earlier, (though not their analysis) relate political violence with change but fail to specify the directionality of change.

Realizing this, Honderich at least attempts to distinguish between 'democratic violence' and other kinds of political violence. He rightly argues that democratic violence may even be justified. Democratic violence serves the larger ends of freedom and equality. Violence "is, by one comparison an attempt to gain equality of influence". If coercion by persuasion is integral to the working of democracies, coercion by force (democratic violence) may also be accepted as consistent with democratic premises: it "cannot be said without dismay or apprehension, but it is to be said that some bombs are like votes". Democratic violence, furthermore, is, by definition, not directed "to the ending of democratic systems" but to making them more democratic. Democratic violence is always in intention, and often in result, directed to both the preservation and enhancement of democracy. (Honderich, 1976: 170).

By 'democracy', Honderich clearly means representative liberal democracy - a set of practices which aspire to "uncoerced choosing" of those who form governments (free and fair elections), "uncoerced" influencing of elected representatives and governments, "proximate equality of opportunity in choosing and influencing of government" and "effective majority decisions or by government" (pp.147 - 152). Political violence which cleanses political processes of distortions in these practices or otherwise strengthens these practices is justified or at least justifiable.

In other words, with this thesis we go beyond the important banality that violence is normal in societies, to a cautious normative commendation of democratic violence. The practice of democratic violence, and limits to toleration of it, will depend on judgements concerning choice of alternatives (for example, campaign for violence as against campaign for non-violent change) and rational assessments, although inherently probabilistic and characterized by radical uncertainty, of likely short-term and long-term impacts.

Implicit in this analysis, is the notion of 'un-' or 'anti-' democratic violence. Political violence by dominating groups which dilutes practices of representative liberal democracy is inherently anti-democratic and is, to that extent, not legitimate. By the same token, to the extent that subservient or dominated groups resort to political violence which dilute or destroy democratic practices, it is also unjustified. Both the oppressors and oppressed are notionally liable to practice anti-democratic political violence; But only the oppressed are notionally capable of using democratic violence.

Honderich does not go this far, but it stands to reason to say that only those people who are coerced in choosing and influencing governments, or who are denied approximate equality, are prime facie justified in recouring to democratic violence. Historically, such groups have been not a part of dominant groups.

At the same time, Honderich's analysis rules out the possibility of legitimate violence which seeks to convert a liberal democratic polity into a socialist or Marxist-Leninist polity. Since such political violence seeks to transcend practices of bourgeois democracy, it is would, by definition, anti-democratic. Violence of the Left or extreme Left, on this approach, will be anti-democratic. This is, to say the least, a curious result, one in which the reactionary violence of dominating classes is lumped together with the revolutionary violence of those pursuing the ideals of people's democracy.

What Honderich fails to appreciate explicitly is that "the point of socialist critique of 'bourgeois freedoms' is not (or should not be) that they are of no consequence, but they are profoundly inadequate, and they need to be extended by a radical transformation of the context, economic, social and political, which condemns them to inadequacy and erosion" (Milband, 1973: 183 ff). In other words, socialist revolutionary violence can, at least in terms of its aspirations, if not actual results) be seen as democratic violence, transcending of course the criteria of advanced capitalist legal liberalism.

I would, accordingly, include in the conception of political violence, democratic violence (in the sense of Honderich) as well as revolutionary violence. Such expansion of the notion also enables us to appreciate the modes of repression. At a pinch, though real life complicates everything, democratic violence invites repression in which

processes of law are predominant. In contrast, revolutionary violence invites repression characterized predominantly not by legal coercion but by a regime of terror. In a society like India, marked by increasing incidences of both types of violence, the modes of repression increasingly interact, and raise intractable problems concerning the nature of the crisis of legal system (Baxi, 1982).

III. MODES OF REPRESSION

Violence is destructive; it involves death, disablement, distress, carnage and damage. It suggests collapse of social order and threat to political stability. The legal system and culture in every society tends to delegitimize violence and criminalize processes of violence. This is in a variety of ways. First, historically, a prime cultural function of the law has been to draw boundaries between permissible and proscribed uses of force by its subjects, as an aspect of ensuring force monopoly for the nation-state. Second, the law seeks to institutionalize conflicts and modes of their resolution. By depriving continually the individual and groups of their autonomic in identifying and resolving conflicts, the law professionalizes conflict resolution and, in turn, depoliticizes conflict. In other words, the legal system provides a repertoire of resources (including conflict avoidance) which have a tendency towards minimization of violent resolution or handling, of conflicts. Third, the law provides a normative language which camouflages its coercive modalities. This is a factor of enormous significance and it is not available to violent actors. The normative language of the law carries its own justification, as it were, and it conceals the behavioural reality of repressive violence. For example, the statement that X was denied bail or a jail escape was prevented do not bring readily to our minds the elements of sustained violence involved at a behavioural level. The behavioural translation of both these statements would go something like this: (1) The magistrate has ordered that X be physically prevented from moving beyond confinement and the police or jailor is entitled to use all necessary force (including handcuffing, cellular confinement, custodial discipline etc.) to keep X in custody and (2) the correctional staff in the escape situation have used all available coercion (shooting as to debilitate, shooting to kill

the escapees, disciplinary coercion on frustrate escapees etc.) permitted to them by the law. The behavioural reality of structured coercion, applied by specialized bureaucracies, trained and maintained for the purpose, is almost always concealed by the law (except in rare cases (e.g. X is awarded capital punishment, and that too not with immediacy of feeling). In contrast, violent actors do not have authoritative language which camouflages their behaviour; violence is for all to see and feel.

Those who recourse to violence have, therefore, to use ideologies to legitimate their exercises. And they have to do so without the benefit of a shared authoritative system of communication, like the normative language of law. Unless the ideology is powerfully articulated and disseminated, legal repression stands swiftly legitimated. There is thus from the beginning, an asymmetry in power relations notably introduced by the legal system and the culture. Police do not so much have to justify strategies and methods of 'riot' control; the rioters have to justify 'rioting'.

The law depoliticizes collective political violence is another way, as Balbus has shown in his remarkable study on the dialectics of legal repression. The law, as it were, decollectivizes violent group behaviour; it atomises the participants, charging them singly (on similar, if not the same, offences) and proceeds to deal with each individual case, thus making collective articulation of the rationality of violence even more difficult. "Formal legal rationality thus circumscribes the conflict between the state and the accused into a conflict over the facts", writes Balbus; thus, the "question of ideological class or racial complexion... is prevented from entering the meaning of 'crime' in the liberal state" (Balbus, 1977:8).

Balbus has shown only in considerable detail how formal legal rationality "offers important advantages to the elite in the struggle to minimize revolutionary potential and maximize longterm legitimacy". He demonstrates that a "successful adaptation of the ordinary criminal justice system" in situations of collective political violence "is likely to have a profound impact on the consciousness" and ideological coherence of participants in the violence (Balbus, 1977:12). Thus, the law and its processes share a dual character: they are important components of the state coercive apparatus and the same time, they also function as ideology-propagating institutions of the State.

In situations of violent mass demonstrations or disorders typically the enforcers of the law have much more leeway than the participants in violence. In dealing with political violence, police and courts typically switch over to what I would like to call the "minimal due process" model. This is distinct from the "optimal due process" model expected to be followed in 'normal' Circumstance. Mass or dragnet arrests through the use of standardized blank warrants are accepted as a part of law-and-order operations in such situations; constitutional obligations of bringing people to court within twenty four hours after arrest receive scant attention; courts accept prosecution requests without much judicious application of mind, and set stiff bails ensuring preventive detention of participants in collective violence (Balbus, 1977). The minimal due process or due process at its vanishing point still enables it to be said that some formal legal rationality is maintained. In Los Angeles, Detroit, and Chicago riots, although the police and military response "was brutal and led to considerable destruction of life, there was no wholesale slaughter of the riot participants". People who were arrested "were prosecuted" and not locked up without trial. Although exorbitant bail was set, "bail was set" and the Writ of Habeas Corpus was not formally revoked". (Balbus, 1977:234-235). The minimal or vanishing due process involves "blatant abrogations of legality"; order triumphs over law. And yet some appearance of legality is retained. The Indian experience of dealing with CPV is much similar, though not extensively analysed.

The regression to minimal due process reduces accountability of the state coercive apparatus. The lack of "wholesale slaughter by police and para-military forces is no doubt reassuring, but violent deaths are not negligible either in such situations. between during mid-1963 to mid-1968, 9500 casualties resulted from police action in the United States, a rate of 48 persons per million population, giving the United States the first rank among seventeen western democracies (Gurr, 1969:775). The corresponding casualties for India (for a comparative period 1961-65) is stated to be one per one hundred thousand population, an estimation undoubtedly based on underreporting.

The point remains: violent deaths from police action remain strikingly high, though mercifully short of "wholesale slaughter". The use of fatal force is usually unaccompanied by any accountability at law proceeding in level or in political fora. When one recalls the mechanisms of non-fatal force inflicting severe or substantial physical injury (through lathi charge, water houses, shootings in order to maim or paralyze, cavalry charges etc.), the total picture of vast the to use

counter-violence begins to emerge a little more sharply. It is important to stress that these forms of fatal and non-fatal violence remain totally outside the pale even of the formal rationality of the law. What is more, this kind of repressive violence stands vindicated by two features: by the restoration of "order" it achieves and by the fact that it is used by agents of law, who are in the first place accredited with the legitimate monopoly on violence in society.

Legal repression of political violence involves, a la Balbus, some appearance of formal legal rationality: at the same time it involves abandonment of formal legal rationality as well. It is important to stress that if political violence entails repudiation of the law, repression of that violence always, to some extent or the other, involves abandonment of the law. The category "legal repression" is thus always problematic, containing within it elements of extra-legal repression as well. Whether it could or should be otherwise is a different question altogether. But the somewhat misleading nature of the notion of legal repression especially as it involves the use of state military and para-military forces, ought never to be forgotten.

IV. AGRARIAN VIOLENCE AND REPRESSION IN INDIA

Contemporary India has witnessed considerable escalation of political violence, notwithstanding the culture of non-violence symbolized in Gandhi. From the holocaust of the partition to the massacre at Nellore, political violence has haunted the Indian developmental experience. In fact, it would seem that India has a tradition of political violence, not contained by religion, culture or caste. From late eighteenth century till the present. India has seen a large number of agrarian movements, involving violence and repression (Gough, 1979; Desai, 1979; Dhanagare, 1983; Das, 1982). Kathleen Gough has identified at least 77 major peasant revolts in last two hundred years, including the Mutiny of 1957-58. Of these, about 30 revolts "must have affected several tens of thousands of people" and about 12 "several hundreds of thousands". And, significantly, about 34 revolts were conducted "solely or partly" by Hindus, exploding the idea that the hierarchical caste system inhabited political violence.

The classification of these revolts, interestingly, shows striking parallels with the American experience with CPV disclosed by the labours of the Kerner Commission. The "purely modern" form of political violence, à la Tilly, emerged with organizations of peasant unions on socialist lines around mid-1930s. But the nature and magnitude of relative deprivation (e.g. a total of 20,687,700 famine deaths in India between 1866 and 1943), the colonial repression and related factors of political economy (e.g. rack renting and agrarian settlements) caution us even in such modest comparisons.

what is more, Gough demonstrates that there is a "continuity of tactics" in political violence in India, at least in its agrarian militancy. The "more successful" revolts have involved "mass insurrections, initially against specific grievances" and the "less successful" ones are characterized by "social banditry and terrorist vengeance" (Gough, 1979-117).

The acknowledgement of the fact that the Indian peasantry is not passive is not accompanied by any academic consensus on the nature and future of Indian peasant militancy. What basic shifts in the political economy of India are represented by agrarian violence is a question which naturally continues to evoke different answers or even approaches to answers. The mode of production debates since the sixties in India is virtually bereft of any theorizing on the nature of the state which this makes understanding of the structural causes of agrarian political violence and modes of repression by the state doubly difficult. But this crucial debate, even when its prescriptions "smack of the armchair and the scholar's candle" (Thorne, 1982-2064), does hold interesting approaches to a structural understanding of agrarian militancy in India.

On the one hand, some scholars characterize the mode of production in contemporary India as semi-feudalistic in the sense that the "dominant character of existing production relations" has features common "with the classic feudalism of master-serf type than with industrial capitalism" and are thus characterized by share cropping, perpetual indebtedness, usury and concentration of landownership in a few hands and relative lack of accessibility to markets by the small tenant. Among the options inherent in this mode is the overthrowing of these production relations by the "desperate poor", in the absence of radical land reforms by the state. (Bahaduri, 1973).

On the other hand, applying various and much debated criteria (like capital accumulation, wage labour, generalized commodity production, mobility of rural proletariat, technological innovation) many scholars believe that production

relations in Indian agriculture are now preeminently capitalistic. One peculiarity of the feudal mode of production on the eve of the independence of India was its caste-structuring. Emerging capitalist production relations tendencies during the colonial period began the differentiation of 'caste' and 'class'. This analysis reminds us that while peasant revolts represented anti-feudal movement they were also reinforced by another phenomenon, the "radical anti-caste movements of Phule, Ambedkar and Periyar" (a.g.Omvedt, 1981).

Both these approaches, in their own distinctive ways, enable us to understand agrarian conflict and violence in structural terms. Just as objectively there are possibilities of shifts in the modes of production, there occur shifts involving "radical transformation" of weltanschauung for peasants in their perception of modes of repression. There is increasing awareness that the "structure of exploitation" is changing, too: from "rack-renting through usury or wage labour" (Das, 1982:10). The objective conditions coupled with subjective perceptions contribute to an enhancement of relative deprivation, which has always resulted in militant peasant uprisings. Relative deprivations of "unusually severe character, always economic, and often also involving physical brutality or ethnic persecution" was a prime causative factor of peasant violence from late eighteenth century onwards. Independence has not "brought succasa from these distresses, for imperial extraction of wealth from India" and "oppression by local property owners" still "continue to produce poverty, famine, agricultural sluggishness and agrarian unrest" (Gough, 1979: 116-17).

A variant of these approaches is found in the notion of a dual mode of production. Sharat Sin suggests that in modern India both the capitalistic and pre-capitalist modes of production "interpenetrate". Both these primary modes are in historic conflict with each other and generate, through internal dynamics, "dual ruling class interests"-- the bourgeoisie and the feudal landlords. This "dual state power has aspects of both stability and transition. This has important implications for CPV:

any struggle against the feudal aspect without considering the bourgeois aspect will inevitably lead by default to strengthening the relative position of the latter and to the type of class collaboration exercised by various left parties.

Moreover, the existence of the dual mode means that bourgeois democratic revolution has only been half completed in India:

the existence of a dual mode of production and dual state power, relative political independence with relative economic dependence, the appearance of immature bourgeois parliamentary situations, the rise of the Indian 'middle class', the general failure to deal with poverty and land reforms suggest cumulatively that only an "alliance of of proletariat and impoverished peasantry who together constitute 90 per cent of the population" can complete "a democratic revolution" (Sin, 1980:572-573).

In the entire mode of production debate Sin comes closest to some approaches to the notion of the state in India. The notion of dual state power enables us a little better to appreciate modes of legal and extra-legal repression in response to CPV. At any rate, it suggests prospects of continuing agrarian violence matched by continual enhancement of repressive paraphernalia of the state power. The enormous growth of state para-military forces in the sixties and seventies which puzzled me in my analysis of the crisis of the Indian legal system (Baxi, 1982) becomes less puzzling and my pleas for moderation in their growth and for changes in their style of operation appear to naive in the light of Sin's suggestive analysis of the dual and perpetually contradictory nature of state power in India.

At the same time, Sin's analysis suggests two further probabilities: one is that increase in agrarian violence may hasten the transition to "status dominance" (i.e. cohesion and emergence) of national bourgeoisie and the other (in much the same vein) is that left parties may continue with their parliamentism, transforming CPV from revolutionary to reformist ends. In other words, CPV may take the direction of democratic violence both in the short and long terms. If this happens, one may also expect a mild reversal in the modes of repression: from militaristic modes of repression, state power may increasingly turn to "legal" repression,

The debate on the modes of production may, perhaps, be over, but the debate on the nature of state power in India has yet to begin. Avowedly Marxist approaches to state power, I believe, promise us greater insight into the nature and future of collective political violence and repression than if the existing liberal approaches.

tend to perceive it in terms of a "soft state" (Myrdal, 1967:) or as "political decay" (Huntington,) or "crisis in legal liberalism" (Trubak & Galanter, 1971 Baxi, 1982) or as "anomie" (Kothari, 1970). For These approaches fail to articulate the political economy of violence and repression.

V. VIOLENCE AGAINST UNTOUCHABLES

Violence against untouchables, (who constitute fifteen per cent of Indian population), is increase not just in scale as well as in levels of brutality. The period 1973 to 1978 accountant to one estimate, witnessed 62,295 violent incidents, commonly called 'atrocities', against untouchable life and property. In 1977-78, 12,746 atrocities were registered, involving 354 killings and 306 registered cases of rape. The very names--kilvenmani, Belchi, Dharampur, Villipuram, pantnagar. Marathewada, pipra -- evoke a cluster of images of inhuman violence with huts set ablaze, people tied to trees and burnt alive first shot at point blank range and hacked to pieces, women raped and brutally killed, and children bayoneted or burnt alive. The gruesome story of genocidal violence against untouchables is as yet not fully told. But what we know is already enough to strip away every pretence of tolerance and non-violence from the face of India, and reveals instead a brutalized and brutalizing society.

The theatre of atrocities is mainly rural India, though the reservation riots in the city of Ahmedabad (Glass, 1982) show that this is not excluding. Although there is some evidence to show that violence against untouchables is often caused by conflicts over ritual norms, assessments which have attributed 70% of atrocities for the period 1974-77 to 'ritual disputes invite a suspicion of exaggeration (India, 1977). For, it is a fact that "the first cases of firm and vocal" untouchable resistance and their repression "recurred in the Green Revolution areas of Godavari-Tungbadhira delta, Thanjavur, Bihar and Punjab" (P. Seth, 1979: 35). The provocation for resistance and repression has almost always come from a variety of material factors: demand for higher wages, distribution of surplus land or persistent demand for land distribution or occupancy rights. And the "current conflicts.... are neither local in implication, nor sectional in interest nor short-lived and transient". They have:

remained confined neither to States which are supposed to have worked out the various crises of modernization (Maharashtra) or those with the strongholds of conservatism or backwardness (U.P., Bihar or M.P.) nor to the states where social reform movement favouring the backward castes had already occurred (Maharashtra, Tamil Nadu) (P.Seth, 1979 : 39).

Moreover, the vulnerability of untouchables to repression, even as the scope for resistance, has increased. Not only does the upper peasantry (the landlords or rich peasants), but also "the socially backward but economically aspiring and politically ascendant castes of lower peasantry" provide the fierce new source of untouchable repression. The "lower peasant castes are simultaneously pitted against both the upper castes" and the untouchables. In the late seventies they have particularly turned towards untouchables with ruthless "aggressiveness and ferocity". (P.Seth, 1979 : 34).

The last decade, with an authoritarian interlude of the emergency and its Janata aftermath, complicates the understanding of violence against untouchables even further. The emergency propaganda and performance in the sphere of land reforms and 'uplift' of untouchables through the twenty point programme has been shown to be a causative factor in the pattern of violence. In Bihar, for example, the state acquired an unprecedented 50,000 acres of surplus land under the ceiling laws (as compared with a paltry 9700 acres in the period between 1961-62 and 1974-75); in addition, the state received 20,431 acres in voluntary surrender scheme. Agricultural workers were settled in one lakh acres of government land. 68,000 agricultural workers were awarded recovery totalling one crore rupees by as arrears for minimum wages and indebtedness worth Rs.4.5 crores, was written off by law. Arun Sinha suggests that these measures, coupled with socio-psychological propaganda, accentuated "antagonism between agricultural proletariat and the landlords", and, led even during the emergency to murders of and brutal assaults against untouchables. After the elections in 1977, "feudal anger" was aroused by the untouchable resistance to return to old wages and refusal to pay cancelled debts. This led to large-scale massacres (Sinha, 1982: 150-151). On the other hand, The leadership and patronage provided to rich and middle peasants by Charan Singh during Janata years aggravated the scale of atrocities all over India. In the late seventies-one steadily began to hear of "caste wars" and "peasant unrest", leading to the massive mobilization of peasants and other backward castes.

Thus, at a very historic moment, when change expectancies were aroused in the most oppressed groups of untouchables, the repressive resolve and coercive arsenal of caste peasantry was also strengthened. While a Marxist analyst sees in this situation a transition from "caste" to "Class" the containing potential for escalating violence of the oppressed, the liberal analyst finds that the opposition policies of "propping up the peasant castes" and the ruling party's policy of "isolating Harijan and Muslim issues from the larger struggle of all exploited sections," together amount to no less than joint authorship of a "programme of annihilation" of the untouchables. (D. Seth, 1979: 36)

The class analysis of untouchable resistance and repression often overlooks or underplays the ritual or caste aspects of much violence against untouchables. Many conflicts and mayhems centre upon violation of traditional taboos--- such as drawing water from water sources traditionally reserved for savarnas or higher castes (Joshi, 1982; Desai, 1976; Sharma, 1979; Baxi, 1979; Galanter, 1972). Similarly, in Marathawada riots, caste Hindus raised a campaign of violence lasting for 67 days over 1200 villages which totally frustrated a unanimous resolution (renaming Marathawada University into Ambedkar University) of the Maharashtra Legislative Assembly (Punalekar, 1980). Following Meenakshipuram untouchable conversions into Islam (Mathew, 1982), some Hindu militant organizations have, since 1981, engaged in propaganda against Muslims these contributing to communal riots in Pune, Sholapur, Ahmedabad and Meerut. And The Arya Samaj has already mounted a vigorous re-conversion drive in Meenakshipuram.

These, and many other episodes, continue to illustrate "dispute over the legitimacy of the ritual hierarchy on purity and pollution". Of course, the "absence of any event economic issue" does not necessarily imply "that religious ideology serves no latent function in supporting economic hierarchy". But the conflict -- and resulting violence and repression-- is perceived primarily in caste rather than class terms by participants themselves (Joshi, 1982: 679).

Be that as it may, pervasive violence against untouchables (a kind of reactionary violence) and untouchable militancy, mainly through Dalit groups (a violence for equality), raises crucial questions concerning state and law. Notionally, both types of violence are illegal; in reality, available evidence suggests that violence by untouchables is more readily

repressed by the law and the state then violence against them. This duality in modes of repression may be seen to correspond to the dual nature of state power, as analyzed by Sarat Sin (1980). The dual ruling class interests-- bourgeois and feudal landlords-- are in direct and deep antagonism here. In a sense, violence against untouchables by feudal landlords (and the newly emerging peasant classes) is an attack on the "status dominance" of the bourgeois. Barbara Joshi's observation (although made in the context of three months of Gujarat reservation riots) that "violence involving 'Untouchables' is often also a direct attack on the authority of the State itself" (p.681) furnishes (though outside the context of her analysis) a perfect example of the dual nature of state power. And the first unanimous resolution (after the war with China) passed by Parliament on April 13, 1981, rededicating the nation to policy of reservations at the close of the decade of caste wars, furnishes yet another illustration of the process of fine balancing of dual ruling class interests.

VI. COMMUNAL VIOLENCE

At the very outset, we recall with Imtiaz Ahmad that "any attempt to discuss Muslim problems in India is beset with one serious difficulty" --namely, the paucity of data "required to assess the nature of the problem or to estimate its magnitude" (1981:1457). This observation applies most acutely to the problem of communal or Hindu-Muslim violence.

Since Independence, communal violence has occurred in almost every part of India. From an average of about 65 riots per year in the fifties, the number has increased to 367 riots in the seventies. Between 1954 and 1959, there were 367 violence clashes; the number has increased to 2938 between 1960-1969. The decade 1971-80 is marked by 2574 riots (Shah, 1983-35). In this period, 816 muslims and 362 Hindus were killed and 15,404 people were injured.

These figures, besides erring on the side of caution, cannot possibly tell the story of destruction and horror which major communal riots entail. But the reports of some commissions of enquiry (as in the 1969 Ahmedabad and Bhiwandi riots) and accounts of recent riots in Pune, Solapur, Ahmedabad, Baroda and Meerut indicate the brutality of attacks, not sparing Muslim women, old people and even children, and heavy loss of property. Property worth tens of thousands of rupees is looted and destroyed. Obviously, in each riot Muslims suffer the most

extensive casualties and damage to property. Communal riots are triggered off by some rather trivial incidents--such as kite flying, (in 1982 Ahmedabad riots), use of amplifiers in mosques and routes and progress of religious processions of either community claims over on nonexistent temples or mazra (tomb of saints). But behind these immediate provocations, sometimes stage managed, lies weeks and months of hostile propaganda and careful planning, including the collection of arms (knives, sharp weapons, country made revolvers, bombs and grenade materials). The riots, thus planned, have in recent years longer duration (weeks and in some cases even months) and intensity (in terms of injury, death and damage). Riots usually take place in a middle-sized town, with a rather heavy concentration of Muslim population (about 30%) (Engineer, 1982: 1803). There is evidence in judicial commissions of enquiry pointing of extensive amount of preparations by "a large number of workers," some of whom are equipped with "technical skills" (Gujarat, 1971). The pattern of fatal injuries, including of stabbings, indicates recruitment of trained personnel in communal conflicts on both sides, although it has not been possible to positively identify their actual participation in a riot situation, there has been evidence especially of the communal parties and organizations having fomented the actual situation of violence by hostile propaganda and rumormongering and by processions of door to door campaigns and pamphletting. In all major riots after the 1981 Meenakshipuram conversion of a few untouchables to Islam, a militant Hindu non-political religious organization (Vishwa Hindu Parishad) has been said to be thus very actively engaged this including in Ahmedabad. Pune, Solapur and the ghastly killings of Muslims in the Meerut riots. Occasional too, there is evidence that the state para-military and police forces assist the Hindu communalistic designs by acts of commission and omission (see for their role in Meerut riots in 1982; Engineer, op.cit).

Communal riots are generally projected in available literature as urban rather than rural phenomena. This may be due to the fact despite the "social vacuum" created by exodus of six million Muslims (including 2.34 urban Muslim intelligentsia on the partition of India), there is an increasing trend "among Indian Muslims to migrate to urban areas. 29 per cent of Muslim live in urban areas in India. The 18 per cent. (Imam, 1975).

Most urban Muslims are employed in industry, trade and self-employed professions, and small scale industries. Except where their population in urban area is large (only in 9 districts of India is their population more than 50 per cent,

and its more than 20 per cent in 30 districts of about 9 states), Muslims do not offer any substantial economic competition to Hindus. The bulk of urban Muslims are not economically dominant in most parts of India. Indeed, some are exceedingly poor. It has been reported that many Muslim women resort to prostitution in urban areas because of poverty and in some parts of India, Muslims work as sub-contractor from scheduled caste sweepers of the municipal corporation (Engineer, 1982: 356);

Muslim representation in central services, in official and clerical cadres, the Indian Administrative Service (IAS) and the Indian Police Service (IPS) shows chronic and seemingly irreversible under representation. In fact, their percentage in IAS has declined from 4.6 per cent in 1960 to 3.09 per cent in 1974. In IPS it also declined from 4.1 per cent to 3.19 per cent in the same period. As of May 1971, only seven out of 542 selection grade and grade I officers were Muslims. And there were only 12 out of 19 out of 4526, 9 upper division clerks and 30 of lower division clerks out of 6615. The position in states, barring states like Bihar, is also said to reveal a similar picture (Shah, 1983: 23-24).

Politically, while Muslim votes are highly coveted, Muslim representation in Parliament has remained only 7 per cent in 1980, betokening virtually the same position which prevailed at the first general election in 1952. The situation in the Assemblies is much the same, despite some augmentation in West Bengal, Uttar Pradesh, Rajasthan and Bihar (Shah, 1983: 33).

The virtual non-representation of Muslims in State services is often attributed to their educational backwardness. But, as Imtiaz Ahmad has pointed out, this backwardness is not due so much to "their religious fanaticism or their acute minority complex" but rather owes to the "small size of the social strata whose members can be expected to go in for education as a normal activity". In other words, there has been no "strenuous expansion" of the urban Muslim middle class since Independence (Ahmad, 1981: 1461).

The smallness or the relative decline of the urban Muslim middle class could be a factor engendered by the reality of communal violence and the overall insecurity created by this peculiar form of collective violence. On the other hand, it might also be a factor facilitating the scale and the intensity of growing communal violence in India.

Like the question of social 'casuation' of communal violence in India, the magnitude of its social impact on concerned communities has been not fully examined. But it should be clear that apart from generating radical insecurity among the Muslims, increasing alienation of the educated and affluent Muslims, tendencies towards Islamization (Singh, 1973; Ghose, 1973; Baxi, 1975) and the impact of communal riots, must also very severely affect the forms of economic enterprise among the urban Muslims. Attacks on Muslim homes, shops and factories force them to change their occupations. A study of Uttar Pradesh reveals that about 16 per cent of Muslims "had to change their occupation following communal disturbances"; a majority of them were shop keepers who could not "reopen their shop or had to dispose them off and accept inferior occupation..." (Gupta, 1976). Total looting and destruction of Muslim shops or commercial establishments is the standard feature of communal violence, having no doubt unsettling effect on modes of occupation and livelihood.

A complete understanding of communal violence is simply possible at the present stage of knowledge. But it is clear that communal violence is now planned and organized; most incidents are difficult to characterize as "spontaneous". And the sub-elites involved in the planning and execution of such violence, on both side seek to promote material economic interests and including political interests. Political interests especially seem to suggest a strategy of promotion of planned antagonism between the Untouchable and Muslims, as their unity, even in merely electoral terms, has certain far-reaching implications on the dual nature of the state (For example, in the recent Meerut riots, extremely poor untouchables (Sweepers-Valmikis) were persuaded or conscripted to fight Muslims. Engineer, 1982: 1803).

It is possible to characterize communal violence as "reactionary" or "regressive" or "vigilantism", in terms of categories usually used in classification of collective violence (Tilly, 1969). Both in terms of causation and of impact, communal violence appears to be not just collective violence, but its a distinctive form of collective political violence articulating certain strategies common to the achievement of certain strategic interests of dominant groups. In many ways, communal violence fragments the urban poor, discouraging alliances among the oppressed strata in urban areas and having a profound impact on certain Muslim social formations. It is also a crucial part of the ensemble of electoral violence. "Hindu Militancy," "Muslim fanaticism", and pan-Islamism (the convenient "foreign hand" argument), just cannot furnish any

adequate explanation, or even elements of such explanation, of this form of collective political violence.

VII. CONCLUSION

Many related forms of CPV have not been analyzed in this paper. Revolutionary violence is one such major form. In contemporary India, it has occurred either as a Naxalite movement or a movement for secession from India. In both cases, repression has taken the mode of counter-insurgency operations. Such operations have of necessity involved the armed forces and para military forces of the state. Although the legal processes and institutions have been involved (e.g. preventive detention, criminal trials of 'Naxalites' or 'subversives', enhancement of legislative and executive powers to meet the actual and potential violence, capital punishment), counter-insurgency measures have been preeminently characterized by militaristic use of force (e.g. annihilation campaign, reign of terror for those suspected of supporting subversion, torture in jails, hamstringing, counter-propaganda and brainwashing). The technique of annihilation has reached even the civilian police entrusted with law and order operations in the "infested" areas. The term of art is "encounters", it describes rebel casualties as being results of armed encounters between police and rebels. Social action litigation in India has sought to demonstrate in many cases that cold-blooded killings are being camouflaged as 'encounters'; citizens commissions have been active, by force and terror; the ruling classes are not altogether in a position to derognize the relatively autonomous legal system which serves their material or class interests. Their long term interest in the legal order is apt for the dual or dominant mode of production and often creates a need to justify counter-revolutionary violence as an aspect of legitimate legal repression. But the liberal legal order is unable to fully sustain the legitimation of such violence, which involves the indiscriminate and standardless use of force and even terror. It is this attempt to convert legal what, in essence, does not belong to the realm of legal repression into rest that which creates the appearance of the 'crisis of the legal system' through governmental lawlessness. Paradoxically, thus, even when rebellions fail to smash the

state and the law, they succeed, in one way or the other, in demonstrating that the primary mode is the extra-legal mode. somewhat (this is an empirical question), to the eventual delegitimation of the law.

All this deserves more extended analysis. So do the other categories of CPV which we have not. One of these categories is 'social banditry' which, in contemporary India, appears only as 'dacoity' and is characterized by militaristic repression on the one hand and legal amnesty on the other (Baxi, 1982). In both these responses, formal legal rationality altogether gives way to regime - sponsored violence or extra-legal containment strategies. Once again the notion of 'legal repression' appears problematic.

Collective political violence involving the assertion, extension, and consolidation of ethnic group or sub-national identities presents a situation involving mixed modes of repression. The "sons of soil" and language riots have led to fascinatingly complex exercises in constitutional and legal accommodation (see, e.g., Weiner et. al., 1980). Of course, such accommodation has often occurred after the CPV has been contained usually through the techniques of routine legal repression. The foreign national issue in the present Assam movement, like the 'separatist' Telangana movement in the fifties, has, however, seen pointedly mixed modes of repression. A theoretically rigorous grasp of the Assam type CPV and modes of repression, and the emergent social formations, remains high on the agenda of the student of contemporary Indian CPV.

Other forms of CPV involve campus violence and violence against women. The former has been extensively studied in terms of alienation, frustration, "politicization", anomie and so on. But the question of how to relate it effectively to the transitional dynamics of dual state power has not been as yet explicitly raised. Student violence seems difficult to explain in these terms, as most of it appears devoid of developmental content. In passing it would be worthwhile to note two features of the cumulative result of campus violence. First, 'symbolic violence' has been increasingly legitimated. Symbolic violence means damage to property or things. Burning of buses, damaging furniture, libraries, equipment has rarely involved setting of the criminal law in motion.

In fact, a zone of immunity surrounds such symbolic violence. Second, even the normal techniques of legal repression (force feeding in cases of fast unto death, mass prosecutions for violence against persons) are not noticeably used in dealing with campus violence.

Violence against women, especially in terms of bride-burning and rape, is certainly on the rise. Measures for legal repression of this kind of violence are inadequate and are made to operate with utmost difficulty. A structural understanding of violence against Indian women in terms of Marxist or neo-Marxist theories of patriarchy (Balbus, 1982) is yet to emerge. Even a cohesive liberal theory of violence against women is not in sight. Such a theory in any event will not fully focus on a structural grasp of causes of violence against women, which are usually identified in terms of cultural practices and overlooks the relation of violence against to the dominant modes of production.

Industrial and electoral violence also represent forms of CPV. Electoral violence must be seen as inherently anti-democratic (in terms of the analysis of Honderich). The more traditional form of electoral violence is represented by coerced voting or prevention from voting and associated practices of both capturing. This is violence designed to influence the electoral process and verdict. There are signs that this is now an organized practice. The other form of violence is typified by the Nalla massacres, a phenomenon too recent to allow reasoned and total analysis, but, in essence, symbolizing a violent disapproval of the holding or conduct of elections in the first place. The massacre which resulted in well over 2000 killings (mostly along ethnic lines), has messages for the dual ruling classes which have still to be decided.

Industrial violence, on the other hand, broadly reinforces the predominance of the capitalistic mode of production. Legal repression of workers is an oft-noted phenomenon, more so when the labour is unorganized or disorganized. Once again this is an area in which the interaction of the legal and militaristic modes of repression, and qualitative changes in relations of production, or in terms of class consciousness at the very least, have yet to be fully examined.

The paper is, in other words, incomplete and inadequate. It offers a partial (and in this concluding section, impressionistic) view of violence and repression. The potentialities of modes of repression in transformations of modes of production still await fuller examination and this, in turn, requires a more thorough elaboration of the nature of state, and therefore of the law, in the contemporary Indian society.

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Violence and socio-economic development

- Rasheeduddin Khan

Towards a definition of violence

Violence is a term that suffers from a surfeit of meanings. Even a cursory glance through the rapidly proliferating literature on the subject is enough to show the bewildering medley in which the concept is entrapped.

In a recent study violence has been defined as 'the exercise of physical force so as to inflict injury on or cause damage to persons or property; action or conduct characterized by this; treatment or usage tending to cause bodily injury or forcibly interfering with personal freedom'. This is obviously the commonly assumed, personalized, criminological and lexicographical meaning of the term. It emphasizes, to the exclusion of other aspects, one particular aspect of violence. As is pointed out in the same study, some indication of the modern usage of the term can be obtained by reflecting on the fact that 'violence is itself a symbol and a metaphor', as indicated in phrases like 'violent crime' (physical assault or threat thereof), 'violence in the streets' (provocation, demonstration, police violence, partisan counter-violence, internal war), 'external war', 'violence to oneself' (suicide, alcoholism, drug addiction, etc.), 'violence at the wheel' (killing by vehicular accident), 'violence in the media' (a syndrome; news or fiction of violence stimulating further violence), 'non-violent violence' (the paradox that personality may be destroyed by indirect methods as much as by physical brutality), 'social violence' (or what Herbert Marcuse and R.D. Laing call 'repressive toleration'). Then there is a lot of discussion and inquiry these days about 'violence in groups', 'violence in mobs', and 'violence in subcultures' as part of the macro-study of 'violence in society'. But in each case, as Mackenzie bemoans, 'one looks uncertainly for an operational definition'.

Social psychologists like Neil Smelser in his Theory of collective Behaviour, regard violent behaviour as a 'pathological deviation' that generates balancing forces to maintain the structural-functional equilibrium in society. Political sociologists like Ted Robert Gurr, on the other hand, maintain that 'political violence' is a 'normal' phenomenon and that, as part of the 'self-adjusting conflict' situation, it contributes to the eventual maintenance of a societal equilibrium. Gurr's basic premise is stated as

Rasheeduddin Khan is a Professor of Political Science at the Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Mehrauli Road, New Delhi-67

Some of men's perspectives on violence are physcho-cultural in origin, the result of socialization patterns that encourage or discourage outward displays of aggression, and of cultural traditions which sanction violent collective responses to various kinds of deprivation. These perspectives are underlying attitudes about, or normative predispositions toward, violence. There is considerable variation in such attitudes within most cultures...modal dispositions towards violence vary significantly from one nation to another and from one sub-culture to another within nations. These underlying attitudes are seperable from the doctrines that mean accept...which provide them with specific justifications for violence in response to their immediate political circumstances. Such doctrines conventionally are categorized as 'ideologies'....

A major focus on violence today is on the aspect of it that is called political violence. The casual linkage between politics, power and violence is self-evident. This is that C.Wright Mills underlines when he propounds succinctly: 'All politics is struggle for power, the ultimate kind of power is violence.' And this is what Mao means in his oft-quoted aphorism that political power 'flows out of the barrel of a gun'. While it is well known that Karl Marx maintained that the State is an instrument of opppression in the hands of the ruling class, it is not equally known that Max Weber also postulated that violence is a 'means specific' to the State, and that the State alone possesses the 'exclusive source of the right to use violence'.

While differentiating between violence used by the State or its agents (police, military, bureaucracy, etc.), which Fred H.von der Mehden calls 'establishment violence' (i.e. use of violence as a deterrence to deviant behaviour of the citizens for the maintenance of domestic tranquility), and violence used by the masses and the classes, Gurr suggests a three-tier typology for the latter: (a) turmoil-relatively spontaneous, unorganized political violence with substantial popular participation including violent political strikes, riots, political clashes, demonstrations, localized rebellions, (b) conspiracy-highly organized political violence with limited participation, including organized political assassination, small-scale terrorism, small-scale guerrilla wars, coups d'Etat, mutinies, etc.; and (c) internal war-highly organized political violence with widespread popular participation, designed to overthrow a regime or dissolve the State, and accompanied by extensive violence, including large-scale terrorism and guerrilla wars and revolutions.

Typology of violence

Johan Galtung, in two papers, "Violence, Peace and Peace Research, . and 'The Specific Contribution of Peace Research to the study of the Causes of Violence; Typologies', provides a systematic and multi-dimensional typology of violence.

In the first paper he differentiates six important dimensions of violence, by drawing various distinctions concerning; (a) physical, psychological and biological violence; (b) a negative and a positive approach to influence; (c) whether or not there is an object that is hurt; (d) whether or not there is a subject (person) who acts; (e) violence that is intended or unintended, and (f) the two traditional levels of violence, the manifest and the latent. He refers essentially to two types of violence, the personal or direct (where there is an actor who commits the violence), and the structural or indirect (where there is no such actor). He adds that structural violence is sometimes referred to as 'social injustice', because it is 'built into the structure and shows up as unequal power and consequently as unequal life chances.' This typology is represented in the following diagram:

In his second paper (Unesco, 1975) Galtung rejects what he calls 'the negative approach'. This includes: (a) aggressive versus defensive violence and intended versus unintended violence (b) intrapersonal, interpersonal, intergroup (with interclass as a special case), and intersocietal (with international as a special case) violence. He then seeks to build an elaborate typology composed of four major groups; (a) classical (or direct) violence; (b) poverty - deprivation of basic material needs; (c) repression - deprivation of human rights; and (d) alienation - deprivation of higher needs. Each of the four groups covers the categories included here in brackets (a) classical violence (survival); (b) poverty (physiological, ecological and social); (c) repression (freedom, politics, legal, work); and (d) alienation (in relation to society, to others, to self and to nature).

The advantage of tentatively accepting this typology is that it shifts the focus from the direct, personalized, juristic aspect of violence (which is in any case more a consequence than a cause, a symptom rather than the malady) to the more basic, environmentally endemic, intractable and latent aetiology of violence, whose comprehension alone might help in providing positive remedial action for the eradication of the main causes of violence. Three out of its four components deal with structural violence in its three universal manifestations - structurally conditioned poverty, structurally conditioned repression ('repressive intolerance') and structurally conditioned alienation ('repressive tolerance'). What is interesting is that Galtung further treats the following three forms of 'direct violence' as a repercussion to 'structural violence': (a) vertical direct-violence directed against the top - 'revolutionary violence', the fight for liberation, in other words, direct counter-counter-violence; (c) horizontal violence, which does not take place within a vertical structure.

Galtung identifies 'inequality', particularly inequality 'in the distribution of power' as the 'general formula behind structural violence'. The study of social structure and, beyond that, social stratification, is necessary in order to comprehend structural violence. In this connection 'most fundamental are the ideas of actor, system, structure, rank and level'.¹⁷ Galtung suggests that examples of structural violence (which can be traced back to personal violence in their prehistory) are an exploitative inequalitarian caste system or race society.¹⁸

As a corrective to and amplification of Galtung's formulation, it may be mentioned that 'the definition of social structure can be given in terms of properties of the members of groups of a society and relations between the members. Social structure can be reduced to concepts like social position (class or status) and interaction (exchange and influence) relations and the concepts like groups, organizations and institutions.'

Theories of the aetiology of violence

This brings us to the question of the aetiology of violence—that is, the causality pattern of the origins and consequences of violence.²⁰ The relevance of this, particularly in structural violence, is all too apparent. Several theoretical writings both normative and empirical, dealing with the problem have appeared in recent years. They are mostly interdisciplinary in their approach and transdisciplinary in their scope, fusing the approaches of social psychology with data on criminology, and interfacing parameters of psychodynamics with those of social dynamics and motivations of political and social action. A whole school of 'conflict theorists' has emerged, who draw their classical inspiration, directly or obliquely, from the writings of Marx and Engels on the one hand, and Weber and Parsons on the other.

There are five well-known theories of the aetiology of violence that need to be mentioned in this connection:

First, the frustration-anger-aggression theory, developed with empirical evidence by John Dollard.

Second, the concept of relative deprivation by Ted Robert Gurr.

Third, the J-curve principle, of Davies.

Fourth, the Feierabend-Nesvold theory of social change and systematic frustration.

Fifth, the theory of modernization causing violence in transitional societies, by Samuel Huntington.

For our purpose, a bare statement of the major postulates of the five theories will be sufficient, followed by a brief critique of the major theoretical assumptions.

Gurr divides the psychological assumptions about the generic sources of human aggression into three categories; (a) that aggression is solely instinctive; (b) that it is solely learned, and (c) that it is an innate response activated by frustration.

The first assumption is based on Neiburg's proposition regarding people's capacity for outraged, uncontrolled, bitter and bloody violence. The second assumption is reflected in the writings of Chalmer Johnson, who speaks of civil violence as purposive, contributing to the demise of a despised social system. Talcott Parsons fits political violence into the framework of social interaction theory, as a deterrence, punishment or symbolic demonstration of capacity to act. The third assumption has been amplified by Dollard, who maintains

that the primary source of the human capacity for violence appears to be the frustration-aggression mechanism. The agner induced by frustration is a motivating force that disposes man to aggression. Frustration is defined as the thwarting of, or interference with, the attainment of goals, aspirations or expectations, and aggression as behaviour designed to injure, physically or otherwise, those towards whom it is directed.

Relative deprivation (RD) is defined by Gurr as 'a perceived discrepancy between men's value expectations and their value capabilities'. Value expectations are the goods and conditions of life to which people believe they are rightfully entitled. Value capabilities are the goods and conditions they think they are capable of attaining and maintaining, given the social means available to them.

Gurr's hypothesis is that the potential for collective violence varies strongly with the intensity and the scope of relative deprivation among members of a collectivity. Deprivation-induced discontent is a general spur to action. The aetiology may have the following pattern; the primary casual sequence in political violence is, first, the development of discontent, second, the politicization of that discontent, and finally, its expression in violent action against political objects and actors. However, the expression is strongly influenced by the patterns of coercive control and institutional support in the political community. Violence can take the form of internal war, if a regime and its opponents exercise an approximately equal degree of coercive control, and command a similar and relatively high degree of institutional support in society.

Davies attributes revolutionary outbreaks to the frustration that results from a short-term decline in achievement following a long-term increase that generated expectations about continuing increase. He holds that, contrary to Marxian expectations, or even the assumptions of Alexis de Tocqueville and others, revolutions do not occur during periods of prolonged, abject or worsening situations of social deprivation. On the contrary, revolutions occur during periods of relative prosperity and improvement. Thus, Davies postulates a J-curve of socio-economic development, and projects revolution at that point of curve where the discrepancy between 'achievement' and 'expectations' becomes intolerable.

Feierabend and Nesvold have developed the hypothesis of 'systematic frustration', which, they argue, is applicable to any analysis of aggregate, violent political behaviour within social systems. 'Systematic frustration' is defined as frustration collectively experienced within societies, particularly with reference to three situations: (a) interference in the attainment and maintenance of social goals, aspirations and values; (b) similar simultaneous experience by members of a social aggregate; and (c) strain produced within the structures and processes of a social system. They formulate two propositions: (a) violent political behaviour is instigated by systematic frustration; and (b) systematic frustration may stem, among other things, from specific characteristics of social change. As an extension of the basic hypothesis of frustration-aggression, they advance four general hypotheses for empirical investigation; (a) systematic frustration at any given time is a function of the discrepancy between present social aspirations and expectations on the one hand, and social achievements on the other; (b) present estimates (e.i. expectations of future frustrations or satisfaction) determine the level of present frustrations or satisfaction; (c) uncertainties in social expectations (i.e. whether the future will bring disaster or salvation) in themselves increase the sense of systematic frustration; (d) conflicting aspirations and conflicting expectations provide another source of systematic frustration.

Huntington argues that the causes of violence and instability in the emerging countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America are to be found in the lag between the development of viable political institutions and the processes of social and economic change. Accepting the three-tier paradigm of societies as developed by the structural functionalists- traditional, transitional and modern- Huntington argues that the first and the last are less prone to political violence and instability, and the transitional societies are the most prone. Revolutionary upheavals, military coups, insurrections, guerrilla warfare and assassinations are a common feature of transitional societies. Rejecting the 'poverty thesis', Huntington postulates that it is not poverty and backwardness but the desire to become rich and modern that breeds violence and instability.³⁰ He recalls that, in modernizing countries, violence, unrest and extremism are found, more often than not, in the wealthier parts of the country and society rather than in the poorer. He states that some measure of economic growth is necessary to make instability possible.

Explaining the 'lag' or 'gap' hypothesis- which is akin to the Feierabends' theory of social change and violence and Gurr's concept of relative discrepancy and political violence-Huntington asserts that social mobilization is much more destabilizing than economic development. Urbanization, literacy, education and the mass media expose the traditional man to new forms of life, new standards of enjoyment, new possibilities of satisfaction. These in turn break the cognitive and attitudinal barriers of the traditional culture and promote new levels of aspirations and wants. However, the ability of a transitional society to satisfy these new aspirations increases much more slowly; consequently a gap or lag develops between aspirations and expectations, want-formation and want-satisfaction, between the aspirations function and the level-of-living function. This gap generates social frustration and dissatisfaction, which lead to demands on government and the expansion of political mobilization and participation to enforce those demands. The lack of adequate political institutions makes it difficult, if not impossible, for the demands to be expressed through legitimate channels and to be moderated and aggregated within the political system. Hence, the sharp increase in political participation leads to political instability and violence.

A Critique of the theories of the aetiology of violence

By way of a general and specific critique of these five theories the following comments may be made.

All the theories presume a normative situation that implies a 'stable political system' at each level of socio-economic development, i.e. in the three-tier paradigm: traditional, transitional and modern. Further, a higher premium is attached to 'political stability' than to 'change' (social and economic). Regarding the phenomenon of 'change', these theorists suggest that 'change' without upsetting the 'system' is 'legitimate', 'normal', and 'functional'; but 'change' involving a radical recasting of socio-economic relations and a shift in the locus of power and more particularly, the modalities of such a change, are conceived as 'pejorative', 'non-legitimate', 'abnormal' and 'dysfunctional'.

The epistemological roots and heuristic parameters of these theories are not difficult to identify as ethnocentric. The entire perspective of the global phenomenon, the framework of the preferred future, the perception of ends and goals, and the stages of change and its realization, are set by value premises of the North Atlantic community. The ultimate model of all socio-economic development is either blatantly or subtly identified as the prototype of Western liberal-bourgeois

polity, particularly as exemplified by the United States, or to a lesser extent by Western Europe.

Even the model of 'modernization' or 'political development' is a stereotype patterned on the historical experience of the West, with minor accretions and modification to lend to an impression of universal validity. The term 'Westernization', which was earlier used rather unabashedly, has now been discarded, partly in response to the charge that it smacks openly of a geopolitical predilection, and partly to differentiate between the cultural ethos, which is regional and territorial, and the processes of socio-economic transformation, which can be universal. Yet, scrutinized more closely, 'modernization' appears to be the same old wine of 'Westernization' offered in a new bottle of contemporary jargon. Indeed, the concept of 'modernization' has been proposed by the structural functionalists, no less than by the behaviourists and even the post-behaviourists, as an alternative to what the Marxists call 'revolution'. There can be, and in fact there are, other theories of modernization, including the Marxian one, even if this term is not used. The Marxists talk of basic structural change in socio-economic relations, and a political superstructure that reflects these changes. To them, modernization is the competition of the socio-economic revolution, involving the elimination of exploitation and inequality, and the affirmation (to use Engel's phrase), that 'freedom is the recognition of necessity'. Revolution is projected as a basic, radical and overall change, and what is more, a change in depth.

In these theories there is no recognition of the basic global process, the process of decolonization, which permeates the life, society, economy and politics of the bulk of contemporary States and territories. More than 100 of the 149 Member States of the United Nations today, accounting for more than two-thirds of mankind, are today faced with this stupendous challenge of creating a new identity out of the wreckage of the defunct colonial system. But this present and urgent reality is almost totally ignored in the esoteric wisdom of Western model-builders of social change, except for an oblique or indirect reference. But this present and urgent reality is almost totally ignored in the esoteric wisdom of Western model-builders of social change, except for an oblique or indirect reference. Naturally, therefore, the nature, role and impact of the liberation movements—one of the dominant processes of group and national awakening, and of politico-social mobilization in modern times—remain at best relegated to the background. The role of ideology in mobilizing articulating and activating people for change, upsurge and revolt is also underplayed, or mentioned in a pejorative way.

The frustration-anger-aggression theory and the concept of relative deprivation are more applicable to individuals, compact groups and subsegments, rather than to numerically large segments or heterogeneous groups, and they are even less applicable to a society as a collectivity. These theories and concepts appear more as an extension of individual psychology to social levels, assuming a constancy of stimuli and response in two otherwise distinct categories, i.e. the individual as a unit and society as a collectivity.

The J-curve principle of Davies is valid in certain specific socio-political situations, it seems wanting in universal applicability. Cross-national case studies of revolutions would refute some of its basic premises. It does help to explain the occurrence of coups d'Etat particularly in a Latin American context, but is inadequate in explaining other revolutionary outbreaks.

The Feierabend-Nesvold theory and Huntington's 'gap' hypothesis are partially valid. 'Systematic frustration' is difficult to measure. Even if it can be gauged in quantitative terms, it is hard to work out a plausible calculus for establishing the modal point where 'quantities' get transformed into a new 'quality'. In its generality it is ambiguous, and in its specificity it is neatly academic - a sort of 'laboratory formula' that cannot be tested at the 'production level'. Huntington's hypothesis overemphasizes violence in what he calls transitional societies, and overlooks the types of violence - both direct and structural - that are endemic in tribal and feudal societies on the one hand, and in developed industrialized (modern) society on the other. The plural nature of modernized societies, particularly in federal polities with multi-ethnic and multi-strata complexities, gives rise to a different set of intergroup tensions, intergroup conflicts and intergroup violence. The increase and recrudescence of student and youth, interracial and interdenominational violence modifies, if it does not refute the 'universalist' assumptions of Huntington's thesis.

Patterns of structural violence

Economic and political systems, situational contexts and violence:
a correlation

Territorial sovereignty (i.e. nation-State or multinationality State, as the case may be) is, in terms of its multidimensional cohesion, socio-economic distinctiveness and political identity and as a definite analytical unit of global problems, the most convenient, and an all-inclusive, category of study. This is so partly because of the nature and exercise of power and the sanction to back the exercise of that power by the State on citizens, groups, classes and masses, and partly

because of the recognition accorded to States in international economy, in international transactions and in a wide variety of regional, hemispheric and global activities in our modern, highly interdependent world. Therefore it will be more meaningful and analytically convenient to examine societal patterns also in terms of territorially determined political and economic system

The division of the world into what may be called geographical dichotomies, i.e. either North and South in terms of economic-industrial-technological levels of development, or East and West in terms of ideological allegiances and military economic combinations, is too broad, too loose and too undifferentiated, apart from the fact that it is unidimensional in approach.

Accepting the State (or territorial sovereignty) as a unit, we can relate societal patterns to two determining systems, i.e. a political system and an economic system, and to dominant situational contexts in which a country or people finds itself. Let us therefore define the three terms, economic system, political system and situational context, and then suggest a typology of violence correlating these three parameters.

The economic system can be characterized by at least six aspects; (a) basic nature of the economy (subsistence, barter, money or credit), (b) employment of the predominant part of the population in the primary, secondary or tertiary sector of production, (c) the nature of production relations (tribal, feudal, capitalist-industrial, socialist-industrial), (d) the aggregate GNP and per capita income; (e) the communication pattern for goods and persons, and (f) the stage of maturity is one of the three decisive economic-cum-technological revolutions, viz. the urban revolution, the industrial revolution or the automation revolution.³³ On these bases of socio-economic development, we might identify four types of economic system:

Primitive: subsistence economy, tribal society, low technology, on the verge of urban revolution.

Traditional: barter economy, feudal society, intermediate technology, on the verge of industrial revolution.

Modern (capitalist): money-cum-credit economy, competitive, profit-oriented entrepreneurial post-industrial society, multinational-dominated global commercial transactions, undergoing the automation revolution.

Modern (socialist): money-cum-credit economy, cooperative-cum-centrally planned industrial society, on the verge of an automation revolution.

A contemporary political system may be identified by the orientation of the regime, the locus of power, the basis of legitimacy, the constitutional structure and political functions.

'Situational context' is a term used to indicate the general socio-political orientation in which a people or country finds itself today in terms of the major goals and concerns of internal (domestic) development. Tentatively, the following five 'situational contexts' may be identified: (a) colonial/liberation struggle, (b) post-colonial/nascent independence, (c) ex-colonial-/neo-metropolitan, (d) socialism under construction, and (e) mature socialism. The nature, types and manifestation of violence in each of the 'societal patterns' and 'situational contexts' are different and require specific comprehensive study. As basic assumption is that violence is endemic in each 'societal pattern' and 'situational context'. Epigrammatically one might even say that 'to be violent is human', even if the converse is not true. It is a truism that no society and very few human beings are bereft of all manifestations of violence. The dynamics and dialectics of socio-economic change generate certain types of violence, even as the very existence (and persistence) of poverty and inequality secrete violence. Violence, like politics, is culture-bound and system-bound. A dominant feature of our times, affecting the lives and fortunes of much of mankind living in almost a hundred territories (states or countries in revolt) is what is known as decolonization. The ramifications are very wide, involving both the internal and the external dimensions of collective life, social, cultural, political and economic aspects and cross-cultural, interracial and international patterns of peaceful co-existence. Decolonization represents a watershed in human history. It is both the rejection of a dominant power structure and the affirmation of a new awakening. By throwing or attempting to throw off the yoke of colonial hegemony, the people in struggle, in revolt, manifest a yearning for a new relation between man and man and groups of men, expressed in diverse ways, depending on each specific situation (level and leadership of the struggle) and not always free of ambiguity or contradictions. Decolonization is not always a complete or a completed process. Sometimes it is piecemeal, fragmented, partly genuine, partly spurious, partly accomplished, partly compromised, partly mutilated, partly intact. But whatever shape and form it takes, decolonization nevertheless represents a decisive break with the past, a step away from the domination of the colonial masters and their indigenous agents. The Prometheus of the enslaved people, having stolen the fire of freedom, can no longer remain chained to the rocks of colonial infamy, tortured by the vultures of oppression.

Frantz Fanon, in his sentiment-charged book, *The Wretched of the Earth*,... sang the psalm of the resurrection of the downstrodden. Together with Sorel, Fanon remains one of the most outspoken proponents of violence as a catharsis of the enslaved people and as a catalyst of change. He is one of the leading lights of the literature of 'rebirth through commitment to violence'.¹ Sorel proclaimed that 'a class can be resurrected through violence', and Fanon asserted that 'individuals and peoples can become whole again by participating in violent politics.'² This is certainly reminiscent of Marx, with his classic formulation that 'class constitutes itself only through conflict'.

Fanon begins his celebrated work with these words: 'National liberation, national renaissance, the restoration of nationhood to the people, commonwealth: whatever may be the headings used or the new formulas introduced, decolonization is always a violent phenomenon.'³ He goes on to argue (and it is instructive to quote his own words so as to bring alive his passion):

Decolonization which sets out to change the order of the world, is obviously, a programme of complete disorder... (Since) decolonization... is a historical process... it cannot be understood...except in its historical form and content. Decolonization is the meeting of two forces, opposed to each other...Their first encounter was marked by violence... that is to say the exploitation of the native by the settler... Decolonization is the veritable creation of a new man... In decolonization there is therefore the need of a complete calling in question of the colonial situation. The colonial world is a world divided into compartments... a world cut into two... The zone where the natives live... (and) the zone inhabited by the settlers. The two zones are opposed...(and) they both follow the principle of reciprocal exclusivity.'

Reflecting on the repercussion of violence in colonial situation, Fanon says that, since violence was used in the ordering of the colonial world, which has ceaselessly drummed the rhythm for the destruction of native social forms', therefore when the time comes violence would be used by the natives 'to wreck the colonial world'.⁴ Fanon differentiate the various components of the colonized peoples, in terms of their responses to the colonial situation. He is wary of national political parties and of intellectual and commercial elites. The objective of the national political parties, he says, 'is not the radical overthrowing of the system. Pacifists and legalists, they are in fact partisans of order.. On the specific question of violence, the elite are ambiguous.

They are violent in words and reformist in their attitudes.. Then there is the rank and file of the nationalist party, he says, who are predominantly urban, comprising the workers, teachers, artisans, shopkeepers, whose main demand are better salaries, improved living conditions, electoral representation, liberty of the press and association, and the like. He derides them as 'a kind of class of affranchised slaves or slaves who are individually free'. He proclaims that 'the peasantry is systematically disregarded', hence 'in the colonial countries the peasants alone are revolutionary, for they have nothing to lose and everything to gain. The starving peasant, outside the class system, is the first among the exploited to discover that only violence pays. For him there is no compromise.. (because colonialism) is violence in its natural state, and it will only yield when confronted with greater violence'. It is, however, the colonialist bourgeoisie which, Fanon says, enters later and 'introduces that new idea which is in proper parlance a creation of the colonial situation: non-violence.. Non-violence is an attempt to settle the colonial problem around.. a table.. But if the masses.. begin committing outrages and setting fire.. the elites and the nationalist bourgeois parties.. find a solution-some sort of a compromise!'

Fanon's commitment to violence is as much euphoric as prescriptive. 'The colonized man', he declares, 'finds his freedom in and through violence.' 'The violence of the colonial regime and the counter-violence of the native', he says, 'balance each other in an extraordinary reciprocal homogeneity.. Terror, counter-terror, violence, counter-violence, that is what (makes).. the circle of hate, which is so tenacious and so evident.. He adds: 'The natives' violence unifies the people.. colonialism is separatist and regionalist.. violence is in action all-inclusive and national.. violence is a cleansing force. It frees the native from his inferiority complex.. and restores his self-respect.'

Social change, conflict and violence

A systematic study of the relationship between social cohesion, social conflict and social violence has been conducted by Lewis Coser in *The Functions of Social Conflict* and 'Internal Violence as a Mechanism for Conflict Resolution'.

Coser explains the social structural aspect of violence: 'Violence comes about when groups cannot get heard.' He argues that 'the perception of violence by rulers can lead to remedial social action for those who commit violence'. Thus Coser sees 'violence as serving social structures by furnishing mechanisms for conflict-resolution when established authority fails to accommodate to demands of new groups for hearings.'⁴⁸

The interrelationship between violence and conflict is self-evident. Paul H. Conn says: 'The use of the term conflict with reference to political systems often brings to mind physical violence, coercion, rioting and other forms of destructive or negative behaviour. It implies a collision: a battle between individuals or groups with different standards, norms or goals. Yet conflict may be violent and non-violent.'

Similarly, the relation between conflict and change is not too difficult to establish. Again to quote Conn:

Conflict in a society is most often the product of change. When circumstances change in a society or community, the existing pattern of social and economic relations is altered. Change often advantages some groups while disadvantaging others, or at least sets the stage for the presentation of demands by groups and individuals who find that such changes have altered their status or environment.. conflicts are intimately bound up with change. This is not to imply that conflict exclusively or even primarily arises from changing economic conditions.

As is universally recognized, it was Marx who made the classic formulation linking change with conflict and conflict with violence, with philosophical profundity tempered by a vision of the future.

Restating the Marxian that the State is an instrument of oppression and force used by the ruling class to keep the exploited classes in subjugation, Lenin writes in his classic *The States and Revolution*:

The State is a product and the manifestation of the irreconcilability of class antagonisms. The State arises where, when and in so far as the class antagonisms objectively cannot be reconciled. And, conversely, the existence of the State proves that the class antagonisms are irreconcilable.. According to Marx, the State is an organ of class rule, an organ for the oppression of one class by another, it is the creation of order, which legalizes and perpetuates this oppression by moderating the conflict between the classes.. it is obvious that the liberation of the oppressed class is impossible not only without a violent revolution, but also without the destruction of the apparatus of State power which was created by the ruling class and which is the embodiment of this 'alienation'.

Interpreting the Marxian concept of class struggle, Lenin emphasizes that the 'contradiction' and 'struggle' take place not only between classes within the same society and nation (i.e. intrasocietal and international conflict) but also between societies and nations (i.e. international conflict). Further, he says that there is an 'alternation of periods of revolution and reaction, peace and war, stagnation and rapid progress or decline'. Lenin also underlines the creative aspects of political action, including violent action.

Reverting to the 'driving forces and forms of the national liberation revolution', Lenin perceived what is known as the national and colonial question as part of the wider world revolutionary process. He propounded the thesis of the alignment of class and social forces in the national liberation movements. The national movements could not go beyond the boundaries of bourgeois democratic movements, precisely because, as Lenin put it, 'the overwhelming mass of population in the backward countries consists of peasants'. This made him conclude that the 'peasants must make up the main social basis of the national liberation movement'. Of course, the importance of the alliance of the working class and the peasantry was emphasized, together with the active role of the national bourgeoisie in the national movement.

Ho Chi-minh, while affirming that the principles of Marxism-Leninism as applied to the national and colonial question were triumphantly corroborated 'by the experience of the people's liberation struggle in the East', recapitulates three guiding principles, viz. (a) that the revolution in the colonial and semi-colonial countries is a national-democratic revolution, conducted by a very broad national front uniting all the social strata and classes interested in liberation from colonial domination; (b) that this revolution is primarily a peasant revolution but conducted by the alliance of the peasants with the working class, and is therefore inseparable from the anti-feudal revolution with agrarian reform as the chief objective; and (c) that the liberation revolution in the oppressed countries and the proletarian revolution in the oppressing ones must support each other.

Because of a peculiar combination of forces, internal and international, in many liberation struggles in Asia, Africa and Latin America in the wake of decolonization after the Second World War, guerrilla war became an important method of struggle. Naturally therefore, "the bulk of the work on guerrilla war, including the contemporary "classics" by revolutionaries Mao, Guevara, Giap and Debray, has been more concerned with techniques of violence appropriate to

stages of insurrection than with the outcomes for social change.⁵⁵ Debray postulates: 'Guerrilla warfare is to peasant uprising what Marx is to Sorel'. He relates violence and uprising to change, and says that 'insurrection is a total political strategy for total change'. Mao laid stress on national mobilization for fighting the internal and external enemy. For him 'rural revolution' is an act of violence because 'violence implicates and involves people'. It is reported that, refuting Bertrand Russell's suggestion to establish Communism without the dictatorship of the proletariat, Mao argued that 'this was not feasible historically and psychologically'. He stressed that the propertied classes did not change by persuasion or education. To change them a resolute struggle and violence in a brief period of dictatorship of the proletariat were 'necessary to suppress the activities of counter-revolutionaries and to establish the authority of the formerly oppressed.' For Lenin, Mao and Debray, 'under conditions of a specificable kind, well-organized violence is the shortest distance between two points.' This is in keeping with the Marxian line that violence and political revolution are intertwined, and that political revolution by itself does not create change but only expresses the transition from one economic system to another. It is this premise that leads to Mao's contention 'that the central task and the highest form of revolution is to seize political power by armed force and decide issues by war'.⁵⁶ It was Marx who said that the revolutionary role of 'force' is that 'it is midwife of every old society which is pregnant with the new'.⁵⁷ Engels stressed the immense moral and spiritual impetus which has resulted from every victorious revolution!

Among the non-Marxist theorists of violence and revolution, Hannah Arendt and R. Dahrendorf have emphasized the linkage between violence and change. Arendt⁵⁸ considers violence as 'the instrument of direct intervention in politics' and therefore postulates that 'a theory of revolution can deal only with the justification for violence'. She distinguishes between violence as used for destroying existing power and violence as the necessary prerequisite of change. R. Dahrendorf⁵⁹ conceives of revolution as a rapid and violent political and social change. He attempts to correlate violence and change and suggests certain propositions..

Lucian Pye,⁶⁰ Edward Shils⁶¹ and Clifford Geertz, among others,⁶² representing the structural-functionalist-cum-behaviourist school of thought, have drawn attention to the prevalence of violence in the newly emergent States of Asia and Africa, constituting what they call the transitional societies (in the tripartite paradigm of traditional-transitional-modern societies.). Their main contention is that the

basic cause of internal violence is the lack of political integration because of ethnic, regional, linguistic or communal splits and divisions. Bienen points out that 'as people are being changed from traditionals into moderns..(their) sensitivity to being changed is a source of violence in transitional societies.. Since change produces more insecurity, there must be a quantitative increase in the degree of aggression and hostility within society.'

It is suggested that the main features of the development process are six-dimensional accounting ultimately for the performance of the system. Eggil Fossum, lists the following three conceptual pairs comprising the six dimensions: (a) accumulation-distribution (economic dimension), (b) bureaucracy-mobilization (political dimension), (c) co-operation-autonomy (international dimension). Playing with these six dimensions, paired in three sets, Fossum identifies three models of development, with different permutations and combinations of the conceptual pairs as follows:

Model 1., liberal modernizing: accumulation first, distribution later, bureaucracy first, mobilization later, co-operation first, autonomy later.

Model 2. radical nationalist: accumulation first, distribution later, bureaucracy first, mobilization later, autonomy first, cooperation later.

Model 3. revolutionary socialist; distribution first, accumulation later; mobilization first, bureaucracy socialist, distribution first first, cooperation later

He also suggests that the class character of the proponents of and the driving force behind, each strategy would be: for Model 1, modern upper class and middle class; for Model 2, middle class, especially from co-operative structures; for Model 3, working class.

The main thrust of Fossum's argument is that there is no single or all-exclusive model of development, and further, that there are many deficiencies in the much advertised 'liberal modernizing model'. He pointedly refers to the following shortcomings: (a) the assumption of collective goals and interest identity in society is untenable, resulting in a wrong conception of conflict, and a quantitative way of reasoning; (b) the model assumes too restricted a concept of politics; (c) the notion that politics is autonomous and that socio-economic factors enter almost exclusively as independent variables in the structure and functioning of the political system is misleading and lop-sided; and (d) the exclusion of the international class structure and specific foreign actors as determining factors in the politics of poor countries is fallacious because there is no insulated national political system.

Relating the two conceptual pairs accumulation-distribution (economic dimension) and bureaucracy-mobilization (political dimension) in each of the three models of development to the phenomenon of violence, one can draw up different patterns of societal violence and individual violence. It is assumed that in each of the models of development there are structural characteristics contributing to the use of force by the State, in defence of the 'values' cherished and maintained by the politically dominant class.

The accumulation of resources and capital for economic growth, and the distribution of goods and services for effecting social justice, procuring popular support and establishing legitimacy, entail an element of coercion, both in terms of organization and even more in the implementation of decisions. Resistance by certain strata and classes, active opposition or support by others, result in conflict and possible violence. In economic development the 'ends' have always overshadowed the 'means' in every system.

The pair in the political dimension, bureaucracy-mobilization, entails, among other things, controls, rules, the subordination of personal will to 'general will', both quantitative and qualitative restrictions, collectivization, etc. Such is the total away of States in each of the models (in our contemporary world) that citizens everywhere are faced within a 'maximal State', a new leviathan. The nature of structural violence may vary from model to model, and more specifically within submodels, but no child of man can escape the bondage of the all-powerful modern State. Sugata Dasgupta writes: 'Societal violence lies not so much in the use of the bayonets but in what the bayonets protect. This, according to Gandhi, is "exploitation", and exploitation to him is the supreme form of violence.'

In a highly interdependent world, the international dimension in its twin aspects, co-operation and autonomy, impinges most significantly on the comprehensive development process. Let us look here briefly at some aspects that impede international co-operation, weaken the autonomy of States, and accentuate the structure of violence at the international level.

The dismantling of the Western colonial system (begun in the wake of the Second World War) and the structuring of 'one world' by multiple ties of inter-dependence may or may not have a casual relationship. Yet it requires emphasis that precisely at the time when new States and the new nations of Asia, Africa and Oceania were gaining independence the world became perilously a interlinked, interlocked politico-economic unity. This was obviously the result of

many processes, which reached a point of maturity by the mid-twentieth century. They included the far-reaching revolution in communications and transport, active technological exchanges and transactions between States and countries, the emergence of a world market for basic raw materials and commodities, a phenomenal increase in world trade and investment, the growth of nuclear technology and the colossal defence structures of the big powers and power blocs, whose repercussions have been world-wide, and the emergence of a 'world consciousness' impelled particularly by the role and effectiveness of the United Nations and its many agencies. Gone are the days when nations and States could develop in comparative isolation, in voluntary insulation from the conflicts and tensions generated at the international level, or in autonomy from global concerns and problems. The 'international environment' became a determining factor, even in 'internal' or 'domestic' development.

But what is surprising, as Fossum points out, in that 'the most important effect of the international structures.. is the extent to which they (negatively) influence the possibility of attainment of desired values in the poor world, and values which the international system itself defines important, (such as) the striving for increased accumulation of wealth and the quest for education'. Development is frustrated by 'by the existence of the distributive mechanism inherent in the international structure. Implicitly..the amount of value taken out of the poor countries is far greater than what is invested in them'. And to top it all, 'not only are socio-economic dimensions basically determined by the international structure and the big powers, but also the functioning of the political system itself. It decides which groups are allowed to take power. It defines the limits of their actions, often in conjunction with the most conservative national groups..This is one of the vicious circles in which the poor countries find themselves'.

Six major factors that act as heavy constraints on the positive and balanced development of the poor countries eager to reconcile the principle of economic growth with that of social justice are: (a) inter-penetration of national economies by multinational corporations, (b) a six fold increase in twenty-five years (1950-75) in the volume of world exports and international transactions, (c) the phenomenal growth of international capital flows, ranging from direct investments to shifts of liquid balances, (d) the vigorous impact of international economic relations on national and (within nations) on sectoral economic relations; (e) the steep rise in oil prices, resulting in energy crises, inflationary conditions, economic disequilibrium and the crisis of the foreign exchange balances; and (f) a world

armaments race, resulting, on the one hand, in the spiralling of world military expenditure that diverts a significant proportion of world resources from aid to poor countries and from productive pursuits everywhere, and, on the other, in the ever-increasing expenditure by poor and developing countries on arms purchase and the diversion of their scarce resources from much-needed development to wasteful defence expenditures.⁸⁵

All this has contributed to the increase in the ever-widening gap between the developed and the developing. Over-consumption in the industrial countries has badly depleted, and contributes to the continuous depletion of the renewable and non-renewable resources of the world. For instance, the West (the United States, Canada and Western Europe), with 16.2 percent of the world's population, registers an energy consumption of 57 percent of the world total and the East (U.S.S.R and Eastern Europe), with 9.6 percent of the population, consumes 20.9 percent; while Asia, with 53.3 per cent of the population, consumes 9.8 per cent, and Africa and Latin America, with a total population of 17.5 per cent, consume just 6 per cent of the world's energy.

Violence in developing countries

Patterns of structural violence can be analysed in each of the socio-economic systems and situations indicated above, with due regard to the specific factors that differentiate them; but here, for illustrative purposes, we shall focus on certain aspects of violence in the developing countries.

Looking more closely at this problem, it becomes necessary to rectify the common impression that violence is the by-product of the developmental process, per se. The fact is that it is not development itself but the disequilibrium in development or what may be described as 'maldevelopment', that results in tensions, conflicts and violence.

Maldevelopment in the newly liberated, erstwhile colonial, poor and backward countries is the result of many forces. At the base is the appalling problem of poverty, inherited inequality and the lack of equal opportunity as a legacy of the tribal and feudal past. This legacy was prolonged by the colonial system, which not only allowed tribal and feudal hierarchies to survive and perpetuate unequal social relations that directly contributed to the perpetuation of poverty and kept the economies at low levels of performance, but also introduced a new form and higher level of exploitation, by transforming the indigenous traditional political and economic elite into an intermediate strata of collaborators in the colonial design of political domination and economic aggrandizement.

With the dawn of political independence, the dark night of poverty, inequality and exploitation has not vanished. On the contrary, in most parts of Asia and Africa, political independence has only transferred power to the dominant elite and, what is more, legitimized the political domination of the indigenous power elite in the name of the new national political order. The identity of class origin and the class interests of the political elite with the economic elite (the captains of business and industry and rich landlords) made the concentration of power and wealth in fewer hands quite a smooth and a 'spontaneous' operation. In any variant of authoritarian regimes, this process is facilitated, but even where 'liberal democracies' or constitutional governments have been established, the manipulation of politics and of economic policies and action to ensure the continuous hegemony of the incumbent elite groups and supporting classes has occurred within the framework of a parliamentary system, electoral politics, a constitution and laws, if possible, or, if necessary, through extra-constitutional methods, the suspension of parliaments and rights, the subversion of electoral process and so on.

The point to be noted is that the dominant competing parties, i.e. those capable of capturing and retaining power through the ballot box in liberal democracies in Asia and Africa, are really variations on the same theme, with more or less the same social and electoral base of support, and almost similar policy perspectives, the only differences being a change of leaders and minor divergences in political emphasis and policy priorities.

The task of ensuring development with social justice and the elimination of poverty becomes difficult if not impossible when resources are scarce or undeveloped and, in addition, there is low production, inadequate or obsolete technology and increasing demands by a steadily growing population, newly conscious of its political rights. In an unequal society, fragmented by tribal, caste, class or other cleavages, the 'maldevelopment' that means unequal opportunities in the competition for jobs, services, educational and social facilities and so on, aggravates group and class conflicts and accentuates individual frustration. While the rich have either remained poor or in some cases become even poorer because of the increasing gulf between the 'haves' and the 'have nots'.

The links between economic inequality and political violence have attracted the attention of some of the world's foremost 'politologists', from Aristotle to contemporary times. Sigelman and Simpson write:

Aristotle considered inequality to be the 'universal and chief cause' of revolutions, contending in Politics that 'inferiors revolt in order that they may be equal, and equals that they may be superiors'. Centuries later Madison, in The Federalist, characterized inequality in the distribution of property as the 'most common and durable' source of political faction. Still later, Engels argued that political violence results when political structures are not synchronised with socio-economic conditions.

In the same study, the authors take a global sample covering forty-nine nations, for which data on the following indicators were available: personal-income inequality, political violence, affluence, social mobility, socio-cultural heterogeneity, rate of social change and population size. They have tested four major hypothesis: (a) the greater the inequality in the national distribution of personal incomes, the greater the level of political violence; (b) the greater the national deviation in either direction from the midpoint of the income inequality scale, the greater the level of political violence; (c) the greater the national deviation in either direction from the mean of the distribution of national income inequality scores, the greater the level of political violence; and (d) the less extremely concentrated or dispersed the national distribution of personal incomes, the greater the level of political violence. While testing these hypotheses in diverse and varied social settings, and noting that 'the political implications of inequality may vary dramatically from impoverished to affluent nations', they state that 'we have...broad theoretical agreement that economic inequality begets political violence'.

New opportunities and openings in the political system increase political mobilization and participation. Economic interests and disputes get politicized, resulting in tensions, conflicts and violence. Intergroup disputes acquire the form of interethnic, interlingual, intercommunal, intercaste, intertribe, intercultural, or interclass conflicts, pursued by methods ranging from peaceful demonstrations, non-co-operation and parliamentary battles to street fights, stabbings, strikes, riots and civil violence. Sometimes these situations are transformed by active radical parties into congenial soil for ideological extremism and political militancy. Similarly, disputes and conflicts arising from regional disparities and economic imbalances within an administrative State or province can become focal points for militant mobilization. Regional and subregional movements, in many parts of the Third World, have resulted in violent conflicts that have rocked even stable governments.

Shortfalls in the performance of the system-indicated by indices like price rise, an increasing unemployment and under-employment (even of educated and skilled personnel), inflationary conditions contributing to a decline in already weak purchasing power, failure to overcome famine or near-famine conditions, default in implementing land reforms and production-boosting schemes in agriculture and industry, failure to solve labour-management, disputes peacefully and to maintain disciplining in schools and colleges, an increasing impression of administrative inefficiency and corruption in the bureaucracy and among the political elite, and so on become breeding grounds of discontent that are soon politicized and transformed into militant demogogy followed by large-scale conflict and organized violence.

COLLECTIVE VIOLENCE, LAW & ORDER AND POLICE

KRISHNA MOHAN MATHUR.

Violence can be defined as the illegal employment of methods of physical coercion, excessive, unjustified and unrestrained force, out-range, profanation or injury. The essence of violence is the infliction of uncalled for injury on other people, this injury may be mental or physical, violence can also be defined as the "illegal employment of methods of physical coercion for personal or group ends." Violence manifests itself in several ways and in varying degrees and is not infrequently, the most vital element which shapes decisions in present day society. Agitations, hartals, strikes, bandhs, gheraos, insurgencies, fasts, self-immolations, coercive public protests, all constitute integral parts of the syndrome of violence. Communal riots, linguistic agitations, labour strikes, demonstrations, looting and arson, assault and stabbing, tampering of tele-communication, attacks on tram cars, buses, petrol pumps, brick-battling, bayonet attack, shooting with fire-arms, attacks on police, destruction of public property are the main forms of violence which are committed in present day society. Unfortunately, violence according to professor Sidney Hook, accompanies most mass movements today for three important reasons- firstly, violence is dramatic and concentrates the attention of the community; secondly, violence is an involuntary act under the impulse of crowd mind in the face of resistance and in a sensitive situation any appearance of resistance is enough to spark off violence. "Any systematic and consistent refusal to use violence, no matter how extreme the provocation, would doom every movement of social reform to futility if it were faced by an intransigent foe whose liberty of action was not bound by the fetish of non-resistance." (1). Violence is a universal phenomenon and is present in some degree and in some form in every kind of social arrangement. Violence symbolizes the outward manifestation of participation of a newly awakened political group into the world of politics and at times violence acts as a "Danger Signal." (2). Violence makes the community "see" a socio-political evil and draws the attention of the political leaders in a powerful and dramatic way to the community's deep seated feelings of disgust and frustration. Violence serves as a "storm signal" on the political horizon and is often the "mid-wife" of change as the history of chartism in England shows. Mass violence provides a tension - release to pent up mass frustration and an escape from the boredom of disgusting human existence. As Bernard Crick puts it, "Boredom is the only illegitimate child of conformity and physical violence becomes its inevitable bastard." Criminal violence, suicides, murders riots and civil disorders are various forms of violent human behaviours.

The Roots of Collective Violence-

Professor Sidney Hook has enumerated three reasons for collective violence in mass movements. Firstly Group Violence is dramatic and concentrates the attention of the community by making a powerful emotional appeal to the heroic sentiments of sacrifice, honour and courage. Secondly, whatever the nature of the social process, its ultimate constituents consist of a series of individual actions by individual men driven under the impulse of "Crowd-mind" or "group-mind". Thirdly, "the threats of violence have won occasional concessions which would hardly have been granted out of admiration for the non-resistant spirit". Violence is often the "mid-wife of change" and the history of all countries show that violence is a universal phenomenon. Violence make the society "see" a social evil. Violence acts as a "Danger signal" and group violence, not infrequently, serves as a "storm signal" on the political horizon.

The gap between the rich and the poor has undoubtedly increased growing frustration and sense of deprivation among the poor and the weaker sections giving rise to the militant class war psychology. Rising expectations, mass poverty, inadequate housing, rising prices of essential commodities combined with universal suffrage and rapid politicization of the masses provide an explosive environment for group violence. Unplanned growth of large industrial cities with their vast slums, their insanitary conditions and their uprooted humanity provide another breeding ground for group violence. The anonymity of enslummed urban masses serves as an effective cover for group violence. Radicalism whether of the Right or the left finds it easy to foment group violence. Group violence quickly mobilizes the energies of the people; it is interesting to participate in; the anonymity of the crowd gives the participants a sense of security, group violence provides a tension-release to put up frustrations, they provide an escape from the boredom of existence and a refreshing distraction in the unventful dull life of the urban masses. Violence manifests itself in several ways and in varying degrees.

Collective violence posing threat to law and order can be conveniently categorised into the following-

1. Communal Violence.
2. Caste Violence.
3. Industrial labour unrest.
4. Separatist movement and insurgency causing violence including Ethnic violence

5. Political terrorism causing violence.
6. Agrarian tensions and riots.
7. Student violence.
8. Election violence and political violence like anti-reservation violence.
9. Dacoities and group violence
10. Apparently transient disturbances and violence including linguistic violence.

Violence within the context of law and order is generally limited to rioting as defined under section 146 I.P.C. Sectarian violence, whether perpetrated in the name of caste religion, region or language is different from class conflict.

Causes of Violence:-

While individual violence may be explained in terms of deviant behaviour, the collective violence is reflected in racial riots, communal disturbances, insurgencies and wars between communities and nations. Social scientists conceptualize the conflict situations ultimately resulting in violence in terms of four concepts of "prejudice, discrimination, social tension and social violence." Most frequently prejudice and discrimination mutually reinforce each other as in the case of high caste and weaker sections or between two language groups (Bengali & Assamese). The various theories explaining the phenomenon of violence in man are as under:-

Biological theory: It stipulates that human violence is instinctive- as is the violent behaviour of animals or that it is caused by genetic irregularities. According to Konard Lorenz while many animals kill for food, only rats and humans kill their own kind in anger. (3).

Anthropological theory: Anthropologists account for violence by stressing the different cultural norms generally termed as "sub-culture differences" which govern the functioning of one group within a society against another. Feelings of frustration and injustice in ethnic minorities, religious groups and certain sections of society ultimately lead to violence.

Psychological theory: According to Freud, the death instinct is centred in the "Id" (the unconscious reservoir of instinctual, biological drives) and must be controlled by the "Ego" (the self) and the "Super Ego" (that portion of mind concerned with the social norms). Freud believed that violence is linked to a human impulse to return to the inorganic state known as the death instinct.(4). In another psychological theory propounded by Erich Fromm, human aggression stems from the character of individual personalities. The three potentially aggressive personality types are characterized in Fromm's theory: "the Sadistic" who compensates for real or imagined impotence by seeking absolute control over others; "the Necrophiliac" who is driven to destruction and annihilation by hatred for life and "the bored" who displays a lack of interest not only in other people and things but in himself as well. (5). Seeds of violence are planted early in life by incidents in individual's personal life history.

The Social Learning theory: Albert Bandura and Richard Walters have formulated a social learning theory of aggression that focuses on the initiation, especially by children of aggressive role models to which they are exposed. Violent behaviour is acquired by man merely by watching and imitating the violent behaviour of others and it is a learned behaviour.

The Frustration Aggression theory: The frustration aggression theory maintains that violent behaviour results from the frustration of purposeful activity.(6). Violent behaviour is the result of the interference which is caused to an on-going activity and interference causes frustration which in turn leads to violence.

Sociological theory: P.K.Paul, in his article "Why do People Riot" has held that human violence is the result of (a) a severe conflict of social values between the dominant and minority groups; (b) a hostile belief system held by the aggrieved group based considerably on reality; (c) a failure of communication between the aggrieved and dominant groups of a society and (d) a failure in social control resulting from either over-control or under-control"(7). Weber argued that the legitimate use of violence is restricted to the state. A great deal of the violence in our society is related to fundamental and deep-seated value conflicts. From the sociological view point, violence is the out-come of many variables of a social order. In this classic study "suicide", Emile Durkheim observed that so long as society remains unchanged, the number of egoistic, altruistic and anomic suicides remain the same. (8).

Neil J. Smelser has enumerated the following six essential conditions for violent collective behaviour in his book "The theory of collective Behaviour":-

1. Structural Conduciveness
2. Structural Strain
3. A generalised belief System
4. Precipitating factors
5. Mobilisation for action by leaders
6. Ineffective social control

Relative Deprivation theory: One of the major exponents of relative deprivation theory defines relative deprivation as:

"Actors' perception of discrepancy between their value expectations and their environment's apparent value capabilities. Value expectations are the goods and conditions of life to which people believe they are justifiably entitled. The referents of value capabilities are to be found largely in the social and physical environment: they are the conditions that determine people's perceived chances of getting or keeping the values they legitimately expect to obtain." (8-a).

A sense of suddenly worsening deprivation, injustice or oppression, is often a major precondition of violence. De-tocqueville, in L'Ancien Regime et la Revolution, was probably the first to articulate this hypothesis:

"It is not always by going from bad to worse that a country falls into a revolution. It happens most frequently that a people, which had supported the most crushing laws without complaint, and apparently as if they were unfelt, throws them off with violence as soon as the burden begins to be diminished. The state of things destroyed by a revolution is almost always somewhat better than that which immediately preceded it; and experience has shown that the most dangerous moment for a bad government is usually that when it enters upon the work of reform.... The evils which were endured with patience so long as they were inevitable seem intolerable as soon as a hope can be entertained of escaping from them. The abuses which are removed seem to lay bare those which remain, and to render the sense of them more acute; the evil has decreased, it is true, but the perception of the evil is more keen." (8-b).

Four basic models of relative deprivation have been explored and refined by modern theorists: (8-c) -(i) capabilities remaining static while expectations rise; (ii) rising capabilities overtaken by rising expectations; (iii) the so-called J-curve situation, in which capabilities keep pace with expectations for a period and then suddenly drop behind; and (iv) general socio-economic malaise which may cause a dramatic fall in capabilities while expectations remain constant. Some writers on relative deprivation theory shrewdly broaden their concept of deprivation to encompass values and rights. Felix Gross, for example, gives high priority to the role of mass perceptions of ethnic and political oppression and injustices, and he argues that historically it is periods of intense politico-ideological tensions rather than those marked by inequalities which are most conducive to violence. (8-d).

MultiCausative theory: We frankly recognise the lack of any adequate general scientific theory of the necessary and sufficient conditions for constantly recurring in the recorded history of conflict and challenging both our attention and our powers of explanation and analysis: (i) ethnic conflicts, hatreds, discrimination and oppression (ii) religious and ideological conflicts, hatreds, discrimination and oppression; (iii) socio-economic relative deprivation (iv) stresses and strains of rapid modernisation tending to accentuate; (8-3) (v) perceived political inequalities, infringements of rights, injustice or oppression; (vi) lack of adequate channels for peaceful communication of protests, grievances and demands (eg. denial of franchise or other rights of participation, representation or access to media); (vii) existence of a tradition of violence, disaffection and popular turbulence; (viii) the availability of a revolutionary leadership equipped with a potentially attractive ideology; (8-f) (ix) weakness and ineptness of the government, police and judicial organs (eg. under-reaction, over-reaction); (x) erosion of confidence in the regime, its values and institutions afflicting all levels of the population including the government; (xi) deep divisions within governing elites and leadership groups. (8-g).

The Anatomy of Violence-

David H. Bayley has analysed the anatomy of public violence in India & categorised it into three categories: a) The violence of Remonstrance; (b) The violence of confrontation & (c) The violence of Frustration. (9). David H. Bayley has summarised the attributes of each major form of violence as under the following nine headings: (See Appx. 'A').

Procession and public meetings, hartals and strikes, fasts, courting of arrests, riots, are various forms which exhibit violence of Remonstrance. Communal riots, and violence against weaker sections fall into category of the violence of confrontation. Burning of buses and trains, student violence, looting of fair price-shops, hijacking of buses, sabotage, political murders etc. fall in the category of the violence of Frustration. "In India, whether violence comes from remonstrance or confrontation, much of its momentum comes from frustration as the circle of participants widens."

The rickshaw drivers, holligans, street urchins and unemployed youngmen join not because they identify with the initial cause but because violence appeals to their personal predicament." (10).

Pathology of Violence-

The law and order administration has to understand the pathology of mass violence and must answer relevant questions pertaining to each dimension of violence. First- There are politico-economic- social agitations which result in mass violence. The second manifestation of violence is that of Communal riots between minority and majority and majority groups between weaker sections and upper sections of the society. The third manifestation of violence is that of students and younger group. The fourth dimension of violence, is that of insurgents of Nagaland, Mizoram and Manipur and Naxalite violence of political extremists. The fifth manifestation of violence is that which is indulged by the armed gangs of dacoits and out-laws of Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh & U.P. The latest form of violence is that of terrorists and extremists and urban guerrillas. Organised, calculated and brutal violence by small groups is the most disturbing features of the contemporary political scene in India and buses and trains, posts and telegraphs, the government property, telephone exchange, university and college premises are the usual targets. Unfortunately one of the attractions of mass violence is the capacity of violence to dramatize and intensify the issue. Mass violence has become a national phenomenon in India. "Today violence erupts in all parts of the country - organised and massive in the cities, sporadic and individual in the villages -- but the character and causes of violence are not the same everywhere. There are similarities between the Communist-led, secular, organised violence of Bombay and Calcutta; linguistic and regional violence as in Bombay in 1956 and Mysore in 1966; tradition-rooted violence as in Madras under D.M.K. inspiration in 1965 and the anti-cow-slaughter agitation in Delhi in 1966.(1) Mass violence by hostiles/insurgents in Nagaland, Mizoram and Manipur and Naxalites movement in West Bengal, Adhra & Orissa also form part of the national phenomenon."

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Political Violence-

The immediate causes of political violence in the country in the recent past are mainly (1) increasing political instability; (2) sharply deteriorating economic conditions of the people; (3) rise in and spread of consciousness among the people that they are not getting justice; (4) gradual break of links between the political parties and people (many of the agitations taking place outside the framework of the political parties); (5) nearly complete collapse of the party system (horse-trading is the main feature) and (6) increasing dependence of the Government upon police and armed forces to maintain itself.

political violence, according to Paul Wilkinson, "is either the deliberate infliction or threat of physical injury or damage for political ends or it is violence which occurs unintentionally in the course of severe political conflicts." Political violence is very difficult to classify and analyse because it frequently involves the inter-action and effects of the actions of a whole group or a whole community involving a multi-plicity of motivations, political considerations, psychological effects and subjective evaluations. Mass political violence can be in the shape of Riots or street violence, armed rebellion or resistance, state or mass terror and repression, civil war, limited war, revolution or counter-revolution depending on the intensity of violence.. Small group political violence can be found in the shape of isolated acts of sabotage of attacks on property, isolated assassination attempts, political gang warfare and feuds, political terrorism, localised or small scale guerrilla operations, international or transnational terrorism and guerrilla raids on foreign states. (11-a). Acts of political violence can be murder, kidnapping and other forms of terrorism such as bombs, arson and robbery. Political violence is a singularly clumsy and ambiguous mode of communication and it is extremely difficult for its promoters and perpetrators to control it once it is started. Most political violence serves both instrumental and expressive functions simultaneously but unfortunately the immediate physical effects of political violence- death, maiming, destruction - are irreversible and cannot be atoned. Paul Wilkinson has classified the types of political violence by general aims or purposes in the following nine categories: (11-b).|

Types

General Aims or Purposes

- | | | |
|----|--|---|
| 1. | Inter Communal | Defence or furtherance of alleged group interests in conflicts with rival ethnic or religious groups. |
| 2. | Remonstrative | Expression of anger and protest: can be used to persuade Govt. to remedy grievances. |
| 3. | Prætorian (men of like rank a member of emperors body-guards) | Used to coerce change in government leadership and policy. |
| 4. | Repression/Retributive | Quelling actual or potential opposition and dissent. |
| 5. | Resistance | To oppose and prevent a Govt. establishing authority and executing its laws. |
| 6. | Terroristic | Use of systematic murder and destruction, or threats of murder and destruction to terrorise targets or victims into conceding the terrorists political aims. |
| 7. | Revolutionary | Overthrow of existing political system and its replacement by a new regime; note that leaders of this type of violence are often prepared to exploit all types of political violence including war. |
| 8. | Counter-Revolutionary | |
| 9. | War | To gain political ends by means of military victory over opponents. |

Types of political violence mentioned above however are rarely to be found in their pure form in the real world and in most countries inter-communal, remonstrative prætorian and repressive violence have wrought endemic instability to the liberal states. Unfortunately, criminal gangs and anti-social elements often exploit political violence.

Police Violence-

According to David Burnham, the use of violent force by the police can be divided into four sometimes overlapping categories "First the violent force the state legislature has authorised the police to use while making an arrest. Second the violent force that is tacitly authorised by either public or police tradition to handle such offenders as the sex criminals or the "cop fighter". Third the violence used by those policemen who enjoy hurting others. Fourth the violence that erupts when policemen become afraid or are under great physical or mental stress.(12). The fourth kind of violent force erupts during public riots, demonstrations and agitations when policemen are subject to brick bats and mental strain. Police have developed a sub-culture of violence and Westley's most significant finding is that at least 37 per cent of the policemen believe that it was legitimate to use violence to coerce respect.(13). Barkley, referring to socio-cultural factors prevailing in America has said: "If the American Police are prone to use violent and repressive tactics, American society offers them the means and the climate to do so. (14) Indian society can be compared well with the American society in the acceptance and even glorification of violence as a way to solve problems. Use of third degree methods of police interrogation, police firings on mobs and rioting crowds, police arrogance in behaviour and police handling of Naxalites, Dacoits and Insurgents in so-called encounters- all these things bring police violence as a prominent feature of police sub-culture. Dr. Nelson Watson, a psychologist on the staff of International Association of Chiefs of Police noted: "The very fact that police are the only group authorised by the state to use force tends to attract the occasional men who like to use it". In his study of the police Dr. Westley said that he found a small number of policemen "who are clearly sadists, who frequently commit brutalities repugnant to the rest of the police". However, Dr. Hans Toch, has held the view that "there are no sadists -just weak and stupid policemen who distort the hell out of the way the police normally operate". Some psychologists justify police violence as a reaction of physical fear and emotional discomforts of policemen. Dr. Spiegel has said- "Most cops don't have any education, they are inarticulate. At some time when police are faced by a crowd or mob fear erupts and the individual policeman no longer seems to be able to discriminate and he strikes. Out at any one near him." Police training tactics and the direction given by the top commanders are considered extremely important factors in reducing police violence. Unfortunately, the government always honours those policemen who had gun-battles with armed criminals

but not those who carry out non-violent arrest of a notorious violent criminal or those who tactfully prevent or control a violent riot without use of force or police violence. This government attitude also indirectly supports police violence as a police sub-culture. The suppression of mass violence always generates more violence on the part of the government and unfortunately official violence has, according to Dr. P.D. Sharma, provoked popular violence in a non-violent society like India. The administration of order has to view, according to Dr. P.D. Sharma, "and understand the concept of 'bilateral violence' in the context of existing class structure of Indian society and has to respect each life, whether it is that of the labourer or that of the police sub-inspector". (15).

Police Response-

Collective violence in India could be categorised in three broad categories pertaining to communal, educational and political economic issues. A violent bandh poses the question of protection of public and private property and maintenance of law and order in the society. The Govt. is placed in such situations in an unenviable position because if organisers of bandh are detained, the Govt. is branded as undemocratic and if it avoids confrontation, violence and lawlessness rule the society and organisers describe the bandhs as a total success. If police force is used to quell violence, press splash bold headlines about the orgy of police: Violence of the peaceful demonstrators; if police has orders to use restraint, it is blamed for inefficiency and inaction. The dangers posed by the problems of lawless and group violence require, inter alia, evolving or proper strategies in regard to law and order administration. (16). The police administration normally responds to public violence in the following ways:

1. Imposition of section 144, or clamping of curfew;
2. Rounding up of a few miscreants and starting prosecuting against those involved in violent activities;
3. Declaring assemblies as unlawful and dispersing them by use of force - use of teargas, lathi and ultimately firing.

The police have an impressive armoury of laws that they can use to control and head off violence. Section 30 of Indian police Act, Section 145 of Indian Penal Code, Section 106, 107, 151, 144, 145, 55, 109 of code of criminal procedure the preventive Detention Act 1950. However the first requirement for effectively dealing with the violence is adequate intelligence violence resulting from public remonstrance is describable

in advance but police intelligence has to be well trained, vigilant and alive to the situation. Violence of confrontation can also be anticipated by signs of tensions building up in the community but violence of frustration is almost totally unpredictable. The job of regulating crowds and monitoring them for incipient violence is most arduous, continual and extremely difficult. "The police often feel like fire watchers in a dry region, when the forests are like tinders and one careless act by a single individual may cause a holocaust beyond hope of containing. (17).

The existence of violence in public life thrusts the police into the limelight of public attention in an invidious role. Unfortunately police action against public violence generally results in scandals about police excesses and police atrocities (zulums). Remarking on the charge of police brutality Pandit Jawahar Lal Nehru said in Lok Sabha in 1956: "The poor police is so used to being kicked and cuffed like that and always condemned. It is easy to make a charge against the police.... let us punish the policeman when he is guilty or anybody else when he is guilty. But the stone thrower becomes a hero and is taken out in procession - may be - and the poor policeman who gets the stone on his head is a person who is guilty of zulum or atrocities." (Lok Sabha Debates). Due to a number of factors police are uncertain and sometimes hesitant in their handling of violent criminals and agitators. "The handling of violence is without question", as has rightly remarked by David Bayley, "the most contentious area of police activity". Increasing violence of extremist groups of society cannot be adequately dealt by the ordinary police. Better trained, alert and professionally competent armed policemen are required to deal with increasing violence. Special combat troops like commandos are required to head off violence in our society. Hijackers cannot be handled by ordinary policemen, we need highly trained young police commandos to deal with them. Hard core insurgents, can be contained, isolated and defeated by specially trained police Commandos. Government of India has taken a bold decision to train young CRP Officers for police Commando duties at Internal Security Academy, at Mount Abu (Rajasthan).

The most basic tasks of police in dealing with collective violence are as under:-

- (1) Intervene in gang conflicts and violent situations by effective interposing.
- (2) Collect evidence, apprehend suspects and testify in courts.
- (3) Gather intelligence on various activities to prevent them by timely arrests

- (4) Confiscate weapons and explosives/ammunition and carry out effective show of force.
- (5) Obtain information about members, territories and impending violence.
- (6) Carry out effective patrolling and surveillance
- (7) Riot control schemes be kept up-to-date and carry out the same whenever needed.
- (8) Take out heat and fury of the situation by effective crisis Management.
- (9) Police must endeavour to use an absolute minimum of force in dealing with violence.
- (10) The state and federal government should be approached to provide facilities to develop non-lethal control devices for use in violent disorders.
- (11) Mechanical agents like rubber bullets, wooden bullets, fabric bullets, plastic projectiles and high powered water jets should be developed to supplement conventional lethal firearms for controlling violence.
- (12) Police must avoid "brutality" while dealing with violent situations and must exhibit a high degree of self control during their efforts to moderate and contain violence.
A high degree of training, motivation and self control is needed for such behaviour by the police.

Whenever possible in controlling violence, authoritarian "peacekeeping" should be supplemented by "humanitarian peace-keeping" which should be characterized by openness, informality, flexibility and under-reaction. Police should rely primarily on conversation, persuasion, and social science knowledge about human behaviour. The following techniques can be used for resolving conflicts and violent situations:-

- 1) Assemble leaders from opposing groups for negotiations and truce talks in a peaceful atmosphere.
- 2) Appeal to moral values and ideals and make pleas for understanding cooperation and forgiveness among the warring violent groups.
- 3) Dispel false impressions and disseminate accurate information about groups and thus reduce tensions and hostile belief system.
- 4) Divert energies away from collective goals to individual goals.

- 5) Bring opposing groups together to share pleasant activities such as dance, rock concerts, picnics etc.
- 6) Persuade conflicting groups to develop healthy atmosphere of trust and cooperation.
- 7) The vicious cycle of misunderstanding, protests and violent reactions should be broken by resolving inter-group conflicts.
- 8) The show of force by the police can at times have great psychological impact in management of violent situations.

Violence, Disturbance of public order and requirements for special law-

As observed by National Police Commission in its third report, increasing violence is seen as the most disturbing feature of the contemporary law and order situation in the country. Mass media particularly news-papers frequent report details of violent incidents involving large groups of agitators who clash with the police while articulating some issue of discontent and frustration. Violent crime like murder, dacoity, robbery, rape, kidnapping, abduction and riots have increased at a very fast rate during the last three decades due to rising prices, growing unemployment, poverty, increasing migration to cities, growth of city slums, inadequate and irregular services and the stresses and strains of daily life. Population growth, urbanisation, communal clashes, group conflicts, extremist activities have added to the growth of violence in the contemporary society. Criminal liability of individuals participating in group violence is difficult to establish under the existing laws. Article 352 of the Indian constitution read with 42nd amendment has made it possible for emergency provisions to be restricted to a part of the country which may be threatened by internal disturbances. There is a definite need for an effective law to deal with violence and disturbances of public order. The National Police Commission has recommended special laws which should provide for-

- (i) notification of any specific area disturbed by widespread disorder and breach of peace as a 'proclaimed area' to which certain provisions of the Act will apply;
- (ii) suitable definitions of 'riotous mob', 'instigator', 'public property' and 'sabotage' to identify crimes connected with them;
- (iii) control over movements of persons in the proclaimed area;
- (iv) tighter control over possession and use of arms and explosives;

- (v) externment of bad characters from a specified area;
- (vi) preventive detention for a period not exceeding three months;
- (vii) attachment of criminal liability to instigators for unlawful acts committed by riotous mobs on their instigation;
- (viii) Special Courts to deal with offences under the Act as also other specified offences;
- (ix) presumption regarding culpable mental state unless rebutted by the accused;
- (x) presumptions regarding some aspects of evidence arising from documents;
- (xi) tightening the provisions regarding 'bail'; and
- (xii) fixing time limits for the completion of investigations and commencement of proceedings in court.

CONCLUDING REMARKS-

Violence is increasing in modern society and mass media and cinema are partly responsible for its excessive popularity. The social control institutions like family, school and college education, religion and ethical value-system have failed to contain and control the increasing violence. Police of future will have to deal with more and more violent agitations and incidents of social unrest. In all state police headquarters a policy planning cell should be created to work out the long range strategies of police policy towards violent disorders and political agitations. Intelligence set up of the police organisations has to be geared up for collection of social intelligence about volatile groups and extremist organisations. Special training to the police forces to deal with violence should be arranged for all levels of police officers. During police operations against communal violence, student unrest and industrial disputes, police must act impartially, firmly and in a very humane manner. Damage of public property should be minimised by effective police intervention. The scope of section 435 I.P.C. should be widened to cover all conceivable means employed in the damage of public property in India and deterrent punishments should be prescribed under section 425 I.P.C. for those who carry out violent activities. The organisers of public protests should be made responsible for damage of property by suitable amendment in existing laws. Police should be given adequate training and orientation to build up healthy public relations so that citizens may come forward to help the police in dealing with violent agitators. All police officers of the rank of station house officers and above should be permitted

to hold press conferences and issue press briefings so that no rumours come out in newspaper. Massmedia should be used effectively to build up public opinion against violence and extremist activities. The culture of Reception rooms should permeate the police stations to educate the citizens about the problems and dilemma of police life and safeguard police image from distortion. Public must come to assist police by giving timely information and all possible assistance in police operations against volatile groups. Police officers should be actively associated in all programmes of rehabilitation of victims. The police brutalities and lawlessness can be reduced by effective intra-departmental and organisational control. Organisational control of police involves matters like quality of new entrants, their basic training, subsequent in-service training, attitudinal orientation, organisational culture, etc. Modernisation of police, provision of adequate resources, sound deployment strategy and effective leadership can go a long way in building up an enlightened police force which alone can deal with violence in a correct manner as is required in a democratic society.

APPENDIX 'A'

THE ANATOMY OF VIOLENCE

(D.H. BAYLE: THE POLICE & POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN INDIA P. 255)

| Occasion | Target | Catalytic Agent | Organisation | Duration of growth | Visibility of growth | Manner of growth | Participants | Location |
|----------------------------------|---------------|-----------------------|------------------|------------------------------|----------------------|------------------|-----------------------------------|-----------------|
| 1. The violence of remonstrance | Authority | Police | Organised | Prolonged | Clear | Definable | Modern social & political groups. | Urban |
| 2. The violence of confrontation | Private group | Another private group | loose & informal | Indeterminable | Not visible | Indefinable | Informal traditional groups. | Primarily rural |
| 3. The Violence of Frustration | Society | Impersonal experience | None | Short, abrupt, instantaneous | clear | Indefinable | Any one | Urban |

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THE DIFFUSION OF COLLECTIVE VIOLENCE*

BRIAN L. PITCHER, ROBERT L. HAMBLIN AND JERRY
L.L. MILLER

University of Arizona

American Sociological Review 1978,
Vol. 43 (February) 23-35

Past explanations of violence have characteristically paid more attention to the issues of social conditions and psychocultural stimuli than to the issue of timing. Timing is the focus of this paper in which a differential equation model of the temporal diffusion of violence is developed. This model is derived from behavioural generalizations which indicate that aggression is both instigated and inhibited via direct and vicarious learning. The parameters of the model provide measures of the instigation and inhibition processes that take place throughout an outbreak. Twenty-five data sets representing a wide variety of collective outbreaks of violence are used to test the empirical fit and to evaluate the credibility of the assumptions of the model. The model describes the overtime distribution of incidents quite accurately and the assumptions and implications of the derivation appear to be consistent with the cultural conditions surrounding the outbreaks.

One basic shortcoming of research on causes of violence is the assumption of independence among incidents. This assumption overlooks the fact that present actions are to a certain degree affected by the outcomes of actions experienced in the past, either directly or vicariously. Explanations that simply identify different social conditions which cause violence, such as social disorganization (Downes, 1968), absolute deprivation (Lupsha, 1969), political structure (Lieberman and Silverman, 1965), organizational capacity (Shorter and Tilly, 1974; Snyder, 1975) and social conflict (Sears and Tomlinson, 1968) or that specify different psychocultural stimuli of violence such as relative deprivation (Gurr, 1968; Caplan and Paige, 1968), rising expectations (Davies, 1969), alienation-powerlessness (Kerner, 1968), internal-external control (Gurr, 1970) and normative or value conflicts (Spiegel, 1971) are incomplete.

* This is a revision of a paper presented at the International Workshop on Comparative Ecological Analysis of Social Change, Ljubljana, Yugoslavia, August, 1976. The research was supported by Grant SOC 75-08448 from the National Science Foundation. The specification of the nature and functional form of the model was mainly done by the second author. The author wishes to thank their colleague, Michael Hout, for reading the manuscript and making a number of helpful criticisms and suggestions. An in-house reviewer gave an earlier version of the manuscript a careful reading and produced three pages of queries which helped us considerably in the revision. We are very appreciative of that effort and expertise.

They fail to take into account the time related social learning processes that mediate the impact of these factors.

A number of researchers have analyzed time-series data to investigate cyclical outbreaks of various kinds of violence (c.f. Denton and Phillips, 1968; Huff and Lutz, 1974. Li and Thompson, 1975; Lieberman and Silverman, 1965; Shorter and Tilly, 1974; Synder, 1975; Synder and Kelly, 1976; Spilerman, 1970; 1971; Tilly et al. 1975). Some have discussed possible interdependency or contagion effects, and a few (Huff and Lutz, 1974; Li and Thompson, 1975; Midlarsky, 1970) have attempted to measure and evaluate contagion processes. Spilerman (1970; 1971), for example, produced strong evidence that the probability of contagion in the U.S. urban riots was proportional to the population size of relevant units. However, social contagion has not been rigorously conceptualized in terms of social learning processes where individuals are instigated and inhibited by the outcomes of others' violent actions.

The purposes of this paper are to develop a differential equation model of the diffusion process inherent in most outbreaks of violence and to evaluate the adequacy of the model and its implications. The adequacy will be judged by: (1) empirically fitting it to data on a variety of outbreaks of violence; (2) comparing the fit of alternative differential equation models derived using different inhibition terms; (3) examining the congruence between the model's assumptions and known facts about particular outbreaks and (4) discussing the reasonability and meaning of the parameter estimates.

THEORY

Violence may be defined as any activity which results in the nonaccidental physical damage of persons or property. It generally, if not always, occurs in a conflict situation where two or more parties contest to settle an issue in their own favor. There are several kinds of contests (e.g. legal and political, as well as violent). In a violent conflict, the parties damage each others persons and property until one is destroyed, concedes the issue, or a compromise or stalemate is reached. Some violence is individual as when a husband beats his wife. Other violence may be organized as when two or more armies battle each other. Collective violence is a mixture of the two - unorganized individuals, collectivities or organizations involved in a battle over time against a common foe (the country, the establishment, the government, adults, blacks, or jews, for example). It involves social contagion wherein the units are instigated and inhibited by the information they receive through time about one another's behaviour and its consequences. Hence, the modifier collective here implies a population of units separated in time and space and influencing one another as they act together on the basis of secondhand information and without hierarchical leadership.

Collective Violence as Cultural Diffusion

It has been suggested (Huff and Lutz, 1974) that the logistic model of cultural diffusion (Dodd, 1953; 1955; Griliches, 1957; Coleman et al., 1966) explains why violent incidents usually accumulate in a sigmoid pattern. However, a careful analysis reveals four serious problems with this formulation.

First, the mechanism in the logistic model is communication by salesmen and admen, and people who have already adopted and experienced the benefits and costs (cf. Coleman et al., 1966). In contrast, the probable mechanism for outbreaks of collective violence is much more subtle; imitation or vicarious learning usually based on news media reports of violence and its consequences occurring in other parts of the nation or world (Archer and Gartner, 1976; Spilerman, 1976).

Second, while the cumulative curves of collective violence are sigmoid, many violate an essential condition of Dodd's (1953; 1955) and Coleman et al.'s (1966) logistic theory; the units of the populations which generate them are seldom, if ever, in direct communication with one another. Consequently, the redundancy of contacts cannot explain the later slowing of the accumulation that results in the sigmoid pattern. According to the Coleman et al. (1966) theory, without direct communication among units in the population, the data should take a decaying exponential shape, not the sigmoid pattern which all exhibit.

Third, the logistic diffusion distribution results when each unit's adoption or first use of the invention is counted, whereas the sigmoid curves of collective violence are generated by actors who often participate more than once. For example, in the sigmoid outbreaks of coups d'etat among countries in Africa, 1960-1975, one of the units (Dahomy) produced at least one coup during each of seven years.

Fourth, while the violence data are more or less sigmoid, they are not all symmetric. This asymmetry excludes the logistic model from serious consideration since it is always symmetrical. The suggestion by Hamblin et al. (1973)

1. The logistic is symmetrical because it is assumed that the rate of adoption is a constant. If, alternatively, it is assumed that this rate changes through time, the model becomes asymmetrical (Hennets, 1972). This necessitates the introduction of an additional parameter. Generally the asymmetric Logistic is not preferred over more parsimonious models, such as the Gompertz, unless the fit to the data is consistently and significantly better.

that a logistic model of innovation describes outbreaks of violence may be rejected for the same reason.

For the above reasons, it appears that the nature and mechanisms of the diffusion of collective violence are not isomorphic with those of general cultural diffusion and that an alternative model is needed.

Mechanisms of Collective Violence Diffusion

There have been a number of suggestions (cf. Turner and Killian, 1972) regarding specific mechanisms for the spread or diffusion of collective behavior; suggestibility, circular reaction, identification and, as noted, imitation. While all of these may have some merit, the imitation mechanism has enjoyed by far the most theoretical and empirical investigation, with most of the recent developments pioneered by Albert Bandura (cf. 1977) and his colleagues.

Imitation or modeling involves vicarious learning, By watching others working the environment or by talking with them about their experiences, people are made aware of reinforcing consequences, and thereby learn what works and what does not work. However, according to Bandura's (1973) experimental results, learning is not to be confused with behaving. A subject may have vicariously learned that a particular behaviour produces a specific reinforcement. Yet, to engage regularly in that behaviour the subject ordinarily must frequently encounter the same cues, observe models who legitimate the behavior and personally try the behaviour and experience the reinforcing consequences. Evidence from several experiments suggests that overt aggression occurs with substantial frequency only when people are threatened in a conflict situation and observe a model successfully aggressing against the source of threat, the other party in the conflict. The threat without the aggressing model or the aggressing model without the threat produces minimal aggression (Wheeler and Caggiula, 1966; Hanratty et al, 1972). Other experimental data (cf. Bandura et al., 1963; Gilmore, 1971) show that in a threatening conflict the observers' aggressive behaviour increases as the success of the model's aggression increases (where success is defined as resolving the issue in favor of the model and model's getting by without punishment).

The Mathematical Derivation

In large scale outbreaks of collective violence much observational learning evidently occurs secondhand, via reports and descriptions in the mass media. By attentively following news media accounts of incidents of violence, units affected by the conflict become familiar with the methods and innovations used by both the units who have thus far participated and by the combatants. The following derivation assumes that a more or less constant proportion of the violent events occurring during an outbreak are reported in the media (see Synder and Kelly, 1977).

The derivation starts with a definition equating three basic concepts relating to the imitation mechanism. A party in a conflict is composed of a population of behaving units, individuals, groups, collectivities or organizations. Given the assumption that the timing of a unit's participation in collective violence is determined primarily by observational and symbolic learning vis-a-vis others, each violent incident by a unit is both an imitation of previous behaviours and a behavioral model for other units to imitate.² Therefore, at any time (t), the cumulative number of imitations (I) by units and the cumulative number of behavioral models (M) for units, or:

$$V = I = M$$

The social psychologists involved in the experimental work on imitation have not attempted to develop equations. However, sociologists (cf. Dodd, 1953; 1955; Coleman et al., 1966) in deriving the logistic model of cultural diffusion have used an exponential differential equation which, given epistimetic assumptions similar to the above, is an equation for imitation. This exponential differential equation for imitation specifies that the increment in imitations (dI) per increment in time (dt) is some proportion (p) of the number of previous imitations (I):

$$\frac{dI}{dt} = p I \text{ or } \frac{dI}{I} = p dt. \quad (2)$$

Because of the equalities in (I), equation (2) implies:

$$\frac{dM}{M} = p dt \quad (3)$$

and

$$\frac{dV}{V} = p dt. \quad (4)$$

2. It is assumed that the first unit to start the outbreaks is imitating another unit outside the system or, much less frequently, has independently invented the particular kind of violence in question.

The parameter (p) is the rate at which imitation is instigated and is assumed to depend on the costs and benefits of that particular action relative to those of all plausible alternative actions. This is consistent with both experimental evidence on the imitation of aggression (Bandura, 1973) and evidence for the relationship between the rate of diffusion and amount of reinforcement (Hamblin and Miller, 1976).

Equation (4) involving the collective violence terms (dV and V) is the one of principal interest because of the close correspondence between these terms and the data. However, the others are important because they specify the vicarious learning and imitation processes from which (4) is derived.

Aggression is not only instigated through behavioural modeling but may also be inhibited by costs resulting from failures and the deterrence strategies implemented by opposition units (cf. Bandura, 1973). Increases in the frequency and magnitude of such costs relative to alternatives augment the number of instigated units who are inhibited from engaging in the violence. Inhibition effects are assumed to be cumulative so the relative increase in violence (dV/V per increment of time (dt)) not only varies directly with the instigation rate (p) but also inversely with the accumulated number who are inhibited (i) as in the following equation:

In outbreaks of collective violence relative costs are observed and talked about and the experimental data show that aggressive behavior by threatened observers is inhibited as they observe the punishment of aggressing models (Bandura et.al, 1963; Gilmore, 1971). It is, therefore, assumed that observational and symbolic learning occurs to inhibit violence and that the imitation equation (2) applies so that the increment in numbers inhibited per increment of time (di/dt) is some proportion (q) of the accumulated number of units who have been inhibited (i) up to time (t), or:

Solving(6) for i via integration yields:

where q is the previously defined rate at which units are inhibited, e is the base of the natural logarithm and i_0 is the value of i when $t=0$. This value of i may be substituted into (5) to obtain:

where $c = p/i_0$, or the net rate at which units are instigated to imitate the violence in question; and q is the rate at which they are inhibited. Thus, if this model adequately describes the through-time diffusion of a particular type of violence, the nonlinear regression analysis will provide measures of the rates of the two constitutive processes--instigation and inhibition--for the 25 data sets modeled here.

THE ANALYSIS

The Data

In order to evaluate the descriptive adequacy of the model, we obtained data sets on ten different forms of collective violence; lynchings of blacks, vandalism and swastika painting on Jewish buildings, air hijacking attempts and attempts to deter hijackings, guerrilla warfare, revolutions, purges, coups d'etat, agrarian protests and civil disorders. For a description of the data see Table 1.

The Estimation of Parameters

Because both instigation and inhibition are assumed to approximate continuous rather than discrete processes, the model is stated in differential rather than difference equations. The term (dv/dt) refers to the rate of violence during very small increments of time and V is the accumulated number of incidents of collective violence up to a point in time. The accumulated data correspond to V very much better than data per day, week, etc. correspond to dv/dt , and for that reason, equation (8) was solved by integration for V :

3. All apparent indications are that the various coders took considerable care to assure the accuracy of each of these data sets. For example, Banks(1971) reports that the intercoder stability averaged .974. However, independently coded data are available for the air hijacking attempt outbreaks and the 1958-66 outbreak of coups d'etat in Latin America. The agreement between the FAA reports on hijacking and the reports in the New York Times on worldwide hijacking was over 98 percent. In addition to Banks, data on successful Latin American coups d'etat are also available in Li and Thompson(1975) and Solaun and Quinn (1973). The only discrepancy among all three data sets concerned

The right part of the equation was used in fitting the data and c and q were calculated using the following identities: $c = -qk$ and $q = \ln b$, which are implied above. The intermediate steps required to obtain (9), usually referred to as the Gompertz equation, were omitted because they involve calculus and are quite technical. Those proficient in calculus can derive the equation for themselves; those not would scarcely be helped by the rationale that could be outlined in the space available here. The essential point is that by fitting the integrated equation to the accumulated data, one is able to calculate estimates of c and q as postulated in the model.

The fitting or estimating was done with a nonlinear least-squares regression program based on the Fletcher-Powell (1963) optimization technique. Equation (9) was also fit to most of the data sets using the SPSS nonlinear results to the fourth significant digit.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Goodness of Fit

The results of the nonlinear least-squares regression analyses are given in Table 1. The integrated equation fits the data very well: r^2 values range from .941 to .999 with a median of .995. Overall, there are no systematic deviations in the residuals. The empirical fit to the accumulated distribution of events is quite acceptable (i.e. $r^2 = .98$) for all but the 1967 U.S. outbreak of civil disorders.

Two alternative sigmoid models were considered but rejected. The alternative models were:

3 No. cont... the coding of the Cuban revolution-coup (Banks coded it in 1959, Solaun and Quinn coded it in 1958 and Li and Thompson did not include it). In addition, Li and Thompson coded two events as coups that the others did not - one in Brazil, 1961, where the President resigned under severe pressure and a second in Peru, 1963, where the head of the military junta was replaced by another General. The high overall agreement among data sets is evidence of their accuracy. Also, in modeling, measurement error typically attenuates the r^2 values here evidence the data are both reliable and valid.

Table 1. Nonlinear Least-Squares Parameter Estimates and R2 Values
for 25 Collective Violence Outbreak Data Sets

| collectiveViolence Outbreak | Duration | Equation | | | | Data Sources |
|--------------------------------|-------------------|--------------|---------------|-------------|------|--------------------------------|
| | | $V_e(c/q)^*$ | $V=Voe/C/q)e$ | $(c/q)e-qt$ | R2 | |
| Lynching of blacks,U.S. a | 1882-1956 | 3483.00 | .0007 | .0002 | .998 | U.S.Bureau of the Census(1966) |
| Anti-Semitic,U.S.1958b | 10/12/58-11/29/58 | 84.29 | .2985 | .1395 | .982 | Caplovitz and Rogers(1961) |
| Anti-Semitic,U.S.1960b | 12/26/59-2/29/60 | 643.30 | .3145 | .1046 | .995 | Caplovitz and Rogers(1961) |
| Air hijacking attempts,U.S.c | 11/67-12/69 | 73.01 | .0622 | .0096 | .994 | Federal Aviation Agency(1974) |
| Air hijacking attempts,U.S.c | 1/70-8/71 | 53.49 | .0232 | .0080 | .997 | Federal Aviation Agency(1974) |
| Air hijacking attempts,U.S.c. | 7/71-7/73 | 53.29 | .0531 | .0148 | .995 | Federal Aviation Agency(1974) |
| Air hijacking attempts,L.A.c | 9/67,10/70 | 104.20 | .0332 | .0049 | .995 | Federal Aviation Agency(1974) |
| Air hijacking attempts,L.A.c | 12/70-6/73 | 19.22 | .0315 | .0083 | .992 | Federal Aviation Agency(1974) |
| Air hijacking deterrance,U.S.d | 11/67-12/69 | 68.89 | .0390 | .0074 | .985 | New YorkTimes(1967-1973) |
| Air hijacking deterrance,U.S.d | 1/70-8/71 | 83.47 | .0282 | .0113 | .993 | New YorkTimes(1967-1973) |
| Air hijacking deterrance,U.S.d | 9/71-7/73 | 151.80 | .0576 | .0123 | .994 | New YorkTimes(1967-1973) |
| Air hijacking deterrance,L.A.d | 10/68-10/70 | 35.46 | .0274 | .0079 | .981 | New YorkTimes(1967-1973) |
| Air hijacking deterrance,L.A.d | 12/70-6/73 | 18.62 | .0178 | .0080 | .986 | New YorkTimes(1967-1973) |
| Riots, L.A.e | 1955-1963 | 188.30 | .0031 | .0009 | .996 | Banks(1971) |
| Guerrilla Warfare,L.A.e | 1955-1963 | 112.80 | .0037 | .0009 | .996 | Banks(1971) |
| Revolutions, L.A.e | 1957-1965 | 78.30 | .0025 | .0011 | .996 | Banks(1971) |
| Purges, L.A.e | 1958-1966 | 103.90 | .0022 | .0013 | .999 | Banks(1971) |
| Coups d'etat,L.A.e | 1958-1966 | 21.06 | .0036 | .0010 | .993 | Banks(1971) |
| Coups d'etat,Africa | 1960-1975 | 49.01 | .0051 | .0008 | .995 | Huff and Lutz(1974), 1972-1971 |
| Arson, England, 1830g | 10/4/30-2/3/31 | 281.31 | .7191 | .0513 | .997 | Hobsbawm and Rude(1968) |
| Wage meetings,England1830g | 11/9/30-12/21/30 | 168.20 | 1.2989 | .1009 | .994 | Hobsbawm and Rude(1968) |
| Machinery breaking,Eng.1830g | 11/9/30-12/15/30 | 249.50 | 7.4561 | .2601 | .996 | Hobsbawm and Rude(1968) |
| Riots,England,1830g | 11/15/30-12/10/30 | 85.71 | 2.7540 | .2930 | .996 | Hobsbawm and Rude(1968) |
| Civil disorders,U.S.1966h | 3-15-66-10/19/66 | 23.67 | .8627 | .0266 | .986 | U.S.Senate Committee on Govt. |
| Civil disorders,U.S.1967h | 4/1/67-11/21/67 | 80.12 | 173.7578 | .0724 | .943 | U.S.Senate Committee on Govt. |

Operations(1968)

Table 1. Continued

- b. These outbreaks of vandalism, and swastika paintings on Jewish homes, stores and institutional buildings were nationwide and lasted respectively seven and nine weeks. According to Caplovitz and Rogers (1961) there was no evidence of an organized plot in either of the outbreaks.
- c. A hijacking attempt was counted every time a person or a group of persons tried to commandeer an aircraft by threat of harm. The data indicated there were three separate outbreaks of hijacking attempts in the United States and two in Latin America during the August 1967-July 1973 interval.
- d. Deterrence attempts are actions taken by combatants which, if successful, might increase potential hijackers' expectations of failure and punishment. These were coded by Miller from the stories on hijacking in the New York Times (1967-1973)
- e. Hamblin et al. (1973:126-35) analyzed Bank's data and found, in Latin America, two series of epidemics of various kinds of political violence since World War II. Banks data for the second series are analyzed here. For definitions are see Banks (1971,xv) and Rummel (1963:25-6).
- f. Huff and Lutz's data on the diffusion of coups d'etat (1960-72) among 30 contiguous black-ruled countries in Africa were updated through 1975.
- g. These data trace an agricultural labor uprising that occurred throughout the east and south of England in the final months of 1830. The data were collected by Hobsbawm and Rude from all available newspapers as well as public and private records, and are given by date, type of disturbance, place and target.
- h. These data are from questionnaires completed by the mayors of city managers of all cities reported to have experienced some sort of riot or civil disturbance. Where information could not be obtained from municipal officials, the data were compiled from local news reports.


Both of these were derived using instigation and inhibition assumptions analogous to those used in the derivation of equation (8), but with different specifications of the functional form of the inhibition process.

Equation (10) consistently gave the worst fit and for this reason was eliminated from further consideration. Equation (1) gave a poorer fit but was rejected primarily because of the obvious asymmetry of some of the data sets which are known to be complete (especially the two anti-Semitic outbreaks, the third U.S. hijacking outbreaks, the outbreaks of purges and revolutions in Latin America and the outbreaks of machine breaking and rioting in England). This asymmetry conflicts with the necessary symmetry of the logistic process specified in equation (1) (See fn.1).

Validity of Assumptions

Continuity of reinforcement contingencies. Equation (8) assumes relatively stable trends in changes in the reinforcement contingencies. One way to display reinforcement conditions in different epidemics is via collective learning curves, by plotting accumulated successes against accumulated attempts. The usual form of such learning curves-individual, organization or collective - is a power function with an exponent somewhat different from 1.0 (cf. Hamblin et al. 1973). The requisite success data are presently available only for the hijacking epidemics and for the coups d'etat outbreak in Africa. The appropriate plots are given in Figure 1. Data relationships described by power functions become linear on logarithmic coordinates and that is the case here. Note that the r^2 values are all above .98, and the exponents are quite different from 1.0 except for the African coups. These analyses support the assumptions that reinforcement contingencies are typically not constant and that changes are characterized by continuity.

Premature terminations. Since the model assumes that outbreaks of collective violence are characterized by continuities, discontinuities in reinforcement could prematurely truncate an epidemic and set the conditions for a new one. Examples of early terminations are the first and second U.S. epidemics of air hijacking attempts and the first Latin American air hijacking epidemic, all five counter epidemics of deterrence attempts and the Latin American epidemics of riots, guerrilla warfare, and coups d'etat.



ACCUMULATED ATTEMPTED INCIDENTS

| Plot | Outbreak | Exponent | r^2 |
|------|----------------------|----------|-------|
| A. | 1st U.S. Hijacking | 1.22 | .99 |
| B. | Coups d'etat, Africa | 1.04 | .99 |
| C. | 2nd U.S. Hijacking | .79 | .98 |
| D. | 3rd U.S. Hijacking | .49 | .99 |

Notes: On both the ordinate and the abscissa, the plots were positioned for display by multiplying each with a different constant. This does not change the slope or the fit.

Figure 1. Collective Learning Curves for the Three U.S. Air Hijacking Outbreaks (11/67-12/69, 1/70-8/71, 9/71-9/73) and the Black African Coups d'Etat Outbreak (1960-1975)

The authors analyzed abstracts of all the stories in the New York Times on each hijacking so we have rather detailed knowledge of these events and can, at least, suggest a likely source of the premature truncations in these data.

The first U.S. outbreak mostly involved political migration, hijacking attempts to Cuba which at that time was romanticized as a socialist haven, with imagery of leftist hijackers receiving a hero's welcome. However, that epidemic ended prematurely shortly after six U.S. hijackers returned voluntarily from Cuba to certain prison terms in the United States. They complained bitterly about housing and food. Blacks charged racial discrimination and escaped criminals reported they were put into terrible prisons. These stories given wide coverage in the media, evidently created a discontinuity, enough of a jump in the inhibition process to cut off the outbreak.

The second U.S. outbreak came to a premature end when D. B. Cooper accomplished what appeared to be a successful extortion hijacking by parachuting into the night over Oregon or Washington with \$200,000 from Northwest Airlines. Consequently, the third outbreak began vigorously with most hijackers attempting extortions and with increased levels of counterviolence.


However, the data suggest overlaps rather than abrupt transitions from one outbreak to another. This is depicted in Figure 2 where the U.S. data are accumulated over the entire period and the transition points are included in both epidemics. The parameters are slightly different from those in Table 1 which were calculated without assumed transitions, and the fit is slightly better.

A discontinuity may also account for the unsatisfactory fit of the model to the 1967 U.S. civil disorder data. In July, 1967 a dramatic, massive disorder occurred in Newark, New Jersey, partly because of the sheer severity of the disorder and partly because it occurred across the river from Manhattan, the U.S. media centre, this event received intensive coverage for several days (Spilerman, 1976). This greater than usual media coverage evidently produced a discontinuity, a jump in the instigation process. Over one-half of the 83 disorders in 1967 occurred in the two-week period immediately following the Newark coverage.

The Parameter Estimates

When time is measured using the same unit, as in Table 1 where t is in days, the c and q parameters can be compared across outbreaks. Such comparisons are useful in evaluating the model, since parameters may or may not behave as predicted from the underlying theory. Because of the unsatisfactory fit of the model, the parameters for the 1967 U.S. civil disorder outbreaks were not included in the following analyses.

First we consider the expected relations between violence outbreak between c , the net instigation rate, and q , the inhibition rate. As noted, past research in the imitation of aggression suggests that instigation rates increase as their punishment and other costs increase. Violence usually begets violence in equal magnitude- "an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth." And, in a violent conflict what is beneficial to one side is usually costly to the other. While the conflict through time continues, the benefits and costs are ordinarily more or less balanced. All of this implies a matching function which in turn




TIME IN MONTHS FROM NOVEMBER, 1967

| Plot | Outbreak | V_{oc}/q | c | q |
|------|------------|------------|-------|-------|
| A. | 11/67-1/70 | 70.62 | .0677 | .0100 |
| B. | 1/70-9/71 | 61.50 | .0197 | .0066 |
| C. | 7/71-9/73 | 55.91 | .0625 | .0139 |

Figure 2. Air Hijacking Attempts in the U.S.
Accumulated over the Entire Period
of the Outbreak.

implies a positive relationship between the net instigation and inhibition parameters across outbreaks. In general, power functions describe behavior-reinforcement relationships and that is the prediction here.

The c and q parameters from Table 1 are plotted in Figure 3 on logarithmic coordinates. The relationship is linear indicating the data are described by a power function, and positive, with a least-squares exponent of .0.78. The .78 exponent indicates that outbreak of violence are generally characterized by undermatching-i.e., relative increases in the instigation rate are greater than the corresponding relative increases in the inhibition rate.² The relationship may seem somewhat less than perfect, but an r^2 of .92 is quite high for cross-modality comparisons over such broad continuums of time, culture and violence. In general, these results are very supportive of the model and auxiliary theory.



NET INSTIGATION RATE, c

a The solid line represents the least-squares power function given in the figure.

Figure 3. Inhibition Rate (q) for 24 Outbreaks of Collective Violence Plotted on Logarithmic Coordinates by the Net Instigation Rate (c)a.


Second, we consider the relationship between the magnitude of the instigation and inhibition processes and the duration of a violence outbreak. It might be argued that the lower the net instigation rate and the lower the inhibition rate, the longer an outbreak will last. On the other hand, according to the model incidence of aggression is slowed only by the inhibition rate which functions to terminate the outbreak of violence and thus determine its duration. The hypothesis is that q is the best predictor of duration although c is expected to be highly related because it is a determinant of q . The relationship should be negative and should be described by a power function.

A number of analyses were done, but the one pictured in Figure 4 gives the essential finding: a strong negative relationship between the inhibition rate and the duration of an outbreak. It is described by a power function with an r^2 value of .97 and an exponent of .88. The first order correlation between c , the net instigation rate, and duration was negative and the r^2 value was .290. When c was added as a second independent variable in a multivariate power function, the variance already explained by q was not improved. Other plausible functional forms of these relationships were also tried but their explained variance was substantially lower. Thus, the hypothesis derived from the model is again supported by the data.

Generality

Tilly (1975:514, 519) suggests that the study of collective violence ought to be limited to damage to persons or property by groups of fifty or more in conflict with other such groups. That violence by smaller groups or individuals is either not important or not measurable at a suitable level of accuracy. Contrary to Tilly's (1975) measurement assumption, the size of unit makes no difference in the fit of this model. Since unreliability attenuates relations, this indicates the reliabilities are consistently high for outbreaks with units of all sizes - individuals (e.g. most hijackings), small groups (most hijacking deterrence), crowds (riots) and organizations (revolutionary battles, coups).

The analysis here also questions Tilly's (1975) assumption that small-scale violence is not important enough to study. The data relationships suggest that lesser forms of violence often prelude more serious forms as part of an escalation process. For example, the four agrarian labor outbreaks were nested one within another, with the outbreak of arson starting first and ending last, the wage meetings



a The solid line represents the least-squares power function given in the figure.

Figure 4. Duration in Days of 24 Outbreaks of Collective Violence Plotted on Logarithmic Coordinates by the Inhibition Rate (q)^a

outbreak starting second and ending next to last, then the machine breaking and the riots. The seriousness of the outbreaks may be gauged by the inhibition rates the counterreactions generated: 0.0513 for the arson, 0.1009 for the wage meetings, 0.2610 for the machine breaking and 0.2930 for the riots. The unemployed farm laborers, realizing their earlier strategies were not working, evidently escalated the level of violent conflict in the hope of winning. Hamblin et al. (1973:129-33) also have published analyses which evidence an escalation process relating the different outbreaks of political violence in Latin America.

Synder (1975:275) has called for the investigation of the life history of collective violence; tracing such escalation processes seems to be a fruitful way to go about it.

The results here suggest that social condemnation can have a very strong inhibitory effect. The perpetrators of the anti-Semitic violence were never caught and, therefore, never subjected to vigilante violence nor prosecuted. Yet those inhibition rates are among the highest exhibited in the outbreaks investigated here. Part of the reason for these high rates seems to have been the rather unanimous and severe condemnation of these acts in the mass media. Memories of Nazi atrocities were still fresh and the outrage against these Nazi imitators was nearly universal. The causes of inhibition are evidently complex and social condemnation may be as important as other counter-reactions.

Certainly counterviolence is often not the most productive way of managing violent outbreaks. When the authorities in Latin America and the United States opted for shootouts with hijackers, about as many passengers and flight personnel were killed as hijackers. In contrast, 10, 16 and 26 percent of the hijackers were talked into surrendering in the first, second and third U.S. outbreaks, respectively. Generally crew members or passengers discussed the options with the hijackers and persuaded them that surrendering was the least noxious alternative.

As noted, most of the violence investigated here involved basic conflicts where the members of both sides were doing physical damage to one another's persons and properties in efforts to settle the issue in their favor. Much of the violence and counterviolence might have been avoided if the conflicts were somehow turned into either legal contests where the facts were considered and the issues adjudicated to effect justice, or political contests where the issues were settled via discussion, debate, compromise and a vote.

Some of the more bizarre outbreaks like the hijacking do not tend to lend themselves to these kinds of solutions, but in most instances that kind of violence is felonious, clearly against the law. In the first U.S. hijacking outbreak, the airlines asked law enforcement agencies to do nothing to allow the hijacked airliners to proceed to Cuba without resistance. In the later outbreaks, when the hijackers were forcing pilots to fly them transoceanic and were extorting huge sums, the airlines reverse that policy and law enforcement personnel became quite innovative. As

can be seen from the learning curves in Figure 1, they also became much more effective. The hijackings were turned off completely in 1973 when the F.A.A. finally instituted a nonviolent solution: the electronic screening of all passengers for weapons.

CONCLUSIONS

Cumulative distributions of outbreaks of violence are generally sigmoid, some skewed to the right. Our purpose was to develop a model to predict, if possible, the mathematical form of these distributions and to specify the generative processes which could explain these outbreaks. Three models were developed (one detailed), assuming that the benefits and costs to units engaged in a violent outbreak up to any point in time respectively instigated and inhibited subsequent participation by others. It was assumed that a differential equation supported in prior research on logistic models of cultural diffusion is, in fact, a general imitation equation and it was used to predict the form of the instigation process through time. We assumed further that the inhibition process was cumulative and the three models involved different inhibition terms. The model from which the Gompertz function was derived used the imitation equation to describe the inhibition process.

The Gompertz turned out to predict the empirical distributions of violence better than the other equations. The fit was virtually perfect; the median r^2 being .995. There was one deviant case and in that outbreak an essential assumption (i.e. a relatively stable rate of mass media reporting to the public on events) appears to have been badly violated.

The preliminary tests eliminated the alternatives, including application of the logistic diffusion model suggested by Huff and Lutz (1974) and the logistic innovation model suggested by Hamblin et al. (1973). Still, it must be pointed out that the Gompertz might be derived from alternative premises and assumptions. The premises chosen here, however, were empirical generalizations from previous research which were thought to apply in these situations. Also, a number of analyses were done to further evaluate the premises and auxiliary assumptions. Learning curves support the model's assumption that reinforcement contingencies generally exhibited continuity. Early terminations of some of the outbreaks were apparently a function of massive, well published changes in reinforcement contingencies—as would be predicted by auxiliary theory. The inhibition rates were

highly related ($r^2 = .92$) to the net instigation rates, a predicted result. The duration of the outbreaks were predicted quite accurately by the value of q ($r^2 = .97$), another predicted result. Because unpredictable variation in parameters can be a prime reason for rejecting a model (cf. Hamblin et al, 1977), these positive results are important corroboration.

This diffusion model has a number of interesting features. First, it appears to be very general: it describes and explains equally well a wide range of violence perpetrated in a number of cultural and historical contexts by units of varying size and type (individuals, small groups, crowds and large organizations). Second, it predicts and explains institutional and dissident violence equally well and thus escapes Firstone's (1974) criticism that theory and research on violence (a) have focused on dissident violence neglecting institutional violence and (b) have failed to conceptualize a set of processes that account for both.

Finally, the purpose here has been to specify and investigate the processes involved in the timing and contagion of violence, unlike most earlier research which has investigated variables related to the location of violence, the motivation of units engaging in violence, and the social, political and economic conflicts which generate violence. The relative successes here in terms of explained variance, replication and generality suggest these other questions might be profitably investigated in the context of this diffusion model. The constitutive imitation processes as well as the interactive nature of conflict appear to be too powerful to ignore.

COLLECTIVE VIOLENCE - A VESTIGE OF MEDIAVALISM

S.N. KANDU

The cult of collective violence that now is being practiced in recent times is the result of the intermixture of two streams of organised violence that had developed in the last half of the 18th Century and the first half of 19th Century. The first stream of collective violence generated through the political awakening of the people as manifested in various activities of different revolutionary societies with some political aims and objectives in view. The other stream of collective violence had its genesis in the industrial field. Awakening of the mass against the misrule of autocratic governments resulted in violent activities as we have witnessed during the French revolution, the American war of independence, the Russian revolution, the Chinese war of liberation and lastly in recent days the movements in Latin American countries.

Political force which are the products of different pressure Groups / had given rise to revolutionary societies which could be treated as alias of collective violence against established authority. Let us take the example of Italy. Here the revolutionary societies like Carbonari of Sardinia had been successful in forcing King Victor Emmanuel to abdicate in 1821. During the period 1829-30 there was trouble amongst the students in Italy and Germany. In 1830 violent fight broke out in the streets of Brussels on the demand of Independence of Belgium, the slogan being 'Belgium is no Dutch Colony.' Thus there was mass upsurge against authority who could be a ruler or a foreign country exercising sovereignty. The nature of such violence as already stated could be just a demonstration as it was seen during the French revolution or it could be a barricade as it was staged in the wake of July revolution in France. It could be also armed violence including incendiarism.

The mode of treatment of such political activities by collective mob through the path of violence was countered also in various ways. It could be right from the individual showmanship of a particular ruler or it could be by use of armed force. Tsar Nicholas- I had to display the strength of his personality in 1831 in bringing violent mob under control. Earlier in 1841 he had ridden triumphantly into Paris alongside his brother Alexander, - to show as if all governments were an endless military parade. In Belgium troops

Commandant, CISF/Unit A S P Durgapur.

had to be engaged in 1830, though without any result. Government has sometimes organised and encouraged formation of anti-revolutionary societies.

It would be quite evident that the period in which the revolutionary societies were formed was the one which had been witnessing the dwindling powers of autocratic government and monarchy. The resentment against such governments and monarchs was crystalized and developed into pressure group of societies who emulated the people to fight with and come to be known as revolutionaries.

The revolutionary societies had generally produced people's militia. Naturally when the totalitarian authority could be wiped out, there was always a need for disarming the people's militia. As a matter of fact, at the place where armed revolution has taken place, there now we have single party rule where political pressure group and the individuals have no role to play.

In India, however, the creed of violence was unknown to the people. The philosophy of life of average Indian people was tolerance. The mass awakening or consciousness was not, however, unknown. The Ramayana and the Mahabharata had depicted pictures of mass awakening against injustice done to Ramachandra or to the pandavas. The mass had assembled to give vent to their feelings but their such awakening never reached the pitch of violence. When Ramchandra went to forest, people wept. When the Pandavas went to forest then also the people rose to a man to express their sentiments. But at no stage they were violent. The first organised violence that we see in India in recent time had been witnessed during the so-called Sepoy Mutiny of 1857. Though this mutiny had been engineered and led by princely houses mostly, at some place, as in Lucknow, the general mass also joined hands. In political field the collective mass thinking was, perhaps, ushered in by the Indian National Congress under the leadership of Mahatma Gandhi. But Mahatma Gandhi's path was one of non-violence. It may, however, be pointed out that this non-violence did not mean total passivity. The use of strength or force without any avarice, lust or anger was non-violence as Gandhiji meant it. Mahatma Gandhi was staunch believer of the preachings of the Geeta and he, perhaps, believed in the use of force as envisaged in the Geeta "Balam Balabatam Asmi Kama Krodha Bibarjita." In India alien power having been made to quite, there was a vacuum in the political field. India being a democratic country the monolith mass movement got fragmented and different political, social, economic and religious pressure groups developed. Their spheres of activity range from mere demonstration against another pressure group to organised violence against the government in power.

In mid 19th Century the factors guiding mob violence in socio-political field were basically Nationalism and Liberalism. Only in some cases as in French revolution it was a fight for right to equality. Liberalism at a later stage took the shape of justice to and freedom of the mass. The pressure group of political thinkers and their supporters though moved by a sense of idealism, could not, however, overcome the ills of late mediavalism. Thus use of force, a variation of misconceived chivalry, became the instrument of operation to match the military prowess of the totalitarian authority. They matched arms for arms.

Organised mob violence in Industrial Field in Europe was witnessed as early as 1675 when a mob of London weavers attacked immigrant French weavers for using ribbon looms known as 'Dutch Engine' by which a weaver could weave 16 or more ribbons at the same time. This was organised violence of one group against another group. But more significant development was along the line of labour unrest against the employers. A riot had also broken out among the woollen workers of Melksham in Wiltshire in 1738 when the workers had cut all the warps in the looms of a merchant clothier who had lowered the piece work prices for cloth. In the north-eastern coal-fields in England the miners went on riot in 1740 and burnt down pit head machineries. They also set stock piles of coal on fire demanding higher wages. In early periods of 1811 to 1813 during the turning point of the wars with Napoleon, three regions on England namely Leicestershire, Derbyshire and Nottinghamshire were disturbed by a series of industrial riots involving the destruction of machinery. It eventually became necessary to employ a force of about 1200 soldiers to suppress the riots.

In India, however, the creed of violence in Industrial field is a recent development as part of Marxist culture in that field. The violence is fewer in this field as the agitations in the form of demonstration, strike etc are handy weapons. Violence is treated, by and large, as unwanted development of any trade Union movement. Violence as an instruments of mob frenzy however, is perceptible in India in the field of communal disharmony. To the communal groups violence is a Crusade, a Jihad, a religious ritual. The intra-community sanction goes very much in support of the perpetuation of violence. There are instances of organised dacoity by people of one religion against the other. The dacoits are held in high esteem. Though inter-social, concencious is often raised against organised violence on parochial and dogmatic approach to socio-religious life, communal riots are continuing to take heavy toll of the society and the life of the people.

In India caste rivalry also gave birth to collective violence. When western education brought about an awakening in the general mass and the cult of right to equality imbibed the society, the so far down-trodden castes rose up to protest against tyranny. As it happened in England in the early 18th Century when moneyed bourgeois began to dominate the aristocracy, in India also the conventionally social superior caste people tried to keep their hold. This had often led to apprehension of troubles in 1st decade of 20th Century in some parts of Bengal as because the down-trodden had then learnt to organise themselves and take recourse to violence. In most of the cases the trouble was precipitated over worship of Gods and access to the place of worship.

A part from this socio-religious cause, the economic frustration of the down-trodden was another field. In this field the political party sponsored organised mob violence is an interesting feature in India Society in recent times where the agricultural labourers have organised mass violence in the shape of movements like Telangana movement, Tebhaga movement of Bengal and the Naxalite movements. These movements have seen the extreme use of violence as an instrument of political movement. These groups have now come to be known as the 'extremist' groups.

Violence, however, is a vestige of mediaevalism and it continues to raise its hydra-head inspite of social enlightenment. It started as a protest against totalitarianism and now it is the weapon in the hands of different pressure groups, be it based on social, or on religious or on economic injustices and consideration.

The students' involvement in freedom movement subsequently brought about a new dimensions to the political activities involving the students community in India. Moved by the impetuosity of youth often the students community got involved into violent activities, it does not matter whether it is inter-students' Union rivalry or whether it is students' protest against any social injustice. Radhakrishna committee had recommended for students' participation in limited sense in the political activities of the country by way of forming their own students' Union. But this degenerated into rather vandalism in the name of political movements. There are instances when the students community as a whole have taken recourse to violence in Cinema halls for refusal to allow them to go inside without ticket or for not giving them tickets which could have been all sold.

The refugees from erstwhile East Pakistan had once become ready weapon in the hands of political parties for organising mass movement and, if required, to take recourse to mass violence through them. Thus the political parties have either taken up the cause of the refugees or the so-called down trodden class or the industrial labourers or the students communities where even there was already a nucleus of mass discontentment or impetuosity and these forces have been led by them to violent activities if it had suited their purpose. Basically the problem in India is that of a decadent society where the old values of Indian philosophy of life have been lost and new values have not yet come up. Marxist culture tends to fill up the vacuum created by the obliteration of old social values and norms. But the role of Marxist culture is not very effective either. The result is that the ghost of mediavalism has thrust itself on a decadent society and has given rise to mob violence.

Social censure and new concepts of political thinking have hardly been properly formulated or preached. The crisis is the crisis of mass education in values of life which alone could have forced to combat mob violence.

The role of the administration has been guided by the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code. At some places, - why at some places, at almost every disturbed places a peace Committee would be formed through the leaders of the different political parties where there is large scale collective violence. The job of the peace Committee would be merely to bring about joint processions to be termed as peace-processions and to organise a few so-called peace meetings. Such peace committees die their natural death within a very short time leaving the society again to cult of violence which continue to remain a vestige of mediavalism. This explains why on so many occasions after independence of India the Army are to be called out for I.S. duty and Curfew are to be imposed. Police firing is also not very uncommon. Rather, the frequency of police firing and imposition of Curfew is on the increase. To combat collective violence and extremist activity several enactments like Maintenance of Public order Act, Maintenance of Internal Security Act were made. Provisions of different suppression of Terrorist Outrageous Activities Act have been invoked without good result.

In India in the post independence period the collective violence has been directed against the government not only for social injustice or to voice grievances against operation of any statutory authority but it has been made an instrument to drive home demands on racial, provincial and religious issues. The regionalism has led to mob violence against people of other

region and also against the government. Here again the social
censure has been lacking. The political parties, to grind their
own axe, have more often than not sided with the mob who have perpetrated
collective violence as in Assam and in Punjab. Here again the
limitation of modern society to cope up with such problem and fight
collective violence has been amply exhibited. The problem is the
problem of formulation of working policy to combat and counter
collective violence which may arise out of such cause as religious
fanaticism, racial parochialism and dogmatic regionalism. People
still feel like the people in the mediaval period that only when the
people would form assembly and would take recourse to violence,
they can make the authorities take notice of their grievances.
Authorities have given fillip to violence at times by yielding to
such pressure of violent groups. Thus the pressure group of conscious
people have seized to exist more or less and the pressure group
of violent people have taken their place carrying with it the vestige
of mediavalism.

Statements about Terrorism

By BRIAN M. JENKINS

ABSTRACT: Terrorism has proved to be a far more serious problem than we anticipated 10 or 12 years ago. After more than a decade of terrorism to observe and nearly 10 years of research on the topic, we can say few things for certain. One is that terrorism has increased in volume and severity, although despite the increasing bloodshed, terrorists still operate within self-imposed constraints. Although terrorism is a widespread phenomenon, it affects the world unequally. There is no single factor that explains why some societies suffer higher levels of terrorist violence than others. Terrorists operate with a limited technical repertoire that has changed little over time. Diplomats and businessmen are the most frequent target of incidents of international terrorism. Terrorists share a common demographic profile and certain common attitudes, but we do not know enough about them as individuals to identify a common terrorist personality. Authoritarian regimes have characteristically reacted to terrorism with repressive measures, while nations with strong democratic traditions have cautiously limited certain liberties. Generally, the rhetoric against terrorism exceeds the commitment of resources to combat it, and international cooperation is limited.

Brian M. Jenkins has been director of the Security and Subnational Conflict Program, The Rand Corporation, since 1979. From 1976-80, he was associate head of Rand Corporation's Social Science Department; in 1980, director of the International Conference on Terrorism and Low-Level Conflict, hosted by the Rand Corporation; from 1977-present, research project leader of numerous Rand studies sponsored by various government agencies. Formerly a Green Beret paratrooper, he served in the Dominican Republic and later in Vietnam. He is the recipient of two Bronze Stars, the Vietnamese Cross of Gallantry, and the Outstanding Civilian Service Award while on General Creighton Abram's Long-Range Planning Task Group.

Any prediction ten years ago that terrorists would seize 50 embassies and consulates, take over the headquarters of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in Vienna and hold the oil ministers of 11 nations hostage, kidnap hundreds of diplomats and businessmen and collect hundreds of millions of dollars in ransom, kidnap and murder the former premier of Italy, assassinate Lord Mountbatten and President Sadat, and try to assassinate the President of France, the commander of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and even the Pope, would have been regarded as the stuff of novels, not headlines.

Terrorism has proved to be a far more serious problem than we anticipated 10 or 12 years ago.

Terrorism has commanded the attention of governments and attracted the attention of scholars. After more than 10 years of terrorism to observe and nearly 10 years of research on the topic, what can we say about it? I would like to review what we know about terrorism, and what trends are discernible. Before doing that, however, we must deal with the problem of definition.

The term "terrorism" has no precise or widely accepted definition. The problem of definition is compounded by the fact that "terrorism" has become a fad word, used promiscuously and often applied to a variety of acts of violence that are not strictly terrorism. The term is generally pejorative. Some governments label as terrorism all violent acts committed by their political opponents, while anti-government extremists frequently claim to be the victims of government terror. Thus, what terrorism is seems to depend on one's point of view. Use of the term implies a moral judgment; if a party can successfully attach the label of terrorist to its opponent, then it has indirectly persuaded others to adopt its moral view point.

The difficulty of defining terrorism has led to the cliché that one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter, implying that there can be no objective definition of terrorism, no universal standards of conduct in peace or war. I reject that.

Most civilized nations have identified modes of conflict that are criminal -- homicide, kidnapping, threats to life, the willful destruction of property, and so on. Laws against such criminal acts may be violated in war, but even in war there are rules that outlaw the use of certain weapons and tactics.

The rules of war grant civilian noncombatants at least theoretical immunity from deliberate attack; they prohibit taking civilian hostages and they prohibit actions against

those held captive; they recognize neutral territory. But terrorists recognize no neutral territory, no noncombatants, no bystanders. They seize, threaten, and often murder hostages. One man's terrorist is everyone's terrorist.

Terrorism is best defined by the quality of the acts, not by the identity of the perpetrators or the nature of their cause. All terrorist acts are crimes. Many would also be violations of the rules of war, if a state of war existed. All involve violence or the threat of violence, usually directed against civilian targets. The motives of most terrorists are political, and terrorist actions are generally carried out in a way that will achieve maximum publicity. The perpetrators are usually members of an organized group, and unlike other criminals, they often claim credit for their acts. Finally, a terrorist act is intended to produce effects beyond the immediate physical damage it causes.

This definition of terrorism does not limit the application of the term to actions by nongovernmental groups. Governments may also be terrorist, and it makes little difference to the victim whether he is kidnapped and murdered by a gang of anti-government extremists or by gunmen employed by the secret police. Government terror tends to be primarily internal, however, and most incidents of international terrorism are carried out by nongovernmental groups, although they may have direct or indirect state support.

International terrorism comprises those incidents that have clear international consequences: incidents in which terrorists go abroad to strike their targets, select victims or targets because of their connections to a foreign state (diplomats, executives of foreign corporations), attack airliners on international flights, or force airliners to fly to another country.

I do not for a moment think that these comments have disposed of the issue of definition. Doubtless, it will come up again. Let us put it aside for the moment, however, and proceed with a review of trends in terrorism.

THE LEVEL OF TERRORIST VIOLENCE

The use of terrorist violence has increased significantly during the last 14 years. The number of recorded incidents oscillates from year to year, but the overall trajectory is clearly upward, and the increase is not merely a reflection of better reporting; it is genuine.

Terrorism has also increased in severity. The number of fatalities and other casualties resulting from terrorist attacks has climbed. Of greater significance is the fact that the number of terrorist incidents resulting in multiple fatalities has increased both in actual number and as a percentage of the total number of incidents.

Despite these increases, terrorists continue to operate within limits. Most terrorist incidents involve no casualties. They are purely symbolic acts of violence. The median of those incidents with fatalities is close to one. With the exception of a few incidents such as the 1980 bombing of the Bologna train station in which 84 people were killed, terrorists have not entered the domain of mass murder or carried out schemes that could cause widespread disruption.

Within its present limits, terrorism is bearable. This is not to say that terrorism is tolerable, for it has become a more serious problem than anticipated. Yet few governments are seriously imperiled. Society survives. Terrorism is a pain, not a mortal danger.

THE SPREAD OF TERRORIST VIOLENCE

The use of terrorist tactics is spreading throughout the world. The number of countries in which terrorist incidents have taken place has increased.

Terrorism affects the world unequally. Although the problem is widespread--the Rand Corporation's chronology of international terrorism records incidents in 117 countries since 1968--a handful of countries suffer a disproportionate share of terrorist activities. Approximately half of the recorded incidents have occurred in only 10 countries.

Most of the incidents take place in Western Europe, followed by Latin America, the Middle East and North Africa, then North America. Few incidents occur in Eastern Europe, Asia, or the Pacific region.

THE ENVIRONMENT OF TERRORISM

There are many hypotheses that attribute the cause of terrorism to social, economic, cultural, technological, and geographical factors, but no single factor can be identified as a universal cause of terrorism or even as a universal precipitating factor.

Some environments, however, clearly are not propitious. Totalitarian states provide a poor environment for terrorism.

There are many factors that contribute to an environment propitious for terrorism: the mobility provided by modern jet travel; access to a global audience through the news media; the vulnerabilities of modern society; the availability of weapons and explosives; perceived injustice; deep-rooted ethnic, ideological, and religious divisions; the failure of other modes of dissent or influence; historical traditions of political violence; ideologies that condone violence; unresponsive or insensitive governments; sharply circumscribed or ineffective security forces; the high value that most societies place on human life, which constrains governments from totally ignoring the fate of hostages held by terrorists; the historically unprecedented respect shown in the world today for the concept of national sovereignty, even for the sovereignty of those nations that provide sanctuary and aid to terrorists; the growing number of nations that no longer abide by the rules of international conduct and that support terrorists or dispatch assassination squads; the "legitimization" of terrorism itself as a mode of conduct.

In no country are all of these ingredients present. Terrorism results from idiosyncratic combinations of factors.

THE TACTICS OF TERRORISM

Terrorists operate with a very limited tactical repertoire. Bombings alone account for roughly half of all terrorist incidents. Six basic tactics comprise 95 percent of the total: bombings, assassinations, armed assaults, kidnappings, barricade and hostage situations, and hijackings. No terrorist group uses all of them.

Approximately one-third of all terrorist incidents involve hostages. Terrorists seize hostages to gain attention and to increase their lever-age by placing human lives in the balance.

The terrorists' tactical repertoire has changed little over time. Hijacking airliners and seizing embassies to make political demands are two significant terrorist inventions, along with kidnapping and leg-shooting. Some terrorist groups have experimented with other forms of attack--for example, poisoning oranges--but most groups stick to familiar tactics.

Terrorists appear more imitative than innovative. New tactics, once they are introduced, are likely to be widely imitated.

THE TARGETS OF TERRORISM

Terrorist attacks are directed almost entirely against civilian targets, individuals who in any other mode of conflict would be regarded as noncombatants. Only about 6 percent of the incidents listed in the Rand chronology were directed against military or police officials, for example, military or police officials, for example, military attaches. Certainly, blowing up a social worker in a car with his children on the way to school because he is a part-time reserve police officer is an act that belongs within the domain of terrorism rather than combat.

Diplomats are the most common target in incidents of international terrorism, and increasingly so. Terrorist attacks against diplomatic personnel and facilities increased by 60 percent in 1980 and 1981 over the previous two-year period.

Businessmen are also frequent targets of terrorists. Terrorists attack businessmen as symbols of economic systems they oppose or of foreign domination. They kidnap executives or threaten corporations to finance further terrorist operations. In the past 10 years, terrorists have collected between \$ 125 million and \$250 million in ransom payments.

THE TERRORISTS

Terrorists share a common demographic profile. The typical terrorist is male--although there are numerous notable exceptions--in his early twenties, single, from a middle- or upper-class urban family, well educated, with some university training.

We know far less about the terrorist's mindset. Do terrorists think differently from the way you or I think? Is there a type of personality predisposed to terrorism? Little systematic research has been done in this area. Indeed, what we know about the terrorist mind today is roughly equivalent to what we knew about Africa in the middle of the nineteenth century. We knew the general shape of the continent, and a few explorers had traveled up African rivers and returned with their observations. But for the most part, it remained terra incognita for Europeans, a dark continent! So it is with the terrorist mindset today. We have a few notions, some assumptions, and some assertions, but some of the ideas seem as

fanciful as those demons and sea monsters that ancient cartographers put at the far edge of what they knew. The growing population of terrorists who have written memoirs, given interviews while still on the run, or talked in prison has provided glimpses into the interior, and a few scholarly inquiries have been made. What can we say about them?

For one thing, there appears to be no identifiable psychotic personality. Most terrorists are not crazy in the clinical sense. Indeed, there may be nothing psychiatrically unexpected about terrorists.

Most terrorists appear to share certain common attitudes. Observers generally agree that terrorists are for the most part true-believers, absolutists who see the world in black and white, us versus them. They are uncompromising, action-prone, willing--sometimes even eager---to take risks. Whether these traits are present in an individual before he joins a terrorist group or whether they develop as a result of being in a terrorist group is not clear.

Terrorists do not become terrorists overnight. It is a long process that begins with alienation, perhaps mixed with boredom, proceeds to protest and permanent dissidence, and ends with going underground as a member of a terrorist group.

Observers agree that terrorists have many problems, something we tend to overlook. They suffer depression. They may feel as uncomfortable with their role in a terrorist group as they did with their role in society. They have neurotic fears of succeeding. They strive to inflate their own importance by adopting grandiose postures or engaging in histrionic behavior. They lose sight of reality and come to believe their own propaganda, overestimating their own strength, their appeal, the weakness of their enemies, the imminence of victory. At the same time, they are not immune to disillusionment with their group or its cause. Some quit. Others want to. But getting out of a terrorist group is hard to do, much harder than joining one. It requires an admission by the terrorist that he has been wrong. It involves physical risk, in that his former comrades may brand him a traitor and try to kill him. He may have to remain on the run from both police and the terrorists.

Terrorists have failed to articulate a comprehensive strategy for taking power. They are bombers and shooters, tacticians at best, not strategists.

Terrorist groups have increased their links, providing each other with expressions of support, training, weapons, and asylum, occasionally participating in joint operations or proxy operations. Still there is no evidence of a single brain. Relationships are loose. Terrorists boast of more cohesion than actually exists in an attempt to appear more powerful than they are.

Terrorist groups change over time. Ideology declines as violent action becomes an end in itself. Members who survive, brutalized by the long struggle and the loss of comrades, tend to become more ruthless in their tactics. New members, some of whom are common criminals recruited in the prisons and thugs attracted to terrorist activity for entirely personal rather than political motives, change the composition of a group and the mindset of its members.

Many terrorist groups engage in ordinary criminal activity to support themselves. In time, terrorist groups increasingly come to resemble ordinary criminal organizations operating under a thin political veneer. Kidnappers keep the ransom they collect for themselves, and "Godfathers" skim cash from protection rackets.

THE GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO TERRORISM

Terrorists have occasionally won concessions and some have provoked the overthrow of governments, but terrorist tactics alone have failed to bring terrorists to power. Terrorism remains an ingredient, not a recipe, for seizing power. Over the long run, governments have prevailed over the terrorists.

We cannot really say that democracy has been imperiled by terrorism. Authoritarian regimes have characteristically reacted to terrorist threats with repressive measures, while nations with strong democratic institutions and traditions have cautiously limited certain liberties as the price of security-- making travelers undergo screening procedures at airports, for example.

Terrorism diverts government attention for brief moments of crisis. When not under the gun, most governments treat terrorism as no more than a nuisance. This makes planning and preparation difficult.

In the United States and most Western European countries, combating terrorism has low priority. The rhetoric against terrorism almost always exceeds the amount of resources devoted to combating it.

Although governments have a clear advantage over the long run, they are almost always at a disadvantage in dealing with individual episodes. Terrorists create dramas in which they and their victims are the central figures. Except for an occasional successful commando rescue, governments seldom get to play the role of the hero. More often, governments are seen as reactive, impotent, incompetent. Intelligence has failed, security has been breached. The government is unable to satisfy the public's appetite for action against the terrorists.

Public perceptions of government standing and competence in combating terrorism are based not on the government's overall performance but rather on its performance in a few dramatic hostage incidents in which it suffers disadvantages from the moment the incident occurs. The public sees the government only in crisis, demonstrably unable to provide security for its citizens, sometimes yielding to the terrorists to save lives, often unable to bring its enemies to justice. Such perceptions may corrode the links between the governed and the government and may contribute to public support for drastic measures to counter terrorism.

Governments have developed specialized capabilities for dealing with terrorism. Security has been increased. Specialized tactics and skills have been developed for use in hostage situations. Negotiators have been trained. The behavioral sciences have made a major contribution to this aspect of the terrorist problem. Crisis management procedures have been developed, and specially trained military units have been created.

The development of negotiating skills does not imply a greater willingness to bargain with terrorists holding hostages. More and more governments have adopted hard-line, no concessions, no negotiations policies in dealing with terrorists.

Governments have also demonstrated an increased willingness to use force in resolving terrorist incidents at home and abroad. Specially trained units have successfully used force in rescuing hostages held aboard hijacked airliners and in embassies. The willingness to use force may have some deterrent effect, but the evidence in that direction is barely perceptible. There has, however, been a recent decline in embassy takeovers.

We may have arrived at or come pretty close to the limits of international cooperation in combating terrorism. In spite of the problems that remain, it appears that unless terrorism takes new directions, progress in international cooperation will continue to be limited, with emphasis on the details of implementation.

STATE SUPPORT OF TERRORISM

A number of states provide financial support, arms, training, asylum, and other forms of assistance to various terrorist groups. State support appears to be more important to terrorist groups operating on foreign territory. Indigenous terrorist groups obtain most of their support from domestic sources. A growing number of governments themselves are using terrorist tactics, employing terrorist groups, or exploiting terrorist incidents to wage war on foreign foes or domestic enemies living abroad.

THE EFFECTS OF TERRORISM ON SOCIETY

Few efforts have been made to measure systematically the effects of terrorism on society. Except for a few public opinion polls, we have only individual observations to rely on. What do these tell us?

Unlike their governments, most people consider terrorism to be a very serious problem. This is true even in countries that have not experienced high levels of terrorism.

Terrorism provokes backlash and polarization, and hardens attitudes. A series of polls conducted in Western European countries between February 1970 and November 1977, a period of growing terrorism, show a steady erosion of support for the statement that "our society must be gradually improved by reform" and growing support for the statement that "our present society must be valiantly defended against all subversive force."

A majority of people appear to support harsher action against terrorists than governments have been willing to impose. Public opinion polls indicate widespread support for military reprisals, the assassination of terrorist leaders, capital punishment, and summary executions, even if these measures limit civil liberties or endanger innocent civilians.

The impression that governments cannot provide basic security has become more widespread.

Terrorism has seriously eroded the quality of life in many places, including Northern Ireland, Lebanon, Israel, Turkey, Uruguay, Argentina, and El Salvador.

Terrorism has affected the life-styles and work habits of political leaders, diplomats, and corporate executives.

THE FUTURE OF TERRORISM

Although under pressure from increasingly skillful authorities, the indigenous terrorist groups that appeared in Europe in the late 1960s Irish Republican Army (IRA), the Basque ETA, the Red Army Faction, and the Red Brigade. That such groups could survive for more than a decade in an unfriendly urban environment in a modern nation is a surprise.

The survival of many of the older terrorist groups who have been on the scene for a decade or more, plus the appearance of new groups emulating the model provided by the first generation of terrorist groups, suggests that terrorism is likely to be a long-range, perhaps a chronic problem.

Will terrorists escalate? There are certain pressures in that direction--the increasing resistance of governments, the declining news value of terrorist incidents as they become commonplace--but there is no inexorable progression from what terrorists have done so far to acts of greater magnitude. Technical limitations or self-imposed constraints have kept terrorists out of the realm of mass destruction. Although some minor escalation can be seen in the increased number of terrorist incidents resulting in multiple fatalities, we simply cannot say whether or not terrorists will exploit new weapons or new targets to create greater destruction or disruption.

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Terror, the Strategic Tool: Response and Control

By ROBERT H. KUPPERMAN,
with Debra Van Opstal and David Williamson, Jr.

ABSTRACT: The United States appears ill prepared to deal with an emerging form of interstate rivalry, that is, the use of terror as an unconventional weapon to achieve conventional political ends. The terror event represents a powerful form of leverage simply because of its media value. Using media coverage to amplify their impact, acts of terrorist violence have paralyzed Western governments and undermined their credibility. In a destabilized international environment, the vectored terrorist threat offers additional advantages to radical nations or superpowers in pursuit of foreign policy objectives. Under the guise of criminality, it can become a low-cost, low-risk, high-leverage tool of low-intensity warfare, difficult to combat because uncertainty about the origin of the threat limits the full range of diplomatic and military responses.

International terrorism is a new class of violence, beyond the norms of common criminality, that exploits today's advanced technologies, especially jet transport and instant global communications. Regrettably, it is becoming established as a worldwide, steady state phenomenon.

Hardly a day passes without a terrorist incident occurring somewhere in the world; it pervades the fabric of contemporary civilization. Although the United States has not so far been a primary target of attack, any optimism that this benign state of affairs will continue is misplaced. Terrorism has, among other things, become part of the arsenal of international warfare, recognized as a useful tool of low-intensity conflict. As a surrogate means of warfare, terrorism also becomes a tool of strategic importance. We must recognize the promotion of such violence from the level of a criminal act or political nuisance to a matter deserving serious national attention.

THE DIMENSIONS OF THE PROBLEM

The significance of the terror act has been raised exponentially by several different but interrelated factors. First, the tools available for destruction are suddenly much more lethal and much more frightening than ever before. Second, the media attention focused on terrorism is immediate, global, and usually undisciplined. Third, motives for terrorist attack today span a spectrum that includes, at the extremes, personal grudges and superpower ambitions of global hegemony--and there

is little certainty as to which underlying motive may really be at play in any particular case. Finally, this nation--unlike others in the Western Alliance--has no internal consensus on how to respond to either acts of supercriminal violence or coercive political threats; has no common philosophical basis for accepting the high costs--in lives, materials, pride, and power--of occasional failure in dealing with terrorism; and has no internationally recognized commitment to firm, retributive deterrence of such violence.

Although terrorism is a ubiquitous phenomenon, it is nearly impossible to define formally. The range of violence we have labeled "terrorism" extends from the hijackings of aircraft at pistol point to car bombings, from the senseless destruction of lives and property at the Bologna train station to the attempted assassination of the Pope in Rome. In the absence of either a generally accepted definition or of a new taxonomy, the term "terrorism" can be used as a shorthand to describe the kind of violence--either threatened or real--exercised for political ends but outside all normal political relationships.

Terrorism is manipulative; it seeks to turn an opponent's strengths against him. For example, it can exploit the technological, cultural, and legal infrastructure of a state against the state's own interests. This type of exploitation is particularly successful in cultures with strong traditions of personal freedom and limitations on executive power; these cultures already endure a degree of disorder as the price of democracy and are less able than others to respond uncompromisingly to terrorist threats. By contrast, terrorism is relatively ineffective in totalitarian societies, where it is simply denied an environment for existence as a matter of state prerogative. To be effective in a totalitarian culture, terrorism must be raised to the level of full-scale revolution.

Unlike the totalitarian states, the West has had relatively few unequivocal successes in the face of terrorist activity. Embassies have been seized with impunity. Governments have been perceived to capitulate in the face of terrorist threats. Since 1972, terrorists have elevated the arts of assassination, hijacking, kidnapping, arson, and bombing into the public domain, paralyzing Western nations and damaging the credibility of their governments. In Munich, terrorists took advantage of German unreadiness and mounted a vicious assault on the Olympic Village. For a relatively small investment--the lives of the terrorists involved--they relied on television to shock 100 million onlookers around the world. At the 1975 Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) ministers' meeting in Vienna, a terrorist act humiliated the Austrian government, clothed the

criminal terrorist Carlos in a Robin Hood image of international appeal, and advanced Libya and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) to the forefront of the radical Arab world. The 1979 seizure of the American embassy in Teheran by a mob of uncertain allegiance paralyzed our nation for a year and probably altered the course of American electoral history. America's paralysis was converted into ignominy when a rescue attempt failed before it was even under way. No atomic bomb could help. America failed diplomatically and militarily to deal in proportionate terms with the immoderate behavior of a rogue nation and with the terrorist tactics of subnational elements. The very high cost to America's leadership of the West has yet to be assessed.

The role of the media in such incidents is pivotal. The media provide enormous political leverage to an act which, on its own, would simply be an example of criminal barbarism. The terrorist uses the media in a way democratic governments cannot. As a result, governments have often appeared inept--unable to defend themselves against a relatively small criminal element. Eventually, however, governments do learn to counteract the first-generation tools of terrorism, and both the media and public become inured to a given level of threatened or actual violence. At that point, terror, like a disease organism in the face of antibiotics, must mutate to survive both physically and in the public eye.

Libyan death threats against the President and attacks against high-ranking NATO officials presage a new form of adaptation. These incidents highlight the fact that, by careful target selection and by using the media to amplify the effect, terrorism can become a strategic instrument of policy influence as well as a tactical tool of social disruption. Whether or not the Libyan hit team actually existed became irrelevant. The threat itself forced the President to retreat into a "steel cocoon" and appeared to paralyze the American government. Responding to this governmental posture, the media were led to overplay the matter, and the incident emerged as a self-inflicted act of terror, with Colonel Kadaffi as the catalyst.

It also made clear that America is not immune to the terror event, either at home or abroad. If the usually random act of violence can paralyze a government, as we have seen, the strategically directed terrorist attack is potentially devastating. The United States appears unready to cope effectively with either tactically or strategically inspired terrorism, and that very unreadiness invites attack. In the immediate future, America can expect to join its European allies as a victim of terrorism, playing the unwilling costar in a media event that undermines the government's credibility internationally.

and weakens it in the eyes of the domestic electorate. Unless the United States learns to deal at home and abroad with the phenomenology of terrorism in the longer term, it should expect to see its substantive strength sharply reduced as terrorism replaces conventional hostilities in the international allocation of power.

ADAPTATION AND THE MEDIA MULTIPLIER

It may seem inconceivable that tactics of terror could be used successfully against a nation as powerful as the United States, or indeed any industrial nation. No band of terrorists is a match for the smallest standing army or indeed any metropolitan police force. None can command the resources of the tiniest nation. Yet, terrorism has been characterized as a worldwide menace. The terror event enjoys an unparalleled power simply because of its media value.

Of all the reasons for terrorist success, the platform offered by the enthusiastic media is by far the most important. Terrorists have used the media as a springboard onto the world stage. As a result, the terrorist assault has come to resemble highly choreographed theater, with the Western media inadvertently emerging as an adversary of liberal democracies by working in de facto partnership with terrorists.

Both government and terrorists operate in the glare of the media spot-light. Without that attention, the outcome of the incident becomes relatively insignificant. The militants in Iran recognized this as an essential ingredient of success and acted accordingly. By encouraging regular media coverage, the terrorists made the torment of the hostages an integral part of everyone's life. The T4 quickly became so well known that any action by the United States that could have jeopardized their lives would have engendered severe political penalties.

The media mold public perceptions about the success or failure of the terrorist operation, about official competence in the face of the threat, and about the prowess of the terrorist organization. For example, Israel's desperate decision to resist escalating terrorist demands and its attempt at a high-risk rescue at Entebbe were depicted by the media as a major triumph. The Germans at Mogadishu basked in the same affirmative limelight. By contrast, the American experience in the Iranian desert was presented not simply as a justified attempt that failed, but as a debacle, a symbol of American command weakness and presidential bungling.

As a terror event unfolds, the media's involvement creates a peculiar synergy between the government, the public, and the terrorists. Each of the actors participates directly in the event, creating in effect a spectacle with a participative audience. The problem comes when the level of violence loses its media sex appeal, when the next airline hijacking or "knee-capping" is no longer spellbinding news.

To maintain the media spotlight, terrorist organizations must heighten the threshold for the spectacular assault. Accepting the thesis that a primary goal is governmental disruption and that there must be an aura of "Broadway" about the event, we can speculate about the next phase: terrorists will be forced to adapt their methods, their tools, and their targets to stay ahead of government preparations and assure front-page coverage.

As governments have learned to counter commonplace terrorist attacks with specialized rescue teams--the Delta Force in the United States, the GSG-9 (Grenzschutzgruppe) in Germany, and the Saiyeret in Israel--the dangers of forced adaptation or mutation automatically increase. While amateurs may continue to rely on time-tested tactics, such as sky-jacking or embassy seizures, imaginative professional terrorists will alter their methods to ensure surprise, panic, and genuine disruption.

Terrorist organizations are being forced to adapt not only because their more traditional tools, such as sky-jacking, no longer attract the desired media attention, but also because these older methods can be defeated. While governments learn slowly, they do learn. The terrorists must keep one step ahead of governments' ability to respond in order to survive both physically and in the popular eye.

A number of avenues are open to them: attack the infrastructure of metropolitan areas (systems such as the electric or natural gas networks, communications or computer facilities appear particularly vulnerable); threaten thousands of people with agents of mass destruction (nuclear explosives, chemical or biological weapons can all serve this end); or find subtle political evers to exploit (the antinuclear and environmental movements in the United States and in Europe are potential targets for infiltration).

Attacks on society's infrastructure have already occurred. The New World Liberation Front has targeted Pacific Gas and Electric some 70 times, albeit with minimal damage. The Red Brigade attempted to knock out the electric power system in Rome, following the Aldo Moro kidnapping, but created only a minor power failure. Nuclear power stations in Spain, France, and Germany have been unsuccessfully attacked. A raid on a FALN (Armed Forces of National Liberation of Puerto Rico) safehouse prior to

the 1980 Democratic National Convention turned up detailed plans of the power system of Madison Square Garden, perhaps signaling a plot to black out the facility and disrupt the electoral process. To date, these terrorist attacks have been largely ineffective, but they raise the prospect of very large disruptive impacts being created with very few human and material resources.

As Western civilization has grown dependent on technology for survival--and with the technological infrastructure vertically stacked, leaving little room for redundancy--society's vulnerability to attack has become increasingly obvious. Certainly, electric generation and distribution systems, computer networks, nuclear installations, port facilities, water systems, and oil refineries provide leverageable targets. In addition, certain responsible organizations have enough evidence to lead some to conclude that terrorist groups have been recruiting technical talent to correct past failures.

Terrorists have employed whatever portable and concealable antitank and anti-aircraft weapons they have been able to obtain. In 1973, PLO terrorists were apprehended attempting to knock down an El Al jet at the Rome airport. In 1976, members of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) were arrested at the perimeter of the Nairobi airport preparing to fire at an El Al jet coming in to land. Less than a year ago, an anti-tank missile was used by the Red Army Faction in the attack against General Kroesen's car in Germany. We must face the prospect that the spectrum of potential disruption is becoming substantially enlarged and may even include the threat of nuclear or chemical weapons. Although the means of mass destruction have become increasingly available, their use by terrorists would represent a quantum jump and would likely backfire by assuring an overwhelming governmental response and the terrorists' demise.

On the other hand, the degree of threat need not be raised to achieve a greater scope of disruption and requisite media attention. What is equally plausible--albeit more subtle--is a political adaptation of the threat. Instead of isolated attacks against individual nations, terrorism can heighten its leverage by careful selection of targets within the international community. The level of violence can remain the same while the effect is expanded dramatically.

The attacks on General Kroesen in Germany and General Dozier in Italy represent a new form of "cushion shot" terrorism. Dozier was not merely a high-ranking official whose kidnapping might seriously embarrass the American government; he was a symbol of the Western Alliance. His kidnapping was designed to provide the Red Brigade with power to influence, through the media, the outcome of issues of great political import; the structure of the Western Alliance and the decisions on theater force modernization.

It is essential to distinguish between a routine terrorist kidnapping for extortionate purposes and the Dozier case. The former is straightforward: there is a hostage to be traded for meeting a specific set of demands. In the latter, the elements are considerably more complex. Using the same tools, the Red Brigade was in position to attack a range of targets--the military, the U.S. government, the Italian government, and even the NATO alliance. Using the media as a springboard, the terrorists attempted a cushion shot to capitalize on the political strains in the alliance and the growing, worldwide, antinuclear movement. Had the terrorists chosen another day--rather than one in which events in Poland and the Golan Heights overshadowed their drama--the U.S. government, as well as the entire alliance, would have been even more seriously embarrassed.

The Dozier case highlights the possibility of ever stronger leverage and a broadened scope of attacks. It has also revealed that NATO is a vulnerable terrorist target. Colonel Kaddafi's threat alone, following the Gulf of Sidra incident, to attack a nuclear weapons storage facility in Europe is another example of cushion shot terrorism in that it involves many international interests at little current cost to Libya.

The vulnerability of our technological and political infrastructures creates new targets of strategic value, attractive not only to subnational terrorist organizations but to nation-states as well. The possibility that nations will adopt such tactics, sometimes under the guise of common criminality, is a very real threat. The instant and global media attention that such threats would command poses a major dilemma for balanced political response.

If the United States and other large nations are not to be embarrassed or unduly damaged by the terror event, and if the press are to be left unrestrained, improved cooperation between the two will be essential. Although the media have developed internal codes of ethics, the fierce competition among the television networks and wire services has not always been conducive to self-restraint. The reporting of the Iranian hostage seizure is an excellent example of how the media can overdramatize an incident, creating a public perception of governmental impotence. The media must recognize their power to affect the outcome of an event and act responsibly. By the same token, the government has certain responsibilities to the media. For its part, the government should develop more creative means of consultation and a system of accurate information dissemination during an incident so that a better working partnership can evolve. If we fail to forge these improved working accommodations, we run the serious risk of seeing some form of institutionalized censorship resulting from a mishandled terrorist incident.

THE GEOPOLITICAL CONTEXT

The next several decades appear ripe for unconventional forms of conflict among nations as the age of great power dominance is replaced by a more fluid pattern of international relations. As power and influence become increasingly diffuse, the traditional mechanisms of restraint will become decreasingly effective. The international systems will be marked by growing uncertainty simply because of the proliferation of key actors and advanced weapons on the world-stage. It will be far less clear who can do what to whom, why, and with what effect.

We should expect that the very diversity of actors, each pursuing his or her own interests, will expand the opportunity for international conflict. It is important to understand how the international environment itself might encourage low-intensity conflict as a means of achieving foreign policy goals. For the purposes of this analysis, the evolving international context can be characterized by six general propositions:

1. The social, political, military, and economic conditions that sustained the NATO Alliance have so diverged as to place at risk the concept of the alliance itself. For 20 or 30 years, the superpowers played a "zero-sum" game in which winners or losers were clearly identifiable. That era of bipolar confrontation has been transformed into an ambiguous multiactor age in which the spheres of influence of the super-powers have shrunk considerably. Neither can dictate, with any certainty, the desired or apparent course of political or military events. Increasing dependence on Third World countries for economic prosperity, military leverage, and international support has rendered the superpowers more vulnerable to the changing and frequently turbulent environment. In particular, the emergence of a federated Europe, a politically active Japan, and an internationalist China will radically affect the division of power between and among the major elements of the East and West.

2. The ambivalence in Europe about the alliance will continue to be a forcing function in U.S.-NATO relationships. NATO is not robust and shows signs of political and military stress. There is dissension among the partners over a number of issues, not the least of which is what constitutes adequate military deterrence of perceived Soviet Union political ambitions. Western Europe, as an entity, will become more assertive in adopting alternative policies on issues like security, energy, Middle Eastern peace arrangements, and East-West relations. This trend is likely to be mirrored in the Eastern bloc, albeit perhaps not at the same pace. Europe as a whole may inch toward "Swedenization," with concomitant challenges to superpower leadership on both sides.

3. Western European military considerations have changed the nature of the central battleground. Twenty years ago, we compensated for our inability to match the Soviets man-for-man and tank-for-tank with a dominant nuclear force, hoping to deter by deploying the products of a decisive technology against sheer numbers and brawn. Today, not only are we outnumbered in men and tanks but we have no monopoly on superior technology, including smart munitions. The alliance cannot match the Soviet Union in general purpose forces. Moreover, our tactical nuclear force in Europe, designed to bolster an uncertain conventional defense, offers too great an opportunity for unwanted escalation toward nuclear holocaust. From the Soviet vantage point, internal ethnic and economic dilemmas, as well as problems on their willingness and capability to keep up an impregnable front against the West. They can afford an arms race about as much as we can. Neither the United States nor the Soviet Union wants to risk large-scale confrontation.

4. Competition among industrialized nations for scarce resources will intensify. The Achilles heel of technological civilization has been globally bared over the past decade: dependence on raw materials for economic growth, and in turn, for national political stability. Competition for resources may override, in some cases, efforts at international cooperation. Possession of resources is already being used as a tool of political leverage. As specific raw materials become economically scarce, either physically or by design, we should expect that international frictions over their distribution will intensify.

5. Political and economic power will become increasingly liquid. Since the establishment of OPEC in 1973, the world has witnessed a transfer of capital and skilled manpower resources unprecedented in civilized history. The oil crisis introduced a new format for relations between the industrialized and industrializing world, setting a non-linear pattern into motion. The reality of interdependence provides the undeveloped nations not only economic but substantial political leverage over the industrialized world. The international politics of Third World countries will be characterized in the coming decades by evidence of real political independence and shifting alignments in their relations with the superpowers. At the same time, the process of economic differentiation among Third World countries will create internal and bloc instabilities. The accompanying political unrest will enhance opportunities for subversion and the use of proxy military forces in high-gain/low-risk situations by virtually any class of power, not just the advanced and powerful.

6. The traditional diplomatic and military policies of the United States will be inadequate to meet the real challenges of the future. As a result of economic and political constraints, the United States will not be able to afford to tailor its forces

to meet every likely contingency. Our ability to project power in the Third World can be expected to become increasingly precarious--particularly in an environment both hostile and better prepared to resist intervention. Increasingly, we are recognizing that there are limits to force, even overwhelming force.

In such an ambiguous and complex environment, unconventional forms of warfare become more attractive. For the relatively weak, the high-leverage/low-cost factor is essential, since they cannot afford to compete militarily or economically. For the more powerful, the high-leverage/low-risk element is decisive, since the costs of large-scale conventional or even nuclear confrontations are unacceptable.

Techniques of unconventional warfare are not a new dimension in the kinetics of international rivalry. For example, disinformation, espionage, overt or covert thefts of high technology, export of undesirables as refugees--as in the Cuban case--and support for movements of national liberation have long formed part of the spectrum of low-intensity conflict. What is new is an international climate that appears to offer a strategic rationale for unconventional warfare. What is also new is that terrorism may become a major and perhaps dominant part of that spectrum.

Used as a strategic weapon, the vectored terrorist threat offers certain unique advantages in the pursuit of foreign policy objectives. Although unimpressive in firepower, it is profound in leverage. In addition, the initial uncertainty about the origin of attack often limits the full range of diplomatic and military responses. For the Soviet Union and its proxies--certain of the radical national and subnational groups already on the terrorist scene--terrorism may offer an irresistibly low-cost, low-risk means of engaging the West in low-intensity conflict.

The new class of "violence manipulators" we can expect to see grow in importance over the next few years includes: subnational terrorist groups, harbored willingly or unwillingly by various states, that seek to disrupt Western society; Third World countries willing to exploit the tools of terrorism directly for their own ends; and larger powers that desire to manipulate international events without running the risks of formal military confrontation.

None of these actors operates wholly independently. The Soviet Union has provided funding and support for terrorist operations via Eastern Europe and its client nations like Libya

or Cuba. With tacit Soviet approval, many groups have trained together in Cuba, Libya, Iraq, South Yemen, and Lebanon. Informal alliances among the members of different groups have often occurred. Palestinian and German terrorists operated together in the 1975 OPEC hostage incident and the Entebbe sky-jacking. It has been speculated that the Red Brigade cooperated with Germany's Red Army Faction in the Dogier case. The PLO has provided aid and assistance to the Japanese Red Army, and were perhaps repaid in the Lod Massacre; the PLO, in turn, has received assistance from a number of Arab nations, such as Libya, which has supported groups as disparate as the Irish Provos and the right wing Italian groups. This overlap in objective and method raises the specter of an international network for terrorism--a master conspiracy of disruption. Indeed, the Reagan administration declared early on that the Soviet Union was responsible for virtually all international terrorism, using it as a tool of surrogate warfare.

While there is incontrovertible evidence of Soviet involvement, the administration has not produced an actual "smoking gun." Terrorism, on the whole, is too complex an issue to be easily explained away as an example of Soviet interventionism. Even if the Soviet Union withdrew all patronage, terrorist activity would certainly continue, perhaps unabated. Terror has other independent patrons, the most prominent being Libya. Libya, for example, has become quite involved in Central America and Venezuela, having gained some influence with the media and with a number of ranking officials. This kind of link is of primary benefit to Libya in its quest for a leadership role in OPEC. Venezuela provides a natural platform for Libyan terrorism disguised as economic or political nationalism. While there might be tacit support from Moscow, there is little or no evidence that Libyan activities are planned or directed by the Soviets. The terror mechanism represents too useful a tool of low-intensity conflict to be discarded by any small state operating on its own behalf.

Moreover, subnational terrorist groups have matured into self-sustaining organisms; there is no organic need for a master conspiracy. Terrorist organizations are not mirror images of each other, even when there is a broad intersection of interest. Each group learns from the experiences of others, its tactics evolving in response to governmental countermeasures and in the spotlight of media publicity. Hence, a loose confederacy of terrorist groups operates quite successfully without the limits that centralization would impose.

Contemporary terrorism offers few grand visions of a better world. Increasingly, it has become a strategic tactic, whether employed by neonihiilistic subnational groups or by nation-states.

As a result, the days in which terrorism was confined to isolated instances of social disruption are over. The destabilized international system provides the opportunity for profound disruption while the vulnerability of the West, in terms of its unprotected technical and democratic political infrastructure, offers the avenue of attack.

THE ISSUE OF RESPONSIBLE RESPONSE

The conclusion that the United States has no immunity to terrorist attack appears inescapable. We should expect an increase in both the absolute number of violent events and in their qualitative importance. We have already experienced exported terror striking at the exposed nerve centers of the American system through attempts on the lives of presidents, candidates, and key leaders. We are increasingly aware of the rising internal social stresses that provide potentially exploitable cushion shot situations--the United States has its own growing anti-nuclear movement; environmentalists are being affronted without the courtesy of face-saving compromise; the Black, Hispanic, Asian, refugee, and American Indian ethnic minorities perceive their share in the American power system as shrinking rapidly; a class of newly economically disenfranchised former producers and wage-earners is beginning to coalesce around an emotional opposition to administration policies; middle-class resentment against being forced to abandon the political center under the constant harassment of single-interest ideological radicals is pointing toward eventual severe pendulum reactions. In short, there is no shortage of social and political ferment that has found little satisfaction in the traditional and legitimate means of relieving societal stress.

There is a natural quixotic character to America--exploited by the press--that rejoices in hero worship of criminals and rebels--another potential access route into our society by those not dedicated to its survival. The global political process is in growing disarray, with the traditional networks of intra- and international relations collapsing without alternatives in place. The temptation to rely on unconventional action mechanisms to achieve conventional political ends is becoming irresistible.

At the same time that the United States is exhibiting--and, one hopes, recognizing--its growing societal vulnerability to terrorist activity, the range of terrorism to which the society is subject is broadening dramatically. Sophisticated weaponry is widely available now, and it will not be much longer before, in the opinion of observers, chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction will be available to the international terrorist community. Although quite improbable, a few argue that terrorists

will someday get their hands on nuclear explosives. Perhaps more important, the terrorist community itself may become more technologically sophisticated--increasing the scope and vulnerability of possible targets--and psychologically disciplined--maximizing the impact of each threat or event. With U.S. interests--and the media able to report them--being worldwide, terrorist acts directed against those interests are not preconstained or channeled by factors of geography, time, or class of target. The phenomenon has become transnational. And whether the terrorist act is eventually traceable to some small group's nihilistic fanaticism or to some major nation-state's political needs, the surface truth remains the same: in the face of an escalating threat of serious physical and political proportions, the United States is not prepared to respond except reactively.

Whether international terrorism is a form of warfare or not, responsible response begins with a public policy structure that recognizes the issue, places it in proper perspective among the hierarchy of standing problems on the national agenda, and provides useful operational guidance to those who will be dealing with specific future incidents. It should promise with chilling certainty to all who trespass against U.S. interests in this manner that eventual retribution will be exacted from actor and instigator alike. It should engage the confidence and common sense of the American people and not be regarded as just another governmental activity divorced from the real business of the country.

Having matters in hand, or at least appearing to have them so, implies advance preparation. Certainly, luck enters into the equation, but so do well-conceived organizational arrangements; ironed-out jurisdictional questions among local, state, and federal authorities; and planned uses of technology. Such contingency planning is basic if America is to meet the terrorist challenge. Its objective is not to prepare for specific crises but to develop modes of operation and an awareness of available resources, to gain quick access to those resources and understand the logistics involved in using them. Gaming exercises, aimed at developing smooth working routines in crisis conditions, are a requisite of contingency planning. The creation of a professional U.S. "Red Team" of imaginative simulated terrorists would provide realistic training and testing opportunities at many levels of threat. Another area of exploration is to use technology to harden the target, to reduce terrorists' capability for damage, and to deny them the leverage they seek.

Exactly because the society itself is hostage in the largest-scale terrorist extortions--for example, those involving nuclear or biological materials, or those attacking the life-support infrastructure of food, energy, and water--the society must embrace philosophically the quality of mature response that

the threat warrants. A danger in the past has been a tendency to downplay the overall threat and to treat each conventional incident on its own theatrical merits. A graver danger of the future is the probability that unconventional incidents will have a much greater impact than they perhaps warrant and will be allowed to resonate until they eventually fractionate some of our important stabilizing social and political structures. As noted earlier, the singular position of the media in this field imposes some responsibilities for identification with the national interest not exercised since World War II.

Finally, there is one other major player whose early involvement during policy formulation and continuing involvement during periods of active response to terrorist incidents is often overlooked: the judiciary. While not likely to reverse the long tradition of adversary relations between the executive and the judiciary in the general confrontation between social order and individual liberty, the continuing involvement of judicial attention to matters that carry the seeds of social annihilation should allow the full majesty of the law to operate effectively and swiftly in response to extralegal violence and blackmail.

Ideally, a society attacked by terrorists reacts at three hierarchical levels. First, there is the immediate isolation and reduction of the specific incident, much in the manner of the treatment of a dangerous disease. Second, there is the phase of domestic and international "damage control," or dealing with the derivative and delayed political, social, economic, security, and military implications of the event being treated. This can range from reassuring international partners that basic commitments will be upheld--after, say, a nuclear incident--to emergency economic recovery programs--after, say, the breakdown of a city's water system. Third, and probably least considered, is the phase of creating opportunity from adversity and consciously using the incident--in its fullest sense, including success or failure in containment and in dealing with its larger fallout implications--as an element to move forward basic national policy.

The alternative--to try to encyst such events and then rely on the passage of time to remove them from the public consciousness--has two grave disadvantages: it continues to attract new incidents because the field is always fresh for public exploitation, and it suppresses inquiry into the root causes of this class of violence, which, if addressed as part of the political process, would be greatly weakened by routine and open review. By incorporating the ill fortune of terrorism into the rationale for the forward flow of programs, policies, legislation, and individual activities, it would seem that the nation's vulnerability would decrease markedly. Once a risk is recognized as quotidian and incorporated as such into the public consciousness the kinetic energy of that risk in social terms is expended with little real effect.

In short, a mature technological society can absorb the instabilities caused by an occasional lack of success in managing the symptoms of terrorism. It is a matter of social perspective, of informed personal choice, and of educated expectancies backed up by a first-line defense of sound independent policy; quality intelligence; rapid, controlled resource allocation; and a straight-forward mechanism for making difficult decisions quickly.

Does the United States today have either the maturity to accept and constructively respond to the terror problem or the political structure to deal with its gross overt manifestations? It is not untimely, during this current period of reassessment of federal, state, and private responsibilities for the health of the republic, to examine carefully the machinery of law enforcement, national security, and civil emergency reaction... machinery intended to deal with the whole array of foreseen and surprising domestic and international crises we will undoubtedly face over the next decade, ranging from earthquake and famine to nation-scale terror and violence. It is within that machinery, which needs for its own reasons to be streamlined and made potent that we should inconspicuously absorb the new elements of global terrorism, intelligence assessment, protection of key national infrastructures--by hardening, redundancy, and inaccessibility--and realistic contingency planning and practices that involve the hierarchy of authority, as well as the public and the media. If the United States cannot, out of indecision, or will not, out of ignorance, act now to better meet its future challenges, the costs in the decades to come will be paid in the currency of national humiliation and social dis-integration.

TERRORISM AS A WEAPON IN POLITICS

BY N.S. SAKSENA

1. AN OLD PROBLEM

There is no accepted definition of 'terrorism' but by common understanding those motivated by considerations of pure personal aggrandisement are excluded from terrorism. This excludes common crimes like robbery, dacoity, etc. However, dacoities and murders organized by ideological groups like Naxalites fall within our purview but Chambal valley dacoites are again excluded. An Anand Margis had political objectives and as their leader aspired to seize political power, so this group falls within; our ken.

2. Terrorism has also to be differentiated from insurgency problems of Nagaland Mizoram etc. It is difficult to define precisely the difference between insurgency and terrorism. However, an insurgent has the support of a large section of the local population while a terrorist need not have such support. Again an insurgent is a national of a country who is in revolt against the constitutional government of his country and fights to overthrow government by guerilla warfare. The terrorist may or may not be a national of the country in which he operates. The incident in May 1980 in London in Iranian Embassy, when the PAGODA SECTION of the elite special Air Service regiment went into action, shows that terrorism can occur in a country without the cause of the grievance laying in that country

3. Terrorism has been since long a recognised method to achieve the political objectives of group by causing intense fear in another group or individual, whom they want to coerce or subdue. However it has hit the headlines for the last few decades owing to its widespread prevalence and the frightful nature of the risks involved. Assassination by ideologically motivated fanatics or by hired murderers has been an old occupational/risk of kings, queens, presidents, prime ministers etc. As Colin Legum said in an article in 1972 "Acts of terror by individuals, groups and States, are, of course, as old as history; even international terrorism is no new phenomenon. Between 1870 and 1914 terrorist activities were increasingly organised on an international scale by groups who killed as diverse and influential world leaders as the Tsar of Russia, President Carnot of France, President McKinley of the United States, the Empress of Austria, the King of Italy, the Prime Minister of Spain as well as a number of statesmen, while making many unsuccessful attempts on the lives of kings, princess and ministers. Terrorists bombed the French National Assembly, blew up workers, in a Paris cafe, and dropped bombs on peaceful religious demonstrations in Italy. The assassination of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand in 1914 finally brought on World War I.

4. India, especially Bengal and Maharashtra, was one of the first countries in the world, to preach the doctrine of terrorism and to practise it as early as the first decade of the 20th century. A few of our greatest heroes have been terrorists-Arobindo, Chandra Shekhar Azad, Bhagat Singh etc. This tradition has never died in India but it became dormant when India got democracy. The Naxalites revived it in a way. The CPI (Marxist-Leninist) was founded on April 22, 1969 on the birthday of Lenin. This party believes in overthrowing the State in four stages:

- (i) period of organisation and subversion;
- (ii) period of terrorism and to a certain extent low scale guerilla warfare;
- (iii) period of guerilla warfare;
- (iv) period of mobile warfare.

Thus terrorism was their second stage for over-throwing the State. When people read of ugly terrorist incidents in several parts of the world, even many experienced administrators suffered from that escapist feeling; "It cannot happen here". We have seen the ugly face of terrorism. In Calcutta for more than a year, many mothers and wives remained terror-stricken while their sons and husbands went out for their daily work. Assassination by terrorists became a reality on January 3, 1975 at Samastipur and on March 20, 1975 Delhi escaped a tragedy narrowly when an attempt on life of retired Chief Justice, Shri A.N. Ray, was made. The lack of technical knowledge and inefficiency of terrorists saved disaster in what is now called the Baroda Dynamite Conspiracy case.

Serious disaster was again averted narrowly by the vigilant eye of an air hostess, when the time-bomb meant to blow up the JAL Plane in its flight from Delhi to Teheran exploded in a corner of the lounge on May 26, 1976 at a time when no one was there. We were fortunate a fourth time when the hijacked IAE plane, bound for Jaipur, landed in Lahore on September 10, 1976. This was specially deplorable because the hijackers used crude methods and were ill-trained themselves. We cannot always, trust our luck. India felt the full impact of terrorism in Europe when our diplomat, Mhatre, was kidnapped and killed in Birmingham on 5-2-84.

II. DAILY LIFE AFFECTED

5. My stay in Birmingham in June-July 1979 and later visits to London, Paris, Brussels and Bonn gave me the impression that terrorism had become a serious problem in Europe. In August 1979 Lord Mountbatten was killed along with three others in a terrorist attempt. Millionaires in West Europe, especially in Italy, Belgium and West Germany, find publicity dangerous and keep themselves surrounded by armed bodyguards. The killing of Schleyer in West Germany shook them. In Birmingham, in the U.K., one gets one's letters after long delays caused by a scare of letter bombs. The slits in postboxes

have been made smaller to prevent letter-bombs from being dropped in them. Every few hundred yards in London one can read the advice of the Metropolitan police to the citizens, "Do Not Panic" if bombs are found nearby. In West Germany, there are prominent notices at public places announcing rewards of up to 50,000 DM for the arrest of terrorists whose photographs are displayed. In June-August 1979 I found newspapers full of reports of the assassination of Mr. Airey Neave, claimed by the Irish National Liberation Army, in a car bomb explosion at the House of Commons the attempted killing at the end of June 1979 of General Haig, the then NATO Commander, the release on or about July 1 of two British bankers in El Salvador on payment of heavy ransom after 214 days of captivity and negotiations, the attempt in early July of Basque nationalists to wreck the tourist trade in Spain, the audacity with which the IRA displayed its armed volunteers on the streets of Belfast on a Sunday in August all in 1979.

III EACH COUNTRY HAS TO EVOLVE ITS OWN STRATEGY

6. The British police rely on their ancient weapon -public support- and therefore, they have been outspoken about the danger. The French police depend on their ruthless efficiency and have achieved the best results so far. No other European police force has such a large network of informers as the French Police. The Germans have also succeeded remarkably well but their main weapon has been highly sophisticated training and technology, as was demonstrated in 1977 when Mogadishu (Somalia) airport was stormed by West German commandos.

7. Each country has its own problems and history and so there can be no identical solutions. The IRA is rooted in 300 years of British-Irish history; in Germany the intellectuals are against the Establishment and sympathise with the terrorists; the Parisians and the Italians are simply not bothered by the capture of millionaires and politicians and many frankly enjoy media stories of kidnappings. Spain is a difficult situation as people have yet to be convinced that democracy is not too expensive a luxury.

IV RECRUITMENT MOTIVATION AND FINANCING.

8. Two factors have changed the character of terrorism in recent times- narrowing of national frontiers and modern technology- to make it very destructive. Today terrorists can be financed, trained, equipped and inspired by agencies outside the countries of their operation.

9. It would have been easier, to deal with terrorists if they were all criminals, motivated by personal gain. Unfortunately, many of them are ideologically motivated and enjoy the sympathies of large sections of people on grounds of nationality, race, religion or political ideology. At present groups based on political ideology are less active than those based on religion, race and nation. The Jews, Muslims, Protestants, Catholics, Arabs, Israelis, the Irish and others have formed active terrorist groups.

As collection of operationed intelligence, sophisticated weapons, air travel, false passports and other documents message by counter systems and renting of hotel rooms require a lot of money, realise that they are financing the kidnapping of ture victims.

10. A bold act of terrorism is now assured of wide publicity in the world press on raids and television. The grisly drama staged by Palestinian guerillas at the Munich Olympic games in 1972 was watched by about 500 million television viewers. Terrorist groups feel happy that their problems are not forgotten by the world.

11. In spite of ideological fervour it is difficult to obtain recruits the can volunteer for such a risk life. To reduce the risk such a terrorist group adopts revenge and liberation of prisoners as fixed items of its programme. The softer and more humanitarian the approach of a government more risks for the ture victims. A short-sighted policy of yielding to demands can be extremely dangerous.

12. DANGERS TO A FEW HEADS OF GOVERNMENTS

One of the greatest risks to the future of democracy in the world lies in a terrorist group deciding to assassinate the greatest leader of a nation in order to change national policy. Such a decision was made in 1960 by several rightist groups in France who felt that the country could not be saved without finishing De Gaulle. In the six years between 1960 and 1965, De Gaulle was, subjected to at least 18 assassination attempts. The French Secret Service must be given the credit for ensuring that he died peacefully in his own home.

The attempts made to assassinate FIDEL CASTRO of Cuba are well-known. Less well known are the attempts inspired by Secret service agencies, to murder political leaders.

VI FUTURE DANGERS

A combination of factors increase future risks.

13. First is the value of the targets. Letter-bombs may look like to games when oil refineries, nuclear power plants, supertankers, and electric power grids become objects of attack by terrorist groups. The possibility is being brought nearer by international linkages. The terrorists, who carried out the massacre at Lod airport in Israel belonged to Japan, were trained in Korea, purchased arms in Italy with money raised in West Germany and had the sympathy of several Arab countries. Modern technology is adding to the dangers.

14. Secondly there is the danger that a few of the weapons available to modern armed forces may become available to terrorists. In January 1976, security forces in Kenya arrested five Palestinian terrorists who were trying to smuggle a dismantled SAM-7 missile in packages labelled "motor-car-spares". This was to be used for shooting an airliner. Two Arab terrorists were arrested in Rome in 1973 with a Soviet SA-7 heatseeking rocket.

15. Thirdly plastic explosives are becoming more powerful. One authentic calculation is that between 1960 and 1975 more were about 700 incidents of international terrorism (this includes internal terrorism) in which about 700 people were killed and about 2,700 injured. The real danger lies not in the increasing number of incidents but in some of these attacks being more destructive of life and property.

16. Fourthly even more than technology, the danger lies in the increasing number of "Angry Young Men". Contrary to popular belief terrorists mainly come from well-to-do families and the majority are genuinely upset by the acts of injustice they see around them. Very few realise that their methods add to the sum-total of injustice. International terrorist operations are complicated, requiring technical skill, mastery of human psychology and weapons, and a knowledge of foreign languages. The majority of West German terrorists are educated enough to be high-paid executives. In Italy, the majority of terrorists are university educated and come from upper middle class families.

17. Fifthly the real oppression of minority groups poses even great dangers. There is ample moral justification of terrorism in the eyes of several minority groups, who argue that they can never win a conventional war against powerful majority groups, who oppress the minority groups and are not willing to concede national independence to them. The Irish, the Palestinians, the Kurds, the Basques and many others feel that their cause is just. Mr. Menachem Begin, the Israeli Prime Minister, who is so vocal against Palestinians, is perhaps the father of terrorism in West Asia at a time when terrorism was the main instrument of Jews. The majority syndrome has spread so far that these groups are willing to espouse the causes of other groups in the world. This has led to international linkages, which make the task of the police extremely difficult. "Links have been proven not only between Palestinians, Japanese and Irish, but also between these or others and Basque separatists in Spain, Breton irredentists in France, and similar groups in Pakistan, Turkey, Morocco, Indonesia, the Philippines, Latin America, Southern Africa, Ethiopia and "Jurdistan".

18. There is no doubt that a few of the Central Governments are so dictatorial that the revolting area gains the moral sympathy of the intellectuals all over the world. Only one example may be quoted, that is Bhutto's treatment of Baluchistan. For political reasons Bhutto is being built up as a democrat. It was he, who dismissed the provincial Government, enjoying the mandate of the Baluchistan people; set up a puppet regime and when defections could not be arranged three opposition MLAs, were detained.

As the strength of the Baluchistan Assembly was only 19 this meant that about 50% were eliminated by murders/detentions. When the Baluch people rose in revolt against Bhutto the government launched a reign of terror. This was replied to by bombs - blasts at Quetta, Chaman and other urban centres. After Soviet troops marched into Afghanistan a terrified Zia regime has adopted a much more conciliatory attitude towards Baluchistan.

19. There should be no impression that minorities are oppressed everywhere. There are also pampered minorities, for example, the Georgians in the Soviet Union. However whenever there is any disturbance in any such area the world is apt to jump to the conclusion that the minority is being oppressed. Then there are states like Yugoslavia and Lebanon, where no group is in a majority and power is shared by various groups on some preagreed basis. Even then some groups take to terrorist activity.

VII WRITTEN AND ORAL GUIDANCE FOR TERRORISTS

20. It may sound ridiculous to some that there should be written manuals for terrorists. But this is a natural development in regions where their numbers are so large that month-to-month instructions will not do. Simple the following:-

(i) At one time the American terrorists always took away the weapons of policemen killed. Later they found that the number and make of the weapon became a good evidentiary link to connect the terrorist to a specific murder. So in 1972 the guidance was "We do not need to take weapons from food (killed) pigs, specially those that have been righteously baconized. There are better places to rip-off weapons-not where they can be linked to butchered hogs." This shows how terrorists have developed their own vocabulary.

(ii) As banks have the money these writings lay down detailed hints for reconnaissance of the target and planning of getaway.

(iii) Indiscriminate terror as in the Punjab- is often advocated to instill fear in the public so that they do not help the police when the terrorists are carrying out their operations.

(iv) The smuggling of firearms, the illegal transfer of money, the forging of passports, communications by secret codes-all these have become well-developed techniques.

VIII TERROR BY BOTH LEFTISTS AND RIGHTISTS URBAN RURAL.

In India a general fallacy in regard to terrorism is that it is extraleft. This fallacy originated because during the British period several terrorist groups called themselves 'Socialist'. From 1969 onwards the Naxalites, who called themselves communist Party-Marxist Leninist-were so leftist that they called the CIP (M) as a reactionary party. Their acknowledged

leader was Mao-Ze dung and Lin-Biao, whose writing dubbed the Soviet Communists as revisionists. Looking at the world situation it is difficult to say whether there are more terrorists among the right-wing groups or among the leftists. Rightwing terrorists have operated on a large-scale in Latin America, especially Chile and Argentina. Most army dictatorships, including those in Pakistan and Bangladesh, have the support of right-wing extremists. The main objective of these groups is to preserve the old structure against any change and to safeguard the privileges of elite groups like the landlords. Many right-wing terrorists sometimes were religious fanatics. By all accepted standards the Anand Margis, the militant section of the Akalis and the recently raised Bhumi Sena of Bihar fall in the category of right-wing terrorists. It were the right-wing terrorists, who made repeated attempts to murder De Gaulle.

22. It is true that the Naxalites called themselves Marxists-Leninists but judged by the writings of Marx and Lenin terrorism is an infantile disorder because both Marx and Lenin visualised the involvement of the masses. Terrorism, by its very nature, cannot involve more than a few people. Again both Marxism and Leninism have a clear vision of the future-may be good for some and bad for others. On the other hand guerrilla writings are full of hints how to destroy but there is no mention of the type of society, which they wanted create.

23. The controversy between urban and rural terrorists is based partly on the brand of political philosophy, which a group professes and partly on the terrain in which one operates. The theoretical controversy has not been overshadowed by two practical considerations:

(i) First the centre of power of the Establishment is in the cities, where most of their leaders live.

(ii) Secondly the publicity to a cause is much greater if the blow is struck in a city like London, Paris, Berlin, Delhi or even Amritsar as compared to the rural areas of Bihar, east U.P. Haryana etc. Terrorism practised in the interior areas of China from 1913 to 1948 hardly came to the notice of the outside press.

24. In the pre-1945 world in most areas terrorism was a means of last resort when all other methods of redressing grievance failed or had no chance of success against a powerfully entrenched government. After 1945 it has become a normal means of communication by a few groups, who think that this is the correct method to be used at the very first instance. There may be other groups, as in India, who think that the Constitutional machinery of redressing grievances is so heavily weighted in favour of the ruling elite that they can get nothing but promises, which are repeated before every election and quickly forgotten after it. In Bihar the land legislation passed by the same party government has simply not been implemented. This has given rise to Naxalite terrorism of the Bhumi Sena, raised and financed by feudal elements. Freedom for opposing terrorist groups to operate implies either collapse or abdication of government machinery.

25. There is also terrorism by the government machinery in several states, ruled by dictators, notably in Chile, Nicaragua, Argentina, Pakistan, Phillipines etc. Terrorism by government machinery implies that it is done outside the legal framework, accepted by the dictator. In all these States terrorist groups sprang up to counter State terrorism.

IX IDEAL-INTERNATIONAL UNDERSTANDING

26. The ideal method of solving this problem like many other problems, in full international understanding. States, irrespective of their political ideologies have co-operated in fighting plague, small-pox etc and are cooperating in fighting locusts. No organised state has any alternative, but to declare a war on terrorism. The greatest handicap at present is lack of international under subsidy quickly. However there appears little prospects of this at present.

27. When ransom is demanded the saving of lives becomes paramount and ransom is often paid. It is forgotten that each successful blackmail leads to numerous repetitions followed by an escalation in the price demanded. In the their fate-though it may appear to be cruel- and to pay the ransom money to the another refuses to do so. If the majority of governments agree on this, kidnapping for ransom will stop though it may be replaced by outright killings. These are of no ransom and no negotiations.

28. The second international agreement-even among the top should be to compel the national governments concerned to bring the culprits to book. Small nations may look their sources to hunt down terrorist groups. The financial cost of fighting international terrorism should be borne on an agreed basis by the international community. It must be made clear, however what duties most governments at present is not financial costs but political costs.

29. While police measures are essential nothing effective can be done in democracies unless sound public opinion is built up against terrorism. It has to be explained to the public that terrorism has injured that lives of thousands and ruined lakhs of families who do not fall in the category of exploiters or evildoers. The media has become so powerful that it is not difficult for the majority of the people to understand that terrorism is generally a weapon against the innocent and that widows and orphans are not responsible for any policies-even unjust ones-of their governments.

30. This ideal solution of international understanding is, however, quite distant to the ugly realities of the modern world in which several government have established regular schools for training terrorists. There are many secret Service agencies, who do finance terrorist activities in other countries. There fore, in this imperfect world of ours most nations have to rely on their own efforts and the cooperation of governments, friendly to them.

X EFFORTS MADE BY WEST GERMANY

31. One of the greatest victims of both national and international terrorism has been West Germany and that is why she made the best efforts promote international cooperation in this respect. The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany called upon the General Assembly of the United Nations to resolve a convention against the taking of hostages. Its stand was that the nations of the world have already joined in proscribing piracy and slavery international terrorism with the taking of hostages is the new form of. As early as in the Hague Convention of 1970, the signatory states engaged to prevent aircraft-hijackers from doing harm and free the hostages experience however unfortunately shown with what little effect this convention is implemented.

32. During the summer of 1976, the heads of state and government of the nine member countries of the European Community declared "that they regard the inhuman practice of taking hostages in order to exert pressure on a government as absolutely unacceptable, regardless of the aims and reasons involved." The member states of the Community therefore agreed to place terrorists and takers of hostages before their courts or to deport them. The nine countries also agreed to make efforts to reach world-wide agreement on the combatting and prevention of international terrorism and kidnapping.

33. Since 1972, a United Nations Committee has been working on the problems of common measures against terrorism, but without success, the difficulties in defining "terrorism" in a way that is valid for all states were too great. What is a battle for freedom, and what terrorism? Particularly the states of the Third World fear that an international convention to proscribe terrorism could be misunderstood as discrimination against freedom movements. The dramatic events of later years such as the attack on the OPEC in Vienna and the hijacking of an aircraft to Entebbe however made the criminal nature of international terrorism more and more clear to the population of the entire world.

34. As a result mainly of West Germany's efforts in 1976, all members of the Security Council of the United Nations declared themselves against terrorism. The German Ambassador to the United Nations, Von Weizsäcker called upon the Security Council to "develop effective weapons for combat-terror and, in particular, the taking of hostages". Terrorism, he said, threatened international security and the basis for normal international relations. The use of force against innocent and uninvolved persons may not be counteracted as a means of enforcing even political interests and aims- such actions are more than criminal acts. It would be cynical to conclude that the results been nil. Though international terrorism continues yet a number of states have developed a better sense of responsibility to the international community and in obvious acts of terrorism they do help the victim nations.

35 As a result of the efforts of west European countries, mainly, Germany, the European Convention on the Suppression of terrorism, was open for signatures on January 27, 1977. The response from western Europe was overwhelming but there was poor response from the third World because many did not agree with the definition of terrorism. Many felt that these governments ignored terrorism practised by dictatorships. It was also felt that it was heavily weighted in favour of a status-quo society, especially those dominated by right-wing parties. There is some validity in this criticism because west European thinking was heavily influenced by the activities of Baader Meinhof Group, the Japanese Red Army (which was responsible for the hijacking of a JAL aircraft on its flight from Bombay in September 1977), the Popular Front for the liberation of Palestine and other groups, which are ultra leftist. The ghost of ultra-leftism became more haunting when links between various national liberation groups were first formalised in 1966 at the Tricontinental conference of Revolutionary Representatives in Havana, attended by over one hundred delegates from Latin America, the Middle East, Africa and Asia. These links have been subsequently fostered at Guerilla training camps in the Middle East draws together almost every terrorist group large or small, which exists today: the Baader Meinhof of the TPEA the JRA, the FLOQ Black September, Basques Bretons and Irish for example. Those like JRA who had training camps in the Lebanon were believed to have transferred them to Aden, Libya, Somalia or Iraq. According to some reports, some of the instructors at the camps were previously trained in Establishments in the USSR, set up originally for training members of the Fedayeen. PFLP has had some support from China and North Korea. In the source of the investigation of the killing of Paris policeman (June 1975) by Carlos it was found that the same forged London Airport Stamp had been used on (a) the forged Ecuadorian passport used by one of the killers (b) a Guatemalan passport used by an Arab terrorist arrested in London in December, 1972; (c) a forged Israeli passport used by one of the Alfatah Black September squad arrested in Australia in January 1973 (d) the Japanese passport of a JARA member arrested in Paris in July 1974; and (e) the Chilean passport used by a group attacking a TWA aircraft in Rome in August 1974. There are similar chains of common usage linking various terrorist groups by the arms they have used. Owing to the sympathy of large sections of the people in the world with oppressed groups like the Palestinians the support for a convention sponsored by West Europe, has not been world wide.

36. There were three International Conventions - Tokyo (1963), the Hague (1970) and Montreal (1971) outlawing hijacking and giving rules for dealing with hijackers. Previous to these was the Geneva Convention on the High Seas, which dealt both with ships and planes. Many nations signed these but very few ratified these. Another difficulty arises because many nations have legal section for giving sylum to political refugees. Then there are hectic laws regarding extradition. Many states have laws for trying their nationals even if the crime was committed outside the country; others, have laws for trying everyone - including foreigners for crimes committed on their territory. The remedy to all this is an agreement among nations that certain crime should not be remedy to all this is an agreement among nations that certain crimes should not be treated as

political. A uniform policy is in the interest of all nations because countries, which give asylum to criminals today may be victims of another set of criminals tomorrow. Those who want to study the legal position more may study Shri H.R. Khanna's (Retired Judge of the Supreme Court) excellent article in the Statesman of March 16, 1981.

NATIONAL EFFORTS TO TACKLE TERRORISM

37. However, national efforts are still the key to the problem and much progress has been made. Each country has to evolve its own system of dealing with terrorists but a few common features may be noted.

First the higher the general acceptability of the police in society the better public response it can get. The British example has shown that public help is vital in meeting this menace. No intelligence service in the world has ever matched the willing information given by citizens. The recent arrests of a few known extremists in 1983-84 in Delhi would have been impossible without public-spirited citizens, notably MAHAVIR the taxi-driver. In U.K. public information is the main source of intelligence of the police.

38. Secondly all measures taken to reduce the finances at the disposal of terrorists will reduce the scale of their operations. This may be an impossible task if a foreign government takes an indirect hand in helping a terrorist group. Even then no government can give unlimited financial aid. One painful but wise decision is always of great help, that is a government decision not to accept any demands of any group of terrorists. The wanton sacrifice of human lives may look cruel but its ultimate kindness, like that of a surgeon's knife, can only be appreciated by its long-term results.

39. Thirdly trials should be swift and judicial punishments should be quickly implemented. The greater the risk of arrest, prosecution, stiff jail sentences/capital punishment the less recruits there will be available unless the cause is very dear to millions like the Palestinians and the Irish. Whatever one's ideas on Islamic criminal justice system one has to praise the Saudi Arabian government for the speed with which they tried and punished those who seized the Holy mosque at MECCA and converted a citadel of peace into an armed camp.

40. Fourthly in order to trace terrorists all the world over the recording, storing and retrieval of information about the terrorists, their associates, their modus operandi and their sources of finance should not only be as exhaustive as possible but should use the latest technological means available. It should be possible to send information, descriptive rolls fingerprints and photography by wireless.

41. Fifthly security procedures at airports, especially -checking of passports, have to be continuously improved without making these so cumbersome as to harass million of bonafide travellers. These are specially necessary in winter months when heavy warm clothing permits better concealment of weapons.

42. Sixthly experts should study the writings of terrorists and ex-terrorists not only in their countries but also in other countries. It is surprising how many terrorists work according to text books, which the police have not cared to read. A few of these are mentioned.

(i) Carlos Marighella, Minimanual of the Urban Guerilla (New World Liberation Front) 1970),

(ii) On organizing Urban Guerilla Units (Afro-American Liberation Army, 1970).

(iii) Carlos Marighella, Guerilla Tactics and Operations.

(iv) Che Guevara, Guerilla Warfare (New York, 1969).

43. Seventhly the authorities should under no circumstances make the entire public pay for their own incompetence, especially lack of intelligence. It is playing into the hands of terrorists if normal life is so badly disrupted that the public starts hating the government machinery. An example of this can be quoted from punjab where the government banned the playing of motor cycles and scooters in the entire state for 15 days from the first of March 1984 on the plea that these have been increasingly used by extremists and criminal elements for committing offences. Certain risks have to be taken even if it means the loss of a few lives. This brings us to an important point.

44. Eighthly it must never be forgotten that we cannot establish a totalitarian state with no freedom simply to fight terrorist activity. This is playing into the hands of the terrorist. According to Carlos Marighella the "aim is to provoke repression by making it impossible for the government to govern without repression; by violence on the streets, to compel the government to harass the population with searches, curfews, arrest and detention; to make liberal forms of law unworkable by intimidating witnesses and journalists, so that witnesses dare not give evidence and juries dare not convict. As a result less liberal forms of law have to be introduced- for example, the suspension of trial by jury and the acceptance of written evidence without the witness having to appear in person to be cross-examined. This inevitably results in more injustices more sympathy with the accused, and hence more support for the revolutionary movement."

45. Ninthly the higher the general efficiency of the police the better the control on terrorist activity.

(i) A police force which does not know its routine every day criminals can hardly combat the terrorist menace.

(ii) The control of firearms and explosives has a direct bearing on control of terrorism, Drug-peddling, smuggling, bank robberies, blackmailing are all routine sources of financing terrorist activity.

46. Tenthly there must be no political interference or even political motivation on police operations. This is best illustrated by the example of Britain. I will quote extensively from the book written by Sir Robert Marks, the Commissioner of Police London. As Commissioner of the Metropolitan police from 1972-77, Sir Robert Mark bore the responsibility for tackling an unprecedented wave of terrorism, chiefly from the IRA. Car bombs, letter bombs and other outrages became seemingly daily events; P.C. Stephen Tibble was shot dead chasing a terrorist suspect, Ross Mc Whirter was shot dead on his own doorstep. Sir Robert describes how Scotland Yard learnt to combat the terrorists and, in particular reveals the inside story of the celebrated Balcombe Street and Soaghatti House sieges.

"We were all surprised but delighted when in February 1975 a message arrived from the Palace that the Queen would like to visit the Bomb Squad. We had by that time had many explosions, unexploded bombs, letter bombs and incendiaries since the first car bombs were planted in August 1973 and pains taking and often courageous work by the Surveillance team, bomb disposal officers, fingerprint experts, photographers, dog handlers and others had not enjoyed the success we had hoped for. Their combined efforts had, however, compiled a mass of evidence that was to prove invaluable."

Describing the Balcombe Street siege he says, "Arrangements were made to cut off the public telephone system from the flat and later to disconnect the electricity. We knew the terrorists had a battery operated radio but its life was clearly limited and we did not want them to see themselves as heroes in a nationwide melodrama. Instead, a field telephone was lowered to them from the flat above, as was a portable lavatory. This was intended, in the event successfully, to convince them that we were in the flat when that was not always the case. Police marksmen were brought into position, hard-nosed dogs making most unfriendly noises were put in the flat beneath, the field of fire from the flat was clearly marked by tapes and we settled down to the inevitable war of Attrition. It was to last for 5 days, 18 hours and 55 minutes."

"Contrary to general belief, the operation was quite simple and straightforward once we were sure of the problem. Though we were deeply concerned about the safety of the hostages I did not consider for one moment that they were not expendable. I felt heartfelt sympathy for Mr. and Mrs. Matthews but felt that human life was of little importance when balanced against the principle that violence must not be allowed to succeed. Fortunately, in deciding that policy, there was no need to consult anyone, nor did I do so. The four terrorists were common criminals and the responsibility for dealing with them, unless I decided to use the SA, was mine and mine alone. It was not so much a difficult decision as no decision at all."

"The hostages, though badly shaken, were physically unharmed and were to be though heartless. Far from it, they were rarely out of my mind. But we had agreed at the Yard that if any senior police officer was taken he was to be written off. A touch of grim humour was added when I was asked what we should do if they took a politician, or even a cabinet minister, to which I replied without hesitation: "Ask them if they would like a few more."

"Apart from catching the four terrorists the Balcombe Street operation paid enormous dividends. The men were not as silent as we thought they would be and we had a mass of invaluable evidence. Public cooperation was limitless and soon led to the discovery of bomb factories and further evidence. We were not alone in our success. The provincial police had scored some resounding triumphs, especially in Hampshire, the West Midlands and Surrey and at long last it was becoming clear that Great Britain was not a very safe sea for Irish terrorists to swim in. By the end of 1976 there had been 263 incidents in England and Wales involving 302 devices. In London alone there had been 182 explosive devices and 11 shootings. 58 people had been killed and many more injured but 148 persons had been arrested, 49 of them in London, where 68 per cent of all the terrorist incidents had been cleared up. And throughout all this we had not killed or wounded a single terrorist."

Terrorism As Weapon in Politics

Dr. P.D. Sharma
Rajasthan University

It politics is to be defined as "An Art of the attainable" or "The Science of the possible" in the 'Power game', where in the situation of 'Who gets What when and How' determines the network of 'authoritative allocation of values' in the Social system, Terrorism as a Weapon or 'Gun as an argument' will have a cohesive as well as divisive role in the Philosophy of State Building. The conventional view of Politics begins and ends with an 'all pervasive activities school of the compulsory and compulsive organisation historically called the state. The three representative traditional perspectives on Politics in the West envision this State "as an organisation" (Plato, Rousseau, Hegel & Green) "as a Machine (Hobbes, Locke, Bentham) and "as a class" (Marx). All of them accept 'Force' or 'Violence' as a key variable in the notion of the sovereign State, which to-day represents a legal instrumentality of Political survival. Whether people can be kept 'terrified' or they themselves feel the 'terrors of anarchy' is the basic issue, which borders on the question of 'Volition' and 'General Will', institutionalised by the Sovereign State. Machiavelli, Hobbes and Boodin who conceptualised the notion of Modern Sovereign State in the 16th and 17th Century Enrage openly advised the King to play the lion and maintained that a sovereign should be "Feared rather than loved". Even Aristotle saw the possibility of revolutions or discussions in his city states with the diminution of fear or rise of terrorist groups in the body politic.

The contemporary view of the Politics as a crude, vulgar and normless struggle for hegemony and domination permits the state or the government to indoctrinate its citizens into some sort of a pattern Maintenance. As a master science of manipulation Politics today controls the sub systems of society, regulates its economy, co-ordinates its religious beliefs and generates new cultural values of development and modernisation. The Nation state, being the present limit of Political evolution of human history, the National and international dimension of state system concentrate on the question of quest defence and expansion

of sovereign identity of the phenomenon called Nation State. In the Non-Western World of former colonial legacies mere Political independence has accomplished the first incipient stage of sovereign state building but the gru some exercise of Nation-Welding around the nucleus of the soft Political State is a frightening endeavour, often frustrated by the pressures of demographic explosions, cultural pluralism and international ideologies.

The root problem of Nation State Building in the Third World countries, including India, has been to defend the territorial integrity of these nebulous states, modernise the heterogeneous sub groups of their mediaeval population, democratise their dysfunctional institutions and to strengthen the shifting centres of Sovereign Power in the midst of turmoil. The plurality of population groups generates demands of secession of territory and the governments being weak, are forced to compromise their sovereignty under overt and covert pressures of sub nationalism or/and international ideologies.

Thus discord and Politics-Social tensions besides being inevitable, bring unprecedented forces of violence into play. Negatively there is no solvent to coalesce fissiparous tendencies and positively there is an unmanageable hiatus between the levels of rising expectations and systems performance on all fronts. The resilience and strength of the political system is not only under stress but is also under trial and test to manage crises and chaos by developing extra load-bearing capacity. The situation has been further aggravated by:-

- (1) Unrealism of Post Politics, too weak to generate national consensus on live issues of discord.
- (2) Weak articulation of pressure politics, too ineffective to bargain with the coercive structures of Power,
- (3) Decline of charisma of regional leaders, leading to political insensibility of governments to constitutional or peaceful protests by aggrieved sub groups.

The net result has been that peaceful social change gets obstructed and the Revolutionary salvage the System. Naturally, alternatives like (1) Military Coup de State (2) Communal take over on Maoist lines (3) or an all out rebellion and/or revolution through civil war are ruled out at the present juncture of Indian history. But then, the

Political discontentment or minority dissent has to express itself not only in multiplicity. But in intensity as well. Some of the forms or modes of its manifestation are called:-

- (1) Public agitations and Disorders
- (2) Political unrest or Insurrection
- (3) Insurgency or Gurilla war

Terror is or perhaps has to be a part of the Weaponary in all these six expressions of violent change or revolutionary up-heaval. But 'terrorism' as a concept for theoretical analysis to quote Prof. JBS Hardman (in Encyclopedia of Social Science (575) is "the method or the theory behind the method, whereby an organised group or party seeks to achieve its avowed aims, chiefly through the systematic use of violence. Obviously the three critical variables are (a) Organised group, (b) avowed aims and (c) Systematic use of violence. Again all these three are the basic prerequisites of a theory of Revolutionary change. For clarity purposes let us take the standard Encyclopedia definitions of the terms to identify the nature and purposes of Terrorism quite distinct from (1) Intimidation (2) Insurgency (3) Rebellion and (4) Revolution. Intimidation, (Unlike Terrorism) (a) merely threatens injury or material harm to arouse fear of Punishment for non compliance.... (Here) (6) the degree of violence is used to the extent needed to collect a tribute or ransom or to restraint overt and covert acts (c) It is supportive and other methods or used at later stage.

Insurgency - (Unlike Terrorism) represents initial stage of armed violent opposition... It is an (a) incipient rebellion, localised and limited to goals of modified policy or personnel It is negative resistance..and succession or overthrow of government are far off". (6) Pacific means are considered inadequate and (c) circumstances offer hope of success. (actually) the risk of an open trial of strength seems less dangerous than continued acquiescence in a situation which is regarded as intolerable.

"Insurgency involves Public disorders more serious than Mob violence and less serious than true civil war".

"It represents an internal Political revolt which the withstanding state does not risk to recognise as war and while other States are not ready to recognise as belligerency"

"Rebellion is more frequently confined to efforts on the part of a portion of a State to throw off the authority of the remainder".

"Revolution in general is an uprising directed toward a radical modification of the existing Political or Social or Social order through out the whole territory of the State".

Naturally Terrorism is a Strategem of a Consensual or violent Sabotage rather than a Theory or perspective on socio political change. Insurgency may be one of the objectives of the Party or group which employs terrorism as a revolutionary method. But generally the two phenomena are not linked in the theory of revolutionary change strategy. Yet, "as ideological concepts the two may be akin in the sense that they may (1) not necessarily be premiated and are (2) likely to occur without painstaking preliminary preparation".

Terrorism as a method is always characterised by the fact that it seeks to arouse not only the reigning government or the nation in control but also the mass (1) of the people to a realisation that constituted authority, is no longer safely entrenched or un-challenged. Actually a terrorist act is conceived (2) as the advance notice of what may be expected from mass action. Political terrorist does not merely threaten but death and destruction are a part of his program of action. He imposes punishment on those considered guilty and who interference in the revolutionary program. He is a combatant (3) in the struggle between social groups and forces rather than in a fight between individuals. Terrorism as a Weapon in Politics can be employed (4) in any or all sorts of social systems. It's protagonists and victims both stand as representative of social groups or systems of government.

In brief terrorism is a weapon of (5) blackmail, Coercion and imposition of a minority will against and upon a majority decision legitimate or otherwise. The Political terrorist has laudable ideals to profess and a missioner (6) Commitment to suffer for the cause. He operates under the assumptions that:-

- (a) Mass insurrection is Unworkable in the present
- (b) The cause is noble but too obscure and too unispiring to serve as a base to begin with.
- (c) Development of People will proceed in line with his disposition and gradually the Principles will gain recognition and support.
- (d) People are too ignorant to be shocked into 'energetic impulsion' through educative Propaganda of the dead.
- (e) Other Non-Violent or constitutional means are either not permitted or not available or not effective.

Historically speaking Terrorism as a weapon has been tried by the Banquists, The Bolshrists and the member of 'Varnyrya Volya'. All the three schools openly and convincingly accepted "Terror as a chosen instrumentality of Political action." The Banquist wanted to use violent terror where success was reasonably certain. To Bolsharist the armed action was in the revolutionary circumstances but was to be resorted to as a last resort only. In both these cases 'Detailed preparation and conspiratory method' of scare and violence were emphasised. The psychology of "Romantic Messianism" has been their tactic and they draw their theoretical formations: from the wings of

Bokanin, who advocated violence for social change
Kropton, who talked about the Propaganda of the Deed
Brousse whose main thesis was the educative and publicity value of terror in human society.

The classic statement about the Nature scope, purpose and methods of Terrorists was very succinctly outlined in the Para-II Sec D. of the Program of the Executive Committee of Narodnaya Volya in 1879. It reads -

"The terroristic activity consists in destroying the most harmful person in the government in defending the Party against espionage in punishing the perpetrators of the notable causes of Violence and arbitrariness on the part of (authority), aims to Undermine the prestige of the governmental power to demonstrate steadily the possibility of struggle against the government to arouse in this manner the revolutionary spirit of the people and their confidence in the success of the cause and finally to give shape and direction to the forces fit and trained to carry on the fight".

The Terrorists may hijack a plane rob a bank disrupt communications desecrate a holy place, announce Hit lists, assassinate VIPs or indulge in Wanton Killings but every time they feel that their so-called criminality will be respectfully remembered as a martyrs sacrifice. They steadfastly work and want to

- (a) Publicise their cause and
- (b) Seek and establish popular base and support for this cause. Actually they wish to
- (c) Add urgency to the problem by presenting a desperate and cynical dimension, which (d) may democralise the Political rulers and push them into a situation of counter Terrorism
- (e) Their frightening acts create a Breakdown of law and order to intimidate people and to Delegitimise legitimate government by endangering a psychology of the security through institutional collapse.

The Sir Fenness in Ireland, the Killers of Indian Diplomat Mahatma, the Assassins of Tsar Alexander II, Bomb thrower at Alame Masque, Guerrilla fighter of PLO, the Captors of W.S. Hostages in Iran, the murders of Manchanda, Tiwari and Late Jagat Narain and the Killers of British Police woman at Libyan Embassy in London all have a common criminal weaponry of violence, justified as a sublime cause about which people are supposed to have sympathy, but are not strong organised and enlightened enough to fight.

As a complete revolutionary tactic Terrorism has never attained real or total success. Governments seldom retreat before acts of terror. Rather the will to power gets reinforced by the exercise of Power. Terrorists have never kept any office vacant even under the nightmare of a probable assassination. Harassment of isolated individuals or organised groups may incidentally help in widening the popular base of a movement, but the art of revolution or the phenomenon of revolutionary change can be sustained only when the base exists inspite and despite of terrorist coercion or blitzking.

But then the effectivity or impact of terrorist activity in Politics-national as well as international can not be dismissed as mere secondary, complexity of varied forces may not permit the identification of its exclusive role, yet its relative decisiveness can be roughly measured by developing an equation in proportionateness. Some of the indices in this measuring scale can be

- (a) States capacity to hold on (b) Risk Taking on either side
- (c) Availability of Funds & Weapons (d) International compacity
- (e) Leadership & Trained followers (f) Socio Political constraints

Precemptive action, dramatisation, timely overtures, shock therapy etc. are the varied techniques whereby popular attention is kept glued to the cause. But these self defeating tactics ultimately harm the objective unless adumbrated by popular support. Passivity of the people often makes the terrorist more and more daring and they fall in a trap in 'organising terror' rather than a movement. The self sacrificing terrorists may develop an illusion about their faith in the capability of the people. Their dastardly acts even when glamorised may romanticise the liberal bourgeois but they leave the peasants cold and bewildered. The illusion of making any cause venerable through the barrel of a gun is misreading Mao.

But then if the Governments of the day show lack of understanding and appreciation of facts the criminals can become martyres over night. Avoidance of fear psychosis, vulnerability appeasement and surrender is the pre condition for any constitutional government in dealing with terrorism as a weapon.

On the contrary the government should exhibit calm courage, stable firmness and encourage social apathy by taking away wind from the sails. The High morale of the armed forces and an intellectual appreciation of long range Policy Postulates by Police Leaders can be the real source of strength in bringing the Terrorist criminality to book. This policy has to be based on some of the following principles.

- (1) Every precaution taken and effort made that Terrorists do not acquire sympathy, support and respectability by the masses whose cause they profess to champion.
- (2) Hasty, instant and impromptu action is avoided to weaken the cohesive cover of ideology that gives strength to all and sundry in the terrorist camp.
- (3) Multi pronged attack on the demands, activities, Terrain and techniques of terrorist criminality be made to expose them to popular gaze and thereby weaken their support base.
- (4) Continuation of a democratic dialogue to prepare ground for a political settlement which alone is the answer to this so called pseudo problem of public disorder.
- (5) Continuous and objective evaluation of Political Facts in the light of constitutional goals and along range dragging on of the problem to prepare people for nutrition of terrorist activity and avoidance of impression of appeasement and surrender before illegitimate force.

While the long range Policy measure have to be initiated and pursued with caution and vigor, the short term strategies have to be worked out by the administration and the Armed forces stationed in the heartland of turmoil. Obviously they have to be trusted and vested with discretion to handle emergency. They should evolve dodging and baging methods to comb and lob and may follow 'End justifies the means' dictum to maintain the integrity of the Nation in a real causes of treason and sabotage. The law has to be suitably amended to deal with the threat and a little dilution of democratic process may be a fair and reasonable price to preserve the National identity of the State especially when enemies surround the borders. The Police forces notwithstanding the meances of the overall policy must consolidate their logistic gains and dry out the sources of terrorist strength without violating public sensitivities. The efforts of regression and the appearance of non provocative and non-vindictive counter violence of Police can keep

terrorism at Bay. Obviously discretion is the better part of valour and all those who face fire must be left to evolve sub-policies or administrative strategies subject to an over all assessment of Policy directions.

Terror when handled by counter terror requires extra precaution. The sensitivity of violent action usually has uncontrolled and far reaching ramifications. If a legitimate and powerful government mishandles terrorists it is likely to sanction criminality and weaken its own base. The Terrorists may exploit our inapt move for mass murders and communal killings with the result that the psychology of social insanity may cause transfer of segmental populations retardation of economic growth and clandestine involvement of enemy powers on the borders. Counter terrorism by government even, when fortified may shake the very foundations of a polity and throw her in the lap of super power.

Naturally, Terrorism as a weapon in Politics is a prelude to insurgency or secession. In the present Indian context of Punjab it is being practised either to gain support for a negotiated settlement of genuine minority grievances or (2) to strengthen the demand for a Sikh Homeland on the lines of Israel. In army case it has to be combated at Political level. The terrorists have to be exhausted deflated and firmly dealt with an iron hand of law. Their called sympathisers have to be wooed and weaned out. The former requires a concerted and coordinated policy of Police action, while the latter needs a patient and tactful waiting till it loses its publicity value, gets counter productive, exhausts and exposes the mystique and prepares the political ground to clinch the issues crying for a viable solution.

TERRORISM AS A WEAPON IN POLITICS.

- S.M. DIAZ, IPS (RETD.).

1) Definition of Terrorism:

When an organised group seeks to achieve its avowed aims, chiefly through systematic violence, not only against the real or imagined sources of power in the establishment and against the limbs of that power, but also against the common people, who have nothing to do with whatever issue is involved, so as to induce fear and anxiety, i.e. terror in society, all in pursuance of some express purpose of their own, the process adopted and the ideology underlying it, if we may call it that, goes by the name of terrorism. The purpose of such terrorism, both intra-national and international, is usually socio-political. But it may take other over tones, regional, communal racial or national according to the nature of the issue and the projections the particular issue has or develops. Brian Jenkins, an acknowledged authority on terrorism calls it violence for effect. The desired effect terrorists envisage is not merely on the victims, but more often on others. Fear is the instanced effect of terrorism, while the incidence of violent crime on a large scale causes fear only as a by product. E. V. Walter speaks of the three elements in the process as the actual act or threat of violence, the emotional reaction and social results. Carlos Marighella (1969), a professional terrorist who has written a Mini-Manual for the urban terrorist, holds that terrorism is an arm that the Revolution can never relinquish. Another arm of the Revolution is apparently guerrilla warfare which is rural-based and seeks physical destruction while terrorism is urban oriented and aims at psychological advantage. Urban terrorism has now secured an edge over the oldstyle guerilla warfare in the Revolutionary arsenal, against the background of their inverted value system and the success that the attended terrorist activities, let loose believed to be a classic example where just a small group of 3000 terrorists were ultimately able to seize power and establish themselves.

2) The types of Terrorism:

Analysing the types of terrorism prevalent in the world today, we may operationally discern two types. The first is direct terrorism aimed at the establishment, the sources, limbs and instruments of power. Such a hit-list will normally include VIP's officials and diplomats, the last being vulnerable where the terrorist group has international ramifications. The second type is indirect or pure terrorism. This takes the shape of random attacks on the ordinary people pursuing their normal avocations. Hijacking of planes, taking over of buses or other type of kidnapping and taking of hostages, who are killed later if their unreasonable demands are not conceded, fall into this category. Sometimes sabotaging of railway lines arson relating to public properties, and blowing up vital installations with explosives causes a lot of damage of life and property. These account for quite a high percentage of terrorist activity. A 1974 study done by the U.S. House Committee on International Security identified 400 such incidents between 1968 and 1973, excluding malicious kidnappings where the sole object was monetary gain.

The number of terrorist groups in the world is believed to be about 60 and they, particularly the left-oriented revolutionaries, co-operate with each other, wherever they are located. Destroying the Establishment, identifying themselves with local aspiration and ultimately establishing revolutionary power is their aim. The ethnic and national separatist movements are on a different footing. These too could be taken advantage of by the international terrorist groups. Between direct and indirect terrorism, there lies a functional or utilitarian class, which may take the shape of raids on banks with a view to provide themselves with funds and bumbling of dissidents in the Mafia style to enforce strict adherence to their code of conduct.

3)

Purpose of Terrorism:

Terrorism, particularly indirect terrorism, on the face of it appears so purposeless; but the protagonists of terrorism has in mind one or more of the following aims:

- (i) To spread their message in favour of a specific revolutionary doctrine.
- (ii) To gain recognition from the Government and the people as a credible force.
- (iii) To broaden their base of power and enlist new recruits from like minded individuals.
- (iv) For release of apprehended associates and/or to secure ransom for their coffers.
- (v) As retaliatory measure to avenge arrest or death of associates.
- (vi) To terrorise dissident associates.
- (vii) For publicity over news media, over which they seek to gain early control in case of success.
- (viii) To undermine prestige and authority of Established Government and to create demoralisation and chaos.
- (ix) Apart from other vital installations being attacked for purpose stated above, the raids on banks are expected to replenish their funds.
- (x) To provoke over-reaction and repression on the part of the Government and to make the Government unpopular.

4) Causes of Terrorism:

The primary causative factor leading towards terrorism is a perceived sense of injustice and acute deprivation. The deprivation may be out of an ideologically oriented background as in the case of most leftist-oriented Revolutionary terrorist groups. They aim at indiscriminately violent attacks on the establishment and the general public, the consequent emergence of panic and chaos, the discrediting of the established Government and resultant creation of a climate in favour of Revolution and finally the small group of Revolutionaries taking over the Government and so ultimately overcoming deprivation by this political action. There are also other forms of deprivation, like the absence of a socio-political identity which made the Israelis become terrorists before 15th May 1948 and the Palestinians after that date. Or it could be a perceived denial of a electoral opportunity involving side by side loss of educational opportunity involving side by side loss of educational opportunities and job opportunities, as it happened in our country in respect of Assam and not so patently in the Punjab. In the case of Naxalites it is a case of real or imagined economic deprivation of the poor as perceived by a few ideologists. Against this background feeling of overwhelming deprivation, two other factors operate to bring about terrorist activities. One is the fact that over the centuries humanity has come to tolerate and even accept violence as inevitable for securing the needed adjustments in society, between individuals, groups and even nations. If violence in one form is accepted why not in another, provided it is in pursuit of desirable end? The other factor is the relatively low risk of capture and punishment and, even when that happens the possibility of their associates taking the earliest opportunity to take hostages demanding their release. The low risk factor arises out of the small numbers involved in the terrorist groups and the possibility of easy get away and hiding. The terrorists usually identify themselves with at least one set of aspirations in the country and so get sanctuary in some safe place in their habitat, while international terrorists find haven in some countries which sympathise with them or where there are like minded terrorists. Cuba and Libya are well known for encouraging leftist revolutionary terrorists. As regards terrorists getting release of their associates by securing hostages and making demands, a typical example is that of the Japanese Red Army which hijacked plane from Bombay to Dacca demanding the release of terrorists under arrest in Tokyo. The Japanese Government meekly surrendered. Such weakness on the part of Government also encourage terrorists, as proved by the contrary position that there is little or no terrorism in communist countries.

5) Characteristics of Terrorist Groups:

Terrorists as a group are committed persons and, irrespective of the specific objectives of particular groups, all terrorist organisations co-operate with each other. This is now universally true of leftist revolutionary groups, wherever they are based. Sometime ago Cuba even arranged a Solidarity and Orientation Conference for most recognised

terrorist groups. Terrorism, therefore, has come to stay as the focus of ideological dissidents in politics and of revolutionaries dissatisfied with the established Government whose aim is to destabilise that Government and due course establish a Government of their own. Within the country too, terrorism has ultimate political overtones in some form or the other. The terrorism in Assam and the massacre of Nellie, that happened just before the recent elections there, was aimed at warding off the elections for political advantage of their partisans. In the Punjab all the trouble started only after the Akalis were dislodged from power. Then they started using dissident politics and terrorism as a route to political power. All this makes it clear that the basic motivation of terrorism is political advantage of some description. The general characteristics of all terrorist group may be analysed thus:

- (i) Fanciful devotion to a cause, involving patriotic-religious and racial superiority, leading ultimately to the fulfilment of their aspirations:-
- (ii) Contempt for the establishment.
- (iii) Belief in and resort to ruthless violence.
- (iv) Random, indiscriminate and unpredictable actions.
- (v) Small groups- basically weak, but manoeuvrable and easily hidden.
- (vi) Well trained quick-shooters with arms and transport.
- (vii) Desire for publicity to them and their cause.

Terrorist activities, which transcend national frontiers and assume international dimensions are further characterised by

- i) Desire for wide spread publicity in every country of the world.
- ii) Planned stimulation and mobilisation of world opinion and
- iii) Absence of a local battle field and use of bases elsewhere

Carlos Marighella is their teacher and his Mini-Manual is their guide book. The period 1969-69 was a sort of water shed for terrorist movements which have not looked back since then,

6) International Terrorist Groups:

The well known international terrorist groups are the IRA of Northern Ireland, the Red Army of Japan, the Bader Meinhof of West Germany, the Red Brigade of Italy and the Popular Front For Palestine Liberation, the Black September and Al Fatah, all of which joined up finally to form the PLO, now in disarray. All these are compact and powerful groups, which have disproportionately greater strid power than their size would warrant and which have perpetrated the greatest atrocities resulting in enormous loss of life and property. The IRA's Killings and sabotages over the last two decades have harassed the law-abiding people and Rule - of - law Government of UK more than any other single factor. The Palestinian Liberation Groups were for sometime creating terror in most of the western capitals. One recollects the gunning down of hostages in the Cairo and Rome airports and the massacre of Israeli Olympians in Munich (1972). Only after Yasser Arafat took over leadership of the United PLO the organisation has behaved more maturely under a of respectability. But the recent syrian contribution to destabilising the Beirut based PLO might lead it any where at all. Between 1973 and 1975 Carlos Marigheld personally counselled a combined group of terrorists in many operations, of which the principal one was in Vienna (1975), kidnapping of the OPEC Oil ministers. More recently, in 1979, the Red Briggade of Italy was responsible for the killing of the Prime Minister's guards as well as the abduction and killing of Aldo Moro, the Prime Minister of Italy. The Eelam Tamil Tigers of Sri Lanka are yet another terrorist group who have substantially destabilised the affairs of that island. All these groups in the final analysis have used terrorism as a weapon to further their own brand of politics.

7) The Indian Situation:

In India we are aware of early attempts at terrorism in Bengal during the British days. Sir Charles Tegart, the then Commssioner of Police Calcutta, is believed to have handled the situation well and so was later posted to Balestine as an expert to check Israeli terrorism. After Indopendence again, terrorism started in Bengal and spread to Andhra Pradesh, Kerala and other State. They identify class enemies among landlords, rich industrialists and the Estand Kamand, particularly the police, and systematically annihilate them; out of the resulting chaos their political aspiration for a new society will be achieved. Anand more believes in a type of terrorism which is directed mainly against the dissidents in the Mafia way: In J&K State the Kashmir Liberation Army or Front has been active off and on since 1966. Pak-based terrorist Maqbool Britt entered J and K as an agent provocateur and was responsible for the abduction and murder of police Inspector Amarchand. He was sentenced to death under the Enemy Agents Ordinance. But when an appeal was pending he escaped from Srinagar Prison. Eight years later he was located in a murderous raid in a Bank in Baramula. He was also connected with the

two plane hijackings in 1971 and 1976. It was fortunate that he was apprehended after the Bank offence but his execution ordered on two counts was being delayed for various reasons. In the meantime the Kashmir Liberation Group in the UK took hold of Diplomat Mahtre in Birmingham ostensibly to force the release of Maqbool Butt, but killed him without waiting for an answer. This incident hastened the execution of Maqbool Butt, whose involvement in the Pakistani political net work was made clear by the statement of president Zia himself. Assam witnessed terrorism in a virulent form on the eve of the recent elections when it took an anti communal turn and was responsible for the Nellie massacre. But the real terrorist headache now with us relates to the current space of extremism in the Punjab.

8. The lush green plains of Punjab are today ruddy with the blood of its own citizens, shed in a fanatic outbreak of mad violence and senseless fraternal slaughter. There have been numerous killings of individuals in the hit list as well as unsuspecting simple people travelling by bus. The victims are normally Hindus and non-conformist Sikhs like Nirnakaris and other moderates, besides police officers who have tried to do their duty. Twenty three babies have been lost and quite some cases of sabotage have also occurred. People on the hit list include person like D.I.G. A.S. Atwal, Editor Jagatnarayan, Educationist M.P. Tiwari and the Delhi Gurudwara Committee Chairman, Manchanda. The All India Sikhs Students Federation is now reported to have transformed itself into a terrorist organisation, the original terrorists being the votaries of the Khalistan Movement and adherents of the Bhindranwal way of fundamentalist thinking. It is said that volunteers with automatic fire arms and motor cycles have been enlisted in their thousands from all the villages of the Punjab. Their hide-outs are many, the most prominent sanctuary being the Golden Temple in Amritsar. With all these developments the common man is not safe in Punjab today. Unfortunately, Haryana on the other side too, has indulged in retaliatory killings. As Rajmohan Gandhi put it, before 1947, Punjab killings meant the Jallianwallah Massacre perpetrated by General Dyer; after 1947 Punjab killings referred to the fratricidal killings of Hindus and Muslims immediately following the partition. But apparently we have still not learnt our lesson, the Punjabs, Sikhs and Hindus, are now enacting the third act of Punjab killings. The question, whether there is some foreign hand interested in destabilising India supplying weapons and financing the agitation, has been a popular and profitable occupation among the long borderers of the Punjab with Pakistan. If now the same route caters to a different purpose, it should cause no surprise. In the context, Zia's denial too need not mean much.

9) Political Background:

All the parties in Punjab State, particularly the Sikhs of the Akali Dal, had always felt that the State was not treated fairly in regard to the decision on Chandigarh. The Sikhs had also other grievances territorial and river-water as well as social and religious. But most political observers felt that there was not much substance in the Sikh grievances, except in respect of Chandigarh, because the Akalis in power in the State for many terms did not do anything about them. Only after the Congress-I Sikhs and Hindus came to power, the whole issue was seriously raised by the Akalis. The Anandpur Sahib Resolution of the Akali Dal felt out in specific terms the Akali demands which related to religious, social, political financial, Chandigarh and other territorial as well as river waters sharing issues. It was under the cover of this wide umbrella resolution that some sections of the Sikhs started talking in separatist language, though the Akali Dal as such did not voice separation. The movement for Khalistan too did make its appearance then, with one leg at home and one abroad. There were also other policy deviations with fundamentalist slant sponsored by Sant Bhindranwale. The Head of the Akali Dal now is Sant Longowal, who is by all accounts considered a moderate. But in order to maintain his broad-based hold on the Akalis, he has perforce to compromise and very often too the line, either of the extremists or of Bhindranwale are only strange bed fellows. Recently those of the extremists or of Bhindranwale are only strange bed fellows. Recently their differences have surfaced even in a spate of murders on both sides. But there is no reason for the age-old game of playing one against the other. But on the other hand, if a broadly acceptable socio-political solution is found, it will strengthen the moderates and weaken the extremists. One of the latest demands of the Akalis is the amendment of the Article 25 of the Constitution as it mentions Sikhs as a part of the overall Hindu society. An offer of discussion on this and a full conceding of the religious demands, despite its fundamentalist overtones have been made by the Central Government. As pressed for by the Akalis the Congress (I) Government has been superseded by President's rule under Governor B.D. Pande. Under these circumstances there is no reason why the rest of the issues should not be satisfactorily settled without violence or particularly as the consensus on the river-waters sharing problem is in favour of a tribunal presided over by a Supreme court Judge. But still the trouble persists and its area is getting enlarged and violence intensified. What then is to be done now?

10. Dealing with Terrorism - Political & Administrative

For dealing effectively with terrorism, it is important that the vast majority of the populace should back the efforts of the Government to control and eliminate terrorism. This is where the Central Government and Governor Pande's administration are batting on a weak wicket. Terrorism in the Punjab has somehow identified itself not only with the Akalis but with the entire Sikh Community. It is

therefore vital that the grievances of the Sikhs such as they are should be appropriately redressed first. After all, declaring the Sikhs as separate religious entity apart from Hindus should not pose any problem, because this proviso to Article 25 was added in the first place only to benefit those Sikhs, who sought the educational and job prospect advantages of their scheduled caste origin. The religious demands of the Sikhs have already been conceded. It is already being canvassed, and more or less accepted, that Chandigarh should be lock, stock and barrel to the Punjab and that the Central could assist Haryana to build a new capital for itself at a suitable place. The other territorial disputes could be referred for adjudication to an agreed commission or tribunal, as it is conceded that river-water issues could go before a tribunal. There is thus no reason why a reasonably broad-based settlement at the political and administrative level cannot be reached as early as possible. The more the delay the more complicated the situation will become. The next step is to persuade the people in their own larger interests to desist from providing hide outs, harbours, sanctuaries and havens to terrorists. Finally, there should be general agreement between informed public opinion and Governmental policy not to negotiate with terrorists from an obvious position of weakness, even if a difficult hostage situation is involved. No provocation certainly, but no surrender either. Psychological approaches and stalling for time will be in order. But these processes should ultimately lead where possible to a commando storming, destruction of the terrorists and release of the hostages, as it happened in Israel over the recent hijacking of a bus. What is more important is that there should be a rationally emerging local and world-wide disapproval for terrorist methods.

11. Dealing with Terrorism-Legal, Intelligence and Operational:

As regards the legal framework for action against terrorists it is best that we take a leaf out of the oldest and the most stable of all democracies in the world, viz. U.K. in their struggle against IRA terrorists, who have murdered judges and witnesses and indulged in other acts of pure terrorism. The British Government coped reasonably well with the problem primarily with the Emergency provisions Act, which first suspended the Habeas Corpus provisions in respect of terrorists. Secondly, it permitted arrests, searches, and seizures without warrant in cases, which involve terrorist activities. Thirdly, the Act provides for a person being held in police custody for 10 days to facilitate in depth interrogation on grounds of being suspected to be a terrorist. Fourthly, the rules of Criminal procedure were relaxed to demand much less proof for conviction of an offence committed by a terrorist than for other offenders. Apart from these, Juryless trials were approved in such cases; discovery of contraband in any premises shifted the onus of proving 'not guilty' on to everyone on the premises; self-incriminating evidence and hearsay evidence were admitted in certain cases; censorship of letters and monitoring of telephones were freely done. All these are abnormal processes, it is true in democratic

set up, but quite normal in a communist totalitarian regime. That is obviously that reason why terrorism has not been able to raise its ugly head in communist countries. The effective linkage between the legal framework and the operational process to follow is an efficient intelligence service, backed up by meaningful research. The Intelligence Services must do a thorough job of covering all aspects of terrorist activities at all levels even from the grass roots and countering them. Intelligence on terrorism, in order to be really useful, should be systematically supported by identification of individual terrorists and Research material on their background, private motives, habits, methods, etc. Once such a coordinated intelligence is on hand, modern scientific methods of electronic surveillance could be pressed into service for identification of individual terrorists and their movements. The only way to be at the committed terrorists is to prove to him and to his friends and harbourers that their methods will not pay. For this the Police should be trained, oriented and motivated to be equally committed professionally and where necessary ruthless. This is where a temporary suspension of Human Rights by arming the police with emergency provisions to deal with the situation is vital in the larger interests of Society. Suspected terrorists should be ferretted out and identified and placed under preventive detention. Mere membership of a terrorist organisation should be under preventive detention. Mere membership of a terrorist organisation should be crime enough to warrant the severest punishment. By all these methods terrorist activities should be sought to be prevented, but when and where it emerges it must be ruthlessly put down. Highly trained commando units of the police should be readily available to deal with organised terrorist activity, while top notch investigators and anti-interrogators as well as psychologically oriented negotiators should be on hand to deal with contingent problems that arise. All things connected with terrorists must be dealt with from a position of strength. The Israeli and Germans have been handling these problems quite well. Even Margaret Thatcher has been quite firm in these matters. We in India have developed a neo-phyte's devotion to human rights, which is good but we tend too to forget that these rights cannot have a place in a context, where the fabric of human society is being systematically and ruthlessly destroyed by a set of misguided people. Even the Viswanatha Iyer Commission of Kerala enquiring into the Rajan case had recommended special provisions for dealing with terrorists. It must be realised that there is no other way.

12)

Conclusion:

No society which does not respect its own laws and which does not take serious view of persistent breaches of its laws and adopt firm remedial measures, can long survive as a healthy nation. Terrorism is a kind of fanatic lawlessness which makes normal life impossible in the affected area, which will go vital that the prestige of law and decency of order should be systematically resorted to by resorting to calculatedly firm measures in the face of an abnormal situation. But the political background should receive systematic and adequate attention before the operation and again immediately after it in order to ensure that the peace ushered in is really lasting.

Meerut Riots September-October 1982
- A Case Study - N.C. Saxena

Communal riots broke out in Meerut in September-October, 1982. Seven Hindus and 24 Muslims (8 in Police firing) were officially stated to have been killed during the riots. 53 Hindus and 27 Muslims received injuries. 35 Hindu and 126 Muslim houses and 3 mosques were damaged. Property worth Rs.28 lakhs was destroyed during the riots.

As regards the general course of events leading to the riot, the Minister of Home Affairs made the following statement in the Rajya Sabha on 5th October, 1982:-

"Sir, there has been a dispute between two communities over a certain place contended to be a place of worship in Mohalla Shahgasa in Meerut city. In April, 1982, representatives of both the communities came to an interim agreement for a Magisterial enquiry into the matter. Between April 21, 1982 and August 20, 1982, there were some minor incidents and suitable action under law was taken against the culprits. On 20th August, 1982, representatives of both the communities entered into a written agreement to the effect that status quo ante as on 31st March, 1982 would be restored. This agreement was welcomed by the peace loving citizens but was not appreciated by hard core communalists. There were some minor incidents between 20th August, 1982 and 4th September 1982. In the night of 6th September, 1982 a cracker exploded in Khandak Bazar. People from both the communities started collecting near the place of explosion. The priest of disputed place of worship was stabbed and he died subsequently. The mob which had collected shouted slogans and pelted stones on the police force. Police

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resorted to tear gas and lathi charge to disperse the mob. Curfew was imposed in sensitive areas of the city and the communal elements were apprehended. Some incidents of violence occurred between 6th September and 11th September, 1982. District Administration took steps to control the situation. The Chief Minister, Uttar Pradesh, visited Meerut. I visited Meerut on 13th September, 1982 along with the Chief Minister, U.P. and Union Home Secretary and emphasised that Mohalla peace Committees should be activated, efforts should be made to scotch rumour-mongering and better communication should be established with people to bring about normalcy. The process of restoring normalcy picked up and the Id-ul-zuha festival was celebrated peacefully. It is unfortunate that incidents of violence have again erupted since September 29, 1982."

Throughout the months of September and October, 1982 a large number of dignatories visited Meerut, some, a number of times to control the situation, including the Chief Minister of U.P., Home Minister, Government of India; and several important Cabinet Ministers from Government of India and the State Government. Serious allegations were labelled against the police force, specially the PAC by Muslims before these dignatories. It was, therefore, decided by the State Government that the District Administration would receive complaints from the public regarding alleged atrocities, investigate into them and take remedial action.

In all 727 complaints were received. About 92% of them were from the Muslim community. Till the end of September 1983 only 10% complaints could be enquired into. These complaints were given to local civilian officers and referred to destruction of property. About 60% of the investigated complaints were found false and in the rest compensation ranging from 100 to 400 Rupees was given.

The rest 90% complaints referred to police atrocities. These were sent to the SSP for enquiry, but although almost a year has passed, no enquiry has been done. The District Magistrate's explanation was that since a Judicial Commission has been appointed by the State Government, administrative enquiry into these complaints has been shelved and the recommendations of the judicial commission will be awaited.

The State Government issued notification for the appointment of a Judicial Commission on the 21st January 1983. The Commission has been asked to submit its reports on the following issues:-

- a) Ascertain the facts regarding the said incidents and the causes which led to those incidents.
- b) Assessing the justification and adequacy of the force used by the local authorities to control the situation, and
- c) Assessing and fixing the responsibility and the extent thereof in relation to the said incidents.

As regards the first act of violence which led to riots, the District Administration tried to give an impression that the riots broke out in Meerut town because the Pujari of the disputed temple in Mohallah Shahgasa was murdered on the 6th September, 1982. The aggressiveness of the Hindus, unlawful activities of the Hindu communal groups and the police inaction prior to the murder of the Pujari was not highlighted in either the reports of the District Administration or in the national newspapers. But, according to the enquiry report of the Divisional Commission, Shri R.D. Sonkar, a number of important incidents took place before 6th September which were not properly handled by the District Administration and which poisoned the relations between the two communities. For instance, on the Janmashtami day 12th August, 1982, about 400-500 Hindus tried to enter Kotwali demanding permission for a special mid-night Arti at the disputed place. Despite their being an un-lawful assembly, only four people were arrested. On the next day, about 250 Hindus agitated before the Kotwali, but only 19 were arrested. All the 23 arrested persons were released on bail from the police station itself due to pressure from the Hindu leaders. On 20-8-82, 22-8-82, 2-9-82 and 4-9-82 pieces of objectionable meat were found in the premises of Jama Masjid, Swamipara Masjid, Jamasjit and Barhwali Masjid respectively. No arrests were made, although it was clear that attempt was being made by a section of communal Hindus to provoke Muslims. On 4th September 1982 one Nasir, S/o Hanif was stabbed in a Hindu Mohallah near Nand Ram Ka Chowk. Only one arrest was made on 5-9-82 regarding this incident.

The murder of Ram Bhole who was a drug-addict, was handled in an entirely different fashion by the District Administration. Although, till this date the mystery of his murder has not been solved, but according to the District

Administration's own version, 114 Muslims were arrested for this crime. 21 Hindus were also arrested in the night between 6th and 7th September for being members of an unlawful assembly and for shouting slogans. Spot enquiries made in Meerut show that they (only Muslims) were subjected to severe beating at the police station. Those who came to the P.S. to get them released were also arrested and treated similarly. Beating of Muslims has been admitted in the FIR No. 293 dated 6/7th.9.1982. A question was asked in the Assembly as to how many people who were arrested had serious injuries when they were admitted to the jail. In the answer to this unstarred question, the State Government admitted serious injuries to 4 people, who were all Muslims, out of whom one admittedly died on 11.9.1982. In the 'Statesman' of 8th September 1982, the following report filed by Anil Rana is relevant - "While the police refused to give the exact number of people injured during the clash, the Kotwali police station lock-up had 18 of those arrested. All of them had blood-stained clothes and were pleading with the policemen to get them aid. No attention was paid to their demands, even 14 hours after their arrests."

According to the register maintained at the Kotwali the senior officers including the District Magistrate and the DIG visited Kotwali on 7-9-82 and 8-9-82 a number of times. Thus these cases of severe beating by the police must be within their knowledge.

In the list of those arrested for the murder of Ram Bhole were some educated Muslims who by no stretch of imagination could be called anti-social elements. Mention may be made of Shri Fazlur Rahman who possesses a Master's degree and is a journalist. He is also perhaps a member of Congress party, but this fact could not be verified. Even the son of city Qazi Zainul Rashidin was not spared. He was arrested and brutally beaten up. During informal discussions, the officers admitted that his arrest was the most indiscreet one as the town Qazi had been throughout cooperating with the Administration and when his son was not only kept in jail for about 20 days but also badly thrashed up, the attitude of the Qazi changed to insolence. This had important bearing on the communal situation and was to some extent, responsible for Muslim-Police clashes after the 29th September.

The pattern of casualties and arrests upto 15th September was as follows:-

| Item | Hindus | Muslims |
|--|--------|---------|
| Casualties | 2 | 8 |
| Arrested in substantive offences | 124 | 231 |
| Arrested in preventive offences | 112 | 86 |
| No of people arrested under substantive sections per casualty of the other community | 15 | 115 |

No Hindu was arrested u/s 302 or 307 IPC. Most of the Hindus were arrested u/s 188 IPC or 151 GPC the rest under 336, 436 IPC, 25 Arms Act and 7 Cr. Law Amendment Act.

Although the police claims to have fired at the Hindu rioters on the 6th and 7th September, no one got injured on the other hand, when some Muslims wanted to lodge complaints at the police station regarding attacks on them, the complainants were arrested and serious injuries were inflicted on them. Mention may be made of Haji Mohd. Siddiq alias Gurji, an 80 year old person, who was severely beaten up at the police station on September 8, when he had gone to lodge a complaint against the attack on his house by anti-social elements. Several Muslims injured during the riots did not go to the Govt hospital for fear of arrest, thereby substantially reducing the number of injured Muslims in the official records.

Right from the very beginning the District Administration saw the communal riot as instigated by the Muslims and the Hindu action as retaliation and, therefore, chose to take stern action against Muslims only. The perception of the senior police officials is evident from the affidavit filed by the then SSP, Meerut Shri J.P. Rai before the Parikh Commission. Excerpts from the affidavit are reproduced below:-

"On the 6th September 1982 when Ram Bhole was killed, the Hindus started shouting slogans and Muslims started pelting stones at the police..... Situation improved between 23rd and 28th September. But when the court ordered that the disputed

temple may be thrown open to the Hindus, Muslims got gripped with feelings of defeat and annoyance, which increased tension in the town _____. After the 24th September Muslims put black flag on the roof of their houses against the police and consequently the Hindus put up red flags in retaliation _____. When the arrested Muslims were released from the jail on 27th September, they incited the Muslim community by giving exaggerated accounts of alleged police atrocities. This enraged Muslims because of which the police preparation had to be strengthened _____. In the night of 29th September at about 10.15 p.m. Muslims attacked Hindus in several places of the town at the same time. It appeared as if such attacks were a part of prior planning and conspiracy. 44 Muslims had to be arrested _____. On the 1st October Devendra Singh was killed and on the same day at about 2.30 p.m. Muslims started attacking the police from Foroze Building with firearms, bombs and grenades _____. Muslims of Machharan started firing at the Hindus of Kaisarganj."

The affidavit does not discuss how 16 Muslims got killed at the hands of the Hindu antisocial elements, although their deaths were officially admitted. Similarly the reports from the administration to State Government highlighted the deaths of Vijay Kumar, Ashok Kumar, Devendra and other Hindus or attacks on the police from Muslims, but made no mention of deaths to Muslims.

Similar biased reports were sent by the District Administration to the State Headquarters. In a note submitted to the Chief Minister by the Home Department regarding the background and the course of events of the riots, it was stated that "on 6th/7th September 1982 the Muslim community attacked civil police and PAC with stones in which one constable got injured. On the 8th September along with fire incidents and stone throwing in various localities, there was again attempt to gherao the Superintendent of Police. The police was subjected to heavy stone pelting by the people belonging to Muslim community _____. There was strong resentment among the Muslims when Zainul was arrested on 24th September and they expressed their resentment by putting up black flags and banners against the PAC. Situation thus became extremely explosive _____. On the 27th September about 100 Muslims tried to gherao the police officials at Sorab Gate Police Chowki and attempt was made to launch attack at the police chowki _____. On the 29th September, there was simultaneous attack with stones and firearms on the police and the PAC. In addition, police posted at religious places was attacked with bullets."

Thus according to the local administration it was a straight fight between the police and the minority community from the very beginning. Therefore, strong repressive measures had to be taken against Muslims only. A number of issues arise out of this perception. First, the statement made by the Home Minister on the floor of the Rajya Sabha, already quoted, gives a different picture and does not support the conspiracy or the insurgency theory propounded by the District Administration. Second, there appears to be perfect consistency between the version of the District Administration and the action of the police and the PAC in the field. Therefore, there are strong reasons to believe that the brutalities committed by the PAC and the police had full support from the senior officers of the State Government. Third, even if isolated attacks at the police by some Muslim individuals are admitted how far the strategy of mounting such attack with counter violence not sanctioned under law on the entire Muslim community is administratively and morally justified is the main issue which should be seriously considered.

The second phase of the riot which was much more dreadful than the first started from September 30 and lasted till about October 10. The temple-mosque question was lost in the background and it became a direct confrontation between the police and the Muslims. Worst atrocities were committed on October 1st against the residents of Feroze building and Harinagar where at least 23 people were shot dead by the PAC. According to a report filed by Rajat Sharma in the October 31, 1982 issue of ONLOOKER, "Steel-helmeted, rifle-wielding jawans forcibly entered the houses, breaking down doors that were not opened. They refused to obey the order of the civil officers and commenced reckless ransacking of the houses. They overpowered everybody inside and beat them up with rifle butts. Then suddenly the jawans opened fire, their weapons aimed at the young males of the family. Frightened and taken aback by the Jawans behaviour, the civil officers fled the scene. More than 100 bodies were removed by the PAC. It is said that 450 houses were raided by the PAC and each house has now at least one occupant who will live with a deformity for the rest of his life. A PWD Engineer was killed in Kotwali area and his 16 year old boy was shot dead at Bhumia Pul. His mother, a convent school teacher was assaulted. The trauma made her go insane. Ustad, a motor mechanic and his helper were shot dead in Shahghasa, their hut was set afire. Sakhawal, a rickshaw puller was killed in Purwa Faiyaz Ali.

Udayan Sharma filed the following report in RAVIVAR, a Hindi weekly, in its issue of 24th October, "At the Chauhadia and Bhumia Ka Pul localities, the PAC looted the houses of

Sharif Ahmad, Muzaifur Ahmad, Abdul Islam, Iqbal Ahmad, Shabbir Ali Chunna, Dilshad and Abdul Haleem. The houses of Nazir Ahmad, Ali Hasan, Wajid Ali and Samta wrestler were first looted and then set afire. In the night of 3rd October at Machheran and 2nd October in Khairnagar, Muslim shops were looted and burnt in the presence of PAC."

Shri B.N. Pande, the then President, U.P. Congress (I) and now Governor of Orissa, visited Meerut in the third week on 22nd September, 1982. According to his report "it was unfortunate that the ill-reputed PAC was made incharge of law and order arrangements in the town. The congressmen also complained that the police beat up Muslims belonging to the Congress party in which several people lost their limbs."

A delegation of MPs visited Meerut on 6th October, 1982. Their observations which have been taken from the debates in the Lok Sabha on October 7, are given in the annexure. Except for Mrs Rajendra Kumar Bajpai and Shri Ram Jethamalani all other Members belonging to many political parties bitterly criticised the role of the PAC.

It is significant that neither the Chief Minister, U.P. on the floor of the Assembly nor the Home Minister during the Lok Sabha debate defended the PAC. The Chief Minister said "But I do not want to defend the deeds of the PAC. If they have committed mistakes, it is bound to come out during the enquiry. Those found guilty will be punished." The Home Minister observed as follows on the 7th October: "Sir, with regard to the role of the PAC, barring a few exceptions, most of the hon. Members have by and large spoken against the role of the PAC there. Therefore, the role of the PAC or the constitution of the PAC and the functioning of the PAC have to be thoroughly gone into by the U.P. Government. At the present juncture, I would only like to state that it is a 'must' to replace the entire constabulary or the armed constabulary of the State Government with the Central Forces particularly the forces like Border Security Force and the CRPF as in the disturbed areas and the border areas. When I visited Meerut, there were complaints about the behaviour of the PAC. The Chief Minister was also there and in his presence we did tell the District Administration that we were not asking for the replacement of the PAC but whenever there were strong feelings and comments about the PAC, in those particular areas, you could, to that extent, replace them with those of the C.R.P.F. Since then we have given about ten companies of C.R.P. and five companies of the B.S.F. which are already there."

Not only that, there is another point which I have mentioned, that if there is so controversial a position with regard to the P7C then for the time being they should also man it in a manner so that it becomes a mixed force with CRP, BSF and PAC personnel. And I am sure, the local administration must have employed them in that fashion."

PART II

I visited Meerut on the 29th and 30th September and 1st October, 1983. I had a long discussion with the officers who were well conversant with the events. Shri Bajpai, Additional City Magistrate was himself present at the Feroze Building incident of 1st October. Shri L.P. Mishra was C.O. (City), but now has been transferred to the CID. Shri B.S. Varma, ADM (City) Shri Chaturvedi, SP (City) and Tripathi C.O. (City) joined the district after the riots, but they were also interviewed. In addition, I met Shri K.D. Sharma, History Department, Meerut College Shri Bhupendra Kumar, Vice President, Vyapar Sangha, Shri Hafiz Ahmad, Vice President, Momin Conference, Shri Brijraj Kishore, President, CPI and Padamshri Haqim Saifuddin. Before my trip to Meerut I had called Shri Manzoor Ahmad, MLA; and Shri Harpal Singh, Member, Congress Party and Professor of Political Science, NWS Degree College, Meerut for a detailed briefing. I also interviewed Shri Shambhoo Nath, the then District Magistrate, Meerut in Lucknow.

During my stay at Meerut, I was keen to meet the residents of Feroze Building along with the local officers, but they themselves suggested that I should go to the Feroze Building without them as the residents of this building have filed certain writs against the local officers. Shri Bajpai suggested that I may get in touch with Shri A.A. Sabzwari, Advocate, who was quite familiar with the area. Accordingly, I visited Feroze Building, Hari Nagar and the neighbouring areas on 1st October and spent about 4-5 hours with the people of these localities.

According to the version of the District Administration the situation in Meerut had come under control by the 11th of September and very few incidents took place after that date. 27th September was Id and the District Administration tried to persuade the city Qazi and the Muslim community to offer prayers in the usual fashion at the Idgah. However, they did not agree and instead decided to offer prayers only in Mohallah mosques as a protest against alleged police

brutalities. The city Qazi called upon the Muslims to wear black badges on the Id day. On 26-9-82 one Vijay Kumar was stabbed to death. On 27-9-82, there was a blast in Mohallah Kidwai Nagar in which two Muslims were injured. On 28-9-82 black flags were flown from the roof tops by Muslims protesting against alleged police atrocities. In the meantime most of the Muslims arrested between 6th and 15th September were released so that they could offer prayers during the Id. Their exaggerated stories of police brutalities against them infuriated the Muslims and consequently tension was generated. On the night of 27th and 28th September two constables were attacked by the Muslims. The next night about 400 Muslims stoned police posts at Sohrab Gate. A harijan locality was also attacked.

On the fateful day of 1st October at about 11.30 A.M. a Sikh was stabbed to death in Mohallah Bhumia Ka Pul. The exact cause of his death has still not been investigated, but at that time it appeared to the District Administration that the Muslim community is bent upon creating problems for them and cannot be controlled unless it was "taught a lesson."

Feroze Building houses about 250 families which are all Muslims. It is a double storied building with open roof at the first floor. From outside it gives the appearance of a fort with a number of small windows opening in all directions. The residents inside could have easily witnessed violence taking place in the neighbouring localities. According to them they had seen the police and the PAC killing a number of innocent people near the Ocean Cinema and, therefore, the police were looking for some provocation to enter the building and attack them so that they may not be able to give evidence against the police. On the 1st October the building was already surrounded from three sides by the PAC belonging to 6th, 24th and 40th Battalions. The murder of the Sikh was a readymade excuse for the police to enter the building.

On the other hand, the official version of the incident as contained in the FIR of crime No. 232 of Kotwali Meerut is that while the 7DM City Shri Mishra along with a heavy police contingent was on patrol, a bomb was hurled upon his jeep from the Feroze Building which compelled him to take action. Therefore, a magistrate accompanied by the police and PAC party had to enter the Feroze Building. There too they were attacked and, therefore, they had to open fire which killed five people. 37 persons were arrested from the building. Seven country-made pistols, 15 bombs, 29 live cartridges and 23 spent cartridges were recovered from the building.

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There are several inconsistencies in the police version. Since the inside of the Feroze Building is not a public place, the crowd, if any, which was allegedly firing at the police could not be termed as a unlawful assembly as defined under Section 141 IPC. Therefore, the police could not use powers available to them u/s 129 and 130 Cr.PC for firing at the residents of Feroze Building. The police could have used fire only on the pretext of self-defence u/s 100 IPC. According to this section, firing and killing would be justified only if the police party was in imminent danger of losing their lives due to firing from the other side. The FIR does not contain any details of injuries to the police personnel nor any medical examination seems to have been done.

Second, the staircase leading from outside to the building is a very narrow one. At one time only one person could walk through the stairs. If Muslims had collected bombs and were firing from the roof top at the police stationed about 100 to 300 yards away, it should have been fairly easy for the Muslims to attack the single file of P7C jawans who were entering the building through the staircase. It does not stand to reason that Muslims would attack the P7C and the ADM City when they were 100 yards away but would not attack them when it was most convenient to do so.

Third, if the scene of police-Muslim confrontation was really the roof of the building, one would not have found bullet marks inside the houses. Even after one year of the incident, I could notice a large number of bullet marks in the congested houses which shows that the police party entered the houses and shot people from point blank range.

Fourth, Members of the Parliament visited the Feroze Building five days after the incident and many of them saw blood spilled over the rooms and courtyards of the houses. Even Shri Ram Jethmalani and Mrs. Rajendra Kumar Bajpai who chose not to criticise the police, did not contradict specific allegations of the other Members.

Inside the Feroze building I met Shabana aged 11 who still bears many marks of knife injuries on her body. I visited the houses of Abdul Rasheed, Sheru, Anwar, Shardin, Zafar Ali, Abdul Aziz, Irshad, Kalwa, Moin, Salim Iqbal, Abdul Zayyam and Wali Mohd all deceased in the unfortunate police action on the 1st October. I was shown bullet marks on the walls, blood-stained clothes belonging to the deceased and many photographs of the houses which were taken soon after

the incident which prove not only the fact of entry of force inside the houses, but also looting and wanton destruction of property. At one or two places the CRP had constructed the walls which were broken open by the PAC. The CRP had also put up a sign board there indicating "Reconstructed by the CRP." After detailed enquiries I was convinced that at least the killing of eighty innocent people by the PAC were not accounted for in the Police records. Shri Sabzwari, however, alleged that the number of innocent Muslims Killed by the PAC/Police was more than 300.

I also met a retired sub-inspector of police Shri Babu Khan who was given notice of retirement on the 9th September 1982. He showed the bullet marks on his son's shoulder who was injured during the riots.

I went through the issues of local Hindi newspaper during the riot period specially Masrut Samachar, Hindu and Yuva Reporter. According to unconfirmed reports, the sale of these newspapers increased by 400 to 500% in the months of September and October. The reporting of events in the local newspapers was done in such a manner as to give an impression that Muslims were the aggressors and the police was, therefore, rightly taking action to curb their illegal and nefarious activities. In the issue of Prabhat Samachar dated 8th September, the names of 92 arrested Muslims were given. It is not the policy of the Government or District Administration to give community-wise break-up or the names of the dead, injured or arrested to the newspapers. It appears that the newspaper was deliberately leaked out the names by someone in the police or the Intelligence office. Many other news items had head lines like the following:

"PAC Jawan Missing, Sohrah Gate Police Chowki Gharaad, Cars of DM and SSP attacked, Headless corpse of a Police Constable Recovered, Home Guard Jawan Killed, District Administration did not permit Mrs Mohsina Kidwai, Minister in the Central Government to Visit Masrut, DM Accused Shri Manzoor Ahmad, KLA of escalating Riots, etc."

These reports created feeling of insecurity among the Hindus and their reliance on the PAC for protection increased. The PAC was seen in the role of a saviour and protector and at a number of houses banners were put up by the Hindus in support of the PAC.

Padmeshri Hazim Saifuddin Bitterly criticised the role of District Administration during the riots. He also said that his telephone connection was disconnected during the curfew days and was restored only after normalcy in the town was achieved. According to him, the reports of the Intelligence were one-sided which poisoned the minds of the DM and the SSP. He was not given even a curfew pass during the peak periods of violence. When Mrs Mohsina Kidwai came to the town on the 11th September and called for him, he was for the first time issued a pass. While he was coming back from the Circuit House late in the evening, he noticed a large number of traders sitting outside their shops even though the town was under curfew.

According to Shri Brij Raj Kishore, President, CPI, the Balmikis were distributed money and liquor and were asked to stop working in the Muslim houses. He also blamed the cloth merchants of Pilkhua town for encouraging communal activities in Meerut as they directly benefited from curfew in the town. The wholesale market of cloth in Meerut town had to remain closed for a number of days which was to the liking of Pilkhua traders and they reaped huge benefits from the situation.

A number of people blamed infighting within Congress party for the continuance of violence in the town. Instead of working for restoration of normalcy in the town, these groups had an eye on the forthcoming municipal elections and thus were more concerned with the question of survival of their leadership.

In the debate on Meerut riots in the Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha the role of the PAC was bitterly criticised. A number of speakers suggested that the PAC may be replaced by the BSF or the CRPF. It appeared to many MPs as if the PAC was acting independent of the authority of senior officers of the district. My own enquiry does not support this inference. The general strategy to restore normalcy was decided through one-sided action at a high level and the police and the PAC were only executing the orders from above. No doubt, in many places they themselves behaved like a mob and committed atrocities but as far as the general policy to deal with the situation was concerned, it was not left to the constables. The District Administration right from the very beginning perceived threat to public peace only from Muslims and, therefore, they chose to take

one-sided action in pursuance of their thinking, observations and the reports which were received by them from the intelligence machinery. The orders from the senior officers in the district to the Police could be summarised in one phrase. "Muslims must be taught a lesson". The PAC and the Police faithfully implemented this policy. Looting and arson, in this context, was considered legitimate and necessary, and was therefore ignored. The district administration was very keen to retain the PAC in the district and bitterly opposed suggestions for getting it replaced by CRPF or BSF. In some other riots, specially Aligarh 1971, it has been noticed that the presence of District Administration and police force suddenly disappeared for a few hours when most of the incidents of looting, arson and murders took place. The situation in Meerut was entirely different. At no time one could accuse the District Administration of inaction, confusion or hesitation. It is further proved by the fact that no death took place in Meerut due to mob action. People were being killed in isolated violence perhaps in the dead of the night by the members of the other community. This of course does not apply to the people killed by the police and the PAC. During my discussions with the senior police officers it also transpired that the police and the PAC were mortally scared of patrolling the Muslim dominated localities. Even when they were forced to go there they often remained at the periphery of a Hindu dominated locality with their guns pointing towards the Muslim localities.

Shri Hanikash Bahadur.

The PAC is day by day becoming a force in which people are losing their faith, the Government is not trying to replace this force with some other force like the C.R.P. or B.S.F. or any other force.

Shri Samar Mukherjee.

Never had there been bad relations between Harijans and Muslims. Now Harijans have been involved and still the Muslim accuse P.A.C. not Harijans. I personally heard from their complaints that P.A.C. is instigating the Harijans to attack these Muslims. From the roof of a big house where P.A.C. is placed so many firings had taken place and on the walls there are fresh marks of shooting. Then they complained that the bombs wrapped with petrol are thrown on the houses of Muslims, I am stating this not to provoke any communal feeling. I am stating how attack's on Muslims came from that side where PAC headquarter is placed.

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The immediate remedy is that P.A.C. should be removed or the composition of the P.A.C. should be changed in such a way that both sections should feel confident that the P.A.C. can defend both the Hindus and Muslims from the criminal rioters.

Shri C.T. Dhandapani

The lady member had stated that there was no rape incident. Being a lady member she may not like to dishonour the womanhood; that is why they may try to hide those things. But the actual thing is that a girl was raped by the P/C. Her father's name is Karimuddin and the girl's name is Nur Fatima Nizira. I have noted down the names even though I could not understand them, with the assistance of the other Members. This is naked violence by the P/C.

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I asked one gentleman who do an advocate by name, Gupta "Why do you want PAC"? He said 'we want what protection I asked " Suppose BSF or the CRPF can give you protection do you agree? He said "No, I will not agree. We want only PAC" so there is something wrong. The PAC is allowed to attack the Muslims and loot the property of the Muslims. That is why these Hindus, they wanted only PAC.

Shri Rajesh Pilot

It is reported that the P/C had gone to some of their houses and stolen some items. They showed the furniture and some other property which have been burnt down. This should be inquired into.

Prof. Madhu Dandavate.

But even when blood was spilled, blood of the freedom fighters, I was not disturbed by that blood, even, our leader Mahatma Gandhi was not disturbed, but I am definitely disturbed and concerned when the blood that is

spilled is the blood that is spilled in fratricidal war, and in a war between certain sections and the Government. That is really the reason why I feel very much disturbed.

Prof Madhu Dandavate

You go to the Hindus, almost all of them say that P.A.C. are their protectors and if the P.A.C. was removed from Meerut, there will be bloodshed. That is what the Hindus have told us. And when we go to the Muslims, they say that it is this P.A.C. men, who have attacked them, it is not the Hindus or Harijans who attacked them, they have no quarrel with them, it is they who have attacked them.

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We have heard the slogans, P.A.C. Zindabad we have heard the slogans, Mahatma Gandhi Zindabad: we have heard the slogans Bhagat Singh Zindabad: we have heard the slogans Azad Hind Fauz Zindabad; but P.A.C. Mardabad was the slogan here. We must try to understand why that slogan was given by Hindus. It is the fear complex, that if the P.A.C is not there, and the normal police force is there, there will be certain communal prejudices, and probably they will not be protected. That is what the majority of the Hindus, feel and for the very same reason, the Muslims feel that if it is they who attacked them. It is no sin saying how many houses were looted. We went to the Hindu houses

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some Hindus to the Muslim houses. Some Hindus told us what is happening in the Muslim houses and the complaint that they are giving, that is all drama. And when in the Dharama Shala as Mrs. Brar told, when we met women, others were telling that is all drama. Sir, it appears to be a clash of two dramas. But it was a reality. I told a friend of mine when we went to the Muslim localities and we were told certain dead bodies were lying there for two days, someone came and they told me 'this is all drama' I said: "A living individual can play a drama, but a dead body cannot play a drama. That is the tragedy."

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NATIONAL SEMINAR
ON
COLLECTIVE VIOLENCE: GENESIS AND RESPONSE

COLLECTIVE VIOLENCE: GENESIS AND RESPONSE

BY

B.M. SINHA

INDIAN INSTITUTE OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
INDRAPRSTHA ESTATE, RING ROAD, NEW DELHI-110002

Collective Violence: Genesis and Response

by

B.M.Sinha, Editor, WEEKEND REIVEW

Human society or any of its units should move in an harmonious flow for its progress from fundamental negativity to fundamental positivity. The greater is the distance of the society and the units constituting it from the forces and factors that lead them into committing acts that are crude and base, the closer they move to doing deeds and developing thoughts that are sublime and helpful in uniting mankind. It is when the harmonious flow of society is disturbed by one or more than one anti-progress forces that violence erupts causing serious and sometimes irreporable damage to man and the institutions he makes for his movement forward.

It is necessary to mention here what the term society means. According to the Sanskrit meaning, society, in true sense of the word, is made up of people who are moving together and whose movement is parallel to one another. The word Samaj is made up of two words - Sam which means equal or parallel and Aj which means movement. Thus only those whose movement is harmonious and even in flow can constitute society and only such a society is true and real. The Random House dictionary gives the following meaning of society: "An organised group of persons associated together for religious, benevolent, cultural, scientific, political, patriotic or other purposes." An example of what human society ought to be can be found in a housing society. This society is formed by 150 or 200 persons to build houses for themselves. Its members have only one goal: to build houses as early as possible. To achieve this goal they think together, move together and work together, organising and pooling their resources and utilizing

them in a proper and systematic manner. It is thus clear that if the members of any society do not move and work together, they will not be constituting society in the real sense; they will be no better than a crowd. And it is a crowd which becomes easily violence prone because it lacks harmony and unity of purpose.

If we accept the definition of human society as given by citing the example of a housing society, should we not accept that this human society too has a goal and, in order to achieve it, it should function and operate as one whole with groups and communities vastly different from one another in their cultural and linguistic features? Despite there being groups and races seemingly opposed to one another the entire human society should work and move together, as an integrated and well-knit organisation, to achieve greater progress in social, economic and political spheres. This awareness of the truth that human society is one and indivisible grows and becomes powerful with the shrinking of both physical and mental distance between one community and another with the strides being made by science and technology. About 1000 years ago India did not know if America existed; today the distance between them has almost disappeared. Now the distance between one planet and another is also on the point of disappearing, making us realise that this entire universe is one whole, and, therefore, indivisible.

It is inability or deliberate refusal to see and admit the indivisibility of human society that gives rise to tendencies and forces which cause violence not only at the physical level but at mental and spiritual level also. This violence is both at the individual and collective level. We are here to find out what collective violence is and why it takes place. I am sure we are here not discussing

collective violence only at the physical level. To do so would be to take only a partial view of the problem. This violence has its manifestation even at the mental and spiritual level also.

As stated earlier, any effort to divide society causes violence. Today we find our lives have gone out of rhythm. cries of suffering-physical, psychic and spiritual-are rising from everywhere. Not only from India but even from advanced countries of the West. Diseases of poverty like malnutrition, epidemics and famine have afflicted countries like India. The diseases afflicting the developed countries are those of wealth like over-indulgence, hypertension, heart attacks, and alienation. These diseases of poverty and wealth provoke violence on a mass scale. It is these diseases that take the forms of social, economic and political problems. And these problems either drive hundreds and thousands of people to mad and frenzied acts of violence or are exploited by crafty people to cause large scale violence like the communal carnage we have seen in places like Bhiwandi and Jamshedpur or political turmoil in states like Assam and Punjab. Similar instances can be very easily cited from other countries also.

Perhaps India is one of those countries which provide glaring examples of how efforts to divide human society have led to great violent upheavels. Ironically, while these efforts are made on the claims that they would help improve the life of one section of people or another, they cause greater suffering to it. A close and rational study of these examples will help us identify the tendencies and sentiments which work as the causes of collective violence. It will be noticed that this violence involving either a few hundreds of men or a few thousands of people bring about changes which

often unpleasant. These are also several instances of collective violence which indicate that it sometimes produces positive result also; it sometimes occurs to correct certain imbalances or abnormalities that develop blocking the onward movement of society.

One of the important tendencies or **sentiments** that causes collective violence arises from the attachment to land. This attachment can be either to a piece of land or the whole country. This sentiment is whipped up by those who **believe** a piece of land is more dear than human life. When it is dangerously whipped up, this sentiment helps in mobilising even thousands of people to together indulge in **acts** of violence without caring for the serious and irreparable damage, it may cause to the Society. This sentiment is aroused to make some political, religious or economic gains. The most recent example is that of Abohar and Fazilka which are being demanded by the Haryana leaders in **exchange** for Chandigarh and whose transfer is being resisted by Punjab. You will remember the war-like atmosphere that had developed when the time had neared for the Mathew Commission to give its report. The way Punjab has persisted in its demand for full and complete transfer to it of Chandigarh also constitutes another example of this sentiment which has been described by a great mind as geo-sentiment. The feud between Karnataka and Maharashtra over Belgam and the fight over the birth-place of Lord Rama in Ayodhya are some other examples. They prove how with the slightest effort to whip up **geo-sentiment** political and religious leaders can arouse considerable anger among a particular community or group of people and provoke them into acts of collective violence.

Another similar but more dangerous sentiment arises from the attachment to one's social group or one's community whose members may be spread all over the world. This sentiment when aroused and made strong through various means lead the people or members of a particular community to believe that their social, economic and political interests alone are important; they do not care if while serving their interests they violate and damage the interests of the members of any other community. There are examples galore that in their desire to serve their interests, the members of one community destroy and ~~annihilate~~ several other communities or social groups. This socio-sentiment gives birth to other sentiments like socio-religious, socio-political and socio-economic sentiments. The socio-sentiment or the sentiments arising from it produce atmosphere and circumstances conducive to collective violence. Like the November riots in Delhi after Mrs. Indira Gandhi's murder on October 31, 1984. We have watched with dismay how these sentiments have been politically and economically exploited by clever leaders to create unbridgeable gaps between once closely related groups of Hindus and Sikhs in Punjab. Today we can see how socio-religious, socio-economic and socio-political sentiments have led to acts of violence, both individual and collective, which we had not imagined even 10 or 15 years ago. Such acts of violence were also seen in Assam. In Punjab an increasingly large number of Sikhs have come to believe that they are superior to the Hindus and should have full control over their land. The same is the feeling of the Assamese today. They believe, they alone should be allowed to rule their state and their social ethos and economic interests suppressed for decades should be protected and nurtured. The socio-sentiment was and is behind acts of terrorism in Punjab. The same was behind the massacres of people in place like Gohpur and Nellie in Assam when collective violence erupted there in February 1983.

When socio-political sentiment is aroused, then violence takes place on a large scale to for example, restore an N.T. RAMA RAO to power, this sentiment is exploited when a Karunanidhi organises violent mobs to publicly support the cause of the Sri Lanka Tamils so that his own political base becomes powerful enough to topple MGR from powers; a Bhajan Lal or charan Singh instigates violence by the members of their communities in retaliation against the violence committed on some of them by the members of another community. It is the socio-political and socio-economic sentiments which caused violence on a large scale in February 1983 between the Assamese muslims and the muslims who had migrated into Assam and between the Assamese Hindus and the Hindus who had come to the State from across the border. Today the workers belonging mostly to the same social and economic strata are organised in cities like Bombay by a Datta Samant and provoked into acts of collective violence against the owners of textile mills who belong to a different social and economic strata. Socio-economic sentiment is also behind communal riots in places like Moradabad and the violence by workers in West Bengal and Bihar against Marwaris and landlords.

It should be carefully noted here that the socio-sentiment is more dangerous than geo-sentiment as it does not remain confined to a particular land or country. It is often found spread over several countries. It is this sentiment that has helped mobilise a large number of Sikhs from Punjab and Muslims from Kashmir in countries like England and Canada and they are doing their best in

providing help to violent activities in India and causing perhaps disasters like the Kanishka air tragedy and murders of Indian diplomats. It is again this sentiment which creates the kind of stir that has been built up against the Supreme Court verdict in the Shah Bano case. Massive demonstrations organised by the fundamentalist muslims in cities like Bombay, Calcutta and Bhopal can easily turn into a helocaust. It is again this sentiment that can help a muslim bigot and fundamentalist like Syed Shahabuddin to win election against a Congress(I) muslim candidate who too condemn the Shah Bano verdict!

I wish I could give you instances of how these sentiments have led to victimisation and in-human exploitation of one community by another in India and several other countries, including those called advanced, and how the violence they have caused to man's physical and spiritual potentialities, besides the destroying of cultures and the enslaving of the minds of millions of people for ages. But it is not possible to do so because it goes beyond the scope of the discussion here today.

Thus the genesis of collective violence lies in the attempts to destroy the indivisibility of the human society through mobilisation or exploitation of tendencies and sentiments that have roots in the evil of negativity and that drive men away from the sublimity of positivity. It is a tragedy of human society that its so-called leaders in religious, political and economic spheres try to solve its problems through resort to these tendencies and sentiments. The problem of cultural conflicts is sought to be achieved through linguistic division of India - and thereby help cause language riots in the South or in the North-East. The problem of religious differences is solved by partitioning India and creating states like Punjab. The problems created

through the resort to such tendencies are again sought to be tackled through the same means - the Punjab Accord which helps mobilise the Sikhs into a separate nation and the Assam Accord which helps the Assamese to consolidate their position against the Bengalis and the Muslims. The indivisibility of human society thus gets further affected giving rise to circumstances that contribute to the occurrence of collective violence with greater frequency and ferocity.

The need, therefore, is clearly to take steps to reverse the movement of society from fundamental negativity to fundamental positivity. How can this be done? Is there a way out? Yes, there is a way out. In fact, history is witness to the truth that whenever the society seems near annihilation a way is found out to turn it away from that point and put it back on the path of progressive movement. History also proves that the society is part of a universal phenomenon, a phenomenon which is always unfolding itself in newer colour and designs. Every new colour and design is an improvement on the earlier ones. If such is the phenomenon, which we call universe, how can the society, an integral part of it, ever be left behind? It will continue to be pulled back from the verge of annihilation whenever the crude and negative thought of some powerful men will push it towards it.

The antidote to collective violence is an universalistic thought and approach, that should form part of whatever we do in social, economic and political spheres. This thought and approach based on humanistic principles should inform and inspire every programme and policy conceived, initiated and carried into practice. As stated earlier, human society is one and indivisible. Conflicts between one community and another, between one country and another arise only when we

begin to motivate the people through division tendencies mentioned above. The time has come when we will have to really begin to think of human society as one family whose members will not fight one another on grounds of religion, language; culture or caste. All the members should be treated equal in status, no matter where they live, what they eat and what dress they wear. What is important to bear in mind is that though we all are human beings. We develop peculiar features and way of living wherever we live together. This happens because of the influences of conditions where a group of people lives. Thus, a group living in Madhya Pradesh will be different from groups living not only in other parts of the world, but even in other parts of India. It is these conditions that create different communities, each with a separate language, cultural traits and religious practices.

When we talk about the need of our following universalistic thought and approach it does not mean that all the communities should give up their individual identities. It should be kept in mind that each community has its independent cultural ethos and sentimental legacy which need to be protected; its socio-economic development too needs to be planned keeping in view the situation and the conditions in which it is placed. This will be easier to do when we follow universalistic approach based on humanistic principles. Such an approach pursued sincerely would help integrate human society with hundreds and thousands of communities and social groups though often vastly different from one another.

These humanistic principles should not be utopian. They can be and should be made practical for all of us to follow. Let me clarify here that by humanistic principles I don't mean Internationalism or general humanist sentiment. Internationalism fails to achieve the objective of integrated

human society as it admits existence of hostile nations. General humanist sentiment also fails to prevent intra-creature conflict. In the name of this sentiment one nation seeks to exploit another nation. Don't we see how multinationals are helping the exploitation of the poor by the rich in the name of serving the former? It also causes inter-creature conflict. Do the protagonists of this humanist sentiment bother about the deliberate devastation of forests alongwith the living beings dependent on them? The protagonists also make a distinction between the utility and existential value of the animate and inanimate things in the world. We should not forget that an object or living being may not have utility value for us but it has existential value for the universe and is, therefore, very valuable for us also.

The humanistic principles I talk about here thus is extended to include everything in the universe, animate and inanimate. These principles point towards a thought that can be called Neo-humanism. It is in fact a cult of love for all creations of the universe. It will, however, be not easy to practice Neo-humanism because it would affect those who are living and thriving on conflicts of one kind or another. It will be opposed even by those who call themselves revolutionaries and reformists because they are mostly pseudo in character. I can give you hundred and one instances of these revolutionaries and reformists mouthing pious slogans in public but committing diabolical deeds in private. I can also give instances of how these persons provoke violence not only between two communities but also between two nations by various means - one of which can be called meta morphosed sentiment. But there is no scope for it at this seminar.

For the true practice of Neo-humanism in social, economic and political spheres the following things need to be done by those who are interested in the welfare of human society.

We need a spiritual ideology whose practice should help us in training ourselves in identifying the socio-economic evils and eradicating them. This ideology will have to be based on the Principle of Social Equality and will be opposed to the principle of Selfish Pleasure which most of us seem to be practising today. The practice of the principle of Social Equality, in fact, will help us develop and follow universalistic approach which would become the basis of all our social, political and economic policies and programmes. This principle will also help us promote the "holistic" theory which the science too is finding today to be the only way of saving the world from a certain disaster. The practice of a spiritual ideology will create a physhic transformation which is necessary to consider and treat the human society as one and indivisible. There will in fact be a liberation of intellect which is today in various boundages, bondages which are at the root of various conflicts.

The practice of spirituality will slowly make spirituality an essence of life in social, economic and political spheres. It will inform all our actions and deeds and thereby help us all move both materially and mentally towards positivity. This kind of life, which will in fact be true to the concept of life envisaged by the sloka of sang Chadharam sang baddhavam, will adopt spirituality as a mission. The ideas expressed above will surely sound crazy and weird to many of us here. If it does, it would not be surprising because most of us live without seldom recognising the truth that all of us have emerged from spirituality and through various phases of life influenced either by centripetal or centrifugal forces try to seek a union with this very spirituality.

NATIONAL SEMINAR
ON
COLLECTIVE VIOLENCE: GENESIS AND **RESPONSE**

VIOLENCE: GENESIS AND RESPONSE
TIME: NATURE, TREND & PATTERN OF VIOLENCE

BY
A K BHATTACHARYYA

INDIAN INSTITUTE OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
INDRAPRASTHA ESTATE, NEW DELHI-110002.

VIOLENCE: GENESIS AND RESPONSE

TIME: NATURE, TREND & PATTERN OF VIOLENCE

A K BHATTACHARYYA

Violence is a passion and in human history its manifestation was mainly for possession or gain be it individual or group. Motivation with individualistic attitude to dominate among others often aroused the passion in the perspective of 'Might is Right' and as an inevitable consequence violence occurred exploiting weaker strengths. For the last three decades collective violence changed its faces. Communal riots took a massive toll and the vast uprooted refugees who came down from East Pakistan finding no constructive help other than dholes and camp lives got frustrated and degeneration started. No action was taken either from the Govt. or from the Society as such to put back the refugees in the main stream of the country's life. They were never allowed to feel this is their country for whom they have been uprooted from their environments and habitats. Revolution could only change their lot - was the cry. They tested violence leaving their homes behind and then being frustrated got allured and easily trapped by left forces in supporting them not for constructive attitude but in the negative. This factor sowed the seed of mistrust for the ruling party and this psychological aspect was captured by left forces and ultimately this refugees formed the backbone of them, a tool for violence as and when necessary. The first expression came informing United Front Govt. in the State of West Bengal.

The nature and trend of violence as observed now a days in our country could be grouped as follows:-

a) Economic disparities especially among enlightened group lead to violence with an aim to hit the very roots of socio-economic structure of the country. This sentiment of 'haves' and 'have nots' when get politicised the situation takes serious turn and political upsurge like Naxalite movement emerges out.

b) Even when Bonded Labour System, the evils of cast system and oppression by higher castes are banned by the Govt. those practices are still prevailing in the Society. As a result, victims getting frustrated in the laybrinth of procedural matters in trying to get their grievances redressed become out laws.

c) In democracy, winning election is a prime factor for contestants. This attitude of winning election by 'Hook and Crook' often leads to adopt illigal means including having hired muscle-men and influential people in the pay rolls. They are utilised as and when required and in turn those people are protected and patronised by their patrons.

d) Unemployment, detachment from homely atmosphere being fractionalization of families, attraction towards cheap thrills and adventures and without firm objectives in future, draw a large section of youth of our country to the traps laid by political parties in view of exploiting youthful exhuberence and emotions by preaching the doctrines of the parties with an assurance of obtaining solid, positive, bright future as in uptopean land. This misled, vast manpower who could hage done good to the country with proper guidance and help get sapped out in the confused political environment and thereby germinates the seed to descrate the valour of democracy and flipping up the evils of the same.

e) Thriving parasites of the society i e. the middle men in the industry and business circle who do not contribute fruitfully for the batterment of the country's productivity have a tendency to cut short the routes of lawful procedures and corruption emerges out as a causative factor. Accumulation of easy money always finds an easy way to germinate crimes. These crimes, getting unchecked, on a piling up effect give rise to violence as a direct result of corruption and back money.

f) Fanatism in any form obscures the Social values of life and indulges in senseless violence on trifling matters when passion is aroused by the leaders of the community caring too little for the wanton destruction that may happen with serious threat to the integrity of the country.

g) White collar crimes practised by the rich and influential persons are a major blow to the national interest. This frustrates in achieving the goal for country's benefit and on the contrary, society has to pay very dearly both in terms of financial loss and generates a sense of fear and anxiety culminating in doubtful personal security and freedom.

Pattern of collection violence under democratic umbrella is found to be organised one in general by group or group of persons exploiting the weaknesses of law and order situation, politicising the whole affair in the name of country's benefit. Not being able to maintain law and order situation in the society, people lose faith on the whole machinery of public security measures and anti-socials under the shelter of political leaders resort to violence even on minor issues to spread terrorism. Mafia type gang activities in and around Bihar Canal belt, smuggling on coastal areas fit in the same pattern. A different pattern of violence is observed in case of Fanatism and atrocities done on lower cast by higher cast of people. In this case also due to the weaknesses in law and machinery system violence occurs resulting in mass killing of innocences.

Violence occurred in the past and will occur in future also. But knowing the nature, trend and pattern of violence our endeavour should be to curb the violence

as much as possible and to achieve the same nation wide drive is necessary on vital areas i.e. to make people feel National, with a sense of belonging to the country, to educate people in the line to be proud of their own country and to be able to rise above the cult of the religion, cast and creed and to unite to maintaining the integrity of the country as a whole. Existing machineries are only structures implanted without any co-ordination, thrust and purpose to achieve the goals. These need again to be reviewed and actions are required to be taken immediately to avoid serious consequences in the future.

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NATIONAL SEMINAR
ON
COLLECTIVE VIOLENCE: GENESIS AND RESPONSE

DEVELOPMENT AND COLLECTIVE VIOLENCE - A
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE

BY
RAM AHUJA

INDIAN INSTITUTE OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
INDRAPRASTHA ESTATE, RING ROAD, NEW DELHI-110002

DEVELOPMENT AND COLLECTIVE VIOLENCE -
A THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE

- Ram Ahuja

Development: its pattern in India

Development which is an induced or a planned change may be seen either in its total context or in specific areas like economic, social, political and cultural. In each area, development aims at achieving set collective goals and these goals vary not only from society to society but also from period to period. For example, in India goals for economic development after independence (Ahuja, 1975 : 13) are not only economic self-reliance, advanced technology, eliminating destitution and poverty, and raising living standards of people but also distributive justice; goals for social development are equality, mobility, individualism, and rationality, etc.; goals for political development are establishing political system where ruler is accountable to the ruled, associating more and more people with decision-making process, and decentralisation of political power; in religious field, main goal of development is change from 'sacred' to 'secular'.¹

A society is expected to provide means for achieving these goals and also make these means equally available and accessible to all individuals, all classes, all religions, all castes, all regions etc. alike. But development in India has been so lopsided and there are so many contradictions in the present Indian social system that large sections of the people today are discontented, disillusioned and frustrated. Some apparent contradictions are: (Ahuja, 1983) the aspirations of individuals, groups

and communities have been raised but legitimate avenues for them for achieving these aspirations are limited; egalitarian values are projected but discrimination is practised; ideas of individualism are supported but principles of collectivism are reinforced; nationalism is preached but regionalism, casteism and linguism are encouraged; roles are being modernised but values continue to be traditional; ideational culture is aimed at but sensate culture is being promoted; new laws are being enacted but either they are full of loopholes or they are not being properly implemented; old values cease to inspire and new values have not developed roots; rapid change is emphasised by permitting competition but brakes are imposed in the form of granting licenses; when we need tolerant, liberal and pragmatist leaders, we encourage repressive, reactionary and ideologue leaders; we want our society should cease to be closed without seriously attempting to make it open.²

In the last few decades, for all the change envisaged and attempted by our power elite, in several respects India has not changed that much in the deepest recesses of its psyche. Although the past four decades could appropriately be described as the decades of new hopes and expectations that millions of people have from the political elites, the decades which have been the development which indicates the emergence of a new style of socio-political and economic management both at the national as well as at the state levels, yet many issues and problems of the pre-independence period and the period after two decades of independence remain unsolved. The problems of unemployment and

poverty, corruption and nepotism, inflation and rising prices, police humiliation and torture and reactionaries' terrorism, population explosion and unresponsive administration at the state level, and the indifferent and casual attitude of government functionaries at district and local levels, not only continue to weaken the development processes but increase the dejections and frustrations of the people forcing them to adopt collective agitational tactics and strategies. The dominant elite feel that they have allocated values on rational basis and set logical norms free of chaos and confusion, but in fact they have created more contradictions and frustrations. The collective frustrations of the dejected groups lead to agitations and collective violence in the form of riots, demonstrations, gheraos, strikes, and rasta-roko, and so forth.

Before I explain the process of development of collective violence due to the feeling of relative deprivation, it is necessary to operationalise concepts like aggression, violence, and collective violence.

Concept of collective violence:

'Aggression' refers to injurious behaviour. When Berkowitz (1962) uses this term to denote 'behaviour aimed at the injury of some object'.³ Buss (1961) defines it as 'an act that delivers noxious stimuli to another person'.⁴ Buss has also distinguished between 'angry or expressive aggression' and 'instrumental aggression'. The former aims at injuring the victim while latter is only means to some other end.⁵

'Violence' is the extreme form of aggression. Although violence typically refers to physical aggression but it is also applied to psychological stress that causes suffering. Kempe (1982 : 20) has defined violence as 'physically striking an individual and causing injury',⁶ but Gelles and Straus (1979) have defined it as 'act of striking a person with the intent of causing harm or injury but not actually causing it'.⁷ Thus, violence involves not only actual hitting but verbal abuse too. It involves not only overt application of force resulting in the injury or destruction of person(s) or property or reputation but also overt threat of injury that may result in trauma. Violence conveys the heated, the vehement expression of aggressor's feeling to victims and onlookers.

'Collective violence' is the force used by group of persons which injurs others or which inhibits the normal free action of movement of other persons. The important issue in collective violence is of intention. Is 'injury' the goal or the by-product of some other goal-seeking behaviour? My contention is that 'injury' in collective violence is not always desired by the perpetrators, though they have a reasonable expectation that their behaviour might ham other(s) physically and/or psychologically or even emotionally.

On this basis, I include not only riot but also demonstration, gherao, strike and rasta-roko, etc. in the definition of collective violence. All these clearly refer to one central element of violence, which is 'intensity' or extreme feelings, actions or

sensations. Thus, anger, hate, rage, fury, wrath, ire, dislike, aversion, or hot displeasure are always related to collective violence.

In this paper, I am concerned with collective violence which acts as instrumental violence, i.e. which is used to achieve a particular goal, whether a change in the authority structure or drawing the attention of people in power to the necessity of adopting measures for mitigating grievances. It does not aim at destroying or physically liquidating the person or group against whom resentment is expressed; nor it aims at acquiring power or enforcing authority. Thus, I exclude modern terrorism, anarchist violence or revolutionary violence from my assessment of collective violence because they aim at destroying authority, if not 'taking over' authority.

Etiology of collective violence:

My main thesis in explaining collective violence is that when large sections of people in the society fail to achieve their collective goals, they feel relatively deprived, frustrated, and disillusioned and this collective frustration (or what Feilerabends and Nesvold have called 'systematic frustration')⁸ leads to collective violence. For example, collective frustration of industrial workers, students, cultivators, govt. employees, etc. resulting into violent actions like arson, loot and killings as well as violent actions like bandhs and strikes.

Gurr (1969) has also mentioned that collective violence is related to rapidity of social change, which means that rapid change brings with it new expectations and as a consequence new frustrations leading to violence.⁹ It also means that a greater rate of change is associated with greater instability. Gurr has summarised that violent conflict is greatest in developing nations, least in developed nations, intermediate in the least-developed or most 'traditional' nations.

This is undoubtedly an oversimplification, since a number of other considerations also enter in collective violence. In fact, the action planned by the discontented people to 'tempt' or 'incite' 'one' against whom they have launched protest is often non-violent. It is usually some situational factor which precipitates violence. The choice made by the intellectual 'liberal' section of the protestors is non-violence, but a small wing of protestors who despised non-violence from the very beginning and who considered violence essential for the success of their struggle, snatch the precipitating opportunity and start using violence to assert the rightness of their ideology. This subgroup locates the source of discontentment and uses violence thinking that it (violence) will indeed bring about the power elite to the brink of desperation and they will be forced to take ameliorative measures for the 'oppressed' and the 'deprived' people.

This subgroup indulging in the 'destructive' behaviour does not represent the total group of the discontented persons. By and large, the behaviour of this subgroup is not owned and equivocally supported by the rest of the discontented group of

persons from whose ranks this subgroup of the destructive rioters usually come. Thus, my contention accepts the old 'rifraff' theory of violent riot behaviour which holds that a larger majority of the group (99%) disown and oppose the criminal and delinquent behaviour of the subgroup by describing it as irresponsible behaviour.

The question is what causes the 'group of individuals' to be violent? Answers from some intellectuals and the research community tend toward common wisdom, simplistic hypotheses, as well as some serious propositions. Some of the theoretical propositions on collective violence typically encountered are that (i) it is a normal response to provocation, or (ii) that it is a response that is consistent with norms supporting its use, and so forth. This calls for the analysis of some important existing theories. Excluding the psycho-pathological theories (because they focus on aggressor's psychological personality characteristics and pathological disorders as the Chief determinants of violence, and we consider this important for explaining individual violence but not collective violence), we may classify the other theories into two groups: (a) on the level of socio-cultural or sociological analysis. In the first group, we may include theories like Frustration-Aggression theory, perversion theory, Motive Attribution theory, and Self-Attitude theory. In the second group, we may include theories like structural theory, system Tension theory, Anomie theory, theory of Subcultures of Violence, Resource theory, Social Learning theory, Symbolic Interaction theory, and Exchange theory.¹⁰

My submission is that all these theories fail to explain collective violence which is the result of a feeling of relative deprivation arising out of failure to achieve set collective goals of development. I have attempted to explain collective violence in terms of a new theoretical model, what I have termed as "Social Bond Approach".

Theoretical Model : Social Bond Approach

This model not only explains the etiology of collective violence but it also uncovers the recurring patterns in which particular types of people take to collective violence in particular types of circumstances. This model concentrates on the sociological analysis of Social-structural conditions. The important conditions which lead to collective violence are : life stresses, status frustrations and career crisis. This view focusses attention not only on the aggressive act of the group of individuals but also on the persons who use aggression and the persons against whom aggression is used. Our view is that the aggressors use violence not because they are uninhibited hedonists but because they suffer from insecurity feelings and anxieties. The origins of these feelings and anxieties are traceable both to social barriers created by the oppression of social systems and power elite, as well as to individual's inappropriate upbringing and hindrances to individual's childhood social development and incidents in life that serve to aggravate the tendency to irrational and unrealistic attitudes to social norms and social institutions.

Our theory also takes into account on the one hand the three factors in aggressors' behaviour, viz; adjustment, attachment, and commitment, and on the other hand the factor that lack of adjustment, attachment and commitment creates 'frustrations'. The maladjustment, unattachment and non-commitment are to be examined in terms of social environment in which individuals operate as well as the socialised personalities of the individuals. Thus, in our theoretical model we have given importance to social system, personality structure of individual aggressors, and sub-cultural patterns of the society in which individuals use violence. In social system, we include strains and frustrations; in personality structure, we include adjustment (in status), attachment (to groups) and commitment (to values) and roles; and in sub-cultural patterns, we include the (synthesis of traditional and modern) values which operate as a means of social control (in community/society). Our basic hypothesis is that the potential for collective violence varies strongly with the degree of adjustment, commitment and attachment of the individuals (aggressors). Thus, our theory supports Games Theory of rational group behaviour but rejects LeBon's and other theories of Social Facilitation in irrational collective behaviour. Attachment is the bond of affection between an individual and other (conventional) persons. The degree of attachment is how much the person cares for others and is cared for by them, and how much the person values other's feelings, opinions and expectations (e.g. attachment of a Hindu with persons of other religions like Islam or Sikhism; or attachment of students with

their teachers; or attachment of workers with their managers and employers). An individual who is strongly attached to others is likely to consider how his behaviour will affect others and their attitudes, including their attitudes toward that individual. Unattached or less attached people lack such interpersonal stakes in conformity and have only themselves to think about. Attachment is thus a powerful inhibitor of violent behaviour resulting from social frustrations. The more the people are attached to other persons' feelings and expectations, the less likely they are to remain frustrated and feel inclined to indulge in violence.

Committent is a feeling of obligation to seek a particular goal or to follow a particular course of action. The greater the individual's/group's commitment to a goal or to an action, the greater will be his/its stake in conformity to the norms. Thus, commitment serves as a bond between the individual/group and social norms, and represents what the person/group has to loose by violating the norms of society.

Adjustment refers to smooth switch over from one status to other, perceiving role as perceived by others, active participation in all roles, and having a problem-solving attitude. Adjustment specifies a relatively harmonious relationship within and between individuals and groups. The greater the adjustment, the lesser the possibility of individual's indulging in violent behaviour.

The maladjustment, unattachment and non-commitment lead to a feeling of Relative deprivation. Relative deprivation is perceived discrepancy between individuals' values expectations (i.e. expectations pertaining to justice, security, welfare, freedom, status, power, etc. and their value capabilities (conditions of life individuals or groups think they are capable of attaining or maintaining, given the social means available to them).¹¹

Relative Deprivation = Perceived opportunities + Perceived capabilities.

$$R.D. = P.O. + P.C.$$

$$R.D. = P(O + C)$$

Here, the important factor is 'perceived' by the aggressors themselves); hence different variations in behaviour or relative deprivations do not always lead to violent agitations.

Relative Deprivation occurs when (i) expectations increase while capabilities remain the same or decline (i.e., E +, and C -, or C = or (ii) when expectations remain the same while capabilities decline (i.e. E =, C -). Since both expectations (E) and capabilities (C) rest on perception (P), therefore value orientations of an individual/group have an important bearing on (a) the way the individuals/group will perceive deprivation, (b) the target(s) to which it (R.D.) will be directed, and (C) the form in which it will be expressed. Since each individual/group is subjected to different forces, each individual/group will respond differently in terms of violence.

Social Bond Theory for Collective Violence

Social structural Conditions

1. Hinderances in social development
2. Incidents in life.

Result into

Stresses, insecurity feeling and anxieties

1. Adjustment
2. Attachment
3. Commitment

Resulting Maladjustments

Frustrations

and

Relative Deprivations

Violent Behaviour

Our approach thus explains differential distribution and patterns of violence not in terms of agitators' motivations and mental processes but in terms of variations among individuals in their social adjustments, values and beliefs and their social conditions. It is contended that individuals with maladjustment patterns and values and beliefs are more likely to react aggressively than individuals having no such maladjustment patterns and values and beliefs. Hence, individual differences in aggressive behaviour may also reflect different degrees of integration with these values.

Our contention is that the frustrated and relatively deprived individuals are not constrained by their beliefs and values allowing for use of violence whenever and wherever they

feel but they are influenced by (i) the individuals too against whom the violence is to be used, i.e. the "victims" have to be those who lack 'resistance potential' toward aggressive behaviour, and (ii) by the idea of the justification of their act (violence) before and after its commission. Thus, violence is used by these frustrated individuals when they view certain individuals as appropriate victims and certain situations as suggestive of, even opportune for, use of violence, i.e., in specific circumstances and not in all circumstances.

Let us take two recent examples of collective violence in Ahmedabad and Assam. In both cases, the violence was the result of the feeling of deprivation. The main issue in Ahmedabad was the reservation issue, where both groups - the 'anti-reservationists' as well as the 'reservationists' - felt deprived and frustrated. Their frustration was exploited by political parties for their vested interests and the reservation issue came to be linked with caste and religion. Anti-social elements engaged in boot-legging and thriving because of the political support also spread communal venom. Thus, even a minor provocation was enough to flare-up the population sharply divided along communal lines.

The same frustration or the feeling of economic, social and political deprivation of the Assamese was responsible for the riots or collective violence in Assam. As soon as the power elite became serious and took peace initiative to solve the crisis, Assam was back to normal and collective violence was controlled.

Both these examples, thus, show how deprivation-induced collective discontent and politicization of this discontent give spur to violent action against political objects and actors.

Our Social Bond theory based on adjustment, commitment and attachment and the relative feeling of deprivation is different from the Frustration-Aggression theory in the sense that this theory (original Freudian theory) views the emergence of frustrations in terms of innate drive.¹² Psychologists explain frustrations as a result of a variety of intra-psychic conflicts and pressures. We explain frustrations as the consequence of inter-personal relations and functioning of sub-systems in the society. In our approach thus the source of frustration is not internal but external. However, our approach accepts the modified psychological claim of Dollard's and Berkowitz's¹³ that aggression is always directed towards the source of the frustration. But we do not accept their view that aggression is a learned response. Our contention is that aggression is specifically chosen to achieve a particular goal, or that it is instrumental aggression. Our contention is that aggression is specifically chosen to achieve a particular goal, or that it is instrumental aggression. Our theoretical approach thus has a sociological orientation.

It may be argued that the concepts of adjustment, attachment and commitment and social bond and relative deprivation may be more applicable to individual's violence but not to a big group's violence. My answer would be that as already explained earlier, though many-a-time it is a big group which feels frustrated and

discontented but it is a small sub-group or a compact subsequent of a numerically large heterogeneous group which initiates a violent action and gradually more and more people become involved in it. Thus, Social Bond theory is not an extension of the explanation of individual's behaviour to social levels but it explains the collective frustration and the collective violence of small and big groups.

At the same time, the Social Bond explanation is not essentially an elitist theory of violence that the small sub-group which takes the initiative is ideologically 'super' to decide when and how violence will be employed 'for the good' of the total frustrated group, on whose behalf it vocalises its protest. Further, the small group does not depend upon a widespread collective action of the frustrated masses. In this context, our explanation is in contrast to orthodox Marxist theory because Marx did envisage this kind of mass uprising and mass revolution.

The social Bond theory supports the linkage between change and violence as explained by Coser¹⁴ and Dahrendorf,¹⁵ but not Karl Marx. Coser sees violence as mechanism for conflict-resolution when established authority fails to accommodate to demands of new groups. Dahrendorf has also viewed violence as instrument of intervention and as the necessary prerequisite of change.

I may conclude that Social Bond explanation holds that :

(1) the main cause of collective violence is lack of integration because of failure of attachment, commitment and adjustment on the part of the discontented people (2) collective violence is

lack of integration - 16 -

lack of integration because of failure of attachment, commitment and adjustment on the part of the discontented people (2)

collective violence is symptomatic of various shortcomings in the social order, (3) it is closely related to instrumental behaviour,

(4) it is a rational and adaptive responses, and (5) it is not development itself but the process and pattern of development

(Rasheedduin Khan and Sugatta Das Gupta have called it

'maldevelopment').¹⁶ that results in collective violence.

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CONTEMPORARY TERRORISM IN INDIA - A TREND IN COLLECTIVELY
ACTIVATED VIOLENCE, WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE
OCCURRENCES IN PUNJAB

BY
S.S. SRIVASTAVA

INDIAN INSTITUTE OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
INDRAPRASTHA ESTATE, RING ROAD, NEW DELHI-110002

CONTEMPORARY TERRORISM IN INDIA - A TREND IN COLLECTIVELY ACTIVATED
VIOLENCE, WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE OCCURRENCES IN PUNJAB

- S.S. SRIVASTAVA

The paper attempts to analyse the collective dynamics in developing organised violence of extreme criminalising nature. It is more an analysis of collectivity behind an structured violent behaviour than the study of the collective violence per-se. It therefore, endeavours to distinguish two different but overlapping violent criminal phenomena.

- (i) Emotionally charged, vandalic collective upsurge (small or large) reflecting, sui-generis, spontaneity. May be it is a mobilised action motivated by a group with latent vested interests, like riots or other forms of hostile mob reactions.
- (ii) Strategically structured phenomena, reflecting typical continuity, built on the support of a collectivity with more manifest interests, by and large, political and economic, like terrorism.

The structured violence deserves serious attention of the social scientists and the functionaries of the criminal justice, particularly in the so-called developing countries like India, which are currently facing the menace much more than the relatively developed countries. The process of growth marked with the preponderance of disparities and despairingly reactive classes, appears to generate expressive violence as a system of interaction at different levels - social, economic and political. In an obstinate and non-compromising situation, certain groups may turn it into means of extreme terror in order to humiliate the adversary for getting things done.

Notwithstanding the exigency of the problem, the empirical reference material in regard to this phenomenon is scarce. The difficulty of contact with the activists - precipitators or motivators, is obvious.

The phenomenon also has poor predictability in time and place. Nevertheless, the victim-survey approach and collection of inter-subjective impressions of different observers plus the detailed study of the ecology and the social structure, may yield sufficiently acceptable facts.

The study of terrorism - a collective uprising, may need a holistic approach. It is neither a random and venomous attack of a frustrated and misguided youth nor it is an irritant and indiscriminate out-burst of an excited group. It is, inter-alia, a cool and calculated action of an organised collectivity precipitated for a pre-determined purpose.

The contemporary terrorism in India, is a complex and diversified phenomenon branching in three major typologies - terrorism in Punjab, insurgency in the North-Eastern border states and "naxalism" in other parts of the country. These structures differ in regard to the determinants of strains, ideological commitment on the part of the precipitators and supporters, the nature of demands and the ecology of the area. Nevertheless, there are some common elements like mutuality of existence in terms of time, modus-operandi-relying heavily on the use of excessive violence with indifference to victim, and some personality traits of the activists.

The 'terrorism' can be conceptualised as an interaction of aggressional power between two divergent interest groups held in an adversary situation where one commits felonious acts on the other said to oppose the former's interest satisfaction, in order to push the latter to a position of weakness. In the context of the contemporary

Indian scene the target group is said to have the support of the formal power—the power of the state; the intimidating group challenges it with the informal power that they muster through organisation and the help of the support-community.

A further elaboration of the typology, may define terrorism as an organised mode of action (destruction of life and property), or threat to complete such an action by a group of precipitators, set on selected, chance or spill-over target (including 'self' in a suicidal action). The terrorists are specific persons owing allegiance to a support-community (collectivity) claiming an ideology justifying such action for achieving specific goals. The support-community generates powers for the precipitators by extending them money, material, organization and protection. The targets are recognised as the members and supporters of the group taken as hostile and thus relegated to an inimical position deserving the treatment as an act of natural justice. The terrorism thus is a rational action. The major components of this definition can be analysed as under:

- i. The wilful nature of the act.
- ii. The precipitators.
- iii. The support-community (intra-national and extra national).
- iv. Belief in violence as a mode of action.
- v. Terror purpose.
- vi. Organisational structure.
- vii. Targets.
- viii. Implications.

These components in a relative sequence of function explain a particular mode of terrorist phenomena.

Terrorism in India has greatly come above board after the advent of our egalitarian constitution. The rapid socio-economic-political change the country almost suddenly went into, has inter-alia, also created situations of strains and reactions to strains. Different groups have been affected in different ways by the changes. And those like youths, who felt relative deprivations and had the potential of being activists, have distressingly over-reacted. The country has developed strong conduciveness to expressive violence.

A surmounting consciousness for group power and a craze for materialistic achievements have been boosted up; the economy at the other end has failed to generate opportunities of economic involvement for rising multitude of unskilled youth sections. The national policy is for specialisation and technological advancement, where as the youth by and large, is more for anti-meritocracy. A sizable section of them are exposed to politics of opposition and conflicts. And those who surge in large urban aggregates, have been more vulnerable.

The political groups for survival have exploited the situation to the hilt and are basically responsible for augmenting a sub-culture of violence in the country. The surplus youth power has been their mercenary force. A sizable section of our population suffers from economic and social insecurity and because of marginal commitment to national involvements, are almost hung in a state of sub-national animation, susceptible to high degree of expressive violence for survival. The transition from self, kinship or community identity into a concept of national identity, has been an extremely slow process. The sections who find their aspirations unrecognised provide a fertile ground for growth of sectarian ideology.

a necessary element in the genesis of communal terrorism.

To sum-up one can conveniently conclude that the present day susceptibility to violence serves as a necessary pre-condition (a strong contributory factor) if not a sufficient condition of rise of political and economic-terrorism in the country. There may be other associating factors to make the pre-condition sufficient to give an action frame to develop a particular mode of terroristic phenomena. These factors endogeneously emerged out or exogeneously inducted in, are to be identified in reference to the socio-ecological context. One can notice that when serious social strains abound every where in the country there are certain areas only which are relatively more prone to terrorism or for a particular mode of terrorism. Maybe their cultural values and traditions support assaultive behaviour as a problem solving mechanism - translating cultural belief in violence into action for existential purpose. Whether this instrumentalisation of terroristic violence has solely an intra-national genesis, or is being also inculcated in by the extra-national interests, is to be empirically assessed by analysing the structure of the phenomena.

The deductive-holistic approach to study the structure of terrorism may necessitate the consideration of the following local cultural preconditions :

- i. Presence of some sort of Durkheimian collective consciousness promoting homicidal-suicidal reactions for the defence of collective interest.
- ii. Symbolisation of collective interest in forms of sacred values with a history of vendettas for their defence.
- iii. Carrying, keeping and worshipping arms as ritual and symptomatic of masculinity.
- iv. Resistance to secularization.

- vi. Habituation to hard life, with excessive tolerance to pain and quick dissipation of fear.

These properties identify the presence of a sub-culture of violence and promote development of regional and communal character. They create a strong dualism of personality. A highly moralistic, religious person may often justify irreligious indulgences and marginally culturalised groups can be provoked to fight to death for sacred cause.

Punjab terrorism is a typical example of polarisation of separatistic communal politics drawing strength from religion and linguistic differences by exploiting the surplus youth power and the general vulnerability of youth to violence. It is a teactful conversion of a minority communal movement into a violent political movement by a group interested in another division of the maintained.

The strong cultural sensitivity to such a line of action has effused because a community not averse to aggressive behaviour, feels economic strain which throws alarming number of youth persons out to loose economic and social status. They are at the same time psycholigised with a belief that sucession (or even strong political concession) is feasible and is the panacea of the ailment. The strong counter-separalist resistance put up by the nationalist sections and the law enforcement, has crimmalised the movement taking its hard core under ground. Punjab is in web of political group conflicts. Some empirical observations have identified three near to distinct but over-lapping groups with different locus-standi.

1. Conformists, who abide with the Constitution but call for improving the socio-economic status of the State. A section of this group is 'communal concessionists' who strive for special minority status for political considerations. They include sizable marginals so far as national identity is concerned. In the recent election the conformists and the concessionists have combined to give a heavy mandate to the Akalis.

2. Radicals, who follow the broad communist ideology; section of the radicals may have tacit faith in the politics of aggression (maxalites). Radicalism in Punjab however, could muster a limited following only.
3. Communal Separatists, who endeavour to claim a separate national identity. Terrorism in them exists as a surreptitious weapon since the demand they advocate is non-negotiable under the Constitution.

The separatists, however, claim to muster a strong sympathetic community support-intra and international. The inter-national fraternity-the migrants, play a significant role in precipitating terroristic activities. They enjoy relatively a higher economic status vis-a-vis their native fraters who perceive greater mental and social identity with them.

In discussing the specified forces instrumental in fomenting communal turbulence in Punjab, one can cognise three undercurrents.

The first refers to the surreptitious movement set by the migrants who of late, are experiencing strong anti-Indian wake and are being squeezed out of their present mooring with no plausible alternative settlement. They have built up a strong consensus to divert significant portion of their investments to support their separatist fraters in India. A separate homeland where their effects and savings can be safely transferred without being diluted in the general economy of the country, is their tacit ambition. The migrants constitute strong support community interested in destabilising the country. The destabilization process is further reinforced by an increasingly strong group of would-be migrants who are non-being furstratingly held in a state of sub-national animation. They are the folks who have built-up a strong reference-group relationship with their western modernized fraters but are unable to join them because of the current constraints on immigration to the western countries.

The distressing state of sub-national animation and that too on the part of the unskilled youths eulogising their marshall capabilities, is highly conducive to the formation of pressure groups for protruding communal warfare.

The other underforce distracting the youth (especially of villages) from the national mainstream and pushing them to sectarian politics, emerges out of the serious economic imbalance the state economy has developed from within.

Not-with-standing the policy of green-revolution, the major portion of the economic inputs (money, raw material, technological help) in free-market situation, has slided more towards urban industrial growth; barely 35% of the peasantry-the large land-holders, have got the benefit of them (Punjab Crisis-Context and Trends, G.R.R.I.D., Chandigarh, 1984). 65% of the peasantry are small land-holders. They have raised their productivity by sheer hard labour. But, they have surplus man power-unskilled unmarried youths, ready to migrate to cities (even abroad) for employment and education. Such transient migrants are found to be susceptible to deviant behaviour even of anti-national character.

The industrial growth of Punjab, by and large, has been confined to the growth of small, private, urban sectors with limited job potential. Punjab has not shown due interest in developing national level enterprises which could have generated sufficient job opportunities besides inclucating national self-conception among the working classes. An interesting generalisation relates the uncontrolled small scale entrepreneurs with sectarian politics mostly to defend their indulgences in profit raising economic offences and production of spurious and sub-standard material.

On the whole, Punjab cities abound with masses of unskilled youths (rural and urban) without economic engagement and social commitment, congregating in the educational institutions, seeking social status more than education per-se. The youths have enough leisure time to take to indiscriminate politicisation including polarisations for strong violent political movement involving great risk to life. The sub-national character facilitates the polarisation.

The third factor symbiotically related to the first one - the role of the migrants, but subscribing much more heavily to the dreaded terrorism, is the criminal intimidation by the cross-national hostile forces. The borders are vulnerable.

The cultural proximity of the people of both sides with age-old free interactions, have not checked illegitimate to and fro movements of men and material including those concerning proliferation of terrorism. The trafficking of contraband therefore, has infested the villages with traditional offenders as well, who operate hand in hand with the terrorists making terrorism a complicated structure. A typical marginality in terms of national character prevails all along the border, which goes in favour of development and persistence of anti-national activities.

Analysing the functional structure of terrorism in the country, one may find it a laminated, hierarchical but highly unified composition comprising a central core with a strong ring of trusted and trained band of field operators and these two rest on the support-community. The terrorists are mostly identified with the field operators. Both the core and the members of the support-community get the privilege of the social self and thus greatly remain anonymous unless caught as abettors. The core maintains the linkage with the highest authority functioning incognito,

from outside the country. The support-community (intra-national) are the part of the conventional society and the socio-economic-cultural base on which the movement rests and thrives.

Notwithstanding the high permeability between the 'core' and the ring, (the field-workers) the latter appears to be a different class since many of them are ideologically inapt and having long criminal records. Many of them even have changed their appearance for anonymity, which the religion they fight to defend, does not permit. Some of them even belong to different communities and operate as hired mercenaries. The ring therefore, is a hybrid class and gives an impression that irreligious youths fight for a religious cause.

Terrorism therefore, does not symbolise a violent social movement. Even as a violent political process it is a dangerous phenomenon embodying several vested interests. The phenomenon thus often may have an inherent interest, not concerned with the negotiation of the demand but with the continuance of the terrorism itself. This is the reason of its hibernation and reappearance periodically. After Akalis gained political power with heavy mandate there was a lull, but now the ferocious criminality is appearing again.

There are some important generalisations which may be of value when formulation of a policy and corresponding programme of counter-terrorism, are envisaged.

1. Terrorist class with sophisticated weapons, training and cover of the support community - stands privileged vis-a-vis the combatant forces. In highly frustrating situations the latter may over-react (like Sri Lankan security forces). The over-reactions strengthens the cause of terrorism, and humiliates the combatants forces.

2. The terrorists if continue to be blessed by the inimical trans-national powers, can lay hands on still more sophisticated technology and can have much wider mobility. Of late, however, the problem is showing boomerang effect on the surreptitiously hosting nations.
3. Even if the majority of the support-community backs out, a section of the terrorists may still stay on in the life of crime. A new sub-culture of violence for sectarian (criminal) interests has been set in. 'Terrorism' has given an operational field to the traditional offenders.
4. The political compromise without striking the sources of strain and the criminal motive, may contain the unwholesome effect for short duration only.

The Punjab terrorism therefore, is a highly complex phenomenon. The counter-action will necessary be a multi-dimensional approach. The accord and the restoration of the democratic institutions are the right steps. But there are quite a few urgent tasks which are to be done almost immediately.

1. Reinforcement of law-enforcement to break the core and the ring and to plug the sources of help. Banks and commercial centres are to be protected with special emphasis. One fails to understand as to why bank security is not being given the needed priority when bank robberies are every day occurrence and robbers, more-often-than-not, are related to terrorists.
2. Induction of a programme for development of concept of loyalty to nation, to be taken up at the primary group level (family, school and village). It will be a behaviour management programme through education, mass-media and group-work. Constant monitoring shall be required in order to keep the programme alive. The current integrated child development and adult education programmes can be suitably amended in this light.
3. The support-community has to be brought in the national mainstream so that they withdraw the right of sanctuary extended to the precipitators. It may not be an impossible task since 65% of the Punjab population of for that matter even a large chunk of the marginals have respect for nationalism and democracy. Punjab has rendered signal contribution to the national development.

4. A balanced economic growth is needed emphasising cooperative farming, diversion of rural credit to the urban industries, increased participation of the rural youth - surplus in agro-industries at the village level and setting up large national industrial sectors.

In the end, I have two humble suggestions for the masters of our national politics. Collective violence is not as much an emergent norm as it is deliberate induction for narrow ends. Such inductions have to be stopped and a consensus to total conformity in respect of values of national security-integrity, be attained. The politicians may like to leave some areas as politics free zones. The educational institutions are to be helped to maintain their meritocratic and authority systems. Indiscriminate politicisation of youths in the art of agitations and crowd behaviour, has done much more harm than good. Violent political movement or even the radical extremism might have succeeded elsewhere. The Indian plurality has always rejected it and shall reject it again. It has a nuisance value only. So there is no sense in trying it.

NATIONAL SEMINAR
ON
COLLECTIVE VIOLENCE: GENESIS AND RESPONSE

SOCIAL CHANGE AND SOCIAL VIOLENCE IN
INDIA : A CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE

BY

Dr. R.S. SHRIVASTAVA

INDIAN INSTITUTE OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
INDRAPRASTHA ESTATE, RING ROAD, NEW DELHI-110002

SOCIAL CHANGE AND SOCIAL VIOLENCE IN INDIA :

A CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE

- Dr.R.S.Shrivastava*

INTRODUCTION

The present paper is intended to explore the implications of some aspects of change in Indian society in recent times for emergence of forms of social violence. Both social change and social violence have complex origin and diverse character, and only some significant elements of their relationships will be covered here. It is necessary at the outset, to define and delimit the meaning of social violence. Violence may be defined as application of physical force to inflict injury or damage. It is an intentional act to harm or injure. It is considered as a persisting feature of social relationships and societies. Violence may be defined as application of physical force to inflict injury or damage. It is an intentional act to harm or injure. It is considered as a persisting feature of social relationships and societies. Violence may not only be understood in physical sense as being the exercise of physical force; it may be mental or psychological; it may also be institutional, i.e. inherent in the institutions of the society itself and operating in a very subtle and imperceptible way. Much of violence found in contemporary society may be classed into three categories: First, violence which is used in the commission of crimes may be termed as criminal violence. The violent crimes, or 'crimes of violence' fall in this category. Secondly, social violence which occurs at the societal level as an integral feature of interpersonal or intergroup relationships. It takes place among the various social groupings of society such as caste, communal, political, economic, ethnic, majority-minority etc. Third, state violence in which the state uses force and coercion against its own citizens in a legitimate manner to 'civilize'. These distinctions among three

*Associate Professor, Department of Sociology, University of Jodhpur.

kinds of violence may only be tentative for the purposes of discussion, often, there may be considerable overlap among them. All kinds of violence may be 'criminal' from the strictly legal point of view. But the distinguishing feature of social violence is that it occurs at the societal level during, or as a consequence of, some features of social relationships among members of different social groupings.

Basic Propositions

Social violence, in the above sense, is a predominant feature of plural societies with multiplicity of groups, each trying to fulfill its own differing and sectional interests. The groups with opposing interests compete with each other for power and privileges to which they have differential access. This often results in contradictions, coercion, and conflict. Thus it may be argued that transformation of a society from a homogeneous and well integrated one to a heterogeneous and plural type is accompanied by increased situations of social conflict and violence. These situations are characterized by poorly defined interpersonal relationships, lack of consensus, confusion of norms, and social anonymity and alienation of groups from each other. There is the resulting tension, maladjustments, and conflicts in society. As commitment to social norms weakens, law and other forms of formal control emerge to enforce rules in society, which in any case are rendered ineffective due to their lack of moral force. As a corollary to the above, it may be stated that social conflict and violence can be reduced only by enhanced integrative processes and mechanisms set in operation and by bringing about some fundamental changes in socio-economic and political structures.

Another proposition is that the tendency to violence is determined by several factors. First, the tendency to violence is learned, and finds expression, in certain specific social contexts, It has to be prompted by a favourable combination of social factors,

motivations, rationalizations, values and norms. Second, the tendency to violence also varies according to the position of the individuals and groups in the social order, and how they condition themselves to respond to various social pressures.

The Indian Context:

The general context of some of the specific kinds of social violence in contemporary Indian society can be understood in terms of some of the basic propositions stated above. Though India has historically been a plural and complex society, its internal integration had been sustained to a larger degree by some of its traditional values and structures. Some of these were characterised by the autonomy and independence of social and cultural traditions, absence of a single overarching state or political centre, hierarchical division of society, institutionalized inequality, holism, and transcendence. While some of these traditional features facilitated integrative mechanisms, in the wake of modernization the same features also created some disintegration and conflicts. Particularly since Independence, the processes of economic development and social change, accompanied by values of democracy, socialism, and secularism, derived from both the freedom struggle and impact of western values, led to the emergence of various interest groups or pressure groups. The different groups and cleavages were brought together in a common frame work through participatory political processes. This resulted not only in their growing interdependence but also increasing cleavage and conflict, encouraged by an urge to obtain positions and privileges offered in the new social order. The social conflicts among various groups tended to become more organized, having society-wide organizations, and exploiting traditional and parochial loyalties. The social conflicts were used as symbols of social and political identification and also as a means of demonstration of power in a competitive struggle for powers and privileges. In the initial

phase of Independence (in the early fifties) the potential for tension and open confrontation among several groups was held back considerably by several factors: There was hope among all sections of society that the future would bring all of them nearer towards the ideals of equality and social justice promised to them during the freedom struggle as well as on achieving Independence. Much faith was also reposed in the political leadership and ruling elites who had involved the masses in the struggle for freedom, instilled a sense of nationalism, and projected a vision of the 'New Society' before them. It was also hoped that the powerful and affluent classes will sacrifice some of their class and sectional interests and extend their support to the ameliorative and welfare policies to realize the goals of social justice. Above all, there was a sense of confidence that the newly emerged Independent nation state would be able to work effectively and sincerely to help the weaker and underprivileged sections of society to realize their constitutional dreams.

During the decades since Independence, India has no doubt made tremendous progress in economic sphere, agricultural and industrial production, and scientific and technical fields. But unfortunately, the failures in realizing goals of social justice are more glaring. Uneven economic development of various parts and regions of the country, failure to carry the fruits of economic development to all sections of society, particularly the weaker and underprivileged ones, failure of many ambitious poverty ameliorative and other programmes intended to bring about a radical change in prevailing economic structure, such as land reforms, a state sponsored capitalist system in a professed socialistic garb, and administrative failures and corruption have all combined to generate a high degree of tension and resentment among several sections of society, resulting from failure of their aspirations raised by initial hopes, visions, and pledges made to them by leaders as well as the constitution of free India.

This then, is the broad scenario within which social violence is generated and takes place. The phenomenon of violence, both in rural and urban areas can be understood more clearly by analysing some more specific processes and factors operating within this general context. Some of these significant dimension of social violence are mentioned in the following paragraphs:

Socio Economic Dimension

There are several socio-economic dimensions of the problem of social violence. In the first place, the process of planned economic development itself generated a lot of tension and social unrest. The existence of regional disparities, and the anxieties to have a share in the 'National Cake', coupled with the suspicion of other regions and groups led to a number of agitations and collective violence in several parts of India. The vast rural areas which were considered placid and tranquil till recently are seething with anger and dissatisfaction. Increased agricultural production and 'Green Revolution' in a few pockets have generated tension and social conflicts by creating feelings of deprivation among those who could not reap its fruits, in the same and other regions. New agricultural technologies made agricultural enterprise more profitable, but the prevalence of an inequalitarian agrarian structure and failures of various land reform measures generated and intensified social conflicts in rural areas. A new class of large farmers has emerged in rural areas, but few economic options and opportunities are left with the small and petty cultivators and a vast humanity of landless labourers. The rural-urban disparity and gap in terms of the distribution of economic resources and facilities has also generated a lot of social unrest. Though only about twenty per cent of the population lived in urban areas, the bulk of the facilities are concentrated in the urban centres. An important aspects of rural violence is the caste related violence. Worse incidents of intercaste violence and atrocities have taken place in recent years. The causes are

both economic and social. At the economic level, distribution of land resources, harvesting of crops, provision of wages and other work conditions have led to fierce collective caste based violence. At the social level, the values of social justice, institution of political democracy, and a general awakening have created a sense of resentment among the castes who were traditionally assigned a low social status. They are no longer prepared to accept their traditional roles, which in turn invites violent reactions from caste Hindus who feel that their power and privileges are being scuttled. But caste violence occurs not only between caste Hindus and Harijans, but also between upper castes (traditional landlords) and lower middle or intermediate castes, and between intermediate and lower castes and harijans. So it is a very complex phenomenon. The problem has been further complicated by involvement of criminal and antisocial gangs and use of terrorism and 'senas' on both sides. The processes of urbanization and industrialization have in their wake generated other sources of social tension and violence in urban areas. These twin processes have brought together in urban - industrial centres, people belonging to various linguistic, religious, regional groups, and castes through process of inter-regional migrations. In a situation in which the economic opportunity structure is limited, they compete with each other to gain access to these limited, and often, inequalitarian, opportunities. The linguistic, regional and other loyalties are then utilized to attain economic goals through collective mobilization agitations and violence. Varied phenomena, such as the emergence of 'senas', 'sons of soil' policies, pro and anti-reservation stirs, etc. could be viewed in this perspective. The sudden outbursts of collective violence, which are becoming an endemic feature of an urban centres could be seen as manifestations of symposiums. They may assume communal, linguistic, regional or other forms, but have deeper socio-economic dimensions. It is difficult to understand their genesis merely by proximate or local causes which only ignite the immediate violence. The underlying socio-economic circumstances

have led to the emergence of quite explosive elements in cities. This chiefly comprises of the rural migrants who come to cities with many hopes and aspirations but are lost in the vastness, anonymity, poverty, and squalor of urban complexities. The contrasts of city life generate a strong sense of deprivation, class hatred, and individual worthlessness. The army of jobless and homeless youths, cut off from their roots, become the potential recruits for those in search of 'hired' mercenaries for mobilization and violence along communal, regional, linguistic or other lines. Extreme poverty, unemployment, widening disparities, and lack of social justice provide much of the inflammable material constituting our urban social volcanoes. Unplanned urban growth, corruption, breakdown of urban governments, and lack of civil amenities have played no lesser role in exacerbating various forms of social violence in urban areas. Collective mobilizations have taken place on such issues as city transport, water and electricity, sanitation, housing, and a host of other problems which have been aggravated by growing inefficiency and corruption of local governments. Another disturbing feature of urban violence in recent times has been the increasing role the organized criminal elements have been playing in fomenting and participating in collective violence of various types. Some well known smugglers are reported to have actively supported and incited communal riots in Bombay and Bhiwandi a couple of years ago and cities like Bombay, Ahmedabad, Baroda, Surat have of late, witnessed fierce communal violence prompted by rivalries of bootleggers and gang leaders for control of illicit liquor trade in the city. Also, the struggle for real estate in urban areas has also been attracting the attention of slum lords, smugglers, and mafia leaders. They first set up unauthorized colonies and slums and then take recourse to threat and violence to force out the occupants in order to take possession of precious urban land. The very character of urban rioting has changed due to involvement of organized criminals. Now urban riots involve more arson,

accompanied by looting, in order to suppress all evidence; use of more sophisticated techniques and arms, use of terrorism, and, above all, persistence of rioting for a long time which becomes difficult to contain.

Another factor in present day urban violence is the growth urbanized peripheral villages. Due to growth of our big cities, the villages on the fringe have been absorbed in the sprawling urban complex. The residents of these villages had been dispossessed of their land by relative nominal compensations for urban growth, and they have witnessed the escalating cost of the same land. This has created considerable resentment in their minds. Their frustration and anger finds expression in organised incidents of looting and arson in the city which they perceive as the 'cause' of their despair. They are easily recruited to participate in the urban riots and violence. The November 1984 Delhi riots are a case in point.

Political Dimension

Social violence has important political dimensions. In a participatory democracy, based on elections and votes, each political party strives to establish and maintain its pockets of influence. In this struggle of competitive politics, various loyalties, such as communal, caste, regional, or linguistic, are exploited to mobilize the collectivities for political action and support. It is used as a means of demonstrating one's political power also. Violence becomes an integral part of such mobilization for political purposes. Its dramatic nature unfailingly draws the attention of the whole community and helps in focussing attention on the issues involved, or even deflecting attention from the real issues which may be politically inconvenient. Violence also has an emotional appeal to activists and participants and helps in rallying them towards the political cause.

Sometimes, local politicians, whose political position becomes precarious or uncertain instigate violence as a channel for self enhancement, or to regain their lost political position. Apart from these direct ways of politically prompted violence, the links of rioters and criminals with politicians, and the political protection and patronage given to them emboldens them in indulging in future bouts of violence. It may also be argued that the moral decay of Indian politics and political leaders breeds more violence in society. The verbal commitment of political parties and leaders to such values as secularism, socialaism, democracy, social justice etc is not manifested in their political practices and generates an atmosphere of violence in society. The lack of a firm and secular political leadership is another factor of societal violence. The political office is not perceived as a public service but merely as a means of social mobility and personal aggrandizement through an access to a system of spoils by these power brokers and agents's. The resulting lack of confidence and cynicism among average citizens about politicians and political parties lead them to desperate violent actions.

Emergent Values

Certain values and life styles have emerged during the last about four decades of Independence in our country which have encouraged a culture of violence and are a real threat to national integration itself. During these years many contradictions of the development process have surfaced, posing new challenges. These new values and life styles originate from the neo-rich middle class of our society who have gained considerable wealth since Independence as a result of deriving maximum benefits from the programmes and policies of economic development in both rural and urban areas. The contractors, medium level business entrepreneurs, brokers, agents, black money operators, and a host of others who have reaped benefits through exploiting in a corrupt system of spoils. In rural areas also, some sections have been

particularly benefitted by newer programmes of developments and reforms and they have acquired considerable wealth. These neo-rich sections wield tremendous influence over society. They have projected values centering around self-interests, cunningness, lack of fellow feeling, dishonesty, corruption, and opportunism. All aspects of social life-social, economic, political, educational are being influenced by their philosophy and values. The values of consumerism and shameless exhibition of wealth on their part have serious consequences for a society marked by a high degree of economic and social disparities. The ensuing frustration and 'normlessness' are reflected in recurrent social conflicts-caste, regional, minority-majority, etc. In sum, it may be stated that there has not been a development of cultural values commensurate with social mobility and economic progress.

Socio-Psychological Dimension

Though social violence occurs in group situations, it is important to understand the psychology of the individual participants and psychology of group. Collective processes are constituted of series of individual actions, and in critical and resistant situations individuals often resort to violent reactions. These individual reactions vary according to individual's position in social order, his bond with the members of his groups and outgroups, stereotyped images held about others, ethnic dissatisfactions and frustrations, and above all, the learned pattern of response to social pressures and frustrations. The child rearing and socializing practices differ in different classes, which make violent response and appropriate form of behaviour in some sections of society. Due to a particular conditioning of individuals in the deprived sections of society, frustration-induced aggression is directed onwards, resulting in violent behaviour. In the middle and upper classes it is directed inwards, resulting in

depressive, and often suicidal tendencies and behaviour.

Heightened personal expectations generate a sense of relative deprivation, and individual worthlessness. The individual perceives violence as a channel to self-regard and self-enhancement. He is easily attracted by the appeals of religious fundamentalists, political agitators, and other instigators of collective violence because such appeals provide him hopes and collective identity. His participation in collective violence is an alternative to individual criminality in which he participates with a 'nothing to loose attitude'.

Each individual comes to perceive members of outgroups not as individuals but as a collectivity which is assigned certain stereotyped characteristics. He is guided by this perception in his interpersonal interaction. The 'others' are perceived as full with evils with no positive traits. Given these perceptions and beliefs, merely external symbols - religious, linguistic, caste-begin to be exploited for starting a reciprocal and unending chain of actions whose end-product is violence. In this the inter-group violence becomes persistent, more brutal, and uncontractable. The underlying beliefs and images causing hostile outbursts are spread through rumour, scapegoating, or knowledge of a specific incident. Whether such beliefs are true or greatly exaggerated is irrelevant. The important point is that they are 'believed' to be true and serve as a background for action. Given these beliefs, coupled with structural strains and conduciveness, the individual becomes a ready material for mobilization for collective action. It is in this background that any rumour, or an insignificant event serves as a precipitating and proximate 'cause' to ignite collective violence.

The Social Control Dimension

The operation and effectiveness of the various factors - both proximate and predisposing - depend on the level of success of general social control mechanism to contain violence in society.

This has several aspects. Most important among these conditions is the prevalence of a general atmosphere of nonviolence in society. Much depends on the extent to which there exists a tradition of non violence in society and the internalization of norms of nonviolence are weakened, then outbursts of violence to do not create society-wide outrage or concern. People gradually get accustomed to violence or remain indifferent, which in turn promotes further violence. This implies that the institutions of society - the family, neighbourhood, community, religious and educational institutions, mass media - all can play a very important role in fostering the norms of nonviolence in society. Similarly, the effectiveness of leadership in all walks of life - social, political, academic, religious - determine the extent to which they can develop negative attitudes towards leadership, norms of non-violence are difficult to be fostered. Finally, the state and its agencies are also important. Motivations to personal and group violence and revenge become stronger if there is inaction and inefficiency on the part of the state. Similarly, if the state fails to promptly punish the culprits of violence, or gives them encouragement, or firm and prompt action is not taken to contain violence and redress grievances of people, it is a sure way to prop up violence in society. The state structure, administration, police, and judiciary are the mainstay not only of maintaining law and order but of welfare and social justice in a democratic society. The failure to achieve this leads people to desperation and recourse to violence as an alternative means of seeking redress. The respect for law in a society is dependent on the respect for law makers and law enforces. If they lose moral authority and respect due to inefficiency, corruption, or misuse of power, the alternative for people is violence.

Conclusion

Social violence as an aspect of intergroup relationship does not take place in a vacuum, but a number of social and cultural factors determine its origin and expression. As a symptom, it reflects the underlying socio-cultural structure and dynamics of society. Even if the oft-repeated slogan, "All change is revolutionary change", may not be accepted, it can be argued that the processes of social change are often accompanied by, and sometimes are also initiated by, some amount of social violence. In the Indian context the processes of industrialization, urbanization, democratization, and cultural modernization have tended to bring together diverse collectivities into mutual interdependence and impingement. Possibilities of strains and conflict among them have increased because of acceptance of new values and ideals of equality and social justice, and a widening gap between these ideals and practice. As the knowledge and awareness of the gap between these ideals and practice. As the knowledge and awareness of the gap between poverty and wealth increases, along with the rising aspirations and assertion of one's rights, the conflict is intensified. As a result of the perception of the state structure as inefficient, partisan, and corrupt, its external symbols themselves become the target of attack. Faith in the social institutions - law, police, judiciary begins to decline and a tendency for 'direct action' becomes stronger. New techniques of mass protests are devised to browbeat the law enforcing agencies. Above all, new rationalizations for recourse to violence are invented. It will be futile to search for the 'causes' of collective social violence, of whatever shade, in merely localized events and factors. The deeprooted unrest having its ramifications at the national level has to be carefully analyzed. We cannot afford to proceed from incident to incident in an adhoc fashion in search of causes and solutions.

This also underlines the fact that there cannot be a merely 'law and order' solution to the problem of collective social violence. In fact, the legislative, policing, and judicial apparatus need to be geared to meet the complex challenges by integrating them with other community actions and developmental programmes. In so far as collective social violence could be viewed as an attempt at redefinition and restructuring of the prevailing social structure, possibility of an alternative and peaceful manner of such change could always be explored. Fortunately, in our country, the norms and traditions of violent social change have not yet become firmly established; the informal social control mechanisms have not been completely dislocated; the pathological values of the neo-middle class have not ~~been~~ taken deep roots; and the values of conciliation and compromise inherited from the National Movement are still alive. There is still time for us to pause, reflect, and take timely action to contain the impending disaster.

1970
NATIONAL SEMINAR
ON
COLLECTIVE VIOLENCE: GENESIS AND RESPONSE

Socio-psychological Factors Behind
the Violence: The Case of an
Agricultural University.

By
Uday Jain,
Bhopal University,
Bhopal.

INDIAN INSTITUTE OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
INDRAPRASTHA ESTATE
NEW DELHI-110002.

National Seminar

on

Collective Violence: Genesis and Response

I.I.P.A. New Delhi, 12-14 February 1986.

Socio-psychological Factors Behind the Violence:
The Case of an Agricultural University.

Uday Jain*

In a democratic society the functioning of different formal organizations and institutions play a vital role in the socio-psychological climate of the country, for it is their success which leads any nation on the path of development. Especially, in the developing countries, like India, often the progress is hampered because of the ill-functioning of these organizations. Every organization and institution in our country enjoys freedom under the law and exercises its power through hierarchical structure. The dynamics of the functioning is such that social benefits of these institutions can easily be diverted to the vested gains. These vested gains are varied but the magnitude of the gains is directly in proportion to the power of the person who wishes to enjoy the gains. In this process of gain and loss various informal and formal groups often emerge in institutions which are largely based on caste, community, region or political affiliation. Indian universities are not exceptions in this regard. The university authorities, the teachers, the students and other employees within their cells are organised for their personal benefits. In this game of maximizing gains most often than not conflicts between these groups take the violent turn and functioning of the institutions are badly disturbed. The analysis of this violence should be made in the context of the total social environment rather than as a separate independent and isolated case (Singh, 1972).

*Reader in Psychology, Bhopal University, Bhopal-462026.

In the literature several theories of aggression and violence have been offered but they lack sufficient empirical support. Recently, a few empirical studies have been carried out in India (e.g., Singh, 1972; Chatterjee, Singh & Rao, 1967; Sarkar, 1964) and their analysis of violence suggests multiple but uniform pattern of the causes of violence in university and other organizations. The present papers reports a case study of violence at an Agricultural university. This case of violence is unique in the sense that it was a conflict between university authorities and farm labourers rather than the students. A descriptive part of the agitation was published elsewhere (see Iyer, Jain and others, 1978).

The incident - In the said university for the first time in its history of 18 years thenon-teaching employees formed an union and recruited the farm labourers as the members of this union. Subsequently, they placed a six point charter of demands to the Vice Chancellor (VC). The main demands induced the implimentation of the Minimum Wages Act and the reduction of working hours from 12 to 8 a day for the security guards, formulations of service rules, medical facilities and recognition of union. The authorities conceded only one demand, i.e. no deduction of payment for housing, electricity and water. A few days later one worker was shot at with a country made pistol by a relative of a farm officer resulting in the loss of one eye. The union went on strike for two days and again placed their demands including the punishment for the criminal act committed by the relative. The agreement between the university and union was soughtout by the intervention of the district administration. But instead of implementing the agreement, university services were declared essential and 90 workers of Crop Research Center, who were active union members, were retrenched. This resulted almost in the stoppage of work by over 400 workers at this unit. Few of these workers were arrested. In protest of their arrest and retrenchment, over 2000 workers from the various parts of the farm presented a peaceful demonstration at the police station.

Police arrested 1000 workers and kept them hungry for 24 hrs. and then released them. The university authorities also reinstated all the 90 retrenched workers. Just after a few days the senior research assistants of Crop Research Center, in contravention to the agreement signed earlier, tried to force the workers for 12 hrs. work. This follows scuffles between the research assistants and a group of workers. Counter cases were filled by the university and the union. This was the first time that the Provincial Armed Constabulary (PAC) was inducted in to the campus. Soon after 17 labourers were arrested and released on bail. They resumed their duties on a day and were sacked on the other day. They were also asked to vacate their huts and to leave the campus. Then union presented a charter of 14 demands and posed a threat to go on strike from a specified date in case the demands were not conceded. The Vice Chancellor gave a written reply to all the 14 demands (see Iyer, Jain & others, 1978)., and could not concede any of the demands. These demands included the reinstatement of the 17 workers, withdrawal of PAC from the campus, and withdrawal of the ordinance promulgating the Essential Service Act. When their demands were not conceded the union declared strike.

The refusal of V.C. to negotiate further, his announced threat of disciplinary action, the retrenchment of some labourers and office clerks, the union strike, the scuffles between labourers and PAC at various points in the campus, the raids in the houses of the union leaders and workers, and the arrest of several of them contributed to increase in the tension and resulted in a state of confusion. On the 3rd day of the strike the hundreds of labourers were coming to participate in the procession. At the main crossing of the campus the workers were prevented by the PAC to proceed further. The Union leaders felt provoked and instantly decided on a programme of mass arrest. The PAC opened firing and as the official sources declared 13 persons were killed and 34 were injured. The newspapers and the campus people reported 50 to 100 persons as killed and a few hundred as injured.

An empirical study: To study the precipitating causes of the incident and its socio-psychological effects upon the residents at the campus, just after the 4 days of this incident, we interviewed a cross section of the students, inhabitants, and others who were witness to the scene these included the university employees, labourers, school teachers rikshapullers, and the shopkeepers. A sample from each investigator visited all the labour colonies, shopping centers, and the staff quarters. The effort was made to interview one person at a time but in case of labourers presence of other labourers could not be avoided. Each person was allowed to speak freely and relevant information was immediately recorded. Some of the informations were also collected from the university office.

An interview schedule was prepared for this purpose as a guide for the investigators. This schedule contained questions regarding the history of the agitation, the service and living conditions of the labourers, and other employees, the duration of their stay in the campus, etc. All the participants were asked to evaluate their perceptions and feelings of this incident on five point rating scales. The collected information was categorised in to specific categories. The results appear in Tables 1 to 6. The main findings can be summarized as follows.

1. More than 60% of the labourers, and clerks considered that there was no genuine cause of firing. A few of them including the third party, reported the firing as pre-planned. Castegroups participants perceived the cause of firing due to the clash between workers.

*The research team consisted of Iyer, G., Jain, U., Prakash, A; Mazid A; and Tripathi, P.

2. The violence at a particular place occurred because it was pre-planned, was reported by the majority of the labourers, clerks and students. All the caste-group participants reported the cause to be the agitation of workers. Majority of the third party reported confrontation with PAC at the particular place.
3. Most of the participants except the caste group reported that warning was not given.
4. Majority of the labourers, clerks, students and even 50% of the caste group participants accepted that firing was not essential.
5. In response to the question whether procession indulged in any violence most of the labourers, clerks, and third party reported no violence of the procession, whereas students reported that workers were raising slogans. However, the caste group participants reported that workers were violent.
6. All the participants expressed high confidence in guessing the number of persons killed. The reported range of deaths varied from 15 to 100. Third party, labourers, technical staff reported 61-66% chances of the non occurrence of such incident in future, whereas clerks and students reported 57% and 47% chances, respectively.

Only 40 to 54% problems were reported to be solved because of this incident; 26 to 41% reform in the farm management was assessed after this incident. 43 to 61% improvement was guessed in the condition of the labourers in future of this incident.

65% to 86% participants reported confidence in the union. 77 to 93% participants perceived the genuineness of the demands.

74 to 92% participants viewed that the university was capable of fullfilling the demands of the workers.

78 to 87% persons cohesiveness in the workers was guessed by various groups.

56% to 76% participants opened that reform is possible through this type of movement.

20 to 38% participants felt that Government Officials have important role in checking this incident.

36 to 53% participants attributed responsibility of the present incident to the farm officer and 20% to 54% (third party) to the Government. The students attributed 7% responsibility to union and 9% to (third) to 28% (lab. tech.) to the Police.

Additional information:

Formation of the union played a catalytic role to aggravate the situation. It is only because of this growing frustration which unite the labourers and all the labourers of the farm accepted the union membership at the first call by ministerial staff, of the university. Formation of the union might not have led to this fatal incident if university authorities would not have objected so vigorously to the formation of the union. Secondly, if university authorities would have acted according to the agreement initially made between the university and the union the trouble might not have taken this serious turn. As is evident from the interviews of labourers, union workers, and students the farm supervisors were engaging these labourers in their domestic work without any payment, the formation of union might have been perceived as an attack by the supervisors on their material benefits and physical comforts. These officers, therefore, could persuade the V.C. to obstruct the formation of

the union. Thus the two rival forces were emerged for constant conflicts. Students and teachers remained neutral to all these developments.

In spite of the long history of oppression of the labourers, the history of their agitation is so short that one may wonder how this fatal incident took place. There were two sections of the oppressed themselves viz: leaders belonging to the lower middle class and the followers belonging to the poor class. The ignorance of their demands and the pessimistic views about future was evident in the interviews of the workers (Tables 3,4,5,6). Probably, it is because of this reason that the authorities could take such an extreme step of suppression. To support their actions and to distort reality, farm officials tried to create confusion by raising the caste and regional feelings. (This is evident from the leaflets they distributed after the incident). It is probably the power motive intermingled with vested considerations which led these officials to confuse the whole issue for public. All of these irrespective of their status expressed verbal sympathy to these victims. This is a crucial problem in all other similar situations, that the oppressors always rationalize their actions and put the blames on the third which may not exist at all. It was their first effort to fight for their rights which was opposed with an intensive threat. Most of the workers showed their doubts in continuing their agitation.

Observation of Table 6 reveals the variations in the perception by various groups also supports some of these observations. The aim of the questionnaire was to ascertain their confidence in future perceived instrumental value of the present incident in the reform of working conditions etc. and attribution of casualty to the present incident. It is evident from the table that all the groups showed high confidence in their guesses of the number of persons killed. The reported number of persons varied from 15-100. The official record showed only 34 deaths

but reported number varies considerably. The high confidence and discrepant reports are the results of ambiguity, though every-one was sure that he had the correct information. Labourers, technical staff and third party showed higher probability of the non-occurrence of such accident in future as compared to clerical staff and students.

Whether this sacrifice will bring solutions to some of their problems? Labourers could hope the solution of 51% problems, students could hope to an extent of 54%, but all other groups did not show much hope. Similar trend was observed in the hope of improvement in the working conditions. This shows that all the groups did not perceive this incident as futile. This hope alongwith the student's help perhaps motivated them to stay at the campus.

All the groups did not show much hope for the reform in farm conditions. This was, perhaps, because the farm officials were by and large belonging to particular caste group, whose role was perceived as dubious during the present movement.

Quite a high hope from the union was perceived by all the groups. In view of the fact that the union workers and leaders were actively engaged in looking after the victims, in helping the family members to get the compensation etc. their perception by the workers continued to remain positive.

Every-one reported the genuineness of the demands to a higher degree and perceived the university as quite capable of meeting their demands. Whatever the real economic conditions and limitations of the university may be in acceding to the demands of the union, the perception of the university capacity by the employee is important which motivated them to place their demands.

The efforts of the Government officials in controlling this accident was perceived as very limited. Which is obvious from the

initial efforts of the Government official to bring some agreements between university and union which could not be maintained.

The major responsibility of this incident was attributed to the farm authorities, and to the Government. However, the perceived responsibility of P.A.C. was comparatively lower than Government and farm officers.

Analysis: The analysis of the data was done in the context of the history of the university, the service conditions, and the living conditions of the labourers, the appointments of the farm officers belonging to a particular caste group to which V.C. belongs, and the actions of the V.C. after the Union was formed. It can be seen from the data collected that working and living conditions of the labourers remained poor throughout. Because of the insecurity of jobs and poor economic conditions these labourers were helpless. For them, the work on the farm was a must as they came from a different state (Bihar) only to earn some means of living. The Farm officers belonged to a particular caste and were very powerful having the political connections with the state leaders and the V.C. These officers could understand the helplessness of the labourers and could exploit them. It is, perhaps, because of this reason that labourers could not demand their rights till the union was not formed. The campus remained silent for 17 years. Here we can also infer that the university authorities strategically restrain the development of such forces which could oppose them. This inference is evident from the fact that even the students' union was not allowed to take place. Hence the formation of the union by the middle class employees of the university could provide the chance to the labourers to express their resentment.

Exploitation, poor working and living conditions of the labourers accumulated frustrations as many of the labourers were working on these farms since the inception of this university.

The glaring example of their exploitation was the fact that these labourers constructed small huts in the fields by the permission of the authorities but the university was charging the house rent and the electricity and water charges from the labourers. However, there was no provision of the electric connections inside these huts. Moreover, if the two or more labourers were sharing any of these huts the house rent was deducted from the payments of all those labourers. Since they were temporary or casual employees they were depending on the mercy of the farm officers who were in the habit of taking extra work on their own fields and in house hold chores. Most of these workers used to remain out of jobs for many days in the year, and used to pull the rikshaw during those days. Most of these workers were living alone without their families as there was no place to keep the families. Hence consistent growing frustrations forced them to express their resentment at the call of the union.

One may ask a question here that why there was no protest in the past? It can be inferred that gradually the number of the farm officers belonging to a particular caste group increased who could increase the frustration of the workers as a strong group in the university. And some how the union could not be formed. The caste feelings were so explicit that the students belonging to the same caste group reported the agitation as a creation of the labourers and the union, whereas the other students reported differently and were similar to the other groups. Notwithstanding the fact that the caste lobby was active inside the campus alone but the neighbouring farmers of the same caste groups had linkages with the university authorities as they were deriving some benefits in the purchasing of the seeds from the university farms, getting some labourers at the cheaper rates, etc. However, the caste and class are merged at this university as the farm officers belonged to the higher

caste and higher middle class, whereas, the labourers belonged to the lower-caste and class therefore. This agitation can be attributed to the caste-class differences.

The behaviour of the power-class seems to follow a model of suppression of the demands of the power-less class by violent means to protest their own personal gains. The behaviour of the power-less class seems to follow the model of collective protest to safeguard their interests. It is a vicious circle in which behaviours of both the classes are reinforced in the sense that ultimately a few demands of the powerless are accepted, and power-class takes pride of solving the problems. This is what exactly happened at this university. The functioning of power-class in the direction of vested interest has been reported as the most important cause of corruption by the educated class in the Indian society (Jain & Misra, 1985).

Implications for theory and policy

It seems that caste, class, community, and political affiliations provide a basis for group formation in the pursuit of their vested interests. People informally organize themselves on this basis in various institutions. In an extreme competitive situation which have become more intense due to rapid population growth (Jain, 1976) the aggression and violence are most likely to increase. Theoretically, social learning approach provides the concept of modelling on the basis of which collective violence can be best understood. As opposed to the Freudian analysis and other drive theories, social learning theory (Bandura, 1973) emphasizes on the external causes of violence. Caste-class or community provide such models through vicarious reinforcement which can easily be acquired by the members in their socialization process. Higher caste-class people who enjoy powers seem to have developed a model in this system that to suppress the voice of lower caste-class people terrorized

tactics is the best means. The 'Jaindars' were taking the help of their paid workers to suppress the low caste-class people and the present power caste-class people are taking the help of police to do the same. It is a psychological finding that large gathering of the people protesting is perceived as aggressively valenced stimuli. Berkowitz (1970, 1972) has pointed out that aggressive responses are automatically and involuntarily elicited by aggressively valued stimuli. Thus on the campus a large number of police and a large number of workers or students if present then violence is most likely.

In general despite condemnation of their degrading and exploited conditions of life, comparatively few of the sufferers take active measures to pre-warranted changes. A vast majority of the disadvantaged population do not engage in disruptive public protest. The helplessness of the disadvantaged is evident in one of our studies (Sinha, Jain, & Pandey, 1980) where the lower class people even own their failure by attributing the cause of their failure to their bad luck or inability. On the other hand, the higher class people attributed their failure to external factors. The point here is to high light the fact that higher caste/class people seem to follow a model of running the institutions by ignoring the advantages of the lowercaste-class people and by maximizing their personal gains at the cost of their social gains. This seems to be a significant cause of the violence in the institutions.

The present analysis implicates that reduction of violence in the institutions and organizations can be attained by safeguarding the justified benefits of the subordinates at the right time. Moreover, the checks of the misuse of powers must be effectively implemented. The power class should not be reinforced for the misuse of powers in any way.

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Table:1. The immediate cause that sparked of the firing.

Response in %.

| | Lab. Tech. | Clerks | Students | Caste-group | Third Party |
|-----------------------|------------|--------|----------|-------------|-------------|
| No cause of firing | 60.83 | 65.51 | 21.42 | - | - |
| Pre-planned by Univ. | 13.43 | 10.34 | 21.42 | - | 50 |
| Pre-planned by PAC | 17.39 | - | 28.57 | - | - |
| Class between workers | 0.0 | 6.89 | 14.28 | 100 | - |
| No response | 8.69 | 17.24 | 35.71 | - | 50 |

Table: 2. Q. Why did the firing took place at the particular time and place.

| Categories | Labourers | Clerks & Technicians | Students | Caste group | Third Party |
|-------------------------------|-----------|----------------------|----------|-------------|-------------|
| 1. Pre planned | 34.47 | 31.03 | 50.00 | - | 12.5 |
| 2. Caste group wanted to kill | 4.34 | - | - | - | 0.0 |
| 3. Confrontation with PAC | 17.39 | 3.44 | 28.57 | - | 37.5 |
| 4. To create terror | 8.69 | 20.68 | 0.0 | - | 0.0 |
| 5. No reason | 13.04 | 20.68 | 14.28 | - | - |
| 6. Violent Labourers | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 100 | - |
| 7. No response | 21.73 | 24.13 | 7.14 | - | 50.0 |

Table: 3. Did PAC Warned before firing?

| Categories | Labourers | Clerks & Techn. | Students | Caste group | Third party |
|-------------------|-----------|--------------------|----------|----------------|----------------|
| 1. No measures | 86.95 | 86.20 | 57.14 | - | 75.00 |
| 2. Verbal Warning | 0.0 | 3.44 | 0.0 | - | 12.5 |
| 3. Teargas | 8.68 | 6.89 | 21.48 | - | - |
| 4. Lathicharge | 0.0 | 0.0 | 12.48 | 100 | - |
| 5. No response | 3.34 | 3.4 | 7.14 | - | 12.5 |

Table: 4. Was the firing essential?

| Categories | Labourers | Clerks & Techn. | Students | Caste Group | Third party |
|-----------------------|-----------|--------------------|----------|----------------|----------------|
| 1. Not essen- tial | 100.00 | 96.60 | 92.85 | 50.0 | 97.5 |
| 2. Essential | - | - | 7.14 | 50.00 | - |
| 3. Cannot Say | - | - | - | - | 12.5 |
| 4. No response | - | 3.40 | - | - | - |

Table: 5. Did the procession indulged in any violence?

| Categories | Labourers | Clerks & Techn. | Students | Caste group | Third party |
|-------------------------|-----------|--------------------|----------|----------------|----------------|
| 1. No. | 95.65 | 89.65 | - | - | 87.50 |
| 2. Yes | - | - | - | 100 | - |
| 3. Slogans | 4.35 | - | 100 | - | 12.50 |
| 4. Qurrell overwater | - | 10.34 | - | - | - |

Table: 6. A COMPARATIVE REPRESENTATION OF THE PERCENTAGE OF ATTITUDE SCORES OF EACH ITEM FOR EACH GROUP

(% SCORES)

| S.No. | Attitude Items | Clerical Staff | Tech. staff | Labou- rers | Stu- dents | Third party |
|-------|---|----------------|-------------|-------------|------------|-------------|
| 1. | Howmany workers were killed <u>15-100</u> ? What is the Prob of this no. being correct | 70 | 85 | 82 | 81 | 80 |
| 2. | Probability that this type of incident will not occur in future? | 57 | 61 | 62 | 47 | 66 |
| 3. | How many of the workers problems would be solved this incident? | 40 | 46 | 51 | 54 | 40 |
| 4. | How far this incident would help reform of the farm management? | 26 | 38 | 41 | 38 | 40 |
| 5. | To what extent the con- ditions of workers would improve after this incidents? | 48 | 61 | 54 | 43 | 56 |
| 6. | How far this movement proved take careful to the workers? | 45 | 49 | 41 | 44 | 43 |
| 7. | How far it was possible to control the situation without the help of police? | 90 | 92 | 88 | 76 | 80 |
| 8. | How far the union could do for the betterment of workers? | 84 | 86 | 65 | 66 | 71 |
| 9. | How far the demands were genuine? | 93 | 92 | 88 | 77 | 73 |
| 10. | To what extent the 'Farm' was capable of meeting their demands? | 91 | 83 | 92 | 83 | 74 |
| 11. | How far the workers are cooperative? | 97 | 90 | 85 | 78 | 80 |
| 12. | Probability of es+abli- sing a better govt. thro- ugh this type of movement? | 76 | 56 | 67 | 75 | No res. |
| 13. | How far the Govt. offi- cers tried to prevent this incident? | 22 | 20 | 29 | 38 | 30 |

NATIONAL SEMINAR ON
COLLECTIVE VIOLENCE: GENESIS AND RESPONSE

12-14 February, 1986

"College Students and Collective
Violence"

by

Dr. V.V. Devasia, &

Dr.(Mrs.) Leelamma Devasia

INDIAN INSTITUTE OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
NEW DELHI.

In 1985 a head of a college in Nagpur was murdered by his students. Why did they take away the life of their teacher, their Principal? Violence on the campus is raising its ugly head and Nagpur is not an exception. The murder in Mahavidyalaya only represented a growing tendency of rebellion among the students.

Violence consists of legal or illegal behaviour that results in the damage or destruction of property or in the injury or death of an individual, group or community. It includes behaviour such as homicide, armed robbery, dacoity, rape, child abuse, individual or group vandalism, organized crime, arson, terrorism, violence resulting from strike, political crimes, inhuman and cruel acts of police, army and a legally or illegally constituted Government.

Collective violence of students which involves groups of students who act towards a group goal which is destructive in nature. It can be divided into three types:

1. Primitive Collective violence.
2. Reactionary Collective violence.
3. Modern Collective Violence.

Primitive collective violence is non-political in nature and involves the participation of local communal student groups. Here one small group of students fights another small group.

Reactionary collective violence is usually small in nature, but it pits loosely organised students of various categories against representatives of those who hold power.

Modern student collective violence is organised for political or economic goal. Violent strikes, student vandalism, guerrilla warfare, student political violence, student terrorism etc. can be included in this category. These types of student collective violence have certain well defined objectives.

College education has an important role in training the youth of the country. Hence student collective violence to a great extent is attributed to poor education or failure of the educational institutions. Student collective violence is also

constantly reflective and responsive to a given community norms and cultural traditions at a given time. In other words, student collective violence is possible only in terms of a given socio-cultural mould.

Student Collective violence is nevertheless a human behaviour. Therefore it must be explained within the same general principles which are employed to explain other human behaviour. The explanation of student collective violence should be in consonance with a general theory of human behaviour.

Students and Alienation

It is generally accepted that a good number of students in India are alienated from the University and the Society. These students experience powerlessness. It is the expectation that one's own behaviour cannot determine the outcome he seeks. Although this category of students may have clear goals, powerlessness is the assertion that, whatever they do the goal will not be achieved.

In many of the Indian Universities students find meaninglessness. It is the inability to make any interpretation of events at all. For them the events which occur in their colleges and the society are unintelligible. These students also may observe normlessness. It is the awareness that socially

unapproved behaviour are most efficient in attaining desired goals.

A large number of students also feel isolation. It is the anxiety that they do not belong to the main stream of Indian social and economic life. They do feel self estrangement which is the devaluation of self in terms of ideal standards. It is characterized by the negative comparison between that part of the self image arising out of actual behaviour and the ideal standards incorporated through socialization.

Student collective violence is a national problem and in the 70s and 80s it has assumed rather serious proportions in most of the Universities in India, disrupting in many areas the normal functioning of Colleges and often leading to the breakdown of law and order in various States. Can this phenomenon be explained away as a manifestation of "war against corruption", or the sign of alienation of students or crisis of identity, or attributed to the growing menace of political interference or bleak employment opportunities"?

Some Causative Factors

Students collective violence is the major characteristics of student indiscipline in Indian

Universities. In many northern Universities this violence has often involved destruction of private, government and college property. For example agitation against hike of bus or train fares in Bombay, lack of facilities in Osmania or Patna Universities fee hike in Ravishankar or Madurai Universities, are often accompanied by student collective violence. This collective violence of students may be related to the lack of ventilation of bitter feelings through which the desplay frustated students can voice dissent. Violence might occur when a person is frustrated and his effort to obtain some goal is obstructed.

The causes of the student unrest that swept Ahmedabad, Aligarh, Baroda, Guwahati, and Allahabad in the 70s and 80s are typical of the factors which have stimulated such violence since Independence. It is not difficult to discern the causes for these student violence, for in most instances local grievances stimulated the violence.

Student Collective violence is a solution to problem arising out of frustrated desires. Demands related to examination and the administration of Universities and Colleges are a major cause of violence. Protest against police action and other government functionaries is also a reason for collective violence. Very often regional differences mirror in patterns of student collective violence.

Student collective violence aimed at political issues directly related to broader social or national issues such as the foreigners problem in Assam or reservation policy in Gujarat is most significant, as it is the most widespread and often most destructive. This type of student collective violence is triggered by a specific local issue which may have national reference and spreads gradually to other colleges or Universities. The real cause, however lies beyond the specific incident and is related to the more serious and general problems that students of that University or State encounter both in their day to day lives and in their vision to the future. The behaviour of the students of many Universities in Tamil Nadu, Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh became so violent against the imposition of Hindi and the Central Government was forced to change its policy.

There exist major institutional variations in student collective violence. Student collective violence is not a problem in most of the prestigious professional and technological educational institutions such as the Tata Institute of Social Sciences, the Indian Institute of Management, or the Indian Institute of Technology, etc. It is also observed that Church administered educational institutions, such as the

Loyolas, the St. Xaviers or the Don Boscós have had less difficulty than other colleges, perhaps because there is often a tradition of academic excellence and a more satisfactory student - teacher - public relationship at these colleges.

The main causes for student collective violence are not difficult to perceive. There are five main causes for student collective violence:

1. Lack of proper academic atmosphere;
2. Absence of respect of authority;
3. Alienation and ideological frustration;
4. Political interference;
5. Socio-cultural and economic problems and bleak employment opportunities.

In many Universities, a good number of students are unable to provide the minimum necessities of life for themselves. A substantial number of college students are undernourished and in urban areas many of them do not get proper accommodation.

Student collective violence has a crucial impact in India. One need only mention Kerala, Gujarat and Assam in which student violence has actually brought down governments to indicate the importance of it.

Student Collective violence is no means a phenomenon only of the 1980s. Although it has received massive publicity recently, student violence in India has a long history. The variety and scope of student violence in various Universities in India is substantial. In recent years, in India, student population became less homogenous and conditions within the Universities deteriorated. In almost all the states the problem of educated unemployment became acute. Violence erupted in many Universities. It has tended to be localized, focussed on University issues or local conflicts. Student violence in many colleges had led to repression by college or government authorities.

Under the surface, students in many Universities, maintain a latent interest in violence. Violent behaviour results when the restraining forces are too weak to curb inherent aggressive and destructive tendencies. The high chances of unemployment induce in students a sense of frustration. Violence stems from real frustrations of the students and since these frustrations are difficult to solve, it is likely that violence will be a continuing phenomenon.

The corruption which students perceive at all levels of Indian life makes them more frustrated. The political intrigues and nepotism in most of the Universities is a further cause for student violence. In India, the rapid expansion of university education has not been matched by growth in the kinds of professional or skilled jobs suitable for degree holders.

Student collective violence does not exist in a vacuum. The students are members of a college community. The College milieu is therefore of crucial importance in any examination of student collective violence. Today's students do not seem to like the educational environment the way it is, and they resent their teachers having created it in such an insincere way. The principal of a small college had to teach a basic course in the post-graduate level, but he never taught it. At the end of the academic year, after numerous requests from the students to engage the classes, the Principal proclaimed: "Don't worry, I will give you the questions, I am the Chairman of the Moderation Committee in the University". But he failed to understand that irresponsible utterances of a Principal can ignite the frustrated emotions of the students which may cause collective violence.

Teacher - student relationships are typically the most conflicting during student days, and out of these conflicts the search for separate identifications intensifies. Revolt in colleges seem to be related in such identification. Double standard in evaluation hypocrisy in the practice of rules and regulations, not teaching the required courses, interference in choice of friends, authoritarian attitude, etc. are reasons for these revolts.

Man's uniqueness among animals is that in him questioning has risen to consciousness. Students too question everything, otherwise they are not students. When they question, the authorities see them as rebels. But rebellion is one of the essential dimensions of mankind. Man is the only creature who refuses to be what he is. The spirit of rebellion exists in colleges where ignorance overshadows knowledge; where precepts and practices are poles apart; where academic and research excellence is ignored for "cultural" programmes, where theoretic equality conceals great factual inequalities.

The students, who are the rebels, believe that they have a better way, better than anything they might achieve under their teachers. They are convinced

of a philosophy based on freedom of choice. Together with the feeling of rebellion students do understand that their intrinsic interests are subordinated to getting higher grades. They are socialized to the belief that success in college reveals one's fundamental character and that the rewards of such success are a validation of one's intrinsic worth.

Students in Universities gradually become aware that the values which are glorified in the text books are not the values on which either the college or the community are based. The students painfully understand that the Vice-Chancellor, the Principal and most of the teachers are interested only in money making rather than academic achievements and student development. The students also see the society filled with dichotomies, caste problems, fanatic riots, poverty, hunger, illness, repression, hatred, divorce, abortion, dishonesty, black money, corruption religious violence and assassination. All these create in them insecurity, and lack of purpose associated with college education. The students see the educational system as a monolith, a leviathan, which is static, brutish and deaf. To overpower it the students have to become delinquents or criminals. The sporadic instances of collective violence in our educational institutions are related to this chaotic situation.

Where academic atmosphere and employment opportunities are ideal, student collective violence may be less likely. Atmosphere of learning, the orientation of curriculum, the intellectual base of the teachers, freedom of choice, opportunities of employment, all contribute to the nature of student violence. The location of the college often has a relation to the nature and scope of violence.

Higher educational institutions are responsible for training citizen in modern societies. In India, these institutions have assumed an important political function which directly or indirectly fosters student collective violence.

Functional Aspect of Student Collective Violence:

Collective violence among Indian College students does not exist by itself. It has socio-cultural and politico-economic ramifications.

Student collective violence may also reflect the liberating influences of the educational institutions. Students often express their newly found freedom by engaging in violence.

Students opinion as to the place of collective violence in their lives is inherently related to employment avenues and economic and political power position in the country. Hence, the effort to separate colleges from extramural influences depends upon these factors. In Assam, Gujarat, Kerala and Tamil Nadu student collective violence is also affected to a considerable degree by the social position and political values of the intellectuals of these States. The intellectuals and a few academicians in these States realize that they can influence the student community considerably. Academicians who are resentful to the policies of their State often stimulate rebellious students. In many Universities, these academicians see themselves as a deprived lot, one which is not given the rewards of working conditions appropriate to their role.

Student collective violence in college has also been linked with the low salaries, long hours, and bad working conditions of the faculty. The low salaries of University teachers in India which require them to find other sources of remuneration, is a factor lowering the educational standards all over India. This directly or indirectly encourages student collective violence.

Students become violent when they lack legitimate channels of communications with the college authorities, university or government. Students turn violent when they find themselves ignored by the power structure. Indian college students generally lack a long time perspective. They tend to become quickly frustrated if their demands are not met immediately. Some times students may turn to violence if they are activated by a major moral issue.

In various Universities in India student collective violence, in addition to meeting certain emotional and intellectual needs of students also has a number of other important functions. Student collective violence is often a primary contact between the student population and the University or State authorities, thus functioning as a means of communication between the key elements in higher education system. When the students feel strongly about a social, cultural, economic or political issue, they can force the authorities by demanding reform and enforcing their desires by violent behaviour.

College life is a transitory state, usually lasting to three to five years. For many, collective violence is a stepping stone to social, economic advancement, while for some others it is a time of absolute freedom.

Social class and power structure are also affected by student violence. The relationship between the student and society can also have an impact on the nature of violence.

Student collective violence often plays a radical role in the University. It can also act as a reactionary force. It has played an important and at times crucial role in many States.

CONCLUSION:

The enormous increase in the number of Universities and affiliated colleges is to some extent responsible for the frequency and intensity of student collective violence. The standard in education has deteriorated with the rapid increase in the number of students bringing to surface violent behaviour.

The rush in getting admission has given rise to problems such like the lack of adequate facilities, i.e. classrooms, library, laboratories etc. Educational institutions are an integral part of the society. The problems belonging to a particular field, no longer remain confined to their spheres. Thus, the colleges are affected by issues in society or the society at large gets involved in problems of educational institutions. The interaction of the college and the society is normally confined to their immediate environment.

To prevent collective violence the authorities may plan certain concrete programmes including:-

1. Enrolment of only highly motivated students in higher education.
2. Centralized selection of college faculty.
3. Defence of academic and ideological freedom.
4. Nationalization of all colleges in India.
5. Security and improvement of student life.
6. Equal opportunities for education.
7. Depoliticization of education.
8. Better employment opportunities.
9. Headship by rotation, even in colleges.
10. Appointment of academicians of repute as Vice-Chancellors.

Student collective violence will not doubt continue in various Universities in India at a fairly high level. If factional politics within the Universities is curtailed and other reform measures taken, the intensity of student collective violence can probably be limited without major changes in the educational system.

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NATIONAL SEMINAR
ON
COLLECTIVE VIOLENCE: GENESIS AND RESPONSE

DEVELOPMENT, CHANGE AND COLLECTIVE VIOLENCE

BY
N.C. SAXENA

INDIAN INSTITUTE OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
INDRAPRASTHA ESTATE, RING ROAD, NEW DELHI-110002.

the pattern of leadership? Does economic development exacerbate or mitigate social violence? What are the major directions and targets of their action? I am sure these are the issues we would be confronted with in the Seminar, rather than with the ethical or legal aspect of violence.

Collective violence is a crude way of communication. Sometimes it communicates rage, anger and frustration, on other occasions it reflects deep lamented desire to bring in radical changes in social order. It may be used to extract concessions from the authorities or it may be designed to overthrow the established political order.

There could be two extreme forms of collective violence. In one form the disorderly activity takes place without preparation or organisation. For instance, in Calcutta in 1958, the Fire Brigade advertised for candidates for 100 Firemen's jobs. At the time of interview 20,000 candidates turned up which frightened the authorities and they closed recruitment for the day. The crowd exploded and started destroying whatever came in their way. The immediate event may be insignificant but it is seen as an unendurable irritant leading to eruption of violence. This reflects deep seated frustration and dissatisfaction with the existing social order, which is perceived as incapable of change through organised activity. We may term such violence as 'violence of despair'.

In other pattern, the participants possess leadership and organisational capacity to articulate a grievance, to

mobilise human and financial resources and to command a following. Violence may not be openly organised by the group but the events leading to it are generally organised. The prelude to violence is visible, it has a clear beginning in terms of publicly taken decision or action. Violence as seen in Assam and Punjab in recent years would fall in this category. It is certainly a goal directed activity. The agitators realized that there is a certain scale of violence which if reached would force the Government in taking a decision in their favour.

Agitational politics in India is always perceived to be more effective. Unfortunately, Government also judges the intensity of popular feeling on any subject by the number of bunds and riots it has evoked. It disregards all demands which are not coupled with a threat to public order as not having public sanction behind them. The test for gaining attention from the Government becomes therefore the size of crowd and the amount of disorder which is particular demand can generate. Even within the Assembly, the Opposition Members often resort to violence in order to attract attention. Politics in India has, therefore, become more a matter of mass mobilisation in the streets rather than a matter of accommodation and discussion in the legislatures.

Factors which are responsible for growth of collective violence in society may be economic, political, social or psychological.

There appears to be no agreement as to what kinds of economic conditions lead to collective violence. Marxists point to a gradual economic decline and depression, accompanied by increasing impoverishment of the masses. Slow economic progress which creates expectations from new population groups that the economy is unable to fulfil can also produce social protest. On the other hand, rapid economic growth, like in Iran, may cause social dislocation and the resulting alienation may increase violent behaviour.

Conflicts over power are more fundamental than over material goods. Therefore, study of political conditions would generally be a good pointer to conditions which sustain violence. Loss of power by a group, whether based on religion, region, language, class or caste, is rarely tolerated without a fight and therefore imbalance in existing power structure could lead to collective violence. Moreover certain organised groups in a society like urban groups, students, political parties etc have greater threatening power and if their aspirations are not satisfied, they may take to violence.

According to the social approach, modernisation produces a mass society in which social bonds become loose and people develop deep rooted feelings of insecurity. Often development leads to inconsistency between the existing and the normative order. Inequalities may be considered unjust in a modernising society but they do exist and some times in a more acute form - thus leading to anomaly between what exists and what

is considered desirable. Development also leads to disequilibrium in the ranks of the people - some may be educated but not rich, some may be rich but not accepted as elite and so on. Such widespread dissatisfaction often breeds violence.

According to the psychological theory, a necessary prerequisite for violence is relative deprivation as perceived by the people as discrepancy between the value expectations and value capabilities of the environment. More severe is relative deprivation, the greater is the likelihood and intensity of violence.

A purely structure or unidimensional theory may be difficult to sustain as so many different and some time contradictory objective social conditions seem capable of generating violence. In some situations the most manifest cause of violence seems to be violence itself, one instance following another, often without a recurrence of the conditions that led to the original event. Violence is thus self-perpetuating. This is often true of communal violence.

Having covered the subject from a theoretical perspective, we would now discuss to what extent modernisation and economic development has effected two forms of violence in India - Hindu-Muslim violence and agrarian violence.

Hindu-Muslim violence started becoming an endemic feature of Indian public life from the early twentieth century. Riots on the occasion of religious festivals took place in those districts of North India where social and political

activity on the part of organised groups like the Arya Samaj, Muslim League, Indian National Congress etc was prominent. There appears to be a positive correlation between periods of intense rioting and deterioration of relations between the top political leaders of the two communities. The peak of communal frenzy was reached in 1946-48, during which political activity and political mobilisation of the two communities against each other was also at its peak.

After independence riots have taken place in urban areas with a substantial muslim population, ranging between 20 to 40 percent, especially in such towns where muslim artisans have done quite well in the last 10 years. Within Uttar Pradesh, western U P. seems to be more riot prone than eastern U P. The percentage of immigrant muslims from Central Asia and converts from high Hindu castes is also higher in western Uttar Pradesh than in eastern Uttar Pradesh.

Many writers have tried to find economic factors behind such riots. Economic argument may be expressed in a number of ways. First, it is asserted that most of the employers, industrialists and middlemen are Hindu whereas most of the employees, workers and artisans are Muslims. Therefore, communal riots are a distorted form of class-conflict. Second, it is hypothesised that there is a competitive conflict of interests within the middle class and the self-employed people over access to a given array of opportunities like government

jobs, export contracts, market share etc. Since identities of groups have already been formed on religious lines which are time-resistant in nature, group clashes occur along communal lines just as in Bihar where there is a class of interests between caste groups like Brahmins, Rajputs, Bhumi-hars, and Kayasthas. Third, it is alleged that communal clashes are deliberately supplanted over the social fabric in order to ensure that the formation of identities on class lines does not take place. Exponents of this explanation find a strong correlation between periods of economic slump in traditional artisan-based activities and periods of communal clashes. Fourth, it is asserted that continued economic crises in our society and persistence of scarcity conditions have led to brutalization of everyday existence leading not only to communal violence but also increased atrocities on women, scheduled castes and members of the weaker sections of the society. In a stagnant economy there would always be greater danger of violence against such members of the society whose existence is marginal, who are not regarded as full members of the society, and who are living beyond the pale of legitimacy in the eyes of the majority group.

It is possible to get evidence in support of each of the above theories from micro-level data. The Moplah riots in Kerala during the period 1836-1921 had a strong component of class conflict as land was owned by Hindu but was cultivated

by Moplah muslims. Ferozabad riots of 1952 also exhibited strong sense of insecurity among the muslim artisans as well as desire on the part of Hindu industrialists to take action against their recalcitrant workers.

However, the basic cause behind Hindu-Muslim antagonism of the last 100 years has not been economic, it is rather political in nature. The two groups have never been able to come to an agreement on the nature of an ideal society. The Hindus who would like to define an ideal society as one in which all citizens participate freely in all forms of social interaction with no concern for communal affiliation. In their view, the State should not be concerned with the problems of any group based on religion. It may allow for some degree of cultural diversity but on political matters the State should recognise only individual rights, privileges and duties. Muslims on the other hand, have perceived lack of protection from the state as tyranny. They would like to believe in policies of political pluralism in which privileges are distributed according to their share in population. State, to them, is a federation of communities. Hence poor representation in elite professions per se is perceived as evidence of discrimination which leads to frustration and anger.

In a way, partition of the country enabled the Hindu view point to dominate the emerging politics. Muslims were forced to give up political demands and the fact that

they were left in a minority in almost all provinces and districts, they became the only identifiable group in India, unlike regional groups, which cannot convert their cultural identity into a political pressure group. Muslims politicians get elected on sizeable Hindu votes and are thus constrained from giving voice to extremist demands of their community. Although, Muslims feel very strongly about their cultural and educational demands like preservation of Muslims Personal Law, status for Urdu, etc. yet from the point of view of their political status for Urdu, etc., yet from the point of view of their political status these are non-issues. These are the consequence rather than cause of the Muslims distorted mind which is due to their non-participation in policies on the terms of their choice.

Thus, Muslims in India have acquired a psychology of a deprived group with feelings of alienation and perceived persecution. An ordinary incident like a Hindu band playing music in front of the Mosque takes on an entirely different meaning in the Muslim mind. They see it as a gross and violent manifestation of vindictive hostility being perpetrated upon them by the entire Hindu community.

The heritage of partition and the memories of the intense political conflict which took place in the first half of the twentieth century keeps Hindu fears and prejudice alive against Muslims. The school text books also unfortunately encourage anti muslim feelings by raising the culture and values of the majority community.

Viewing the problem from a global perspective, one finds that not only the Third World countries, but the developed countries have also seen emergence of communal conflicts based on region, religion and language. In the 1960s and 70s one witnessed ethnic violence in developing nations like Nigeria, Sudan, Guyana and Malaysia, just as the stability of Western countries like Canada, U K. and Belgium was also threatened by strong minority movements. These led social scientists to do rethinking on the relationship between economic development and communal conflict.

It has often been assumed that technological and economic development would lessen communal conflict, as new economic identities would subsume communal categories. This may not always happen. The experience from developing countries shows that communalism is a persistent feature of social change.

When a traditional society starts modernising, competition is often defined and explained in communal language. People perceive their competitive world through a communal prism and personal successes/failures are explained in terms of their communal connections.

As different communal groups are placed at different levels of economic development, the rate of economic growth for these groups may not be the same. Because of earlier western contacts or cultural predispositions, some groups get mobilised at a faster rate. Thus, another dimension is

added to the communal cleavages. Thus in the first half of the 20th Century, Muslims often saw themselves as being left behind in the race for education and government jobs and defined the conflict as between rich Hindus and poor Muslims.

Even if Government policies try to reduce inequalities in either education, job opportunities, wealth, status or power, it may lead to greater hostility from the already entrenched group. Reduction of imbalance in one dimension produces increased impatience with the remaining imbalance and thus intensifies communal dis-satisfaction. A rich member of the scheduled castes may be more intolerant of patronising behaviour from the upper castes than a poor landless tribal.

Although modernisation produces new kinds of identities and conflicts based upon occupation, class or political affiliation, yet it is possible for human beings to operate at several levels and traditional identities may still persist.

We are not suggesting that development would always excite ethnic bonds in human beings, we are merely cautioning that material satisfaction, under certain circumstances, may heighten communal consciousness. In fact, there is a high degree of indeterminacy in specific outcomes - different groups may react differently to the same set of objective conditions.

Next we discuss the linkages between development and agrarian violence in India.

The popular view about the Indian peasantry being passive, docile and unresisting is not borne out by the facts. During the colonial period Indian peasantry took part in a number of agitations ranging from protest movement to large scale revolts. Mention may be made of Santhal Rebellion (1855-56) Bengal Rent Disturbances (1860-73), Indigo Strike (1859), Deccan Revolt (1857) Champaran Struggle (1917), Khairatpur and Bardoli No rent Campaign (1918), Moplah Outbreaks (1836-1921), UP and Bihar Tenant Struggles (1920-38), Tebhaga Movement (1946) and Telengana Uprising (1946-51).

Most of the movements except the Telengana Uprising had limited objective of redressal of specific grievances or of taking revenge against the oppressive landlords. There was no effort to bring in a basic transformation of agrarian structure. The 19th Century movements took place in such areas of Bengal, Bihar and Bombay where commercial cultivation of cotton, Jute, Tobacco and Indigo was being encouraged. This led to poor availability of foodgrains for the villagers and created uncertainty of cash accruals for them as output prices kept on fluctuating because of under-development in markets. Thus, the new imperfect commercial relations in agriculture broke the traditional social ties, disrupted economic equilibrium and created

conditions of frustration. However, the 20th century movements often took place in areas where traditional mode of cultivation of foodgrains was still in vogue. In UP for instance, the movement was directed against illegal levies, and unlawful evictions. The landlords perceived that the income of tenants had gone up between 1870-1918 because of rise in prices and productivity. But as rent did not increase in the same ratio and moreover the practice of getting rent in kind was being slowly given up because of Government intervention, the landlords perceived a relative fall in their incomes and started oppressing the tenants to extract surplus from them. In many parts of Oudh, tenants were treated worse than slaves. The involvement of Kisan Sabhas and the Congress provided direction and leadership to the Tenant movements. This led to substantial changes in tenancy laws, and for the first time tenants were provided life tenancies.

One would have expected that after independence - with greater democratisation, awareness and better means of communications - such movements would grow in strength. Increasing disparities in asset holding and incomes should have produced sharpened conflicts, especially in the green revolution areas in India. It does not seem to have happened. The reasons are many. Firstly, abolition of Zamindari has benefited the rich and middle peasantry and thus the tinge of militancy has been taken out of them.

Second, announcement of radical programmes like ceiling on land holdings, SFDA, IRD etc. have created an impression that the Government is keen to help the poor and, therefore, antagonism against the State does not get mobilized into action. Third, although disparities may have increased in quantitative terms but qualitative inequalities whereby the poor were regarded as less than human beings have certainly been reduced. Fourth, although scope for upward mobility is severely limited for the poor, yet the more enterprising among them, who would have otherwise provided leadership for militant movements, have been helped by the State machinery by way of job reservations, political offices, land distribution and credit policies, and thus their class interest has changed. Fifth, the process of growth of capitalism in agriculture is a slow one and thus class antagonism between the landed and the landless has not become widespread, as vast majority of the poor are tiny land holders, acting as a buffer between the two classes. Sixth, it can be debated whether the poor consisting of landless labourers, marginal farmers, artisans and urban workers share a homogeneity of economic interests. They are a social group rather than an economic class.

Certain features of post-independence agrarian unrest are worth noting. First, these are concentrated in rice producing areas of Bihar, West Bengal, Andhra Pradesh, Tamilnadu and Kerala. These are neither agriculturally the

most advanced regions nor the most backward. Areas where green revolution has been highly successful like Punjab, Haryana and Western U P. as also the backward areas like Madhya Pradesh and Orissa have not witnessed many agitations. Secondly, wet paddy cultivation requires long hours of back-breaking work in mud or deep water and therefore even small peasants were traditionally leasing out their lands to the land less labourers to avoid manual work. Thus share-cropping and sub-tenancy is generally high in these areas leading to high degree of antagonism between land owning non-cultivators and sharecroppers. Third, there is heavy pressure of population on land. Fourth, a large section of population dependent on agriculture in these areas consists of landless labourers. In the districts of West Godavari, Palghat, Alleppey and Tanjavour more than half of the agricultural families own no land at all. Fifth, distribution of land is generally inequitous. Sixth, in some districts like Tanjavur which are under package programme tensions have appeared under conditions of substantial growth in agricultural production. And last, distinctions of class get heightened because of caste; the share-croppers and agricultural workers belonging to lower castes and the rich cultivators belonging to middle and upper castes.

In many areas of acute tensions like Tanjavour and Alleppy, organisational activity had preceded eruption of violence. This changed the conservative and traditional

norms of the poor to egalitarian norms without a corresponding change in the values of the Rich. Thus the transformation of the rural society from a harmonic to a disharmonic system gave rise to agrarian tension. So long as there was a consensus, which was accepted by the poor, that the rich had a right to exploit them and that it was their duty to work for long hours for the rich without expecting adequate rewards, the society remained tension free. The continuance of exploitation combined with the change in belief of the poor in its being unjust produced a potentially violent situation. Introduction of commercialisation and capitalism in agriculture polarises wealth and power; it also shatters the old integrative institutions. It is this combination of awareness about injustice, breakdown of old patron-client relations, continuance of sharecropping and the role of political parties which makes the situation simmer with discontent.

Although agrarian tensions are likely to continue in India in future, they are likely to have a limited objective of redressal of specific grievances within the existing system. There is neither any attempt to challenge the legitimacy of the regime nor to bring in basic transformation on society and government, except during the Telengana uprising and the Nazalite movement which could perhaps be classified as agrarian revolts, as there was some attempt to capture state power. Both of these movements failed miserably despite initial success. One general conclusion

which could be drawn is that so long as the movement remained broadbased with emphasis on involvement of the people it met with success. When agitational approach and mass mobilization was replaced by terrorist violence and individual killing of class enemies the movement failed.

The history of revolution in other countries proves that misery alone does not cause revolution. It needs widespread deprivation, a belief that government is incapable of action, high class antagonism, weak or divided state machinery and a strong belief in the success of revolutionary struggle. Revolution takes place not against mildly incompetent governments which are failing to solve difficult problems but against deeply detested and tyrannical regimes. Either before or after the emergency it is difficult to describe the Indian government as burdensome or tyrannical. Even the left parties in India talk of revolution only as a rhetoric and do not mean it seriously. Despite inequality poverty and injustice, there are no signs that class is becoming the principal medium for representation and consciousness. Politics in India has been so far centrist in nature and this middle-of-the-road policy is likely to continue for many years to come, notwithstanding sporadic agitations and violence.

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POLICY AND ADMINISTRATIVE IMPLICATIONS OF
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BY

J.N. CHATURVEDI

INDIAN INSTITUTE OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
INDRAPRASTHA ESTATE, RING ROAD, NEW DELHI-110002.

POLICY AND ADMINISTRATIVE IMPLICATIONS
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If large numbers applaud the patently illegal blinding of criminals in Bhagalpur and a Station House Officer in U.P.'s Jaunpur is lynched and his body dismembered by a yelling mob within yards of his police Station because he insisted on complying with the court's order to ensure possession of land to a Harijan; if a Mafia kills an engineer and his son for refusing to award a contract against rules and if gun-toting bands of hoodlums overrun polling booths at the instigation of persons in responsible positions; if even junior high school examinations cannot be conducted without the presence of the armed police; if Muslim fundamentalists go on the rampage in Patna and government servants threaten agitation, over Supreme Court Judgements, they do not like; if some legislators of U.P. threaten to gherao the Governor when he goes to address the budget session, it is time for all Indians to sit up and ponder.

What the 'Pioneer', a leading daily of Lucknow, recently wrote, sums up the nation's concern. "If we are out to demonstrate that we are an ungovernable people in a democratic way, we are succeeding uncommonly well." was the comment of a top-ranking politician on the tumultuous agitations that Lucknow has witnessed during the last three days. Quite a few observers of the Indian scene have been

similarly distressed, not merely by the current goings-on in Lucknow but by events in other metropolitan cities as well including Calcutta, Ahmedabad, Amritsar and places." Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru had described Calcutta as a "nightmare city" and "a city of processions". That sobriquet now applied virtually to all state capitals and important industrial centres. "It is disconcerting to note that what is known as the 'lynch law' is being practised in several regions. Reports come pouring in from many places that persons indulging in anti-social acts are set upon by the people and beaten to death". Lucknow, it said, was under siege" with angry processions of school teachers, lawyers, junior engineers and tempo drivers trying to converge on the Council House to vent their wrath France, on the eve of the Second World War, had a similar rash of what was described as "gimmes" (give me this, give me that). They eroded both the stability and the economy of France with the result that the country collapsed at the first breath of aggression. We can afford to ignore that lesson at our own peril, for history has an uncanny way of repeating itself."

A survey in West Bengal revealed that the incidents in which the public took law into its own hands had risen alarmingly over the last few years. Even outside Calcutta, over 630 persons fell victims to mob violence between 1982 and 1984, many of them, criminals caught committing offences. In another State, it could be gun toting gangs capturing booths during elections. In U.P.'s Ghazipur they are the "Gorakhpur mafia" of Hari Shanker Tiwari and

" the heroin lobby" trying to settle scores with an honest S.P. In Fatehpur it was the ire of the people over the death of a pregnant woman at Railway Station in suspicious circumstances. In Ahmedabad, it is a clash between pro-reservationists, their opponents and the Police. In Patna, they are the Muslim fundamentalists protesting against the Supreme Court judgement in Shah Bano's case.

The circumstances and the proximate causative factors may differ in each case, but there are some basic underlying patterns discernable in most such happenings. The foremost is the erosion of faith in or contempt for rule of law.

These flareups are unmistakable symptoms of the decay of the system. None of the organs created by the Constitution or law has been functioning normally. At the rate at which disorder crops up in one part of the country after another, we may soon have, at hand, a situation in which no order can be maintained without a battalion of troops. In his book, " Terrorism History And Facets In The World And In India", Sri N.S. Saksena has rightly observed that " the militarization of law and order is like the use of narcotics, the dosage has to be continuously increased. " Militarized law and order administration and a government run in accordance with a democratic Constitution cannot co-exist for long. Even the Strongest army, alienated from the people, cannot prevent a collapse. Iran and former East Pakistan are amongst the many examples.

A people so disparate as ours, economically, socially and politically, can be held together only by an abiding faith in the rule of law.

A three way test for whether there is rule of law is:-

- (1) Do the Government and the people alike have respect for the law of the land?
- (2) Is the Government of the country conducted in accordance with the law which we have given to ourselves?
- (3) Have the various organs created by the Constitution themselves observed certain minimum standards in matters of both substance and procedure?

Read together, these would mean that rule of law transcends the narrow principle of strict legality. Lest even the legitimately enacted laws become oppressive or discriminatory, the Constitution framers made the citizens' several rights inviolable even by the Parliament. The framers of the Constitution knew that the only way "unequals" could be persuaded to play the game was to assure them that it would be played according to the agreed rules and that those rules would never be manipulated to the undue advantage of the "more equal".

Four examples of the genuine adherence to the rule of law would amplify the point. By a coincidence, three of these relate to U.K. and the fourth to U.S.A. During the thick of the "Quit India Movement", an appeal was made to the Federal Court against detentions without

trial under Rule 26 of D.I.R. Indians had at time neither the present Constitution nor the Fundamental Rights. Yet, imagine a Britisher, Sir Maurice Gwyer, sitting as the Chief Justice decreeing that the provisions of Rule 26 of the Defence of India Rules were ultra vires as those were repugnant to the principles of natural justice.

The second instance relates to the correspondence between the "Home Government" as the British Government was then called and the Viceroy. In 1945, with the end of the Second World War in sight, the question to decide was about the manner in which Subhas Bose should be dealt with. Despite the dangers inherent, the British Government rejected the Viceroy's suggestion of an in-camera trial outside India because that would be contrary to the principle of fair trial held so sacred by the British.

The third instance relates to Richard Butler, then Britain's Home Secretary. About him, it was said, "the best Prime Minister Britain ever had". He sacrificed his, bright political career on an issue, the politicians in this country would ignore as ridiculously inconsequential. The Scotland yard were investigating a charity with which his wife was indirectly linked and the matter related to a period when Butler held no office. But he resigned, lest there should be even a remote doubt about the impartiality of the investigation.

The last is the verdict of the American Supreme Court disallowing, in 1974, the claim of President Nixon for immunity. The claim of Presidential Privilege for the

tapes, the Court held "had to be considered in the light of our commitment to rule of law." It added, " the generalised assertion of privilege must yield to the demonstrated, specific need for evidence in a pending criminal trial."

If we witness in our country the disruption of "the game" every now and then, the principal reason is that we have subjected the rules of the game to remorseless battering. And hardly anyone who exercised authority of any kind since independence can escape the blame. The institutions which the Constitution created were intended to be the umbrellas for ensuring protection to the weak and the needy against abuse of authority by those in power. All umbrellas would look alike in good weather. The real test of their dependability is during a downpour. Our country's short history since we gave "ourselves this Constitution " is replete with evidence of the pathetic brittleness of all our major institutions, whether it be the political parties swearing by democracy without holding party poll or legislatures, more in news for their bcalams than for seeking consensus on resolving a state's problems; the executive (including the pliant services and the police) or the educational institutions, where youngmen are trained in success through short cuts. May be, as Girilal Jain said in his article " Indian State in Decay" (The Time of India, Delhi dated 26.1.1982) ", " It would be ridiculous to suggest that the Indian people as a whole shared the

ideals of secularism, liberty, equality and progress towards modernity or that the Constitution was the handiwork of a small minority". But one should have expected that once the Constitution had been adopted, all of us would prove true both in letter and spirit to the oath of loyalty to it all of us took. Instead, hardly any political party or group has let go an opportunity to manipulate it to their ends. Indeed, if the various political parties have displayed identity of approach on any matter, it is in this area. We have had ~~Chief Ministers of different hues who defected along~~ with their entire legislature party; party leaders who saw nothing wrong in heading a Government without facing the legislature even once; a Governor who ordered the arrest of Chief Minister and another who treated with contempt, severe strictures on his conduct by the Supreme Court; or a Judge who saw no harm in offering himself as the candidate of a political party even before formally quitting office, and another, who sought land and other favours from a Chief Minister of notorious repute. Said retired Supreme Court Judge V.R. Krishna Iyer, "behavioural anarchy is creeping in" amongst Judges. Imagine a C.M. who openly says that the place of men of high integrity is in the Himalayas and home ministers who rationalise fake encounters because they believe that no law can adequately deal with crimes. Heard of a highly placed politician who, without, sitting an eyelid, openly asks election staff and police on duty in an election

to collude with him in casting bogus votes and another leading a gun wielding group to capture election booths? East Pakistan could have been saved if efforts had not been made to undo the results of the General elections. We have had a Vice Chancellor who rendered the entire system suspect by bending the admission rules to admit A.V.I.P.'s son to the medical college and another who did not dare go to his university a whole year.

The most telling admission of this decay came in the P.M.'s speech at the recently concluded Congress Centenary Session. Newspapers of December 29, 1985 have reported him as having taled of " the brokers of power and influence " riding on the back of ruling party workers" to convert a mass movement into a feudal oligarchy", " self perpetrating cliques who thrive by invoking the slogans of religion and by enmeshing the living body of the Congress in their net of avarice", their life style, their thinking - or lack of it, their self-aggrandisement, their corrupt ways, their linkages with the vested interests in society, and their sanctiomnious, posturing are wholly incompatible with work among the people. They are reducing the Congress organisation to a shell from which the spirit of service and sacrifice has been emptied", trade union movement who claimed power without responsibility and rights without duties; business and industrial establishments" " which sheltered battalions of law breakers and tax evaders ", the bureaucracy which was like the fence that ate away the crop." We have government servants who do not uphold the

law but shield the guilty, tax collectors who do not collect taxes but connive with those who cheat the State, and whole legions whose only concern is their private welfare at the cost of the society. They have no work ethic no feeling for the public cause, no involvement in the future of the nation, no comprehension of national goals, no commitment to the values of modern India. They have only a grasping mercenary outlook, devoid of competence, integrity and commitment ", the political parties locked in their internal contradictions. The sorry, unedifying spectacle of their total incapacity, corruption, nepotism, hypocrisy has disfigured our political landscape. They have shown a cynical disregard for sensitive issues of national security. Some have not hesitated even to collude with anti-national elements. Their ideological roots are shallow, their political outlook circumscribed by region, caste and religion, whenever they have come to power ". The P.M. regretted that the nation was imprisoned by the narrow domestic walls of religion, language, caste and region.

I shall quote a simple example of how a break-down of the rule of law can generate a collective display of contempt for law.. Way back in 1978, the Delhi Administration were greatly concerned at nearly five lakhs of traffic cases remaining pending disposal for a year or more. This had led to a visible contempt amongst the road-users towards the directions of the police.

A meeting was arranged with the Chief Justice, Delhi High Court. The only solution, the High Court could offer was that nearly one lakh cases pending for over a year should be just "filed". The Delhi Police officers felt outraged for several reasons. Firstly, prosecutions for traffic violations would become irrelevant if nothing was heard of the cases for years. People had already begun taking the traffic police for granted and in several cases torn off challans and thrown those in Policemen's faces. They, and by their examples other road-users would now become more defiant. Secondly, this visible contempt for law would encourage more serious crimes. Thirdly, it would make the police look paper tigers and would, additionally, corrupt them. Yet those who had the key to the problem, took three years to take a simple and well tried decision that the traffic police should be authorised to impose spot fines. Judges have often been advised to acquire a social philosophy but they have overlooked a famous dictum of Lord Bryce that "it is not the severity of punishment but the certainty of it" that deters the violators of the law. In our country, the delays of law have rendered the entire concept of rule of law irrelevant; the expenses of it have made it worse.

There have been two kinds of reactions to such a situation. One is generation of cynicism and the other is the temptation to take the law in one's own hands. Eventually, even a feeling of cynicism must build up into a violent reaction. The fiery trade union leader of

Bombay, Dr. Datt Samant and Naxalism owe their rapid rise to such a reaction. It is said that once a worker, long denied his wages and unable to contest court proceedings, went up to Dr. Samant crying. Dr. Samant made a theatrical gesture to his aides "Take away this fellow. I don't want weeping workers; I want fighting workers". The message was driven home. The worker wiped off his tears and swore to follow Dr. Samant's path of confrontation. His slogan that courts of law are a trap for the poor, caught on.

Over two dozen cases against notorious gang leaders of Gorakhpur in U.P. have remained pending for trial for years because no judge or magistrate dares take them up. Pampering by politicians in power had made these criminals so bold that even when an accused was present, the judge would put off the hearing "on grounds of his absence". It was a herculean task to build up cases under N.S.A. against several of them because their victims were mortally afraid even of lodging reports. For people suffering at their hands, both the police Stations and the Courts had become irrelevant. Assured of political quid pro quo, the mafias set up their own courts which would administer "cheap and instant justice."

An example of how they manipulated to stall any measures to weaken their hold comes from Nainital district of U.P. Much of the land there is virgin and had been turning "gold". Therefore, the scramble for this land degenerated into its virtual loot. Very soon, might

became right, compounded by the acquiescence of the frightened or corrupt local forest, irrigation, revenue and police officials, Manipulated land records were totally at variance with the position on the ground. Murders and riots and even arson became a frequent occurrence in 1970-71. Naxalites scented this as a "fertile" ground for their operations and had made Rudrapur (near Nainital) their base. Anticipating large scale violence, the D.I.G. Police sent a detailed proposal to Government suggesting a large scale survey followed by consolidation of land holdings. Before this was done, he felt that posting of officials of proven integrity and dedication from the Forest, Irrigation, Revenue and police departments must be ensured. Nothing happened for two years while riots and murders continued to take place. He explained the urgency of it to the Home Minister in early 1973. The Minister's simple reply was, "What you say is unexceptionable but please wait till the 1974 Assembly elections are over." The D.I.G. argued in vain that the action should be taken without delay. After all, periodical elections are an inseparable part of the democratic cycle. Soon afterwards, a whole family of eleven along with their cattle were roasted alive over a bigha of land or so. As Sri N.S. Saksena has observed in his book on Terrorism, "If investigations, arrests and prosecutions are all to be guided by an assessment of vote banks for the ruling party, the very basis of combating Terrorism is destroyed."

Political support for some quid pro quo is the principal prop of the mafia gangs of practically all hues.

Backed up by this support, they enlarge their areas of operation and organise themselves into what goes by the name of private armies. Unable to get any assurance of protection from the Administration, the victims sought alternative backing. The following extract from a write up in the "Pioneer" dated 25.11.1985 will reveal the havoc the private armies in Bihar have wrought on the criminal justice system:

"Private armies (Senas) are proliferating in Bihar with the growing militancy of the landless.

There are at least nine such private armies in the State, most of them organised on caste lines by landlords and some by the landless demanding land reforms, implementation of minimum wages acts, freeing of bonded labour and provision of house sites.

The latest of these armies is the "Lorik Sena" which struck terror in the interior parts of Nalanda and Gaya districts recently. "Lorik Sena" raided four villages in the Nalanda district on November 15 and killed three people supposed to be members of the "Lal Sena" (red army) of extremists. The killing was allegedly in retaliation to the murder of two members of the "Lorik Sena" by the "Red Army" a day earlier. The strength of these civil armies could be judged from the fact that the fighting between them lasted eight hours. These "armies" are well organised and in some cases have the backing of even police officials. This becomes clear from a report sent by the Gaya district magistrate on the involvement of the -in-charge

of a police station in Nalanda in the "Lorik Sana" attack on the landless. As a result of the running battles, land remained uncultivated and economy shattered."

The principal rationale of their existence is the total collapse of the criminal justice system. Migration to the urban areas and brisk business in illicit fire arms have followed as two major corollaries of the development.

Some times, when for political reasons, the police have been pressed for magic solutions they have often resorted to illegal killings, commonly known as fake encounters.

Quite often, it is the policies of the Government which are the direct cause of collective upsurge and violence. At other times, these have tended to encourage collective defiance. Let us recall Government's reaction to any well organised agitation. The invariable drill, which most rabble rousers have taken for granted, is that the Government declares a proposed strike illegal and tells the authorities concerned to deal with it with firmness. Cases are registered and arrests made. Cases are even sent to court, while negotiations go on. As and when the negotiations succeed, one of the inevitable decisions is to release arrested persons on bail, treat the period spent on strike as on duty or leave and stop pending investigations. It is followed by a direction that cases, except of "those involved in violent crimes", would be withdrawn from courts. If there has been violence and police have resorted to firing,

unfortunately killing some agitators, the demand for judicial enquiry is usually conceded and police officers concerned transferred. Even ex-gratia payments for dead and injured would be announced. If the Government had not created such an impression, perhaps cases of organised violence in recent years would have been fewer. I can recall the U.P. Electricity Engineers' strike of 1973. I was a Range D.I.G. then. It all began in January 1973 with the hunger strike by a few engineers. The Government responded firmly, publishing a long press note showing how much the Government had already conceded and whatever else was being considered by a Commission. Citizens were bravely assured that alternative arrangements had been made and the engineers could not be allowed to black-mail. When they did go on strike a week later, and resorted to sabotage, all alternative arrangements went haywire. For a while, Government continued to put up a show of firmness. Instructions went to the district magistrates and police that if any of the absconding engineers could not be arrested, resort to had to attachment proceedings u/s 87/88 Cr. P.C. (now 82/83 Cr. P.C.). Another wireless message from the Home Secretary said these proceedings should be carried " to their logical conclusion" . Such a message was altogether unnecessary but another one that followed the next day was truly shocking to most police officers. It said that attachment proceedings should NOT be carried to their logical conclusion. A part from being illogical, such a message sent on

wireless must have shown the Government in an extremely poor light. I protested to the Chief Secretary, He was himself aghast at the absurdity of such an order.

In the mean time, nearly 150 senior engineers had been arrested. The services of several others were terminated. But the Government's " alternative arrangements" proved altogether inadequate putting the citizens to untold misery and expenditure. Emboldened, the engineers of other departments threatened to make common cause. The Government yielded. As part of the deal, the Chairman and the Secretary of the State Electricity Board had to be transferred apart from the usual withdrawal of cases. It was, later, discovered that what enabled the agitators to muster large support was the fact that several legitimate demands had remained unattended for years because of the usual smugness and red-tapism. The finale made the Government look a more paper tiger. In the process, even some bad cases of anti-national activities of the engineers like sabotage were condoned.

A more or less similar situation developed when the Delhi police resorted to firing at Bangla Sahib Gurdwara on November 5, 1978 on a violent mob of Akalis, killing two persons. Two Akali ministers at the Centre resigned. The Janta Government was shaken. With a view to tide over the political crisis, the Government asked the Delhi Administration to somehow get the arrested persons released on bail before dawn. An unusual spectacle was

witnessed. A magistrate was sent to the Jail at night to release all the arrested Akalis. When several of them declined to offer bail, the Jail authorities had a trying time persuading the law breakers to get released on bail. The Government survived but rule of law stood mauled.

It has been rightly concluded that had the U.P. engineers' and doctors' strike (that followed) been firmly dealt with according to the law, there would have been no mutiny of the U.P. P.A.C. in May, 1973. The way Government had dealt with the various agitations, left no one in doubt that nothing could be achieved unless there was resort to agitation while even a wholly untenable demand was achievable if that was backed by organised definance. Police and P.A.C. who had been handling these agitations, had their own and perfectly legitimate grievances (as the National police Commission has confirmed). U.P. P.A.C. had a long record of extremely meritorious service. Nothing is more dangerous than unresolved issues over which large sections, specially as sensitive as a uniformed force, are agitated. On the one hand, Policemen saw how organised definance had been yielding quick results; on the other, their own chain of command had been totally disrupted, eating into their discipline and loyalty.

In order to gain cheap popularity, the State Government in April 1971, headed by Kamlaapati Tripathi

had countermanded a very sensible decision of the earlier Government to make student unions optional. The earlier decision to make the unions optional had completely neutralised the professional politicians amongst them and the State had, for once enjoyed an uninterrupted academic session. Seldom are consequences of a wrong decision taken so soon. These student politicians, inebriated by their success held the Lucknow University to ransom. Ironically, it is they who were joined by the agitating P.A.C. personnel to become the principal cause of the ouster of the ministry two years later.

There is another aspect of this tragic episode. It was decided to invoke Article 311 2 (c) to summarily dismiss the activists amongst the P.A.C. men. When the lists were drawn up, the Administration again developed cold feet. During discussions, efforts were made at the Secretariat level to persuade senior Police officers to take a "human" view and the lists were drastically reduced. The Home Secretary rationalised this approach by pleading that if they were all dismissed, they might take to crime and their families would starve. Several senior officers saw the absurdity of the argument. It was mentioned that even in normal course, three to four hundred policemen were dismissed every year, often on less serious charges. No one ever displayed any solicitude for the families of those. Were we not creating an impression that collective definance was safer than individual indiscipline? Would it

not have been far more profitable to show this concern for the half fed, half clad families of those who served in a disciplined, efficient and honest manner?

An important factor in ensuring the good health of a uniformed organisation is the selection of a suitable Chief. But Government have often felt tempted to look for leaders of the force from amongst pliant officers lacking scruples. They may be good stooges but can never earn the affection and respect of the men. Perhaps, this mutiny could have been averted if the Government had not committed the short-sighted folly of replacing a very respected and competent State Policy Chief by another of a questionable past.

Some areas of the State like the Hills remained free of the indiscipline, there, the S.S.P. had a constable agitator promptly arrested and sent to jail. The case against him were speedily investigated and tried on priority basis. He was convicted, his appeal was dismissed and he was also dismissed from service - all within a spell of two months.

Government have felt compelled to order judicial enquiries even in small incidents. But such a large scale mutiny was not considered worthy of an enquiry, probably because it would have thrown many skeletons off the cupboard.

Encouragement to indiscipline and illegal actions can take some other equally disastrous forms. In U.P. a

minister of State for Home felt advised that the short-cut to success lay through fake encounters. If he could get a few hundred criminals liquidated thus, he could go down in history as the person who found a lasting solution to an intractable problem. Sri N.S. Saksena aptly described the situation (in an article in the Times of India dated December 5, 1983).

"In sharp contrast to what Col. Sleeman did, (to liquidate thugs) the police forces in India now devote a major part of their time and energy in small things dear to the politicians. Therefore, they have just no time for worthwhile investigation. Why blame the Punjab Police alone? Faced with increasing dacoities, the police in U.P. acted in the same way from 1978 to 1982. This led to a vicious circle of "encounters", and "revenge murders". Thanks to the propaganda machinery of the U.P. government- including paid advertisements in the press- we have a good idea of the number of dacoits killed by the U.P. Police in "encounters" during this period. The figure rose from 50 in 1970 to 983 in 1980 and further to 1,391 in 1981.. Just imagine: An average of four dacoits killed nearly every day in 1981. The vast majority were done to death in "fake encounters" and, in revenge, the dacoits killed nearly 125 officers and men of U.P. police in less than two years. As soon as the number of "fake encounters" declined - mainly as a result of a pending case in the Supreme Court - the number of "revenge murders" dropped dramatically.

To some extent, the situation in Punjab is similar. Criminals, in the guise of extremists, have to be dealt with like the thugs in 1930s. Our aim should be total elimination by legal methods of arrest, prosecution and execution after a fair judicial trial. This requires hard work. An administration, which wants quick results for political propaganda, will employ, as it is doing now, methods which are likely to aggravate the problem. At best it will only drive the criminals underground to surface at a suitable opportunity soon enough."

It is a fact that an unwritten code of conduct had existed between the police and the dacoits. As, Shobha Kalichand was told by one Ajay, claiming to be a "ideo pirate king".

"The only rule we follow is - never kill a police officer, because you cannot get away with it. Sooner or later his brother officers will get you in a staged police encounter". The unwritten "Code" had been that once a criminal was arrested, no physical harm would come to him and even hazardous criminals would avoid confrontation with a policeman. In U.P. atleast between 1980 and 1982, it is the police who seem to have deviated from this norm by staging "encounters". The gangs retaliated. One retaliatory massacre at village Behmai in Kanpur led to the exist of the C.M. Sri Vishwa Nath Pratap Singh. With him was swept away his Minister of State Sri Rajendra Tripathi, the foster father of these fake encounters.

Another fall out of this new philosophy was the notorious Maya Tyagi rape case of Baghat (Meerut) of 1980. A woman, Maya Tyagi was molested at the police station and her husband alongwith a companion was killed in a stage encounter. When there was a furore, the C.I.D. were asked to investigate the complaint. The Government could have got out of difficult situation unscathed if it had just allowed the C.I.D. investigation to be carried to its logical conclusion. Instead, pressures were brought on the C.I.D. to tailor its report and uphold the local police story of encounter. A couple of senior C.I.D. officers who refused to relent were transferred out. A mass agitation followed in which an estimated 22000 people courted arrests. Eventually, the Government was compelled to order a judicial enquiry. The Judge by and large, upheld the version of the complainant that her husband was killed in a fake encounter. Cases of murder had to be registered against several police officers. The Govt. could have been easily spared this embarrassment if the law had just been allowed to take its course. Additionally, policemen would, in future, behave more responsibly and legally.

Incidentally, provisions like Section 197 Cr.P.C. requiring sanction of the Government for prosecuting a police officer, have tended to make policemen irresponsible. In Britain, no such protection is available. There is no reason why we should not fall in line. When a policeman knows that he cannot get away with his illegal actions, he will be less tempted to pander to the target-

oriented and illegal directions of political bosses and inscrupulous superiors. Even if it were expedient to arm the policemen with the authority to identify and liquidate heinous criminals, would they not, considering the generally low level of integrity and objectivity at the lower levels, abuse this authority to graze their plums and to settle their own or someone else's scores? This and a statistical evaluation of their performance would, invariably, operate to the disadvantage of the weak and the poor. Ironically, it is they who need law's protection most.

It is not as if the political high-ups did not know the consequences of their action. It was pointed out to them that the C.I.D. is an agency whose findings inspire confidence. A mere promise of a C.I.D. probe had in the past helped governments to defuse explosive situations. Secondly, Government would, at least sometimes, need to know the truth. Who will do it if this reliable instrument is destroyed? These pleas, apparently, did not impress them. Yet, it is because of the declining prestige of the State C.I.D. that demands are made for investigations by the C.B.I. Such a crisis of confidence invariably ends up in confrontation in the streets.

Not unoften, politicians and police Chiefs, unsure of the stability of tenures, cause long term damage by seeking short-cuts for quick results. In September 1979, there was a communal incident in Jama Masjid area of Delhi. Within half an hour, all the

senior officers were at the spot. The situation was brought under control within less than two hours. Next day, lots of people who met the Dy. P.M. and the Lt. Governor when they went round, unequivocally admired the strong and prompt action by the police preventing any loss of life and with only minimal loss of property. Two days later, however, the Commissioner was told that the high-ups wanted the Dy. Commissioner of the district transferred as the price for buying the support of a politico-religious leader in the ensuing parliamentary elections. A strange reward for the excellent work done by that officer ! When the pressure mounted, the Commissioner told the highest that he would prefer to quite rather than fall in the estimation of his force as a man of brave words but shying from action when his leadership was on test. The Government yielded and the Dy. Commissioner stayed on for more than a year. Had the Commissioner given in and the transfer effected, it would have destroyed the morale of the Delhi Police and emboldened criminals. No Policeman would stick his neck out at the behest of such a leader.

Just as tardy enforcement of law encourages violence, so could the implementation of laws which do not have wide social acceptance. It will be enough to quote one incident of Rajasthan. A conscientious station house officer proceeded to a village, with whatever force he could muster, on an information that a large number of persons were feasting on the occasion of a marriage at the residence of an influential

person in violation of the Guest Control Order. The police officer insisted on doing his duty which included arrest as well as seizure of the estates. The host and his friends thought that denying food to the invited guests would be an insult for the whole village. An argument led to a free fight for the "honour" of the village. The S.H.O. was killed and several others injured. On top of it, everyone, including the seniors of the deceased Police officer blamed him for creating a situation. In India, it is rare that the enactment of a social and economic legislation is preceded by a national debate to build up popular support for the measures. The consequences have to be taken by the enforcement agency.

In 1978, for over a year, hundreds of rich land holders of village Kanhawala in Delhi and their supporters fought pitched battles with the police, defying what they alleged an illegal and unjust order of the Administrations allotting land to the Harijans. Several Coys of C.R.P. stood between them and a blood bath. No effort was made in between to politically resolve the issue.

In dealing with major law and order situations, literal observance of the laws is neither possible nor even desirable. In 1978, the supporters of Sri Charan Singh decided to hold a mass rally at the Boat Club, New Delhi. His supporters were known to be in foul mood since his resignation from the Government. It was estimated that lakhs of people from the neighbouring.

States would join the rally. There were suggestions from high quarters that police should prevent them by whatever means to reach Delhi. The police, however, stuck to their own assessment that it would be legally indefensible and administratively disastrous to try to block the entry into Delhi of such emotionally charged multitudes. Nor was it desirable to ban the rally by imposing restrictions u/s 144 Cr. P.C. which the Police knew, could not be enforced. Instead, there would be traffic jams on all the trunk routes; Police firings and inevitable retaliatory violence in and around Delhi. Administration being the art of the possible, it was decided to enlist the cooperation of the organisers. Once it was known that they did not intend being violent, Policemen were told to politely guide the incoming crowds. Adequate parking arrangements were made at convenient points all over the city. Arrangements were made even for drinking water, toilets and first aid. Even vendors of eatables were encouraged to be available at convenient points. Barricading was done by the police in cooperation with the organisers as part of the law and orders arrangements. They were advised on installing reliable public address system and even C.C. T.V. At the same time, they were clearly told that their vehicles violating any of the laws would be prosecuted (though not impounded in the circumstances). Policemen and B.S.F. had clear and written instructions that if any section of the rally turned violent, there should be no

hesitation to resort to effective firing. The organisers were also made aware of it in no uncertain terms. At the end of it, everyone, Prime Minister downwards, and the organisers were happy that the event passed off without even a skirmish.

Many of the situations leading to collective or prolonged violence have resulted from the Government's or the local administration's failure to remedy an injustice soon enough. The reaction of a group of people, emotionally charged on account of an injustice, cannot be easily contained. In November 1959, a village woman was allegedly raped at a city out-post in Kanpur. While the news spread, the local police officers, including the Senior Superintendent of police were blissfully unaware of the angry build up. Even when they learnt of it, the initial reaction was more to varnish the evil deed. As a result Kanpur was on fire and under curfew for some days at the end of which nearly twenty persons died and more than forty were injured.

In contrast, was a similar case in 1969 at the same place. Late one night, some persons led by a local political leader reached the S.S.P.'s residence and reported that one of his orderlies had robbed a passenger bound for Bombay at the Railway Station. The constable, they alleged, had also forcibly taken away a young woman accompanying that person. The S.S.P. promptly reacted. A case was registered at the police station and the Sub-Divisional police officer arrested the

constable by midnight and put him in the lock-up . Waiting Pressmen and members of the public were apprised of the action. The explosive situation was quickly defused to the satisfaction of everyone. Two recent incidents of collective violence - one at Railway station, Fatehpur and the other in Lucknow resulting in huge loss of property and life could similarly have been easily prevented if the police officers had promptly reacted and registered cases against all concerned.

Nothing provides a more fertile ground for collective violence than the belief that the administration, specially the police act more with a tribal instinct of self preservation than as trustees charged with the sacred responsibility to ensure justice to the citizens. Driven to the wall, the aggrieved seek "Justice" where they get it. According to a write up appearing in 'The Indian Express' dated 7th March, 1982, the genesis of the Naxalite movement in Bastar M.P. could be traced back to a few stray incidents in the early seventies. Naxalites convinced the exploited tribals of the area to fight for adequate wages and against exploitation. The initial identification of exploiters soon graduated to political indoctrination. In several cases, they provided spot relief to the tribals by punishing corrupt officers. Their first target were Forest and Revenue officials who had exploited the tribals most. They had assaulted them physically, forced them into 'begar' (free-labour), deprived them of

their possessions and even ravaged their women. Naxalites administered punishment on the spot to such officials. They fought for the tribals' rights and compelled contractors to pay fair wages. Instead of taking prompt corrective measures on reports of such blatant exploitation, the Government painted them as criminals and a threat to peace. The police engaged them in so-called encounters.

According to the Government's own admission, one such encounter took place on the M.P. - Andhra border in January, 1981 when a police party went out in search of Naxalites following reports that they had threatened a strike if the labours were paid less than Rs.5/- per day!!! The police are said to have encircled them and asked them to surrender. When they, allegedly, fired, the police returned it - a typical background for one of these "encountered deaths". Two thousand jawans of the S.A.F. returned empty handed after ruthless combing operations for months. They had only succeeded in alienating a vast population.

What the Tamil Nadu Government did in similar circumstances, went down in the Press as "Anti Naxalite Terror". 'The Times of India', New Delhi of 26th March, 1984 reported it as follows:-

" This situation of underdevelopment and oppression formed the backdrop against which some youths, ironically taking their cue from the Chief Minister's films, became active in the area. They started rendering instant justice to the oppressors. Like MGR, who in his

films, never went to court to solve any social problem— be it exploitation, bonded labourer, whatever else— the youths dispensed justice in their own way. But MGR in his new but real life role, could not stomach such "high-handedness". How could he people take the law into their hands?

He came down heavily on the activists, who, by now, had caught the imagination of the educated youths and a section of the rural poor. False cases were framed against the young activists and repression was let loose. Most of them were held under the Tamil Nadu prohibition Act or Section 41 of the Criminal Procedure Code, which authorises the police to arrest any person "moving under suspicious circumstances." This, naturally, drew them towards some Naxalite leaders from neighbouring Andhra. By 1980 more people joined the Naxalites fold; some landlords were killed.

"The Ram Chandran Government, partly, in its zeal to create a semblance of law and order and, partly, owing to pressure from moneybags, gunned down in "encounters" at least 19 Naxalites in North Arcot district alone. But what he failed to see was that he was treating only the symptoms rather than the cause of the malady.

"Killing went on unabated in the name of combating Naxalism. The infamous "Q" branch of the police was set up ostensibly to deal with the Naxalites. Many innocent people were branded Naxalites and dealt with

severely. In fact, the MGR Government has an unenviable record of 331 deaths behind bars. Between January 1981 and May 1982 alone, as many as 61 under-trials died in Tamil Nadu Jails. The Government sought to explain the deaths, away on the specious plea of "congestion" in Jails.

"Interestingly, convicts in Tamil Nadu Jails live longer than the under-trials."

The only lesson one can draw is that governmental terror can never be an answer to the enlarging shadow of collective defiance of law. The only way we can deal with it is to end the dichotomy between professions of adherence to rule of law and resort to illegal short-cuts in practice. Happily, recent steps are signs of the right lead from the top. But it is a problem every Indian must face and help resolve. There is not a moment to lose.

NATIONAL SEMINAR
ON
COLLECTIVE VIOLENCE: GENESIS & RESPONSE

COLLECTIVE VIOLENCE OF THE WORKING CLASS - WITH A
PARTICULAR FOCUS ON THE COLLECTIVE CRIMINALITY OF
THE URBAN SURPLUS LABOUR

BY

B.B.PANDEY
READER, FACULTY OF LAW,
UNIVERSITY OF DELHI, DELHI

INDIAN INSTITUTE OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
INDRAPRASTHA ESTATE, RING ROAD, NEW DELHI-110002

COLLECTIVE VIOLENCE OF THE WORKING CLASS - WITH A
PARTICULAR FOCUS ON THE COLLECTIVE CRIMINALITY OF
THE URBAN SURPLUS LABOUR

- B.B. Pandey, Reader,
Faculty of Law, University of Delhi,
Delhi.

I. Collective actions have always evoked special attention on account of their ability to influence the social situation, both at the physical and non-physical levels. The factor of combination of many individual actions accords to the collectivities or groups a unique ability to produce enormous physical outcomes, destructive as well as constructive. The point of physical level constructive outcomes is well brought home by the shocking instances of mob fury, communal frenzy and other forms of group actions that have become an integral part of the urban scenario today. The enormity of the consequences of such occurrences often leads to the policy of equating such incidents with natural calamities or disasters like earthquakes floods, tornados and establishment of Disaster centres with a view to effectively coping with such eventualities.¹ This potential of physical level outcome is described by Burke as: 'Liberty, when men act in bodies, is power.' The element of power becomes even more crucial when the collective action turns violent,² when it becomes associated with diverse patterns of violent behaviour like arson, loot, killing etc. Under such conditions collective violence becomes directed not only against certain cherished bodily and property interests but also poses a challenge to the social order itself. The element of challenge to the social order relates to the non-physical level outcome of collective action. Thus, collective

action, particularly when it involves the participation of a substantial section of the society, poses a challenge to the state and the formal normative system itself. Understood in this sense each instance of collective action conveys an appeal to the external world, which might immediately or ultimately legitimize the collectivity, on the one hand, and delegitimise the authority/other target groups, on the other. In this sense collective action becomes a potent tool of political action in any democratic society. Thus, the 'power' and the challenge' potential of collective action, particularly where it manifests in violent forms, raise crucial regulation and control demands in every society. These demands can be generalised as follows:

- a. There always exists a need to regulate and control collective actions through formal as well as informal means in every society.
- b. Collective violence affecting body, property and public order interests are treated more seriously and invariably subjected to formal means of control.
- c. Formal means of control relate to a wide range of actions of the authority which includes law and order keeping action of the police and other para-military forces, the preventive action and the punitive action.
- d. Since the nature, causes and motivations of collective violence may vary from case to case there is always a need to constantly re-examine and apply norms and techniques not only on grounds of justice and morality but also on grounds of effective control and management.

II. The task of examining the social control processes in the context of collective violence requires an understanding of the nature, kinds and functional aspects of collectivities or groups, on the one hand, and the rationale of the authoritative response to collective violence, on the other. Collective violence has been perceived differently by the psychologists, sociologists, political scientists, anthropologists, lawyers, judges and policy planners, depending upon the object and the purpose of their analysis.

The psychological perspective of collective or group behaviour seeks to explain the phenomenon in terms of the psychological characteristics of the members as individuals and as a collectivity. There are two main lines of psychological analysis of collective behaviour. The first deems collective behaviour, particularly of the crowds as a unconscious or irrational behaviour (see particularly Gustav Lebon (1960), S. Freud (1922), John Pavid and Herbert Harari (1968), H. Edward Ransford (1968), Neil J. Smelser (1962) and H. Blumer (1969). The second line of thinking accepts that there is nothing fundamentally different about cognitive processes in crowds and that crowds and other collectivities are engaged in the task of fulfilling individual and mutual needs. (See particularly Richard A. Berk (1974), Howard Raiff (1959), (1970), Herman Chernoff and Sineola Moses (1959), Robert M. Fogelar (1971), Tom Hyden (1967), Cohn and Murphy (1966). Both the aforesaid lines of explanation of collective behaviour perceive the collective behaviour within the social control framework that assumes unquestioned acceptance of a value system that is challenged by the collective behaviour.

However, it is possible to view collective behaviour as a problem of social change and assume that at least some instances like political protests and demonstrations are in conformity with the values of a competing social group.³

The sociological perspective of collective behaviour is equally important for the understanding of the collective violence phenomenon. A collectivity or a group is defined as "a plurality of persons who interact with one another in a given context more than they interact with anyone else." (W.J.H. Sprott (1967)). Accordingly the collectivity of individuals should retain the following conditions:

- a. There should be some kind of symbolic interaction between the members which should influence one another.
- b. Each member should appreciate himself as a part of the group and conversely the group should also recognise him as a member.
- c. Members are aware of their roles, duties and obligations resulting from group membership. The sociologists further classify collectivities or groups on the basis of the nature of their relationship as primary (family, clique of friends, gangs etc.) and secondary (trade unions, religious demonstrations, professional organisations etc.). Furthermore, the sociologists display a major concern for face to face collectivities which are more intimately related to social order issues. The sociologists perceive collective behaviour, particularly its violent form, as an instance of societal

norm violation, an instance of disorganisation, or disorder.

The second way treats collective behaviour as a device of upholding the norms of the subgroup to which the members belong (see Howard Becker (1963), Edwin H. Lemert (1970), George B. Vold (1958), Austin A. Turk (1969), Lewis A. Coser (1966)).

The legal perspective to collective behaviour is essentially member or individual oriented. The state laws demand universal obedience irrespective of the nature or character of the political sub-ordinates like the individuals, groups or other entities. Thus, transgressions of the formal rules by collectivities or groups is considered in no way different from individual transgressions and are understood to be a product of human passions. There are certain special rules of liability that are designed with a view to controlling group behaviours which includes preventive actions in respect of prescribed associations, unlawful assemblies, liability for various level participation in group behaviours etc.

Generally the instances of collective violence are considered on the case to case basis. However, for the purposes of understanding and analysis collective or group violence can be classified into the following broad categories (a) classification on the basis of the nature of issue involved as in the cases of caste collective violence, communal collective violence, linguistic collective violence, regional collective violence etc. (b) classification on the basis of the peculiarities of the participants - as in the cases student collective violence,

peasant collective violence, Naxalite violence, Labour collective violence etc. (c) classification on the basis of peculiarities of the behaviour - as in cases of spontaneous, mob collective violence, gang or organised collective violence etc. One peculiar feature of the traditional classifications is that the instances of collective violence are viewed in a class neutral frame. Even in the case of labour collective violence classification the emphasis is not on the class character of the labour but their commonly understood identification. This kind of approach impairs a proper understanding and suitable action relating to collective behaviour, particularly the phenomenon of urban collective violence.

III. The collective violence of the working class would mainly relate to the collective actions of the unionised and non-unionised labour, peasant and the other, working groups that qualify to fall within the 'proletariat class' category. The present paper would, thus, focus on collective incidents involving small and large, organised and unorganised sections of the working class. This would include of collective labour actions like picketing, gherao, demonstrations and spontaneous collective actions like riots etc. of the urban working class and peasant uprisings and other mass actions of the rural working class. It is contended that in view of the peculiarities of their socio-economic conditions and limits of choice of action the collective violence of the working class needs to be appreciated as a distinct category.

Before examining the working class collective violence phenomenon it would be worthwhile to know something about the existential realities of the working class population in India. According to the official statistics there were 240 million persons in our workforce in 1980. Out of these only 168 million had stable employment, 67.9 million were employed casually and 4.1 million were totally unemployed. In addition to this, approximately 130 million were self employed.⁴ A large percentage of the working class (approx 175 million) are still unorganised or non-universed. Also relevant for our purpose is the statistics relating to persons living below poverty line, which comprises the stock pool out of which the working class population is constantly drawn. According to Prof. Malcolm S. Adiseshiah (1982) "317 million persons live under various levels of poverty. There are the extreme destitutes who are spending between Rs. 0-15 per person per month who are 3.5 million in rural areas and 0.2 million in urban areas. In the next level are 16 million people in rural areas and one million in urban areas who spend Rs. 15-21 per person per month. The third level from the bottom comprises 43 million persons in rural and 5 million persons in urban areas who spend Rs. 21-28 per person per month. The fourth level includes 56 million persons in rural and 26 million in urban areas, spending Rs. 28-34 in rural and 28-43 in urban areas. These four groups of destitutes number less than 200 million and the balance 120 million are poor ~~xx~~ but not destitute." The urban surplus labour population is drawn from among the urban poor population of approximately, 40 million persons. The surplus labour population is very well analysed by

Karl Marx in terms of its four namely 'floating', 'latent', 'stagnant' and 'paupers' and criminals' forms.

IV. The instances of working class collective violence can be put into three major categories as follows:

- A. Working class interest-oriented unionised collective actions of general nature.
- B. Working class interest oriented non-unionised collective actions related to specific grievances.
- C. Instigated working-class collective actions

The working class collective actions falling in category A would comprise of vast range of Trade Union collective actions. By its very nature this type of collective violence would involve balancing between the freedom of action of the labour and the interest of security. As an instance of organised and unionised working class action it might be possible to deal with pattern of collective violence through informal/formal labour control devices. Instances of grave violence to bodily interest can always be subjected to criminal liability.

Category B includes within its ambit the non-unionised specific grievance oriented collective actions of the working class. Generally this category of collective violence would be spontaneous or an outcome of a short duration planning. Instances of collective violence following eviction action from paraments, slums or government lands, action against bankers and small stall owners, denial of ration-card and consequent entitlement for cheap food grains etc., This collective violence of

Category B is best illustrated by the Marina Beach Fishermen's Collective Collective Violence incident of December 3 and 4, 1985. According to the newspapers⁵ and the Reports of the Committee (All India Lawyer's Union, Madras District Committee on the Fishermen's Problem and the Police Action in Nadukuppam, 1986), the incident of Fishermens collective violence was an outcome of several past incident like the Administration embarking upon a Marina Beach beautification programme early in the month of November, 1985. Notices were sent by the State Government disclosing their intention of removing the catamarons and boats from the beach, physical removal of catamarans and boats from the beach on 4th November, strike by fishermen against the removal of catamarans etc. on 5th November, meetings between the fishermen leaders and the Fisheries Minister on 15th, 16th, 18th and 19th November, demand for rent by the Slum Clearance Board bill collectors on 3rd December, 1985, Altercation and beating of one of the fishermen in the Slum Clearance Board office on 3rd December, 1985 and the fishermen meeting on the 4th December deciding to picket near the Slum Clearance Board. The collective violence broke out on the 4th December morning after an altercation between the Chaiman, Slum Board and the group of fishermen. The police joined in to restore the warring factions and also became the target of fishermen collective violence. More details about the exact sequence of events and nature of collective violence would come to light after the official enquiry but even on the basis of existing facts one can appreciate the peculiarities of this category of collective violence which could be described more as a reaction to the authorinitative action of 'beautification' that had left little choice for the large number of fishermen.

Unlike the category A and category B collective violence, which centers round general or specific working class interest and is largely a working class affair, the category C relates to those instances of working class collective actions which might have nothing to do with working class interest and may be engineered and instigated, by non-working class forces. In the recent times, particularly after the Bhiwandi (Bombay) riots (1984), the Delhi riots (November 1984), the Ahmedabad riots (1985) the collective violence of the 'degraded' and the 'contemptible' sections of the urban poor has acquired notoriety. There is enough evidence to establish that the main participants in those major incidents of collective violence were the urbanised and peripheral villagers and the migrant population whose aspirations had far over-run their abilities, available job prospects, housing and other basic civic amenities. The mobs that burnt down the chawls along with their inmates in Bhiwandi, those who indulged in loot, arson and killings in Delhi and participated systematic destruction of houses and settlements in the inner city of Ahmedabad belonged to that section of the population which exists in a dehumanized and frustrated state where the finer human sentiments and civilized order values have little place. More important than all this is the fact that in a majority of such cases the class indulging in collective violence is a victim of mechanisations of the political or economic vested interest, who use the working class or surplus labour class collective violence to serve their interests (studies concerning the underlying motivations and economic interests of the Bhiwandi riots, the Delhi riots and the Ahmedabad riots amply illustrate the point). Regarding the collective violence of this category it might not be wrong to make the following generalisations:

- i. Such collective actions are largely inspired by the state of stress and frustration arising on account of multiple disabilities they suffer from.
- ii. Being in a state of stress and frustration makes them an easy play in the hands of the vested interest class who stands to gain both by their collective action and consequent victimization.
- iii. The proveness of the working class to collective violence is directly related to their economic condition and the consequence sense of individual worthlessness.
- iv. These incidents are more like signalling device which sensetise the upper classes to the need for social reconstruction.

Examining the formal system's response to working class collective violence we see little evidence that there is an adequate appreciation of the different categories of working class collective violence. Particularly the collective violence of the urban surplus labour (those falling in category C) are for all practical purposes equalled with other organised and pre-planned forms of collective violence (the institution of criminal cases against the defenceless slum and Jhuggi-jhompri dwellers in connection with Delhi riots and criminal proceedings against the labour class belonging to the active community in Bhiwandi is an evidence of this kind of formal response). Finally, I conclude with an observation of Lewis A. Coser : "often the violent forms a rebellion of labouring poor, the destructiveness of the city mobs, and other forms of popular disturbances which mark

English Social History from 1760's to the middle of the nineteenth century helped to educate the governing elite of England - Wongs and Tory alike - to the recognition that they could ignore the plight of the poor only at their own peril." (Levis A. Coser, 1966).⁶

- B.B. Pandey,
Reader, Faculty of Law,
Delhi University, Delhi.

NOTES

1. The Disaster Research Centre, Ohio State University, Columbus, U.S.A. is currently engaged in the study and research concerning all kinds of disasters whether natural (like earthquakes, floods, tornados) or man-made (like riots, mob action etc.).
2. Violence here is understood as a neutral, non-pejorative technique of coercion. (something similar to the use of the term by Ted Robert Gurr and H.D. Graham (1969). Since the present paper mainly focusses the violence directed against the State or the ruling social group it should not mean that the author does not subscribe to the possibility of state violence.
3. Hobsbawm (1959) and (1964) was the first to take this view in the context of the pre-industrial city mobs. The same line of thinking is reflected in the writings of John Phillips Reid (1977) and E.I. Quarantelli and Russel R. Daynes (1970).
4. NSS: 27th Round (1972-73).
5. The Hindu and the Indian Express, 5th December, 1985.
6. Similar views are expressed by James S. Campbell et al. in Law and Order Reconsidered, A Staff Report to the National Commission on Causes and Prevention of Violence, U.S.

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A NOTE
ON
VIOLENCE AND INDIAN SOCIAL STRUCTURE
(Tentative: Not to be cited)

Rajendra Singh
Deptt. of Social Work
University of Delhi

I. INTRODUCTION

The concept of an organised society as an on-going self-perpetuative system of human relation is linked with two antithetical types of social thought's. Thomas Hobbes is the first among the classical thinkers to examine the question of social order. His major propositions about society have re-incarnated themselves into the contemporary functionalist perspective to society. Hobbes asserted that society is "a conquest of violence". Society as a viable enterprise according to this school of thought comes into being after its individual members have ascended from the 'State of nature' in which "every man was at war with every one". This ascendancy of man from the state of nature is marked by their acceptance of certain set of collectively cherished system of consensual values and related to these values, certain set of collectively accepted system of regulative norms. Absence of collective values and norms characterise Hobbesian man in the state of nature.¹

The other school of thought however begins its inquiry from an a-priori assumption of the existence of social order and then tries to see violence as an endemic social data of all social structures. Ortega-Y Gasset finds existence of built-in

1. Thomas, Hobbes, Leviathan, cited in Chalmers Johnsons in his book, Revolutionary Changes, London, University of London Press, 1968, p.9.

social basis of violence among societies. According to him "Man had always had recourse to violence; some time this recourse was a mere crime and does not interest us here. But at other times violence was the means resorted to by him who had previously exhausted all others in defence of rights of justice which he thought he possessed. It may be regrettable that human nature tends on occasion to this form of violence but it is undeniable that it implies the greatest tribute to reason and justice. For this type of violence is none than reason exasperated." Violence is thus treated as ultima ratio. Need to resort to this ultima ratio arises as the principles on which Hobbesian social order or the functionalists conception of social system is based play partisan role to various groups of men who are part of social order and whose relations constitute the social systems and is amenable to all other recourse except to the use of force and violence.

The raging question of order and its rejection, of conformity and deviance and of quiescence and revolt vis-a-vis the question of man's relation to society and the vice-versa are issues of teleological nature. Significant as these issues are to our present context of research and reflections on violence and social order, they ought to be bypassed at this juncture with an observation that they have convulsed themselves into a specific form of social philosophy which glorifies violence. This is referred to as the New Left Philosophy.

The New Left Philosophy, from Sorel, Sartre to Fanon, excluding the revolutionary fighters, such as Mao, Che Guevara, Giap and Debray and their popular classics² on the techniques of revolution, has shown a tendency to transform macabre of murder and the morbidity of killing and blood shed into a civilised man's sacred ritual for the redemption of the fallen. Sorel treats violence as a metaphor of 'Life-force' or of 'creativity of man'. Violence for him is the weapon in the hands of the toiling working-class to resurrect themselves.³ Sartre, who dubs Sorel's writing as "facist utterances" outpaces Sorel in romanticising violence. "Irrepressible violence is neither sound and fury nor the resurrection of savage instinct, nor even the effect of resentment; it is man recreating himself", writes Sartre. He further goes to state that "The rebel's weapon is the proof for his humanity. For in the first days of revolt you must kill: to shoot down a European is to kill two birds at the same time: there remains a dead man and a free man". The nihilistic phenomenology of violence is taken to the extreme when Sartre concludes, ".....Violence, like Achilles lance, can heal the wound that it has inflicted".⁴

2. Such as, Mao Tse-Tung, On the Protracted War, 1960, Peking Foreign Language Press, Che Guevara, On Guerrilla Warfare, (H.C. Peterson, People's War, People's Army, 1962 New York: Frederick a Page and Regis Debray, Revolution in the Revolution. 1967, Monthly Review, Vol. 19 (July -August).

3. Georges Sorel, Reflections on Violence New York, 1961. See Chapter II & III.

4. See, Jean Paul Sartre's Preface to Frantz Fanon's book The Wretched of the Earth., 1974. Penguin Books, pp.18-19 and 25 see also R. D. Laing and D.G. Cooper, Reason and Violence: A Decade of Sartre's Philosophy, London, 1964 Part-III.

Fanon is keen to attach therapeutic potency to violence and blood shed in the colonial situation. He asserts, At all levels of individuals, violence is a cleansing force. It frees the native from his inferiority complex and from his despair and inaction; it makes him fearless and restores his self-respect," and further he goes to affirm that "this violence, because it constitutes their only work, invests their characters with positive and creative qualities. The practice of violence binds them together as a whole, since each individual forms a violent link in the great chain, a part of the great organism of violence which has surged upwards....."⁵

This tendency of glorifying violence and blood shed by the New Left philosophers and intellectuals is an unique phenomenon in the growth of social thought in history. Not that it infects the minds of young, but also that it provides a moral justification and accords seemingly academic tone to the acts of revolt, terror and collective crime as just and legitimate. Abhorrence is appreciated and adorned. The emergence of this anarchic psyche grounded deep in the logic of negations, nihilism and mutual destruction is a dangerous tendency menacing our age. And worst, by treating the acts of destruction as that of creativity, it misguides the generation. Killings and counter killing end only in further killing and not in the creation of a 'whole man'.

5. Frantz Fanon, op. Cit. pp. 74 and 73 respectively.

The dialectical relation between negation and violence resolved by violence applied to the concrete life situation of men yield nothing but demean the meaning of man and rob his goals and ends of their intrinsic values. Negation is a poor producer of rich values among men and societies.⁶ A tendency to glamorise things gruesome is an attempt to conceal crudities of man in the guise of intellectualism. But such an attempt can not be discarded at their face values as they are in part the natural outcome of contradictions of 20th century societies. The rise of working class at the face of persisting knights, priests and princes, rise of the value of liberty and freedom in the midst of the oppressed, colonised and exploited men living in bondages and of the rise of the global centres of powers with enormous access to the means of violence and destruction of man are some of the oddities in which the contemporary man lives. No doubt that in circumstances as it exist today intellectuals are liable to odditis of thought.

What concerns us most is the fact that such type of thought system coincide with the growth of various type of thought system coincide with the growth of various types of arms and ammunition easily accessible to the ordinary man. Combined with the ideology of violence, the spread of the means of violence is once of the most acute problem of various societies

and their political systems. And if societies, as they often do, contain and reflect contradictions in their structures, chances for the ideology of violence and the weapons available to the bearers of such an ideology to succeed sabotaging social order become greater. The substantive status of violence as social data, therefore, belong to the study of social structures of societies. We shall confine our analysis to the situation of Indian society.

The present article is therefore programmatic in nature. It seeks to examine the correspondence between the increasing incidence of organised and unorganised violence and blood shed in the name of symbols, such as caste, community, creed and armed rebellion and revolt against the state with the changing patterns of Indian social structure. We treat violence as a purposive social act negatively resorted to realise certain ends and interests in violation of the existing normative order of the society. It is a purposive social act as it always involves subject-object relationship. The relationship between the Killer and the killed, the violator and the violated, tormentor and the tormented and finally, between the carriers of coercion, force and fraud on the victims, mirror the situation of subject-object relationships. Morbid and abhorring as these social relations may be, they are the surest indicators of the degree of conflicts and built-in tensions of social structure. For it is the social structure in which these tensions are embedded and

from which they emerge and assume forms of relations of violence. Before we elaborate our perspective to the study of violence and its relation with Indian social structure it is advisable to define violence and to attempt at its typification.

II Defining Violence: Violence is one the oldest social data. It is universal and ubiquitous*. Violence is the dramatic force in the corups of myth slegends of people living in various cultures and societies. And indeed, it is the prime raw material with which history of civilization are built. Rise and fall of empires, tribal chiefs and of king and monarchs are the historical records of wars and violence. The acts of the throat slitor, knief wielders, gun-bearing thieves and bandits are acts of violence. All these varieties of people can further be enlarged to include the committed "true believers"; the fanatics, the political rebels, the clever politicians who stage Violent processions and counter processions against the state or the state atrocities on the people. The Unscruplous greedy who adulterates edible materials and the medicines, killing hundred of people only to get few more easy coins and similar other expressions including killings by drugs and the cases of bride burning belong to the category of violence.

* Ruth Benedict concept of Appolian Culture drawn from the data of the Zunis is perhaps the exception. See here, Patterns of Culture

But the question is how to develop a generic definition of violence which can account for the varieties of conducts we listed above. Prof. Rasheedudin Khan's Schematic article on violence begins with a statement that, "Violence is a term that suffers from the Surfeit of meaning".⁷ He critically surveys the definition of violence formulated by various scholars. However, he does not offer his own definition. Johan Galtung⁸ defines violence as, "anything avoidable that impedes human self realization". Galtung attempts to relate and possibly to quantify the concept of self-realization with the concept of basic needs or rights. Allen D. Grimshaw on the other hand defines violence as "Assault upon individual or his property solely or primarily because of his membership in a social category. It may be noted that while Galtung concerned himself in evolving a definition of and paradigm for the study of violence at global scale, Grimshaw's concern is to the study of ethnic riots in the specific American situation. In the context of New Guinea, L.L. Longness defines it as "the use of forcible means to attain goals".¹⁰ Chalmers Johnson

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7. Rasheedudin Khan, 'Violence and Socio-economic Development' in Jean-Marie Domenach et. al. (ed) Violence and its causes. Paris: UNESCO. 1981, p. 167.
 8. Johan Galtung, 'The Specific Contribution of Peace Research to the Study of Violence in Domenach et. al. (ed) ibid, p. 88.
 9. Allen D. Grimshaw, 'Interpreting Collective Violence' in James A. Short Jr. and Marvin E. Wolfgang (ed) Collective Violence. New York: Aldine -Atheton, 1972, p. 38
 10. L.L. Longness, 'Violence in the New Guinea Highland' in Short and Wolfgang (ed) ibid p. 172.

relying essential on Weberian theory of action defines violence as 'actions that deliberately or unintentionally disorient the behaviour of others'.¹¹

The relations between power and violence, between legitimate and illegitimate violence and similar other questions need to be carefully taken into account before we attempt at defining violence. If democratic systems are rule of majority, and if such a majority has power to inflict violence on the minorities in a plural society in the name of legitimate violence, as it happened in the case of Nazi Germany, what would be the criterion of defining violence in light of the fact that legitimacies without morality often amount to atrocity. Keeping in view the complexity of the sense in which the term 'violence' has been used in social science literature, it would be worthwhile to narrow down its meaning to certain set of concrete identifying India-specific features. The process of identification in science involves both, the definition of the phenomenon as well as their classification. Identification of social reality of violence in Indian society begin with, will pre-suppose.

1. The existence of atleast two more individuals or groups this in a conflict-situation. This involves actors of violence and their victims.

11. Chalmers Johnson, Op. Cit. p. 8

These negatively interacting human units in the case of Indian situations may symbolise two are more individuals, castes, communities, ethnic and political groups and groups and the state. Suicide, masochism and self-infliction of wound or injury remain outside the realm of violence as suggested above. But in situation where people are driven to or forced to commit such an acts, those acts will be the part of the sense in which we assign meaning to the term violence in sociology. This should include attack on beliefs & faith of people also.

2. The act of violence assumes its true meaning when an actor or group of actors, including state forcefully inflicts bodily harm such a killing, maiming, torturing or subjecting the body of the victim to degradation against his wish.

Bodily harms may result on account of direct causes such as out of caste and communal riots, ethnic conflicts or on account of war between two societies. These are the cases of direct violence. But violence on people may also be perpetrated by curtailing, abolishing or snatching away of their mean of subsistence or of source of life. Artificial creation of scarcity of essential commodities, poverty and of deliberately curtailing or adulterating the supply of food and medicine, polluting the environment, enacting laws to degrade citizens are some of the examples of indirect

types of violence. Since the meaning of the term violence direct or indirect converge on the body of man therefore, we are in a position to formulate a preliminary working definition of violence. Violence can be defined as socially a negative act used to distract, destroy or deform human life or sources on which human life depends. Sociologically, violence is an act which either abolishes others behaviour or disorients them.

We are deliberately keeping the normative aspects of social acts out of the definition of violence. For killing on the street and hanging in the prison are de-facto acts to destruct and harm the body. Both are acts of violence. What one can do is to separate them into the categories of legitimate and illegitimate violence. But, both are essentially acts of violence: one enacted illegitimately in the street by war the other legitimately in the prison by the state. The question of citizen's act and the acts of the state in relation to violence must be settled in the interest of a just social order.

III Classifying Violence

An attempt to classifying ¹² a complex phenomenon like violence of heterogeneous types must be brought to socio-

12. On typology of violence, see Johan Galtung, op. cit. pp. 85-96 and Rasheedudin Khan, op. cit. p. 168

logically amenable typification. Since most of the expressions of violence are off-shoots of issues which are cultural-specific in nature, therefore, it would be advisable to identify native type of violence for the purposes of empirical studies in the Indian social settings. Foreign categories of violence are suggestive but they are not to be accepted uncritically. We therefore, intend to systematise the data on violence with the help of a scheme consisting of following classificatory points.

These points are:

- (i) Issues, interests, goals and objective for which violence was committed. Issues & interest could be personal, collectives sectarian communal or territorial etc.
- (ii) Who committed the violence? Burning down of huts and home by a caste or by community such as it happen occasionally in the case of caste and communal violences in different parts of India belong to one set of types from the burning of the bride for more dowry. When individual and collectivity participation aspect is linked with the issue and interest (1) aspect of our classifying device, we approach closer to developing a basis of violence typification.
- (iii) Finally, who were the objects of the violence? The answer would lead to a person or to a group of persons having a specific social, political and economic status in the society. It may be the state and its various organs or it may

be a specific caste or class, community or a political body. Pursuing own exercise step by step further, we note that the three classificatory points, we identified above, do help us in separating various expressions of personal violence which are carried out for personal or familial interests from those that are collective in nature. Personal and familial violence are crime. Important as crime data are for social scientist in their study of violence, we exclude them from our analysis, though they will emerge in some form again and again in our discussion.

Excluding personalised violence from our direct attention we are able to get the following broad types of violence in India which we hope, telescope the Indian scene with relative authenticity. These are the types of the various expression of group violence. They are as given below:

1. Agrarian Violence and protest, involving peasants and land lords and peasants and the state.
2. Tribal violence and uprisings, involving the tribal population and rural money lending zamindars and tribals with the state.
3. Sectarian violence involving an ethnic community with a specific type of religious values which the community intends to use as an instrument of bargain for more power.
4. Communal violence involving the Hindus and Muslim population in India.

5. Caste violence, involving various caste groups of Indian social structure to fight for their share in the sources of production and power in society. Atrocities on Harijan belongs to this type of violence.
6. Political violence, in its pure type hardly exist in contemporary India, Military Coups, loss of the legitimacy of the government and revolt of people against it under the banner of opposition parties ought to signify this type of violence. However, we retain this category as politics has tendency to associate itself with other types of violences.
7. Mixed type of violence. It is indicated by such situations as those in which communal, castists, tribal and sectarian issues are politicised. Most of the peasant rebellions in India have had linkage with political parties. Not only that political parties come into being as an agent of particularised ethnic and sectarian social groupings but also try to transform the total ethnic issue into a national problem.

Crude and preliminary as the attempt at typifying violence is in this article, it does help in getting a way to relate the intensity, severity and frequency of violence of a type (as compared to others) to various socio-cultural components of Indian social structure. In 1964, Harry Exkstein summarising the conclusion of a symposium.

On the sociology of internal war and violence argued that most urgent pre-theoretical need in internal war (violence) studies today is the development, even if only tentative, of basic descriptive categories in terms of which the basic features of internal war can be identified, in terms of which their nuance and broader features can be depicted in general structural concepts classes (or types) constructed and resemblances of cases to one another or to types accurately assessed".¹² The following section of this article, therefore, makes an attempt to relate the phenomenon of violence with the component and nature of Indian social structure.

IV. Violence and Indian Social Structure

The concept of social structure refers to the specific pattern of the arrangement of the inter-personal relation of individuals of a society into status and strata grouping of castes, classes, communities and other types of collectivities. The pattern of arrangement of relations endure and persist under a system of commonly cherished and shared symbols of values and norms. These collectively upheld and accepted system of values and norms legitimise

12. Harry Eckstein, Internal War: Problems and Approaches, new work: Free Press of glances, 1964, p.23.

not only the formations of social grouping in a society but they also generate a whole series of sanctions cementing the relative position of one group in relation to the other on a hierarchy of major social values, such as property, power, honour and prestige. Order and endurance is achieved by a society only after it has arranged the groupings on this essentially inequitarian scale of values, granting access to one group to the majority of values and denying the same to the others.

So long as the regulative norms remain effective on people, legitimacies behind them continue being accepted by the members of society, how-so-ever oppressive and violent a social structure could have been they have survived in history as an organised society. But when the legitimacies are in shift, are in the process of change, are being questioned for their relevance, for their partisan role in yielding bounties to one and suppressing the other; even snatching away the right to survive, are blamed at, held responsible for injustice by the deprived groups; a social structure how-so-ever consensual and democratic at the face value it may be, starts suffering from violence and social disorder. Erosion of faith in the legitimacy of the values and norms which nourish the social structure and accord continuance to it, initiate a process which throws people off their social cultural and emotional mooring.¹³ There appears a whirl-wind of

13. See, Henry Bienen, *Violence and Social Change*, Chicago University of Chicago Press, 1968, and Ted Gur, *Why Men Rebel?*

conflicting intrests and loyalties of groups, castes, classes, communities and sects fighting for their own narrow ethnocentric interests and values, and in that process shedding the blood of each other. Civilised, political institutions of democratic and secular methods of sharing of values and interests of the impersonal system of law enforcing agencies and of the system of justice suffer threats against their survival. Erosion of major political values and of the neutrality of beaurocratic apparatus initiate another retrograde process.

National level leadership in such a situation tends to get replaced by local level elites. A broken social structure, whose major values and norms are under question and scrutiny and are thrown in the process of decay and degeneration develops a tendency to breed a whole array of random, atomised and, from a national point of view, disintegrative local ethnocentric and particularised leaders who sit on the ant hill top of their respective caste, community sect and region as if these are their feudalised power island. They capitalise fragmentation of society and bargain for the partisan share in power, often black mailing the national authority of the state.

When the process of the decline of central political leadership and the rise of local ethnocentric elites is examined in relation to the process of social mobility at national and international levels, to the process of

development and economic growth, the situation becomes more complex. It paves a way for the local partisan elites not only to accumulate power and capacity to nationalise their ethnocentric interests and demands but it also help them to further enlarge their demands and interests. Conflicting demands of castes and communities thus become liable to collide. Such collisions are not only nationalised but also inter-nationalised. This tendency is seemed in the context of terrorism operating at national as well as the international levels.

Social structure is, thus the soil which seeds discontents. Tensions and conflicts are generated by its system of arrangement of relations and, by its distributive system of values in society. A developing democratic system with a continuing history like India is more prone to the threats of violence as its traditional and modern values are yet to be systematised in the contemporary setting. Violence being the consequence of the failure of normative rules to hold people together on a set of major cohesive values which are in tune with the developmental and modernizing course of our society is bound to wield more threats of violence in future than is conceivable today. These issues, however, require an indepth study of the nature of social structure at empirical level.

V. Studying Violence in India

This article, as suggested earlier, is programmatic and preliminary in nature. It attempted at evolving a

qualifying definition of violence into types and categories. Our concern in such an exercise is to relate these typologies of violence with the components of Indian social structure. Such an endeavor is possible only when we are able to establish casual linkages between violence as a phenomenon and its various types and the components of Indian social structure. This casual linkage must be examined on the general paradigm of Time, Space and Social Actors. A tentative procedure in this direction would contain following steps.

A. Identification of Base Factors

1. Characterization of Indian social structure in the traditional setting. It involves identification of major ethnic and territorial social groupings such as, tribes, caste, communities, religious groupings etc. and their relationship with each other and with the state of specific period.
2. Placing these groups on the geographical map of India. By doing this, we establish the relationship between man and the space.
3. The specific form of relationship between man and space at this stage of our research procedure should be qualified by the nature, type, extent, intensity and frequency of violence (types) at any given period of time of groups located on the spatial (regional) distributions on the map of the country.

4. Identification of dominant values and norms commonly shared and upheld by men in space and in time.
5. Relating types of violence with the dominant values of men in time and space.

B. Intervening Factors

1. Change in the norms and values brought about by the state, ideologies, education and development among men in space and time or else their absence in time and space.
2. Relative effect of change on groups on the (space) map in time.
3. Decline or rise of violence in general and of a specific type in particular in group in space and time.

If we are able to operationalise these tentative stages of procedure for empirical study and solve the complexities of their conceptual and empirical implications, we could perhaps be able to move out of the pre-theoretical stage of sociology of violence in India. Casual and comparative model of social science research are required to arrive at a theoretic explanation of phenomenon. Such a model, of necessity, includes the variable of time, space and social Actors. An attempt to examine the inter-play between these variables however, involves the need for a macro - all India social science perspective and a condition, that the researcher is trained in inter disciplinary use and handling of national data from Government Reports and from secondary source of information.

These secondary information are to be used in support of primary field data collections. Selection of field can be decided on the basis of a consideration that the nature of field is appropriate for a specific type of information sought for and that the informations sought for are in tune with the basic proposition of such a study. Crude and tentative as these suggestive observations are, they however, call for an urgent study of violence in India - at a national level. Subsidiary, but crucial factors such as the way people acquire arms and explosive; the spread of the knowledge about the means of violence and destruction, such as the use of chemicals, drugs, explosives etc. and the state policies towards suchas the use of chemicals, drugs, explosives etc. and the state policies towards such factors are to be examined in detail.

NATIONAL SEMINAR
ON
COLLECTIVE VIOLENCE: GENESIS AND RESPONSE

THE NON-VIOLENT HINDU: MYTH OR REALITY

BY

PRATAP CHANDRA

Department of Philosophy, Doctor Harisingh Gour
Vishwavidyalaya, Sagar

INDIAN INSTITUTE OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
INDRAPRASTHA ESTATE, RING ROAD, NEW DELHI-110002.

The Non-Violent Hindu: Myth or Reality?

(Pratap Chandra, Department of Philosophy, Doctor Harisingh
Gour Vishwavidyalaya, Sagar)

PHILOSOPHERS ARE SELDOM remembered in the institutes of public administration, particularly if the deliberation is on as mundane a thing as collective violence. Our host himself thought that "The genesis of this phenomenon (of collective violence) may lie in various political, social, economic forces and in the process of development, witnessed by the Indian society in the last four decades." Yet he was generous enough to let me in. So I might as well begin with a justification for my being with you here.

It is not quite clear to me why our social scientists pay to little attention to the normative environment of a social group. It is evident enough that there are wide divergences among different societies as to what is right and what is wrong, what is desirable and what is not and what one ought to do and what one should desist from. Individuals comprising a group imbibe and/or develop these values all their lives, more so perhaps in the first few years. Crowd psychology being what it is, the values cherished by a majority, or even by a particularly vocal and articulate minority, tend to become the collective norms which in their turn constitute the normative environment. Collective responses to emerging situations, in the final analysis, have much to do with these deeply, often unconsciously, ingrained values. Thus, the same kind of situation which brings out the worst in one group may leave another cold or unaffected. Examples from what is going on all over the country can easily be given, though propriety makes

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it inadvisable to do so. It would, however, be no exaggeration to say that the prevailing normative atmosphere is one of the distinguishing marks of a social personality.

Should there not be some curiosity regarding the nature and character of these values, their genesis and how do they affect the reaction-patterns? We can and really do find out empirically how an incident of collective violence took place, who were responsible for it, whom did it affect, what were the underlying socio-economic and political causes for it, etc. But is it any the less important to know how did a group manage to break down the barriers imposed on it by civilisation against violence and what structural factors in its collective personality encouraged it to do so? After all, violence does not come naturally to a civilised individual. There has to be a great deal of inner conflict before a reasonably cultured group goes on rampage. A correct analysis of the objective situation requires some understanding of this inner conflict. So does the formulation of a strategy.

Since even a bulky volume may not suffice for an analysis of the normative environment of our plural society, I wish to content myself with some observations about the majority community. Its philosophy and religion are somewhat better known to me than those of other communities, and I have the added advantage of participant observation too. My intentions are purely clinical. Though some of my submissions may sound unpleasant, I must vouchsafe my deep pride in my heritage.

It may perhaps be appropriate to begin with what can only be described as the stereo-typed, cliché-ridden image of the Hindu, if indeed such a being could be conjured up. For, the

normative environment as well as pet generalisations pertaining to the majority community are closely allied with this image. Indeed one could say that some of the more pernicious features of the current socio-political situation could perhaps be obviated if greater attention was paid to the objective reality than to the stereotyped image.

For a range of historico-psychological reasons the kind of self-awareness that comes naturally to the Western societies took its own time to develop in India, and when it did develop, it was in the midst of fairly adverse circumstances. To put it more accurately, it did not really develop, it had to be developed as a weapon in the armoury to fight for our national self-identity. Irony of the situation lies in the fact that some of the cultural imperialists also contributed to its growth and, unable to read their real motives, our ancestors co-operated with them!

India's contacts with aliens date back to pre-Christian era. The differences became well-understood when the Arab travellers started coming to India and recording their experiences. Yet, the first really penetrating observations, mostly negative, about the "natives" one comes across only in the personal narratives published by the British visitors/settlers from the end of the eighteenth century onwards. Was it because cultural imperialism is a recent and perhaps Western phenomenon, as is the 'doctrine' of white man's burden? The invaders of medieval times had come to make India their home, not to colonise it. A perusal of those early Western accounts leaves one in no doubt that a feeling of guilt, a bad conscience, hung heavily on them. They had come to exploit and, sensitive individuals as they were, they clearly saw their position as morally indefensible. This probably obliged them to invent good reasons to be in India, the

burden-theory being the best of them. This in my view is in the root of cultural imperialism. The Judgments on the Hindu and character formed part of a grand design and should be seen as such if we wish to understand the origins of the stereo-typed image.

In this connection, it would be interesting to see how the Western assessments of Indian thought underwent a sea-change over a few decades in the last century. The first account of Indian philosophy to be published in Europe was the one by T H Colebrook. Hegel read it in 1823 and formed his opinion about us on its basis. To him, Indians were by inclination naturalistic and earthy. Nowhere in his extensive studies of world history is India treated as a land of spirituality. Barth's History of Indian Religions (1861) and Richard Garbe's Philosophy of Ancient India (1897) largely follow Hegel and Colebrook. However, spiritualisation of entire Indian thought also started towards the end of the last century, led apparently by Max Mueller, Monier-Williams and Paul Deussen. This was done by first deliberately neglecting the essentially plural character of India's tradition of ideas and replacing it with a monolithic model. Then since Samkara's Mayavada served best to show that some thinkers were otherworldly, it was elevated to the Indian thought ! How pervasive was the reach of this misrepresentation can be illustrated by the way some modern and otherwise highly knowledgeable writers speak about India. Thus, historian Toynbee calls Samkara 'the father of Hindu philosophy' at one place and 'the founder of Hindu theology' at another.¹ Theologian Paul Tillich wishes us to believe that every Indian regards this world as illusory.² Psychologist Carl Jung tells us, "For us the essence of that which works is the world of appearance, for the Indian it is the soul. The world

for him is a mere show or shadow, and his reality comes close to what we would call a dream."³ The list can be very long if one has patience.

The pity of it is that our own historians of ideas, beginning with Radhakrishnan, instead of exposing this unhistorical myth and refusing to treat our heritage as a monolith, furthered it and in the process lent it a kind of credibility it lacked earlier. A whole array of luminaries -- Ranade, Raju, Mahadevan, et al -- stressed it repeatedly that the Advaita Vedanta was the essence of Indian thought. The underlying attitude may be summed up in a passage from a speech delivered by Paul Deussen in Bombay in 1893, "In India the influence of this perverted and pervasive spirit of the age (i.e., Empiricism, Realism and Materialism) has not yet overthrown in religion and philosophy the good traditions of great ancient times. ... the Vedanta is now as in the ancient time, living in the mind and heart of every thoughtful Hindoo."⁴ He considered this "a great consolation" for "poor India in so many misfortunes", for, "the eternal interests are higher than the contemporary ones."

The purpose behind this somewhat longish discussion of the Western generalisations about our tradition of philosophy and religion was really to go to the roots of the stereo-typed image. This is the way the Hindu came to be painted in spiritualistic, otherworldly colours. His being non-violent followed from it. Since this greatly helped us in not only raising ourselves in our own estimation but also in a way explained away our political subjugation and material backwardness, it soon caught the imagination of educated Indians at the turn of century.

It is difficult to be definite about Mahatma Gandhi's role in the furthering of the non-violent image of the Hindu. He

was undoubtedly genuinely spiritualistic and non-violent himself, but one wonders whether he regarded every Hindu as naturally non-violent. Had he done so, he could hardly have endlessly reiterated the need and value of non-violence. Moreover, his reaction to the happenings at Chauri-Chaura distinctly gives the impression of a heart-rending lament at a relapse, as if he was hoping to make every Indian non-violent and the incident shattered his dreams. Lastly, and this is very important, one cannot be sure whether he regarded non-violence as good strategy to fight an infinitely superior military power which was equally morally sensitive, or he held it to be a high moral principle per se. At least some of his post-Independence observations seem to bear out the former. The fact remains, however, that he did not create this image, though his being treated as the most representative Hindu did strengthen it.

One adequately familiar with the Indian philosophico-religious tradition is likely to quarrel with the Western generalisations about it on three counts. First, he would respect its remarkably pluralistic character and consequently would rule out of court all talk about the Hindu, the mainstream and the established point of view. Secondly, he would desist from attaching undue importance to the spiritualistic-absolutistic currents and doctrines. He would treat these as forming part of a multilinear tradition, important in themselves but by no means over-whelmingly so. Thirdly, he would also notice that the same kind of plurality obtains in the normative environment. There is no one set of finally fixed norms to which every Hindu subscribes today or ever did so in the past. There are wide disparities even among the teachings of different smritis which are supposed to lay down the social norms and form the basis of the Hindu personal law. He would in fact realise that what

is called for sake of convenience the Hindu tradition or even the ancient Indian tradition is really a conglomeration of a number of different traditions. Some of these accord high importance to non-violence, others do not. As far as I can see, there is no way of ascertaining who constitute the majority.

Every incident has traditionally been viewed as a three-tier affair in India. There is remarkable unanimity on this point. The actual or physical incident, 'karma' aspect, is necessarily preceded by the manasa and vaca aspect, i.e., by the mental preparation and articulation. All the norms have consequently been supposed to have these three aspects. A moral judgment, according to all the more-developed school, can be passed only on the basis of all three. In other words, physical incident by itself is neutral. It becomes good or bad when it is preceded by good or bad intentions and their vocal justifications. Thus, non-violence as well as violence can also be of these three types -- mental, verbal and physical. All types of malevolence, ill-will, hatred, covetousness and envy have been expressly classed among instances of mental violence. Every seeker after truth, peace and perfection must first restructure his mind so as to leave these out since it is clearly realised that the springs of verbal and physical acts are in the mind. One does not always get the opportunity to abuse or beat his enemy, but this does not prevent him from harbouring ill-will and waiting for the opportunity. The scale on which this aspect has been treated by every practical philosophy and religion -- the Upanisads, Buddhism, Jinism, Jinism, Vedanta schools, Vaisnava schools and others -- seems to indicate its pervasive character. But then, these are known human failings. The reason to expend so many words on them here is only to emphasise that human beings in this sub-continent have been like human beings anywhere else, and it was time to rise above the platitudes inspired by historical needs of a by-gone era.

If we go by the objective evidence, it appears only two religio-philosophical currents -- the Jaina and the Vaisnava -- have really cared for ahimsa and made it a basic tenet. The Vedic ritualism set a great store by animal sacrifice, as did and do the Saiva and the Sakta. The position of Buddhism is somewhat ambivalent. While non-violence has been included among the panca-sila, the Buddha never forbade his followers from eating meat. The only condition was that the animal should not be killed specifically for the sake of a bhikkhu. Buddhists all over north Asia have been non-vegetarians. Large-scale animal sacrifice takes place in Kashmir, Nepal, Bengal, North-East, Bihar and Uttar Pradesh, particularly on occasions earmarked for this purpose. Of course this is not what we mean by 'collective violence'. But it generates that mentality, that disregard for life, that is the necessary first step in all kinds of violence. Those who care for non-violence as a supreme virtue do their utmost to avoid inflicting any kind of mental, verbal or physical injury on any living creature. Violence or at least disregard for life, thus, appears to be integral to the normative environment of a wide segment of the Hindu society.

Another feature of the current Hindu, and perhaps Indian, reaction-pattern may also have something to do with our tradition of ideas. One suspects that an average Hindu is perhaps more prone to believing rumours and is also more emotionally inclined than his Western or Chinese counter-part. Of course only an extensive survey can prove or disprove this assessment, but the impression is wide-spread. Both these elements have their roles in most cases of collective violence. Rumour-mongers -- and they are legion on any given date -- become active like honeybee the moment anything happens which can be sensationalised. In addition to this love for sensation, being the first to bring a news pampers self-importance, another common failing. Most people

react uncritically as well as emotionally in these circumstances. Thus, few if any demand to know the source of information. We probably succumb to a kind of fear-psychosis and a siege-mentality rather easily. Innumerable reports on riots and clashes will bear this out. One hardly needs to add that any worthwhile strategy to counter collective violence must take this in account and find ways to minimise it. Rooting it out may, of course, not be easy.

One wonders why sabda-pramana acquired a decisive prestige so early in our cultural history. Besides reason and experience, authority was accepted as a way of knowing. Almost all the schools and sects attach enormous importance to the utterances of those regarded as more-than-human in some way. Only the original Buddhism appears to stick to personal experience and conviction, but later Buddhism has no use for these. Religions, revealed or otherwise, have to be based on authority in the final analysis. But philosophy as well as life is under no compulsion to do so. There were many in the earliest phase of our cultural history who demanded evidence for the existence of gods like Indra.⁵ The Sankhya took pride in being a philosophy based on experience and not authority. However, situation completely changed sometime before the advent of medieval times. Indians gradually lost their capacity to ask questions. With this the glorious tradition of science also declined. In some measure this situation has not changed ever since. Nonetheless, since history tells us that we were highly rational and inquisitive at some stage of our development, we can hope to bring back that tradition. If the efforts under way to inculcate a scientific temper succeed some day, this situation is bound to change.

Whatever strategies are planned to counter collective violence must take the foregoing into account. We must realise that though on the karmana-level we may be a little less prone to violence than some others, this is not so on the manasa-level. We have an uncanny ability to keep quiet in the face of what we consider injustice and settle the accounts the moment an opportunity comes our way. To take just one example, the range and depth of resentment against the policy of reservations could be gauged only after the virulent anti-Dalit riots in Maharashtra at the time of re-naming the Marathwada University and in Gujarat afterwards. I do not recollect any worthwhile debate for or against the policy. The seething resentment at the manasa-level skipped the vaca-stage and manifested itself only on the karmana-level. If effective steps are to be taken against such eventualities, the intelligence net-work must learn how to feel the pulse of the people. Collective violence can and must be stemmed at the manasa-level. If timely action is not taken at that stage, the instigators or planners of violence themselves will not be able to anticipate the future events. We must disabuse ourselves of this myth of the non-violent Hindu and plan our strategies more realistically.

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MULTIPLE CAUSATION OF COLLECTIVE VIOLENCE:
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C.D. TRIPATHI

INDIAN INSTITUTE OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
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FEB. 12 - 14, 1986

FOR LIMITED
CIRCULATION

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A SKETCH OF THE NELLIE TRAGEDY

by C. D. TRIPATHI

We have grown accustomed to giving labels to episodes of collective violence on the basis of a single cause or factor - communal, agrarian, caste-based, election violence, etc. To my mind, such labels are mostly misleading because aetiology of collective violence is not so simple or straightforward. Eruption of collective violence almost invariably takes place on account of a multiplicity of causes. Sometimes it may be possible to establish a hierarchy of such causes but quite often even that is not possible. What happened at more than a dozen places in Assam during the elections in Feb., 1983 in the course of just two weeks amply illustrates this point. In this short paper I propose to discuss the concept through a very brief study of the violence that took place in the Nellie area of Nagaon district on 18th Feb., 1983. I have selected this episode because the Nellie Tragedy was perhaps the most severe in the history of collective violence in independent India.

The Socio-Political Background

First, a brief summary of the back-ground -

An agitation on the "Foreign nationals issue" was launched in the State of Assam towards the middle of 1979. Quite a lot has

been written and discussed about the real nature of the agitation but that is not relevant for our purpose. The only point relevant for us is that during this agitation which seemed to defy any solution, very strong forces creating sharp divisions amongst various sections of people living in Assam were unleashed. By the beginning of 1983 the relations between various communities and social cohesion in the State appeared to have reached the breaking point. In this situation the search for a political solution was a most unenviable task. However, in Jan. '83 the search for such a solution coupled with Constitutional compulsions resulted in announcement of elections to be held on Feb. '14, 17 & 20, 1983. The elections were opposed and boycotted by the agitators on the ground that no proper elections could be held unless the revision of electoral rolls was done, alleging that the rolls contained the names of a large number of foreign nationals. Government and the Election Commission were determined to go ahead with the elections and face its administrative and security implications. The elections that followed were most unusual by any standards and during the first three weeks of February violent incidents took place all over the Brahmaputra Valley in the plains of Assam, resulting in large scale killings and arson. The violence at Nellie and ten surrounding villages over an area of approximately 80 Sq. Kms. was the most serious one. In this paper we are not concerned with the wisdom or otherwise of holding the elections,

nor with the state of preparedness and attitudes of the law-enforcing authorities. We shall concentrate only on bare facts necessary to understand the causes of the tragedy.

The first and foremost fact to be taken note of is the population composition in the area under reference. The original inhabitants of these areas are a tribe called the Lalungs, who are related to the extensive Bodo tribal group. The total population of Lalungs is not more than ninety thousand. Traditionally, the Lalungs looked upon all the lands in and around their villages to be their own regardless of the fact whether these lands were settled with them or not or whether they physically possessed these lands or not. From the turn of the century, Muslim landless peasants from the over-populated East Bengal starting migrating to various regions in Assam including the area under reference. These hardy immigrants proved to be excellent cultivators and gradually reclaimed large tracts of lands, brought these under cultivation and became reasonably prosperous, though by no means rich, even by rural standards. Like many areas in Assam where the Muslim immigrants settled down, in the Nellie area also they were disliked by the old inhabitants. Religious and cultural differences accentuated the dislike. Their prosperity - though acquired solely by their toil - also created envy. Above all the Lalungs looked upon these immigrants as usurpers. In the post-independence era some Hindu Bengali refugees also settled in small

numbers at and around Nellie. They were also never accepted by the local Lalungs.

The Events

The foreign nationals' issue for the Lalungs was thus not a political one and whatever support they extended to the agitation it was based entirely on their experience of economic and cultural - effects of the immigrants' occupation of the lands that they regarded as their own. Very little is really known about how the violence in the Nellie area was organised, who were organisers, and even what actually happened. We do not know if the Government made a complete analysis of the Nellie tragedy. In any case, it is unfortunate that full and authentic facts are not available to the public and we have to essentially rely on the reports of a few journalists.

We, however, do know that while the Lalungs supported the agitators in so far as boycott of the elections was concerned, the immigrant muslims were pro-elections. This created an immediate rift between the two communities and there were some minor incidents between the two communities which proved to be provocative.

In the first and second week of February a number of clashes between various communities took place in many parts of Assam and a large number of lives were lost. The Government machinery was fully occupied with the preparations for and holding of elections. The public order environment, therefore, was not conducive to proper

maintenance of law and order which, according to popular impression, was receiving a rather low priority. It was in this atmosphere that the Lalungs of nearby villages decided to attack the immigrant villages. This was preceded by some incidents of violence between the two communities but when and by whom the planning of the attacks was initiated is not known. There is, however, evidence to show that the tribals had started gathering at least four days prior to the attacks. The actual attack by about ten thousand tribals took place in the morning of February 18, 1983 and continued for just five or six hours. The sole object of the attackers was to kill which they fulfilled in the most brutal manner. They used spears, swords, knives and daos although in a few cases fire-arms were also used. Some non-Lalungs - both tribals and non-tribals - also reportedly joined them. The terrified villagers, including a very large number of women and children started running away in the western and northern directions, i.e. opposite to the direction of attacks. The northern and western sides of this area are bound by the river Kopili. Fleeing villagers were surprised by groups of Lalungs tribals at the river bank and many of them were butchered there. By the afternoon, it was all over. We do not know the figures of casualties. The figure given by the government is reported to be 1,383 dead, although many claimed it to be between 2,000 to 2500. The figure would certainly be higher than those given by the Government in the first instance, because for weeks after the incidents dead bodies continued to be discovered in paddy

fields and river banks not only in the Nellie area but in many other places in Assam.

Whatever the actual figure of casualties, there can be no two opinions about the severity of violence. The de-humanisation of an entire people was complete. The photographs of ^{the} large number of children butchered by the attackers, which were flashed all over the civilised world, bear ample testimony to the merciless nature of violence. The other salient points to note are the swiftness and severity of attack and the strategy adopted by the attackers. The first one could be attributed to the traditional war methods of the tribals. In fact, the history of Assam is full of incidents of very swift surprise attacks by tribals on British garrisons during the 19th and early 20th centuries. But the other aspect, namely, the strategic positioning of the attackers to block the escape routes and use of fire-arms implies organisation and guidance by experts trained in such methods. We know practically nothing about who were behind this organisation.

An Analysis of the Causes

Having briefly sketched the events, let us try to analyse this single biggest incident of violence since the partition of India. The carnage at Nellie raises many pertinent questions regarding the state of intelligence, adequacy or otherwise of the available police forces and their deployment and, above all, whether the carnage could have been prevented. By passing all such questions as not being germane to the analysis at hand, I would like to take note of the following four points:

(i) As noted earlier, there was perpetual hostility between the Lalungs and the immigrants on accounts of the occupation of lands of Lalungs by the latter. If these lands had not been occupied by immigrant Muslims but by some other groups belonging to the same religion as the Lalungs' there would still have been bitterness and hostility. But would there have been a violence of such magnitude? The answer is perhaps 'No'.

(ii) On the issue of elections the Lalungs and immigrant Muslims/were opposed to each other. The opposition of Lalungs, as noted earlier was itself essentially based on the land factor. Would the opposite stands taken on the issue of elections have resulted in large scale violence? The answer again is clearly 'No'.

(iii) It was well-known that the holding of the elections being the top-most priority for the Government the machinery for enforcement of law and order was primarily busy in that connection. In fact, the police forces were already over-stretched. It was also known that in accordance with the directions of the Election Commission of India Army was not likely to be called out in the aid of civil power during the elections. In such a situation organisers of violence - whoever they might have been - felt convinced that there were serious gaps in the maintenance of law and order and if an attack was carried out swiftly their objective would be met before any intervention by the authorities.

(iv) A fact, which is not at all well-known is that the Lalungs have been very staunch Hindus for the last hundred years or so. In their own way quite often they would exhibit an attachment to their faith which is much stronger than even that of high caste Hindus. This strong faith coupled with tribal ruggedness gave a communal touch and barbarity of the worst type to the whole episode

With these observations it may now be possible to sum up the factors responsible for violence at Nellie as follows:

(a) There was a feeling of hatred towards the immigrant Muslims amongst the attacking Lalungs because of a sense of deprivation.

(b) These feelings were fomented during the four years of agitation, the main target of which were immigrant Muslims.

(c) The announcement of elections placed the two communities in violently opposite camps and proved to be the immediate cause of the explosive situation.

(d) The elections also provided the timing and opportunity for attacks; and finally

(e) There was an organisation to plan, guide and execute the attacks.

It is clear that the violence at Nellie cannot be labelled as communal violence. It cannot be labelled as a land-based violence. It will be even more wrong to describe it as an

election violence. The "total violence" at Nellie included elements of all these.

Multiple Causation of Collective Violence and Remedies

While model building is quite often an unrealistic exercise, it is, nevertheless, useful to understand the basic nature of things. No model can be of universal validity. However, if Nellie is an indicator of aetiology of violence, it suggests that a situation of large scale collective violence develops when the following factors are present:

- (i) Long standing hostility and friction between the two groups of people;
- (ii) deterioration of public order environment;
- (iii) heightened activities of organised groups fomenting violence helped by unsatisfactory public order environment; and
- (iv) immediate precipitating factors and the opportune moment.

Quite often it is the last one which catches the eye and gets the highest importance in the public mind resulting in giving a single label to episodes of collective violence. At least the administrators and the social scientists should be informed and cautious enough not to commit such mistake.

Before concluding this sketchy paper, one may venture to draw a framework for preventing collective violence by identifying the roles for various concerned agencies with reference to the

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factors enumerated above. I would suggest as follows:-

(i) The first factor can be removed by political will and social action.

(ii) The second factor can be removed by political will and administrative vigilance.

(iii) The third factor can be curbed by political will and administrative action.

(iv) The fourth factor can be avoided by administrative vigilance and action which in turn can be ensured only by political will.

I need not perhaps point out that political will is the common denominator in all the four remedial measures.



